Adams v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 1, 2025

S25A0665. ADAMS v. THE STATE.

LAGRUA, Justice.

In June 2019, Appellant Xavier Adams, Jr., was convicted of

felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting

death of Sean Peterson.1 On appeal, Adams contends that (1) the

trial court erred by failing to vacate his conviction for felony murder

1 Peterson was shot on September 5, 2017. On March 28, 2018, a Clayton

County grand jury indicted Adams for malice murder, two counts of felony
murder (predicated on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon), aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. At a trial from June 17 to 21, 2019, the jury found Adams guilty of
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault and guilty on all the remaining
counts. The trial court sentenced Adams to serve life in prison without the
possibility of parole for felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. The remaining charges merged or were vacated by operation
of law. On September 26, 2019, Adams filed a motion for new trial, which he
amended with new counsel three times. After an evidentiary hearing on
February 14, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for new
trial on September 25, 2023. Adams filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in April 2025 and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under the

modified merger rule; (2) the jury’s guilty verdicts of voluntary

manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and felony

murder predicated on aggravated assault were mutually exclusive

from the guilty verdict on felony murder predicated on possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon; (3) the trial court committed plain

error by improperly commenting on evidence presented at trial; (4)

the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury on

the proximate cause standard for felony murder; and (5) the trial

court committed plain error by omitting the proximate cause

standard for felony murder in its response to a jury note. We affirm

because the modified merger rule is inapplicable to this case, the

jury’s guilty verdicts of voluntary manslaughter on malice murder

and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and felony

murder predicated on felon-in-possession were not mutually

exclusive, the trial court did not improperly comment on the

evidence presented at trial, the trial court did not commit plain error

in failing to include the proximate cause standard in its jury

2
charges, and Adams affirmatively waived any claim of error by the

trial court with respect to the trial court’s response to the jury’s

question during its deliberations.

The evidence presented at trial showed that, in 2017, Adams,

Peterson, and Adams’s then-wife Destinee Pannell 2 were roommates

at an apartment complex in Clayton County. On September 5, 2017,

Peterson attempted to contact Adams by cell phone to explain that

he did not have the entirety of his share of the rent, but Adams

refused to speak with him. Around 7:45 p.m. the same day, Adams

and Pannell were at their apartment when Peterson arrived,

requesting to speak with Adams about the rent. The two men

immediately began arguing, and Adams told Peterson that he had

“something for [Peterson],” then walked into his bedroom. Pannell

testified that she understood Adams’s statement to mean that he

was retrieving the gun that he kept in his nightstand, which he

purchased in May or June 2017.

When Adams went into the bedroom, Peterson walked out of

2 Adams and Pannell divorced prior to trial.

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the apartment and returned with a 9mm pistol belonging to his

girlfriend, Tasiana Harmon, who was waiting for Peterson in the

parking lot of the complex. As Peterson reentered the apartment,

Adams came out of his bedroom with the gun and pointed it at

Peterson. While aiming the guns in each other’s direction, the two

men continued to argue until they decided to put their weapons

down and “go outside and handle it a different way.” Shortly after

exiting the apartment, the men returned because, according to

Adams, they did not want to be seen fighting by other residents in

the complex.

Upon reentering the apartment, the men picked up their guns,

resumed arguing, and started wrestling with their guns in hand.

Pannell asked Peterson to get off Adams because Adams could not

breathe, but Peterson said that he would not do so until Adams

relinquished his gun. Subsequently, Adams and Peterson gave their

guns to Pannell, who put both guns in a black handbag. A few

moments later, Peterson asked for Harmon’s gun back because he

needed it for his security job. Adams told Pannell that if she gave

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Peterson the gun back, he would “beat [her] ass.” 3 Peterson then

called Harmon from his cell phone to come retrieve the gun from

Pannell. When Harmon entered the apartment, Adams instructed

Pannell not to give Harmon the gun and demanded his gun back.

The two men began to fight again, and while they fought, Pannell

gave Harmon her gun, which Harmon put in the waistband of her

pants.

Adams and Peterson eventually stopped fighting, and Peterson

began exiting the apartment. While walking out, Peterson remarked

that, if he found out that Adams had “put [his] hands on [Pannell],

[Peterson would] come back for [Adams].” Adams responded, “get

the hell out,” causing Peterson to turn around. Peterson told Adams

that he would leave once he collected all his belongings in the

apartment and then walked into his bedroom. Pannell put the black

handbag down, ran after Peterson, and urged him to leave before

Adams got more upset. Upon exiting Peterson’s bedroom, Pannell

saw that Adams had his gun raised and pointed in Peterson’s

3 Adams had a history of physically abusing Pannell.

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direction. Peterson exited the bedroom soon after and attempted to

disarm Adams. Pannell testified that, when Peterson was

attempting to take the gun away from Adams, she heard a gunshot.

Pannell did not see who fired the gun because she immediately ran

out the door of the apartment when she heard the shot but testified

that the last person she saw with a gun was Adams. Harmon

testified that she saw Adams grab his gun out of Pannell’s black

handbag and shoot Peterson. According to Harmon, when Peterson

was shot, he was unarmed, and she had her gun in her waistband.

Shortly after exiting the apartment, Pannell heard someone

say, “he shot me” and “get up, man, you all right. It’s going to be

okay. . . .” She did not know who made either statement. When

Pannell came back into the apartment, she saw Peterson’s dead body

and asked Adams what happened and where the gun was. He

responded that “the gun went off” and that he would not tell her

where the gun was. Pannell tried to call the police, but Adams

stopped her, saying that they needed to get rid of Peterson’s body.

When Pannell refused and insisted on calling the police, Adams

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again prevented her and said that they needed to go to the nightclub

where Adams worked to create an alibi.

On the way to the club, Adams threatened to harm Pannell if

the police found out what happened and asked her “not to fold on

him or turn him in.” When they arrived at the club, Adams told

Pannell that he needed lemon juice to remove any gunpowder

residue from his body and clothing. According to Pannell, Adams

then went to a nearby store “so that the manager could see his face

as part of the alibi . . . .” Adams also put paint on his clothes and

shoes to give the impression that he had been painting at the club

and instructed Pannell to video call her daughter so she could see

where they were. After about an hour, Adams and Pannell left the

club and drove around Atlanta until Adams’s brother called and

informed him that he needed to go to his apartment because the

police were there.4 When they arrived at the apartment, Adams told

Pannell to “ask where [Peterson] was to make it seem like [they]

4 The record reflects that Harmon called 911 after the shooting, and the

police responded to Adams’s apartment around 8:45 p.m.
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didn’t know what had happened.” As soon as the couple exited the

car, they were immediately detained by the police.

Inside Adams’s apartment, the police found Peterson dead with

a gunshot wound to the back. No bullet was recovered from his body.

Police also recovered a .40 caliber bullet near Peterson’s body and a

9mm live round under his body. No shell casings were found at the

scene, and the weapon used to shoot Peterson was never located. A

ballistics expert testified that Harmon’s gun did not fire the .40

caliber bullet found near Peterson’s body. The medical examiner

testified that Peterson’s death was deemed a homicide caused by a

gunshot wound.

At trial, the State presented evidence of jail calls between

Adams and Pannell. On those calls, Adams said to Pannell, among

other things, that “they don’t have [the gun], no shell, no nothing”;

Pannell needed to “tell [investigators] that [she] went home[,] and

[Peterson] was in an altercation with Junior”;5 “why didn’t you stick

5 The record reflects that Adams also occasionally went by “Junior,” but

Pannell testified that, during this call, Adams was referring to another person
named Junior.
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to the f**king story”; and “it was our story against her,” which

Pannell testified referred to Harmon.

1. Adams contends that the trial court erred by sentencing

him for felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession rather than

for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and

felony murder predicated on aggravated assault counts, for which

he was found guilty. He contends that under the modified merger

rule articulated in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 866-868 (2) (414 SE2d

865) (1992), the trial court should have vacated the felony murder

count predicated on felon-in-possession and entered a conviction and

sentence for voluntary manslaughter. We disagree.

In Edge, this Court adopted a “modified merger rule,”

concluding that, where the jury finds a defendant guilty of voluntary

manslaughter, “it cannot also find felony murder based on the same

underlying aggravated assault” because the jury’s guilty verdict of

voluntary manslaughter necessarily implies that the very same

assault was mitigated by provocation and passion. See id. at 865-

866 (“If the jury finds voluntary manslaughter, it necessarily finds

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the felonious assault was mitigated by provocation[] and committed

without the mens rea essential to impute malice to the killing. Thus,

the felony of assault in that instance cannot support a felony murder

conviction because there is no malice to be transferred.” (emphasis

in original)). “We adopted such a rule because to hold otherwise

would eliminate voluntary manslaughter as a separate form of

homicide since, in that event, every voluntary manslaughter would

also be a felony murder.” Smith v. State, 272 Ga. 874, 879 (6) (a) (536

SE2d 514) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted). Consequently,

where a defendant is found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and

felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, arising from the

same assault, the trial court should vacate the felony murder verdict

and “only the voluntary manslaughter conviction may stand.” See

Edge, 261 Ga. at 867 (2).

We subsequently extended the rule in Edge to apply in factual

scenarios where “the felony murder is premised on another

underlying felony that is equally integral to the homicide and

susceptible of mitigation by the sort of provocation and passion that

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voluntary manslaughter involves.” See Griggs v. State, 304 Ga. 806,

808 (2) (822 SE2d 246) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted)

(refusing to extend Edge because the defendant’s possession of a

firearm as a convicted felon was independent of the killing). See also

Sanders v. State, 281 Ga. 36, 37-38 (1) (635 SE2d 772) (2006)

(extending Edge to aggravated battery and arson). However, we

noted in Edge that the modified merger rule is inapplicable where

“the underlying felony is independent of the killing itself, such as

burglary, robbery, or even an assault that is directed against

someone other than the homicide victim.” Edge, 261 Ga. at 867 (2)

n.3 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). See, e.g., Anothony v.

State, 303 Ga. 399, 403 (2) (a) (811 SE2d 399) (2018) (concluding that

“the culpability for unlawful participation in criminal gang activity

is generally not susceptible of mitigation by the sort of provocation

and passion that voluntary manslaughter involves”). And of

particular relevance here, we have consistently refused to extend

the rule in Edge to felony murder convictions predicated on

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See, e.g., DuBose v.

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State, 299 Ga. 652, 653-654 (2) (791 SE2d 9) (2016); Amos v. State,

297 Ga. 892, 893-894 (2) (778 SE2d 203) (2015); Wallace v. State, 294

Ga. 257 258-259 (2) (754 SE2d 5) (2013); Lawson v. State, 280 Ga.

881, 883 (3) (635 SE2d 134) (2006); Sims v. State, 265 Ga. 35, 36 (3)

(453 SE2d 33) (1995).

Here, Adams’s unlawful possession of a firearm was

independent of the killing itself and not “the result of a sudden,

violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation

sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person,” OCGA § 16-

5-2 (a), given that the evidence presented at trial showed that

Adams possessed the gun he used to kill Peterson prior to the

shooting. See Griggs, 304 Ga. at 809 (2) (concluding Edge was

inapplicable where the evidence showed that the defendant had

“acquired the gun that he used to kill [the victim] ‘maybe five

days’ before the shooting”). Therefore, Edge is inapplicable, and the

trial court did not err in entering a judgment of conviction on the

jury’s verdict finding Adams guilty of felony murder predicated on

felon-in-possession and sentencing him accordingly.

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2. Adams next argues that the jury’s guilty verdicts of

voluntary manslaughter—on the malice murder and felony murder

predicated on aggravated assault counts—and felony murder based

on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were mutually

exclusive.

“The term mutually exclusive generally applies to two

guilty verdicts that cannot legally exist simultaneously.” McElrath

v. State, 308 Ga. 104, 110 (2) (b) (839 SE2d 573) (2020) (emphasis

removed) (punctuation omitted). “[I]f a jury returns verdicts of guilty

on two counts of an indictment, and those counts are mutually

exclusive, the convictions must be set aside and a new trial granted.”

Smith, 272 Ga. at 880 (6) (b) (citation omitted). We conclude that

Adams’s guilty verdicts were not mutually exclusive.

A guilty verdict of voluntary manslaughter requires that a jury

find that the defendant intended to kill the victim, but such killing

occurred as a “result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion

resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion

in a reasonable person.” See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). To convict a

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defendant for felony murder, a jury must find that he committed a

felony, and during the commission of that felony, caused the death

of another with or without malice. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). Critically,

a jury need not conclude that the defendant intended to cause the

death of another, only that he intended to commit the underlying

felony. See Smith, 272 Ga. at 880 (6) (b).

Here, the intent supporting Adams’s felony murder conviction

was derived solely from the underlying felon-in-possession offense.

Because felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession of a

firearm does not require an intent to kill and considerations such as

provocation or passion have no bearing on it, Adams’s voluntary

manslaughter conviction has no bearing on whether Adams

committed felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession; rather,

the felony-murder verdict indicated that the jury concluded that

Adams intended to possess a firearm as a convicted felon, and during

such possession, caused the death of Peterson. Therefore, the felony

murder and voluntary manslaughter guilty verdicts were not

mutually exclusive. See Perez v. State, 316 Ga. 433, 452 (4) (888

14
SE2d 526) (2023); Smith, 272 Ga. at 880 (6) (b) (“Significantly, to

convict [the defendant] of felony murder, the jury did not have to

find that [he] did not act with an intent to kill, as malice and intent

to kill are not elements of the offense of felony murder.”).

3. Adams argues that the trial court plainly erred in three

respects. To show plain error, Adams (1) must point to an error that

was not affirmatively waived, (2) the error must have been clear and

obvious, (3) the error must have affected his substantial rights, and

(4) the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings. See State v. Williams, 308

Ga. 228, 231 (2) (838 SE2d 764) (2020). We need not analyze all of

the elements of the plain error test if Adams fails to satisfy one of

them. See Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 194 (11) (a) (850 SE2d 110)

(2020) (citation omitted). Here, we conclude that, as to two of his

claims, Adams cannot show a clear or obvious error by the trial court

and, as to the third claim, he affirmatively waived any alleged claim

of error by the trial court.

(a) Adams first contends that it was plain error for the trial

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court to improperly comment on the evidence presented at trial.6

During the cross-examination of Pannell, Adams’s trial counsel

asked her four times whether she shot Peterson. Each time Pannell

responded that she did not. The fourth time the question was asked,

the trial court interjected and said, “[m]a’am, do not. She’s already

said she did not.” Trial counsel later asked, “Ms. Pannell, isn’t it

correct that [Adams] was concerned about you because he knew that

you were the one who fired the gun that night?” After Pannell

responded that she did not fire the gun, the trial court stated,

“[Counsel], I’m going to have her step down if there’s another

question about that. She’s already answered it.” Trial counsel did

not object to the trial court’s comments.

“It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case,

to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether

a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the

6 Although Adams’s brief does not address this enumeration of error
under the plain error analysis, our review is limited to plain error because
Adams did not object to the comments that he now wishes to challenge on
appeal. See OCGA § 17-8-57 (b).
16
accused.” OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1). Here, the record does not show

that the trial court expressed an opinion about what had or had not

been proven in the case; on the contrary, it merely stated what

Pannell had already testified to, which does not violate OCGA § 17-

8-57 (a) (1). See Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 272 (4) (882 SE2d 227)

(2022) (“To violate [OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1)], the trial court’s

comments must pertain to a disputed issue of fact.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). Moreover, the trial court acted within its

discretion “to keep the case moving along in the face of repetitive

questions by defense counsel.” Gebhardt v. State, 307 Ga. 587, 593

(3) (a) (837 SE2d 318) (2019) (citing OCGA § 24-6-611 (a) (2) (“The

court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of

interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . [a]void

needless consumption of time . . . .”)). Therefore, there was no clear

and obvious error here, and this claim fails.

(b) Adams next argues that it was plain error for the trial court

to omit the proximate cause standard from its jury charge.

As noted above, felony murder occurs when, during the

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commission of a felony, the defendant causes the death of another

irrespective of malice. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). Proving that a

defendant “caused” the death of another requires proof of “proximate

cause,” meaning that the defendant was both the cause in fact and

legal cause of the death. See Melancon v. State, 319 Ga. 741, 751 2

(b) (906 SE2d 725) (2024) (citing State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 647

(2) (697 SE2d 757) (2010)).

Adams has not established that the trial court committed a

clear and obvious error here by not giving more detailed instructions

on the causation standard. To show clear and obvious error, the

defendant must identify “on-point controlling authority” or “the

unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule that plainly establish

that the trial court erred.” Hill v. State, 321 Ga. 177, 182 (913 SE2d

547) (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted). Adams has offered

no such authority, statute, or rule in support of this plain-error

claim. And we have rejected similar plain-error claims before where,

as here, the trial court read the indictment’s allegations as to how

the defendant caused the victim’s death; instructed the jury on the

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statutory definition of felony murder, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (“A person

commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony,

he or she causes the death of another human being irrespective of

malice.”); and told the jury that the State had the burden of proving

“every material allegation of the Indictment and every essential

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” See

Campbell-Williams v. State, 309 Ga. 585, 587-588 (2) (a) (847 SE2d

583) (2020) (citation omitted). See also Flournoy v. State, 294 Ga.

741, 746 (2) (755 SE2d 777) (2014) (concluding that an indictment

alleging that the defendant caused the victim’s death by shooting

him during the commission of a felony, along with a jury instruction

referencing those allegations, sufficiently informed the jury that a

conviction required a finding that the defendant caused the death—

thus, a separate instruction on proximate cause was unnecessary);

Pennie v. State, 292 Ga. 249, 252 (2) (736 SE2d 433) (2013) (charge

omitting proximate cause standard was sufficient where the charge

as a whole informed “the jury that, in order to convict Appellant of

the felony murder of [the victim], it had to determine that he caused

19
. . . the victim’s death during the escape phase of the underlying

felonies”). Therefore, Adams has not established that the trial court

committed a clear and obvious error by failing to give more specific

instructions on proximate cause.7

(c) Adams finally argues that it was plain error for the trial

court to omit the felony-murder proximate cause standard in its

response to a jury note.

During the jury’s deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial

court, asking it to “[p]lease explain Count III in layman’s terms.”

The following colloquy then took place on the record between the

trial court and the parties regarding the note:

COURT: I can re-read that section of the instructions. . . .
TRIAL COUNSEL: They do have the charges, Your
Honor. So -- but they’ve asked for it in layman’s terms.
Meaning, I would say, to indicate that they have difficulty
understanding what is set out in the charges. I don’t know
if the Court [could] [] simplify it for them in some way[?]

7 Although we reject the claim of plain error with respect to the trial

court’s jury instructions in this case, we recognize that there may be some
factual scenarios where a more detailed instruction on proximate cause is
necessary. See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 529 (4) (842 SE2d 45) (2020) (“A
jury instruction must be adjusted to the evidence and embody a correct,
applicable, and complete statement of law.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
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COURT: I could. Do you guys agree to that?
PROSECUTOR: That’s fine, Your Honor. That’s fine.
TRIAL COUNSEL: Uh-huh (affirmative response). Yes. .
..
TRIAL COUNSEL: And I think your instruction that read
would be -- yes -- you have to decide if the defendant
committed a felony. And once you have decided -- the
felony alleged being, being in possession of a firearm as a
convicted felon. And then once you decide that[] you have
then to decide if somebody [died] during the course of that
felony.
COURT: Right.
TRIAL COUNSEL: I think that’s pretty much standard. I
think that that is sufficient, Your Honor.
COURT: Okay?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, Your Honor.
TRIAL COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.

The trial court then brought the jurors back into the courtroom and

explained the following:

COURT: I’ve had an opportunity to talk with the State
and with the Defense. And they have agreed on what I
can say. So, what I’m going to do first, is first read Count
III. That Mr. Adams with -- is charged with the offense of
felony murder, for the said accused person in the County
of Clayton, the State of Georgia, on or about the 5th day
of September, 2017, while in the commission of the offense
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a felony,
did cause the death of Sean Petersen, a human being, by
shooting him. So, first you have to determine if a felony
was committed as alleged. The felony as alleged to have
been committed was that he was in possession of a

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firearm by a convicted felon. That would be the felony.
Then you must go on to determine whether during the
course -- you must then determine that if the defendant
caused the death of another while in the course of that
felony.

“For purposes of plain error review, an affirmative waiver is

the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”

Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 671 (2) (911 SE2d 554) (2025)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the record shows that

prior to the trial court’s reading of its response to the jury, Adams’s

trial counsel suggested language that was included in the response

and stated that the language was “sufficient” and “standard.” And,

when the trial court asked Adams’s trial counsel whether she

approved of the forthcoming response, she said, “Yes, Your Honor.”

Accordingly, because Adams—through his counsel—agreed to a

response that did not include specific detail about proximate cause,

he cannot now assert that the trial court’s response constituted plain

error. See Hughes v. State, 310 Ga. 453, 457 (2) (b) (851 SE2d 580)

(2020) (the defendant affirmatively waived his right to challenge the

trial court’s response to a jury note that requested the trial court to

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explain portions of the jury charge in layman’s terms because the

defendant “agreed that re-reading the indictment was the

appropriate means to answer the jury’s questions”). Therefore,

Adams affirmatively waived any claim of error from the response by

the trial court, so there was no plain error by the trial court. Thus,

this claim fails.

Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel,
Ellington, McMillian, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.

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PINSON, Justice, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court in full. With respect to the

Court’s conclusion in Division 3 (b) that the trial court did not

commit plain error by failing to give more specific instructions on

causation, I note that we have recently “clarified the standard for

proving causation under our murder statute.” Melancon v. State, 319

Ga. 741, 752 (3) (906 SE2d 725) (2024). In Melancon, we explained

that

Proving that a defendant caused the death of another
human being requires proof of proximate cause. This
showing has two components: cause in fact and legal
cause. A defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of a death
if the defendant’s conduct played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the death — typically
shown through evidence that the death would not have
happened but for the defendant’s conduct — or if the
defendant’s conduct materially accelerated the
death. And a defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of a
death if the death was reasonably foreseeable — that is,
a probable or natural consequence of the criminal conduct
according to ordinary and usual experience, not a merely
possible result.

Id. at 751 (2) (b) (cleaned up). An instruction along these lines would

be both a correct statement of the law and useful to jurors who must

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assess whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant has “cause[d] the death of another human being.”

OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 529 (4) (842

SE2d 45) (2020) (“A jury instruction must be adjusted to the

evidence and embody a correct, applicable, and complete statement

of law.”).

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