CourtListener 10680335

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 14, 2024

S24A0014. ISAAC v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Appellant Kenneth Maurice Isaac was convicted of malice

murder, among other crimes, for the shooting death of Reginald

Roberts.1 On appeal, Isaac claims that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by refusing to allow him to testify in his own

1 Roberts was shot and killed on the night of April 19, 2014. On August

30, 2016, Isaac was indicted on five counts in relation to the shooting: (1) malice
murder; (2) felony murder predicated on aggravated assault; (3) aggravated
assault; (4) possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and (5)
violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act. A jury trial took
place October 3-7, and October 11, 2016, and the jury found Isaac guilty of all
counts. On October 20, 2016, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with
the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), five years in prison
consecutive to Count 1 for the possession offense (Count 4), and ten years
consecutive to Count 4 for the street gang offense (Count 5). The felony murder
count (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault
count (Count 3) merged into malice murder. On October 26, 2016, Isaac filed a
motion for new trial, which he amended on September 26, 2022. The trial court
held a hearing on that motion on October 4, 2022, and denied it by order dated
November 1, 2022. On November 28, 2022, Isaac timely filed a notice of appeal,
which he amended on November 29 and again on June 14, 2023. This case was
docketed to the term of court beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
defense and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the

jury on impeachment of a witness through bias toward a party. For

the reasons that follow, his claims fail, so we affirm.

1. The evidence at trial showed the following. On April 20,

2014, Roberts was found dead, nude from the waist down, in a

wooded area connecting two apartment complexes, Kensington

Manor and Southern Pines.

The previous day, April 19, Roberts and two others stole

vehicles from an airport, including a newer-model, black Ford

Mustang. According to his girlfriend Keneisha Williams, Roberts

returned home that afternoon, and then left in the evening to

exchange a silver gun in his possession for a black gun. Williams

testified that in the days leading up to that evening, Roberts had

tried to exchange his silver gun by meeting with “someone named

Chad.” Williams did not know who “Chad” was, but recounted from

her conversations with Roberts that “Chad” lived with his aunt, and

that before April 19, Roberts had gone to the aunt’s apartment to

find “Chad” but did not find him there. After Roberts left on the

2
evening of April 19, Williams did not see him again.

That evening, Kenyatte Stephenson, a resident of Kensington

Manor, saw Roberts near her apartment talking with a man for

about twenty minutes and appearing “mad.” In the days prior to

April 19, Roberts had called Stephenson a number of times looking

for Isaac. The same evening, Stephenson also saw Isaac, whom she

had known for a year by then, at her apartment. Isaac had a black

gun that evening, and he left between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. to go to his

aunt’s house in Southern Pines. Stephenson heard two gun shots

that night, though she did not know what time she heard the shots.

The same night, Tiffany Farley, a resident of Southern Pines

who had known Isaac for years, went with Isaac’s girlfriend to a local

bar. According to Farley, at about 11:30 p.m. or midnight, she saw

Isaac at the bar, and he told her: “I got a body, and he is naked from

the waist down in the cut” and “[y]ou will see, just wait until in the

morning.” At trial, Farley described the “cut” as an area that people

traversed to go between Kensington Manor and Southern Pines.

The next day, April 20, Isaac attended a cookout with family

3
and friends, including his cousin Sequoia Isaac2 and her brother

Kenyara Bolton. According to Sequoia, Isaac told her at the cookout

that he had shot Roberts twice in the head. Sequoia also saw Isaac

“near” and “go into” a newer-model black Mustang. Bolton also saw

Isaac standing next to a newer “black or gray” Mustang.

That same day, Quantavious Hurt, a teenager who often

visited Kensington Manor and Southern Pines, discovered Roberts’s

body, buttocks exposed, in the “cut” between the two apartment

complexes, and notified police. Hurt testified that in the days

leading up to the discovery, Roberts had come to the apartments

looking for Isaac and thought Isaac had his gun; Roberts went to

Isaac’s aunt’s home and asked her about the gun. About three or four

days after he found Roberts dead, Hurt also saw Isaac in a “purplish

blackish” Mustang.

After Hurt notified police, law enforcement responded to the

crime scene. Richard Bowen, a forensic death investigator, found a

2 Since Sequoia and Isaac have the same surname, we refer to Sequoia

by only her first name.
4
gunshot wound in Roberts’s neck. Based in part on the undisturbed

dirt near Roberts’s body, Bowen concluded that Roberts was nude

from the waist down when he was shot and that right after getting

shot, he fell where he was later found. Dr. Gerald Thomas Gowitt,

the medical examiner who performed an autopsy on Roberts, also

noted the gunshot wound on the right side of his neck, and concluded

that the bullet path was “right to left, front to back, and slightly

downward” and that whoever had shot Roberts “couldn’t have been

behind him.”

On May 4, 2014, law enforcement found the black Ford

Mustang that Roberts had stolen. None of the latent prints they

found on the car matched Isaac’s fingerprints, but Dr. Torry

Passmore, the expert in fingerprint examination and analysis who

had compared Isaac’s fingerprints with those on the car, testified

that fingerprints on a car could be wiped or washed down. Another

law enforcement officer also indicated that he and those who towed

the car had to have touched it, that the location where he had found

the car was “out in the elements,” and that “it rain[ed] when the car

5
had gotten wet.”

Also that May, law enforcement arrested and interviewed

Isaac. The audio recordings of two interviews were admitted at trial

and played for the jury. In the first interview, conducted on May 24,

Isaac told police that at the time of Roberts’s shooting, he was in

Florida. But in the second interview, conducted on May 29, Isaac

told police that on April 19, he went to the “cut” with Sequoia’s

boyfriend, Kenyatta Frazier, 3 and saw Frazier come out directly

behind Roberts and fire at Roberts three times. In that interview,

Isaac stated he had never been in a black Mustang.

Isaac also told police that he was a leader in the Bloods gang

with about 170 members under him and indicated that he could

3 At trial, Isaac’s counsel suggested that Frazier and not Isaac killed

Roberts, by drawing attention to evidence that: (1) Frazier told police that he
had been upset with Roberts for stealing and selling his property and that he
thought Roberts was becoming a “greedy man”; (2) Roberts, according to his
girlfriend Williams, wanted to sell Frazier’s gun since Frazier had sold
Roberts’s cars in the past; and (3) Williams told police that Frazier was the one
who called Roberts on April 19 shortly before Roberts left home. Isaac’s trial
counsel also suggested when cross-examining a detective who had interviewed
Frazier, that Frazier and Sequoia’s romantic relationship influenced Sequoia’s
statements to police about Isaac.

6
order members to handle those who disrespected him. At trial,

Investigator Wayne Pinckney, an expert in street gang

investigations, testified that gang leaders maintain their leadership

by commanding respect: gangs always respond to a “disrespectful

situation,” and members often talk about their crimes to instill fear

and command an area. Investigator Pinckney testified that those

who violate a gang’s norms can be “discipline[d]” even by murder,

and recalled Isaac speaking to him about being “in charge of” people

who committed violations. Hurt, the teenager who had found

Roberts’s body—and who had spent time with Isaac and had often

visited Kensington Manor and Southern Pines, sites for gang

activity—testified that it was “kind of a violation” for Roberts to

have asked Isaac’s aunt about a gun, because, in Hurt’s words, “you

don’t never actually go to somebody’s house or any person house and

say something about the gun or anything because that kind of could

spook them or scare them[.]”

Having seen situations where criminals ordered victims to

strip at gunpoint to humiliate them, Investigator Pinckney believed

7
that whoever killed Roberts likely sought to humiliate him and send

a message, because Roberts was found naked from the waist down

in a frequently used area and without signs of sexual abuse.

2. Isaac claims his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by preventing him from testifying. The record

shows that after the State rested, the trial court told Isaac that he

needed to decide whether to testify and took a ten-minute recess to

give Isaac the chance to confer with his trial counsel on whether to

testify. After the recess, counsel announced that she “had the

opportunity to speak with” Isaac, and Isaac himself announced that

he was not going to testify. The defense then presented its case and

rested after calling two witnesses. However, at the motion for new

trial hearing, counsel and Isaac each testified that after the defense

presented its last witness and right before the defense rested, Isaac

told counsel he wanted to testify and she told him “no.” Isaac

indicated that this exchange also occurred in the ten-minute recess

right after the State rested. The trial court, in its order denying

Isaac’s motion for new trial, “decline[d] to credit the testimony of

8
[Isaac] or trial counsel” and stated that “[n]othing in the record

indicates [Isaac] ever expressed any desire to testify.” Yet on appeal,

Isaac maintains that he expressed to counsel a desire to testify and

she told him “no,” and that by doing so, she provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance.

To succeed on his ineffective assistance claim, Isaac must show

that his trial counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency

prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To show deficiency,

Isaac must show that counsel “performed [her] duties in an

objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and

in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Evans v. State, 315

Ga. 607, 611 (2) (b) (884 SE2d 334) (2023). To show prejudice, Isaac

“must establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of

counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have

been different.” Rashad v. State, 318 Ga. 199, 208 (3) (897 SE2d 760)

(2024) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If [Isaac] fails to make a

sufficient showing on one part of the Strickland test, we need not

9
address the other part.” Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3)

(873 SE2d 132) (2022).

Isaac argues that counsel performed deficiently by telling him

“no” after he asked to testify, because by doing so she thwarted the

exercise of his constitutional rights. See Thomas v. State, 314 Ga.

681, 690 (2) (878 SE2d 493) (2022) (“If a defendant decides to testify,

counsel must accept that decision and call him to the stand”); Mobley

v. State, 264 Ga. 854, 856 (2) (452 SE2d 500) (1995) (“[A] criminal

defendant has a constitutional right, based on Fifth and Sixth

Amendment guarantees and due process considerations, to testify in

his . . . own defense”). Isaac argues that we should presume counsel’s

refusal to let him testify prejudiced him because that refusal

amounted to a “constructive denial of counsel,” see Turpin v. Curtis,

278 Ga. 698, 699 (1) (606 SE2d 244) (2004), and that even if we do

not presume prejudice, Isaac has met his burden of showing

prejudice under Strickland. The State, in turn, suggests that the

trial court, in its order denying Isaac’s motion for new trial,

implicitly made a finding that Isaac never even expressed a desire

10
to testify, so we should accept this finding by the trial court unless

it is clearly erroneous. See Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734

SE2d 876) (2012).

Assuming that Isaac asked counsel to testify and counsel told

him “no,” 4 and that counsel performed deficiently by doing so, we

conclude that Isaac failed to show that his counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance.

(a) Isaac first argues that rather than require him to show

prejudice under Strickland, we should presume prejudice because

this case falls into the “constructive denial of counsel” exception to

Strickland that we described in Turpin, 278 Ga. at 699 (1)

(identifying “constructive denial of counsel” as one of the “narrow

range of circumstances” where we “apply a presumption” of

prejudice “in evaluating the prejudice component of a claim of

ineffective assistance”). This exception, we have held, applies “only

when there [is] a breakdown in the adversarial process, such that

4 Since we resolve Isaac’s ineffective assistance claim on prejudice, we

need not decide whether the trial court made a factual finding that Isaac never
expressed a desire to testify or whether such a finding is clearly erroneous.
11
counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful

adversarial testing.” Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63, 68 (3) (823

SE2d 749) (2019). 5 And, we have held, for this exception to apply,

counsel’s failure must be “complete” and “occur throughout the

5 Two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court form the legal

background of the “constructive denial of counsel” exception to Strickland’s
requirements. The first case is Strickland itself, which discussed “constructive
denial of counsel” as an exception to its requirement that a defendant show
prejudice to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim. As the Strickland Court
explained, “[i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed.
Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally
presumed to result in prejudice. . . . Prejudice in these circumstances is so
likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.” 466 U.S.
at 692 (III) (B). The second case is United States v. Cronic, where the Court
similarly discussed, in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance
of counsel, “circumstances . . . so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” See 466 U.S. 648, 658
(III) (104 SCt 2039, 80 LE2d 657) (1984). Those circumstances, the Court
explained, include when there is a “complete denial of counsel” (e.g., counsel is
“totally absent”), or, when “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s
case to meaningful adversarial testing.” See id. at 658-59 (III) & n. 25.
Reading Strickland and Cronic together, we have held that “Cronic’s
‘constructive denial of counsel’ exception to the general Strickland standard is
a narrow one that applies only when there [is] a breakdown in the adversarial
process, such that counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing.” Wainwright, 305 Ga. at 68 (3) (citation and
punctuation omitted); Turpin, 278 Ga. at 699 (1); State v. Heath, 277 Ga. 337,
338-39 (588 SE2d 738) (2003). In addition, we have held, “the Cronic
[constructive denial of counsel] exception requires an attorney’s failure to be
complete and [ ] occur throughout the proceeding and not merely at specific
points.” Wainwright, 305 at 68 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted). See
Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 50-51 (6) (771 SE2d 879) (2015) (citation and
punctuation omitted); Turpin, 278 Ga. at 699 (1).

12
proceeding and not merely at specific points.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted); Turpin, 278 Ga. at 699 (1). Isaac argues that

by preventing him from testifying, counsel failed to subject the

State’s case to “meaningful adversarial testing,” Wainwright, 305

Ga. at 68 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted), because the State

relied primarily on Sequoia’s and Farley’s testimony that Isaac had

confided in them about the murder, and had he testified, he would

have rebutted their testimony.

But as we stated in Turpin—which Isaac cites and does not ask

us to overrule—“Georgia appellate courts have consistently required

that, where a defendant alleges that counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by preventing him from testifying, he must show that this

action actually prejudiced his defense.” 278 Ga. at 700 (1) (emphasis

added; citing cases from this Court and federal courts to support this

proposition and stating “Georgia law in this regard is consistent

with the overwhelming weight of federal and state authority”). Isaac

does not point us to any authority, nor have we found any, in which

counsel’s failure to allow a defendant to testify amounts by itself to

13
the kind of constructive denial of counsel described in Turpin. 6 Thus,

we do not presume prejudice based on the constructive-denial-of-

prejudice exception to Strickland but instead assess whether Isaac

showed prejudice under Strickland. See Turpin, 278 Ga. at 700 (1),

701 (2) (after declining to presume prejudice, assessing whether

defendant showed prejudice under Strickland).

(b) We conclude that Isaac failed to show Strickland prejudice.

To begin, Isaac was never asked at the motion for new trial hearing

what he would have specifically testified had he gotten on the stand.

See Bell v. State, 287 Ga. 670, 675 (3) (697 SE2d 793) (2010)

(defendant did not show prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to call

two witnesses who allegedly could have offered exculpatory

6 In any event, Isaac fails to show that by denying his requests to testify,

counsel “entirely” failed to subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial
testing and that the failure was “not merely at specific points.” See
Wainwright, 305 Ga. at 68 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted). Even without
calling Isaac to testify, counsel, throughout the trial, cross-examined the
State’s witnesses, including Sequoia and Farley; direct-examined defense
witnesses; and objected a multitude of times. See Burrell v. State, 301 Ga. 21,
23 (2) (799 SE2d 181) (2017) (appellant’s allegations that counsel was
ineffective at “specific points of his trial” such as by failing to object at several
moments, did not meet Cronic’s “stringent standard” for presumptive
prejudice).
14
evidence, in part because defendant “offered only speculation as to

the possible testimony of one of the witnesses, and did not offer even

speculation about the possible testimony of the other witness”).

However, Isaac was asked questions about the shooting, and he

denied shooting Roberts, telling Farley that “I got a body,” or telling

Sequoia that he had shot someone. Isaac also testified that Frazier

and Roberts had “beef” between each other, and suggested that

Sequoia lacked credibility because Frazier was the father of her

children.

Even if we assume that Isaac would have testified at trial along

the lines that he testified at the motion for new trial hearing, there

is not a “reasonable probability” that “the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B). See

id. (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.”).

First, the evidence of Isaac’s guilt is strong. Sequoia testified

that Isaac told her he had shot Roberts twice in the head. Farley

recounted that Isaac had told her the night of Roberts’s shooting, “I

15
got a body, and he is naked from the waist down in the cut.” Roberts

stole a black Mustang shortly before his death, and after his death,

at least three people including a defense witness spotted Isaac near

or “go into” a black or dark-colored Mustang, while Isaac told police

he had never been in a black Mustang. In addition, Isaac told

conflicting stories after his arrest. In his first interview, Isaac told

police that he was in Florida at the time of Roberts’s shooting; this

contradicted not only his second interview but also Farley and

Stephenson’s recollection of seeing Isaac on the night of April 19.

Also, Isaac’s account of seeing Frazier shoot Roberts from behind

contradicted expert testimony that the shooter could not have shot

Roberts from behind. And, no witness testified at trial to seeing

Frazier near the crime scene on the night of April 19.

Second, even if Isaac testified at trial, as he did at the motion

for new trial hearing, about Frazier’s relationship with Sequoia and

alleged “beef” with Roberts, such testimony would have been

cumulative of other testimony and evidence presented at trial that

could support the defense’s theory that Frazier committed the

16
murder, including: defense trial counsel’s cross-examination of a

detective about Sequoia’s potential bias in favor of Frazier; Williams’

testimony on Frazier and Roberts’s issues, including that Frazier

had sold Roberts’s cars in the past and that Roberts wanted to sell

Frazier’s gun to “get even”; and Isaac’s second interview, played

before the jury, which included his account of Frazier shooting

Roberts.

Given the strong evidence of Isaac’s guilt and the cumulative

nature of his potential trial testimony, there is not a “reasonable

probability” that had Isaac testified along the lines that he testified

at the motion for new trial hearing, “the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B). See

Hood v. State, 308 Ga. 784, 788-89 (2) (843 SE2d 555) (2020)

(concluding there was no prejudice, because “given the strong

evidence of [defendant’s] guilt, it is not reasonably probable that the

outcome of the trial would have been different even if [an uncalled

witness] had testified at trial”); Mitchell v. State, 308 Ga. 1, 7 (2) (b)

(838 SE2d 820) (2020) (no prejudice from counsel’s failure to

17
introduce evidence, in part because evidence of defendant’s guilt was

already “very strong”); Ivey v. State, 305 Ga. 156, 162-63 (2) (d) (824

SE2d 242) (2019) (defense counsel’s failure to present victim’s

toxicology report did not prejudice defendant in part because report

“would have been cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial”

and so defendant failed to show how admitting the report “would

have changed the result of the trial”).

3. Isaac also argues that the trial court erred by declining to

instruct the jury on impeachment of a witness through bias toward

a party. At the charge conference and again after the court charged

the jury, defense trial counsel objected to the trial court not giving

the jury a pattern charge on impeachment of a witness through bias

toward a party.7 The court declined to give the requested charge, but

7 Specifically, Isaac argues that the trial court should have charged the

jury the following:
“1.31.40 Witness, Attacked (old Impeached) [ ] In determining the
credibility of witnesses and any testimony by them in court, you
may consider, where applicable, evidence offered to [(attack) (cast
doubt upon) (challenge) the credibility [or] believability of] [cause
you to disbelieve] any such witness. This would include evidence
of: Bias toward a part[y]. Shown by “Bad Acts” (extrinsic evidence
or cross-examination)—Specific instances of conduct of the witness

18
provided the pattern jury charge on the credibility of witnesses.8

Isaac argues that the court erred in doing so, contending that there

was slight evidence supporting the requested charge on bias. See

Morris v. State, 301 Ga. 702, 705 (2) (804 SE2d 42) (2017) (“To

authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be slight

evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)).

Pretermitting whether there was slight evidence supporting

the charge on bias, we conclude that the trial court did not err in

declining to give that charge. For the court to have erred in doing so,

(in question) that may relate to the witness’s (in question’s) bias
toward a party. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-608 (b).”
See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, §
1.31.40 (4th ed., updated January 2024).
8 The record shows that the trial court charged the jury on credibility of

witnesses, as follows:
“Credibility of Witnesses[:] The jury must determine the credibility
of the witnesses. In deciding this, you may consider all of the facts
and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts about
which they testify, the nature of the facts about which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest
or lack of interest in the outcome of the case, and their personal
credibility as you observe it.”
See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, §
1.31.10 (4th ed., updated January 2024).
19
the charge declined must not have been “substantially covered by

the charge actually given.” Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 744, 745 (1) (534

SE2d 67) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the trial

court’s charge on the credibility of witnesses already asked jurors to

consider a witness’s “interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the

case,” and thus substantially covered the declined charge on

impeachment of a witness through bias toward a party. See Foster

v. State, 294 Ga. 383, 386 (7) (754 SE2d 33) (2014) (‘“[T]he trial court

thoroughly instructed the jury that it was the arbiter of each

witness’s credibility and that it should give consideration to each

witness’s interest or lack thereof in the outcome of the case. This

charge adequately covered the possible motive, interest, or bias of

the State’s witnesses.”’ (emphasis added; citing Lee v. State, 281 Ga.

776, 777-78 (3) (642 SE2d 835) (2007)).

4. Finally, presuming only one deficiency and finding no other

error by defense trial counsel or by the trial court, we conclude that

to the extent Isaac argues there was cumulative prejudice entitling

him to a new trial, that argument fails. See Jackson v. State, 317

20
Ga. 95, 106-07 (4) (891 SE2d 866) (2023) (assessing both claims of

counsel deficiency and trial court error, and holding that “[t]o

establish cumulative error, [an appellant] must show that . . . at

least two errors were committed in the course of the trial”); Woods

v. State, 312 Ga. 405, 410 (3) (a) n.7 (862 SE2d 526) (2021); State v.

Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 14 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

319 Ga. 25
FINAL COPY

S24A0014. ISAAC v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Appellant Kenneth Maurice Isaac was convicted of malice

murder, among other crimes, for the shooting death of Reginald

Roberts.1 On appeal, Isaac claims that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by refusing to allow him to testify in his own

defense and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the

1 Roberts was shot and killed on the night of April 19, 2014. On August

30, 2016, Isaac was indicted on five counts in relation to the shooting: (1) malice
murder; (2) felony murder predicated on aggravated assault; (3) aggravated
assault; (4) possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and (5)
violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act. A jury trial took
place October 3-7, and October 11, 2016, and the jury found Isaac guilty of all
counts. On October 20, 2016, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with
the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), five years in prison
consecutive to Count 1 for the possession offense (Count 4), and ten years
consecutive to Count 4 for the street gang offense (Count 5). The felony murder
count (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault
count (Count 3) merged into malice murder. On October 26, 2016, Isaac filed a
motion for new trial, which he amended on September 26, 2022. The trial court
held a hearing on that motion on October 4, 2022, and denied it by order dated
November 1, 2022. On November 28, 2022, Isaac timely filed a notice of appeal,
which he amended on November 29 and again on June 14, 2023. This case was
docketed to the term of court beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
jury on impeachment of a witness through bias toward a party. For

the reasons that follow, his claims fail, so we affirm.

1. The evidence at trial showed the following. On April 20,

2014, Roberts was found dead, nude from the waist down, in a

wooded area connecting two apartment complexes, Kensington

Manor and Southern Pines.

The previous day, April 19, Roberts and two others stole

vehicles from an airport, including a newer-model, black Ford

Mustang. According to his girlfriend, Keneisha Williams, Roberts