CourtListener 10680064

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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 16, 2023

S22Z0858. INQUIRY CONCERNING JUDGE GERALD
JOHNSON.

PER CURIAM.

This judicial discipline matter is before the Court on the Report

and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Judicial

Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) and timely filed Notices of

Exceptions filed by the Director of the JQC and respondent Gerald

Johnson. The Hearing Panel recommended that Johnson be

removed from office for violating Rules 1.1, 1.2 (A), and 1.2 (B) of the

Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”). Johnson, however,

submitted his resignation to Governor Kemp shortly after the

Hearing Panel filed its Report and Recommendation. Removal from

office is the only sanction the JQC seeks, and we cannot remove a

former judge from an office he no longer holds. Accordingly, we
dismiss.

According to the formal charges, which Johnson admits are

true and correct, on the evening of October 18, 2021, the Habersham

County Sheriff’s Office received a call regarding multiple gunshots

fired in the residential area where Johnson lived. Travis Jarrell, the

Habersham County Sheriff’s Office lieutenant who responded to the

call, knew Johnson and knew that Johnson lived in the area, so he

went to Johnson’s house to ask Johnson whether he had any

information about the gunshots. After Jarrell rang Johnson’s

doorbell, Johnson opened the door and pointed a loaded AR-15 rifle

at Jarrell. Jarrell, who feared for his safety, fled to his patrol vehicle,

and Johnson dropped the rifle. Johnson then spoke with Jarrell but

told Jarrell he did not want their conversation to be recorded. As

Johnson and Jarrell spoke, Johnson called Jarrell by his first name

and several times asked Jarrell to turn off his recording device. Each

time, Jarrell informed Johnson he could not turn off the recording

device. Johnson, who was angry, visibly intoxicated, unstable on his

feet, and spoke with slurred speech, admitted to Jarrell that he had

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fired an AR-15 rifle from his porch that evening while intoxicated.

Eight days after the incident, Johnson told the JQC Chief

Investigator that the day of the incident was a “blur” because he had

been drinking excessively, but he remembered sitting in his chair

and hearing his wife’s “chatter,” which aggravated him and caused

him to “snap.” Johnson admitted he then went to the porch and fired

multiple rounds from the rifle into the ground, and when Jarrell

came to his house in a marked patrol vehicle, he answered the door

with the loaded rifle pointed at Jarrell’s head.

On October 28, 2021, the Investigative Panel filed a consent

motion suspending Johnson pending a final determination of the

JQC’s investigation. Johnson was suspended with pay by order of

this Court on October 29, 2021. On March 31, 2022, the Director

filed a four-count formal complaint against Johnson. Count 1 alleged

Johnson, in violation of Rule 1.2 (A), “failed to act in a manner that

promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” Count

2 charged Johnson with a violation of Rule 1.2 (B) by failing “to

establish, maintain, and enforce high standards of conduct and

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personally observe such standards of conduct so the integrity of the

judiciary might be preserved[.]” Count 4 charged Johnson with

failing to respect and comply with the law in violation of Rule 1.11

A formal hearing on the charges against Johnson was held on

November 16, 2022. On January 6, 2023, the Hearing Panel

submitted to this Court its Report and Recommendation in which it

concluded that the Director had proved Counts 1, 2, and 4 by clear

and convincing evidence. Although the Hearing Panel acknowledged

in its Report that all proven misconduct attributed to Johnson was

personal in that it did not occur when Johnson was exercising his

official responsibilities, it concluded that Johnson had “brought the

judicial office into disrepute with his actions,” and “restoring

Johnson to the bench would not ‘respect and honor the judicial office

1 Count 3 of the Formal Complaint charged Johnson with violation of

Rule 1.3 of the CJC by lending the prestige of his office to advance his own
private interests by requesting that a law enforcement officer turn off his
recording device. Rule 1.3 provides: “Judges shall not lend the prestige of their
office to advance the private interests of the judge or others.” Count 3 was
dismissed by the Director prior to the hearing and was not considered by the
Hearing Panel.

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as a public trust,’ nor would it ‘enhance and maintain confidence in

our legal system.’” The Hearing Panel thus issued its

recommendation that Johnson be removed from his position as Chief

Judge of the Magistrate Court of Habersham County. Five days

later, Johnson submitted, and Governor Brian Kemp subsequently

accepted, his letter of resignation.

The matter is now before this Court, where Johnson asserts

that the Hearing Panel made several errors in its findings and

conclusions, and the Director argues that Johnson should be

“removed” from office pursuant to this Court’s authority under

Article VI, Section VII, Paragraph VII (a) of the Georgia

Constitution of 1983 to discipline judges.2 It is unnecessary to

2 One argument raised by the Director is that although Article VI,
Section VII, Paragraph VII (a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, the
provision that authorizes us to discipline judges, provides that a “judge may be
removed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for willful misconduct”
(emphasis supplied), we have authority to discipline Johnson, who is now a
former judge, because JQC Rule 2 (B) (2) grants us “continuing jurisdiction
over former judges.” We need not, and do not, address this argument here
because the Director’s request that Johnson be removed from office was
rendered moot by Johnson’s resignation. See generally Inquiry Concerning
Judge Coomer, 315 Ga. 841, 850 (885 SE2d 738) (2023) (“The [CJC] repeatedly

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address the arguments of either party, however, because once

Johnson’s resignation was accepted by the Governor, the Director’s

request that this Court remove Johnson from office3 became moot.4

See OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (3) (An appeal shall be dismissed “[w]here the

makes clear that it governs the conduct of only judges and ‘judicial
candidates[.]’”); Inquiry Concerning Judge Crawford, 310 Ga. 403, 405 (851
SE2d 572) (2020) (concluding it was unnecessary to determine whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the Hearing Panel’s conclusions because the
judge resigned from office after the Hearing Panel issued its Report and
Recommendation).
3 The Director’s request that Johnson be “removed,” even though he no

longer holds a judicial position, appears to derive from the Director’s interest
in preventing Johnson from seeking appointment or election to another judicial
position for at least seven years, as well as the Director’s assertion that the
timing of Johnson’s resignation allows Johnson to “circumvent the judicial
disciplinary process.” See OCGA § 15-1-13 (a) (“[I]f a person has been removed
from any judicial office upon order of the Supreme Court after review, that
person shall not be eligible to be elected or appointed to any judicial office in
this state until seven years have elapsed from the time of such removal.”).
4 The attorney discipline process is notably different in this regard. In

bar discipline matters, lawyers who are the subject of pending disciplinary
proceedings generally cannot resign from membership in the bar without the
approval of this Court. See Bar Rule 1-208 (d) (“No petition for leave to resign
shall be accepted if there are disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges
pending against the member, or if the member is not in good standing for
failure to pay child support obligations[.]”). We are able to impose this rule in
attorney discipline matters because we have exclusive authority to supervise
and regulate the practice of law. By contrast, we have no control over the
circumstances in which public officers, including judges, vacate their office.
That process is controlled by the General Assembly through statute. See
generally OCGA § 45-5-1 et seq., especially § 45-5-1 (a) (2) (“All offices in the
state shall be vacated . . . [b]y resignation, when accepted”).

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questions presented have become moot.”); Scarbrough Group v.

Worley, 290 Ga. 234, 236 (719 SE2d 430) (2011) (“A case is moot

when its resolution would amount to the determination of an

abstract question not arising upon existing facts or rights.”)

(citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). This matter is,

therefore, dismissed.5

Dismissed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not
participating.

5 Our dismissal is without prejudice to the JQC reinstating charges
against Johnson in the event he becomes a judge or judicial candidate in the
future. This Court is not aware of any applicable statute of limitation or
doctrine of estoppel that would prevent the JQC from revisiting any of the
misconduct alleged in Counts 1, 2, or 4 of the Formal Complaint should
Johnson again become a judge or judicial candidate because there has not been
a final disposition of those charges on the merits.

316 Ga. 876
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