Smith v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 21, 2025

S25A1131. SMITH v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Victor Allen Smith was convicted of felony murder,

driving under the influence, and other crimes after he struck and

killed Hugo Nathaniel Martinez during a high-speed attempt to

evade a Georgia State Patrol trooper.1 In his only enumeration of

1 The collision occurred on March 6, 2022. On June 1, 2022, a Gwinnett
County grand jury indicted Smith for felony murder predicated on fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer (Count 1), homicide by vehicle in the first
degree (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), fleeing or attempting to elude
a police officer (Count 4), driving under the influence (less safe) (alcohol)
(Count 5), driving while license suspended (Count 6), speeding (Count 7),
failure to maintain lane (Count 8), and reckless driving (Count 9). Counts 3,
6, and 7 were dismissed before trial. Smith was tried by a jury from March 20
to 22, 2023. The jury found Smith guilty on all counts. Smith was sentenced
to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, and 12
months in prison on Counts 5, 8, and 9, respectively, to run concurrently to
Count 1. The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law.
On April 18, 2023, Smith timely filed a motion for new trial, which he later
amended on January 22, 2025. On April 9, 2025, the trial court entered an
order denying the motion. Smith then filed a timely notice of appeal on May
6, 2025, and the case was docketed to the August 2025 term of this Court and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
error, Smith contends on appeal that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting evidence that his driver’s license was

suspended at the time of the crash. For the reasons explained below,

we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at Smith’s trial showed the

following. At around 8:00 p.m. on March 6, 2022, Georgia State

Patrol Trooper Demarcus Thomas was conducting traffic-

enforcement operations on an interstate in Gwinnett County.

Trooper Thomas observed Smith, who was driving a silver sports

car, “making improper lane changes” and “traveling well over 80

miles per hour,” despite the posted speed limit being 70 miles per

hour. When Trooper Thomas attempted to initiate a traffic stop,

Smith did not pull over and instead sped away. While pursuing

Smith, Trooper Thomas “glance[d]” at his speedometer and noticed

that it registered 117 miles per hour. He estimated that Smith was

driving “over 120” miles per hour.2 Eventually, Smith’s car veered

2 The high-speed pursuit was captured on dashcam video, which was

shown to the jury during Trooper Thomas’s testimony.
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toward the right-hand shoulder of the interstate, where a towing

operation was in progress.

Martinez was standing on the right-hand shoulder of the

interstate waiting to have his pickup truck towed. The tow-truck

driver testified that he positioned the loading vehicle in front of

Martinez’s truck, lowered the flatbed, attached the hook, and

started loading the truck onto the flatbed. The driver planned to

“take [Martinez] to a gas station that was nearby,” and told

Martinez to get into the tow-truck. Then, the driver looked up and

saw “headlights that were coming directly towards” him and

Martinez. Smith’s car struck Martinez and threw his body over the

retaining wall onto a road that parallels the interstate. The medical

examiner later testified that Martinez died from blunt-force injuries,

including a fracture at the base of his skull that tore his brain stem.

The tow-truck driver jumped over the retaining wall before the

collision and was unharmed.

When Trooper Thomas arrived at the scene, he saw Martinez

“laying down” “with a lot of blood” around him. Trooper Thomas

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immediately called the Specialized Collision Reconstruction Team

(SCRT), which was standard practice for fatal car crashes. Trooper

Thomas then approached Smith’s car, where he found Smith

exhibiting signs of severe intoxication: “slow[ness] … to respond,”

“watery, bloodshot” eyes, and “the smell of alcohol emitting from his

person.” Trooper Thomas asked to see Smith’s driver’s license,

which Smith initially said was in his wallet. Smith then accused

Trooper Thomas of taking his wallet, which Trooper Thomas took as

“a cue of impairment.”3 Smith was transported to the hospital for

treatment before later being taken into custody.

Trooper Emily Beaulieu of the SCRT arrived at the scene and

took photographs of the crash site — one depicting the final resting

place of the vehicles, with Smith’s car hanging partially off the

flatbed and wedged under the crushed tailgate of Martinez’s truck,

and another showing Martinez’s hat and cell phone resting on the

end of the flatbed. Trooper Beaulieu testified that Martinez’s body

3 This exchange was also captured on dashcam video and played for the

jury.
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was found “a little over 54 feet” from the hat and cell phone. During

Trooper Beaulieu’s testimony, the State introduced a certified copy

of Smith’s driving record from the Virginia Department of Motor

Vehicles and asked her to “read the driver’s license status.” Over

Smith’s objection, Trooper Beaulieu testified that Smith’s driver’s

license had been suspended since March 2004. 4

A search warrant was acquired to obtain blood samples that

were drawn from Smith while he was treated at the hospital. A

toxicology test revealed that, at the time of the blood draw, Smith

had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.188, which a toxicologist

testified was a concentration sufficient to impair an average person’s

vision, psychomotor functions, and reaction time.

2. Smith contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting evidence of his suspended driver’s license. He claims this

evidence was irrelevant, see OCGA § 24-4-402 (Rule 402), and that

it was unfairly prejudicial and resulted in a needless presentation of

4 Smith’s wife testified that neither she nor Smith ever received notice

that his license was suspended.
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cumulative evidence against him, see OCGA § 24-4-403 (Rule 403).5

“We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under an abuse of

discretion standard of review.” Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 478

(2017) (citation omitted). “And even where an abuse of discretion is

shown, there are no grounds for reversal if the error did not affect a

‘substantial right,’ and thus harm, the defendant.” Venturino v.

State, 306 Ga. 391, 393 (2019) (citing OCGA § 24-1-103(a)). Where,

as here, the alleged error is non-constitutional, we examine

“whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to

the verdict by reviewing the record de novo and weighing the

evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so.”

Pounds v. State, 320 Ga. 288, 294 (2024) (cleaned up). See also Troy

v. State, 312 Ga. 860, 862 (2021) (applying the non-constitutional

error standard in reviewing a Rule 403 challenge). As explained

5 “All relevant evidence shall be admissible, except as limited by
constitutional requirements or as otherwise provided by law or by other rules.
… Evidence which is not relevant shall not be admissible.” OCGA § 24-4-402.
“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403.
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below, we conclude that any error in the admission of evidence of

Smith’s suspended driver’s license was harmless.

(a) Before trial, Smith filed a general and special demurrer to

Count 6 of the indictment (driving while license suspended), arguing

that because the State failed to allege that Smith received notice

that his license was suspended, this count should be dismissed. See

State v. Orr, 246 Ga. 644, 644 (1980) (“[A]bsent proof by the State of

actual or legal notice to the defendant a conviction for the offense of

driving while one’s license is suspended cannot be sustained.”). He

also filed a motion in limine, which sought to preclude the State

“from discussing on cross examination or mentioning” that he “was

driving with a suspended license.” Although the State ultimately

moved to dismiss Count 6, and the trial court did so, the State

opposed Smith’s motion to exclude evidence of Smith’s suspended

license, arguing that it was relevant to explain Smith’s motive in

fleeing from law enforcement; that it was intrinsic and necessary to

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complete the story of the other charged crimes; 6 and that its

probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of

unfair prejudice. See Rule 403. The trial court agreed with the State

and denied Smith’s motion in limine. As discussed above, Trooper

Beaulieu testified at trial that Smith’s license had been suspended

since 2004.

(b) Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting evidence of Smith’s suspended license, we

conclude that any error in admitting this evidence was harmless.

The State presented compelling evidence that Smith

committed felony murder, see OCGA § 16-5-1(c), when he struck and

killed Martinez while attempting to elude a Georgia State Patrol

trooper in violation of OCGA § 40-6-395(b)(5)(A);7 that he was under

6 “Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an
uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions
as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3)
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.”
Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 89 (2022) (citation omitted).

7 At the time of the collision and Smith’s indictment, OCGA § 40-6-
395(b)(5)(A) made it a felony to flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police officer
under certain conditions, including if the fleeing vehicle travelled over “20

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the influence such that it was less safe for him to drive, see OCGA §

40-6-391(a)(1); that he improperly changed lanes, see OCGA § 40-6-

48; and that he was driving recklessly, see OCGA § 40-6-390.

Specifically, Trooper Thomas testified that, after he initiated a

traffic stop, Smith attempted to flee and accelerated his vehicle to

approximately 120 miles per hour, 50 miles per hour over the posted

speed limit. The jury also saw dashcam video of Trooper Thomas’s

pursuit of Smith, which showed Smith driving erratically and at a

high speed. The State introduced post-crash photographs and a

scaled diagram, all of which showed that the force with which

Smith’s vehicle collided with Martinez caused his body to land more

than 50 feet from the crash site. According to a medical examiner,

the collision caused severe blunt-force injuries that resulted in

Martinez’s death. Additionally, the State’s toxicology expert

testified that, around the time of the collision, Smith’s blood alcohol

concentration was 0.188, which the toxicologist testified would

miles an hour above the posted speed limit,” struck or collided “with another
vehicle or pedestrian,” or fled in “traffic conditions which place[d] the general
public at risk of receiving serious injuries.”
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impair an average person’s vision, psychomotor functions, and

reaction time.

By contrast, the evidence of Smith’s suspended license “played

a minor role in … the State’s case.” Morgan v. State, 307 Ga. 889,

898 (2020). The only evidence of the suspension that the State

introduced was a record from the Virginia Department of Motor

Vehicles that showed Smith’s driver’s license was suspended in

2004, which Trooper Beaulieu read during her testimony. The State

did not mention the suspension during its opening statement,

closing argument, or at any point during trial other than during

Trooper Beaulieu’s testimony. Cf. Baker v. State, 318 Ga. 431, 448–

49 (2024) (erroneous admission under Rule 403 of an excerpt of

defendant’s rap video was harmful where, among other reasons, the

State “made it a focal point of the trial” and “emphasized” it “during

[its] closing argument” with “a pointed argument”). And Smith’s

wife testified that Smith never received notice, and thus did not

know at the time of the crash, that his license was suspended, which

undermined the State’s desired inference that Smith fled from

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Trooper Thomas because of his suspended license. Given the strong

evidence of Smith’s guilt and the State’s minimal use of the

suspension record at trial, it is highly probable that any error in

admitting this evidence did not contribute to the verdicts and

therefore was harmless. See Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 105–06

(2016) (concluding that it was highly probable that the trial court’s

admission of evidence in violation of Rule 403 did not contribute to

the verdicts, and therefore was not reversible error, because the

evidence that the appellant “committed the crimes for which he was

convicted was strong”).

Because any error in admitting evidence of Smith’s suspended

license was harmless, his sole enumeration fails. We therefore

affirm.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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