Recommended Order — 26-000932

STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
GERMAN CARABALLO,
Petitioner,
vs.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF REGULATORY
AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES,
Respondent.
/
Case No. 26-0932
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a final hearing in this case was conducted before
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mary Li Creasy of the Division of
Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) by Zoom conference on August 12, 2026.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: 	German Dario Caraballo, pro se
16101 Southwest 138th Terrace
Miami, Florida 33196
For Respondent: 	Eric Alberto Rodriguez, Esquire
111 Northwest First Street, Suite 2810
Miami, Florida 33128
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by his employer
based on his national origin and was retaliated against for reporting the
same; and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy.

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On July 25, 2025, Petitioner, German Caraballo (“Petitioner”), filed a
Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the Florida Commission on Human
Relations (“FCHR”), alleging that Respondent, Miami-Dade County
Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources (“the DRER” or
“Respondent”), his former employer, unlawfully discriminated against him on
the basis of his national origin, and retaliated against him for engaging in
protected activity.
On January 27, 2026, FCHR issued a Notice of Determination to
Petitioner, indicating that FCHR found “no reasonable cause” to believe that
discrimination occurred. Petitioner elected to contest the decision and pursue
administrative remedies by timely filing a Petition for Relief (“Petition”) with
FCHR. FCHR transmitted the Petition to DOAH on February 19, 2026, and
the undersigned was assigned to hear the case.
The final hearing was originally set for May 21, 2026. At the request of
the parties, the matter was continued twice for good cause; rescheduled for
August 12, 2026; and held as scheduled by Zoom conference. At the hearing,
Petitioner testified on his own behalf. He also presented the testimony of
Pedro Carvajal, a former co-worker. Petitioner’s Exhibits 1, 3, and 4 were
admitted into evidence. Respondent presented no witnesses. Respondent’s
Exhibits A through H were admitted into evidence.
The final hearing Transcript was filed with DOAH on August 27, 2026.
The parties agreed to an extension of time for 20 days after the filing of the
Transcript to file post-hearing submissions. Respondent timely filed its
Proposed Recommended Order on September 16, 2026, that was considered
by the undersigned in the preparation of this Recommended Order. Petitioner
disregarded the post-hearing instructions of the undersigned and untimely

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filed a Response to Respondent’s Proposed Recommended Order on
September 22, 2026, that was not taken into consideration.
Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the Florida Statutes refer to the
2025 version in effect at the time of the alleged violations.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Parties
1. Petitioner is from the Dominican Republic. He was hired by Miami-
Dade County to work in the DRER beginning in January 2023. Petitioner
was employed as a Motor Vehicle Repair Enforcement Officer whose duties
included inspection of repair shops in the county to ensure the shops had
proper certifications to perform the repairs they were offering to the public
and to write tickets, if needed.
2. Petitioner accepted a promotion on May 27, 2024, to a higher-paying
position in the Internal Services Department (“ISD”) of the County. He
voluntarily resigned on November 15, 2024. He filed a Charge with FCHR on
August 1, 2025, more than a year after he left the DRER.
3. Miami-Dade County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida
charged with operating a local government within the geographic boundaries
of Miami-Dade County, Florida. The DRER is one of the departments of the
County and was the subject of Petitioner’s allegations of violations of the
Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) in the Charge.
Allegations of Discrimination and Retaliation
4. Petitioner’s Charge was filed August 1, 2025, and it alleges national
origin discrimination and retaliation allegedly in violation of the FCRA.
5. Petitioner’s Charge is based on actions and statements that allegedly
occurred while he was employed in the DRER, namely three incidents that
occurred between February 2024 and May 2024: (1) an initial meet and greet
meeting with Assistant Director Ricardo Roig when Roig asked Petitioner

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where he was from; (2) a meeting where Roig stepped on his foot while
discussing the importance of wearing steel-toed boots; and (3) the assignment
of another employee to ride along with Petitioner to allegedly evaluate him.
6. Petitioner’s claim of retaliation stems from his belief that that someone
from the DRER provided false information and/or a negative reference to the
U.S. Army that Petitioner had been under investigation while employed with
the County.
Petitioner’s Employment with Respondent
7. Petitioner alleges that his employment issues began on February 5,
2024, when the unit in which he worked was re-assigned to a different work
location under a different manager, Roig, who was a DRER Assistant
Director. At the initial meeting with Roig and other employees, Roig asked
Petitioner where he was from. Roig responded that he was from the
Dominican Republic and that he was Dominican. Roig did not make any
other comment about Petitioner’s national origin, either at this meeting or
any time thereafter.
8. The next alleged discriminatory action according to Petitioner was
during a second meeting in February 2024 with Roig and other employees
where Roig intentionally stepped on Petitioner’s foot. When asked to clarify,
Petitioner admitted that Roig did not actually step on his foot directly
because Petitioner was wearing boots at the time. Petitioner was upset about
this although, at that point in early February 2024, he was in the last few
days of his one-year probationary period, so he did not report the foot-
stepping incident internally or to the police.
9. Petitioner admitted that this incident occurred in the context of Roig
highlighting the importance of wearing steel-toed shoes. Petitioner offered no
evidence that Roig’s motivation for stepping on Petitioner’s shoe was his
national origin.
10. Petitioner also alleges that he was unfairly scrutinized because, on one
occasion, Roig chose to do a “ride-along” to observe Petitioner. On another

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occasion, Roig directed a newer employee, Sean Hansel, to ride along with
Petitioner. Petitioner suffered no adverse consequence as a result of these
ride-alongs. He did not receive any discipline. Petitioner offered no evidence
that he was selected for these ride-alongs due to his national origin. To the
contrary, Petitioner was told by Roig that Hansel was riding along with
Petitioner “to learn how we do our work.”
11. Petitioner felt humiliated and singled-out by these events although he
did not report any alleged harassment or discrimination to Human Resources
or management. He applied for another position with the County and was
promoted to Heavy Equipment Operator in the ISD, accompanied by a pay
increase.
12. Prior to the May 27, 2024, effective date of his promotion, Petitioner
had an exchange of emails with Roig and others, including DRER Director
Lourdes Gomez, announcing that he was departing from the DRER. In the
email, Petitioner described his primary reason for leaving the DRER was that
he felt disrespected when Roig stepped on his foot. There was no mention of
national origin discrimination in the email. As such, this email exchange did
not constitute “protected activity.”
13. Petitioner had no problems working for the ISD after May 27, 2024.
After working for ISD for five months, Petitioner resigned effective
November 15, 2024, to pursue a new opportunity for the Department of
Defense. In a resignation letter to his supervisors, Petitioner stated he was
“grateful for the opportunities I have had to grow both professionally and
personally during my time here,” and he enjoyed working alongside talented
colleagues.
14. As part of the separation of employment process, Petitioner filled out
an Exit Interview Questionnaire. In the Exit Interview Questionnaire,
Petitioner’s responses about his employment experience were positive.
Petitioner described his reason(s) for leaving employment as another job and
relocation from the area.

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15. Petitioner was asked the question: What would you have changed
about your employment situation if you could have?” He responded,
“nothing.” In response to the question if anything could have been done to
dissuade him from leaving, Petitioner stated, “nothing. I want to move out of
town.”
16. In response to the question whether he had additional comments that
would assist in making employee’s tenure more satisfying, Petitioner
responded, “Keep up the good work. No complaint.”
17. Petitioner concedes that during his employment with Respondent, he
was not disciplined, written up, or cited for misconduct.
Petitioner’s Post-County Employment and Alleged Retaliation
18. Petitioner separated from County service on November 15, 2024, and
became employed almost immediately with a private company known as
ManTech Corporation (“ManTech”). Nothing that happened during his
employment with Respondent, or after, prevented him from obtaining
employment with ManTech. Petitioner was rehired by the County in
July 2026 and was a County employee at the time of the hearing.
19. Petitioner’s retaliation claim is based upon his allegation that someone
at the DRER provided a negative reference about him to the Army. The
Charge provides no facts that he engaged in protected activity prior to the
alleged negative reference. The Charge also provided no date as to when this
alleged negative reference from someone at the DRER to the Army occurred.
20. At the hearing, Petitioner claimed that although the alleged negative
reference did not prevent him from getting the job at ManTech, he was
unable to get a security clearance in June 2025 at his job at ManTech.
Petitioner’s testimony about allegedly having his security clearance denied,
due to a negative reference about him to the Army, constitutes hearsay and is
not credible evidence to establish that an employee of the County with
authority to provide a reference actually made false statements about
Petitioner to the Army.

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21. Without any details regarding who said what about Petitioner, to
whom, and when, Petitioner’s testimony regarding alleged retaliation is
nothing more than conjecture. Even if his security clearance was not granted,
there may have been a myriad of reasons as to why Petitioner was not
granted security clearance at his job at ManTech. Petitioner offered no
witnesses from Respondent, ManTech, or the Army to substantiate his claim.
22. Notably, Petitioner’s only protected activity was the filing of the
Charge with FCHR on August 1, 2025, which occurred only after the
purported negative reference. There was no credible evidence that Petitioner
complained of unlawful discrimination prior to the filing of the Charge on
August 1, 2025, thus, there is no basis for a claim that any purported
negative reference in June 2025 was retaliation for activity by Petitioner that
was protected by the FCRA.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
23. DOAH has jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this
proceeding. §§ 120.569, 120.57(1), and 760.11(7), Fla. Stat. (2026).
24. The FCRA, section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes, states that it is an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or
otherwise discriminate against an individual on the basis of national origin.
Section 760.10(7) prohibits an employer from engaging in retaliation against
an employee who engages in a protected activity, such as reporting unlawful
discrimination. See Hinton v. Supervision Int’l, Inc., 942 So. 2d 986, 990
(Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
25. In cases involving claims of unlawful employment discrimination, the
burden of proof is on the complainant to establish, by a preponderance, or
“greater weight,” of the evidence, the occurrence of the alleged unlawful
discrimination. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1273
(11th Cir. 2002); St. Louis v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 60 So. 3d 455, 458–59 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2011).

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26. Florida courts “have recognized that [t]he [Florida Civil Rights Act
(“FCRA”)] is patterned after Title VII and that federal case law on Title VII
applies to FCRA claims.” Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Wright, 217 So. 3d
163, 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); see Hinton, 942 So. 2d at 989; Russell v. KSL
Hotel Corp., 887 So. 2d 372, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).
Petitioner’s Discrimination Claims are Untimely
27. Section 760.11(1) requires that complaints of discrimination are to be
filed within 365 days of the alleged violation of the FCRA. Acts that were
committed prior to that date are outside the scope of a complaint under the
FCRA and are not actionable. Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty.,
82 F.4th 1296, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2023).
28. The three acts which Petitioner claims were based on national origin
discrimination all occurred more than a year prior to the filing of his Charge
on August 1, 2025. Petitioner admitted that he had no problems with the
County after he transferred to the ISD on May 27, 2024. Accordingly,
Petitioner’s national origin discrimination claim is time-barred and not
actionable.
29. Although there is a “continuing violation” theory that allows claimants
to link events together to show an on-going pattern of actionable
discrimination, Petitioner did not allege any discrete acts of alleged national
origin discrimination within the one-year look-back period.
Petitioner Cannot Show a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
30. Discriminatory intent can be established through direct or
circumstantial evidence. Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir.
1999). Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that, if believed,
establishes the existence of discriminatory intent behind an employment
decision without inference or presumption. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents,
342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
31. “Direct evidence is composed of ‘only the most blatant remarks, whose
intent could be nothing other than to discriminate’ on the basis of some

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impermissible factor.” Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1266. Petitioner presented no
direct evidence of national origin discrimination or retaliation.
32. “[D]irect evidence of intent is often unavailable.” Shealy v. City of
Albany, Ga., 89 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir. 1996). For this reason, those who
claim to be victims of intentional discrimination “are permitted to establish
their cases through inferential and circumstantial proof.” Kline v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).
33. Where a complainant attempts to prove intentional discrimination
using circumstantial evidence, the shifting burden analysis established by
the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981), is applied. Under this well-established model of proof,
the complainant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination.
34. When the charging party is able to make out a prima facie case, the
burden to go forward shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for the employment action. See Dep’t of Corr.
v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (court discusses shifting
burdens of proof in discrimination cases). The employer has the burden of
production, not persuasion. Id.; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
507 (1993).
35. The employee must then come forward with specific evidence
demonstrating that the reasons given by the employer are a pretext for
discrimination. Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1267. The employee must satisfy this
burden by showing directly that a discriminatory reason, more likely than
not, motivated the decision, or indirectly by showing that the proffered reason
for the employment decision is not worthy of belief. Chandler, 582 So. 2d at
1186. Petitioner has not met this burden.

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Proving National Origin Discrimination
36. To prove a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination
under chapter 760, Petitioner must establish that: (1) he is a member of
the protected group; (2) he was subject to adverse employment action;
(3) Respondent treated similarly situated employees outside of his protected
classifications more favorably; and (4) Petitioner was qualified to do the job
and was performing his job at a level that met the employer’s legitimate
expectations. See, e.g., Jiles v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F. App’x 61,
64 (11th Cir. 2010); Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323
(11th Cir. 2006); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313,
1316 (11th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1441
(11th Cir. 1998); McKenzie v. EAP Mgmt. Corp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374-75
(S.D. Fla. 1999).
37. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful
employment discrimination. The undisputed evidence demonstrated
Petitioner is Dominican and is, therefore, a member of a protected group.
However, he did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
subjected to adverse employment action.
38. The Title VII standard for discrimination claims requires an employee
to establish an “ultimate employment decision” or make some other showing
of substantiality in the employment context in order to establish adverse
employment action. Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
to Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 616–17 (11th Cir. 2004); Davis v.
Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001)); and
Cheatham v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 682 F. App’x 881 (11th Cir. 2017).
39. “Ultimate employment decision” has been defined by the courts as
decisions such as termination, failure to hire, or demotion. As a matter of
law, “conduct falling short of an ultimate employment decision must, in some
substantial way, alter the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, deprive him or her of employment opportunities, or

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adversely affect his or her status as an employee.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970.
In defining the level of substantiality required for a Title VII claim, the
courts have required an employee to show that he suffered a “serious and
material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” in
order to establish an adverse employment action. Id. “[N]ot all conduct by an
employer negatively affecting an employee constitutes an adverse
employment action.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239.
40. While Petitioner asserts that Roig’s conduct of asking Petitioner’s
nationality, stepping on his foot, and riding along with Petitioner were
motivated by national origin, he fails to identify any specific comments,
conduct, or actions that suggest discriminatory intent. Petitioner did not
experience any adverse employment action. His employment was not
terminated, suspended, demoted, or otherwise materially altered. In fact, it
was Petitioner who voluntarily resigned from his position with the County
after receiving a promotion and pay raise.
41. Although arguably the incidents while working at the DRER of which
Petitioner complains were embarrassing or disrespectful, the Supreme Court
has held that Title VII (and therefore the FCRA) is “not a general civility
code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). Petitioner failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination on the basis of
his national origin.
Proving Retaliation
42. To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under section 760.10(7),
a petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected
activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a
causal relation between the two events. See Vill. of Tequesta v. Luscavich,
240 So. 3d 733, 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018); Donovan v. Broward Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 974 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

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43. “Protected activities,” for purposes of a prima facie claim of retaliation
consist of: (1) opposing any practice deemed an unlawful employment practice
by Title VII, which is known as the “opposition clause,” or (2) making a
charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII, which is known as the
“participation clause.” Washington v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 634 F. Supp.
3d 316 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (Black employee’s vague complaints to employer’s
human resources department that coworker yelled at her and that her
training was cancelled did not allege that those actions were done with racial
animus, and thus complaints could not amount to protected activity, as would
support employee’s prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII). See also
Davis v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 F. App’x 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A]
vague complaint, without any reference to an unlawful employment practice
under Title VII, does not constitute protected activity.”).
44. Petitioner’s email to his supervisors when resigning from the DRER
did not amount to “protected activity.” He did not state that he was being
discriminated against or harassed based on his national origin or any other
protected characteristic.
45. Petitioner’s resignation from the County was voluntary and was not
preceded by any demotion, suspension, reduction in pay, or other materially
adverse action that would support a claim of retaliation or constructive
discharge. Petitioner filed his charge with FCHR only after he voluntarily
resigned. Accordingly, there can be no “causal connection” between his charge
at FCHR and the earlier incidents he experienced while working at
Respondent. See Decoste v. City of Boynton Beach, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1383
(S.D. Fla. 2026) (If alleged retaliatory conduct occurred before the employee
engaged in protected activity, the two events cannot be causally connected for
purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim.).

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Case No. 26-0932
46. Similarly, if the Army or ManTech received a negative reference from
Respondent regarding Petitioner prior to the filing of his Charge, there can be
no causal relationship between the two.
47. Petitioner failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was subjected to unlawful retaliation for engaging in statutorily
protected activity.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a
final order finding that Miami-Dade County Department of Regulatory and
Economic Resources did not commit an unlawful employment practice and
dismissing the Petition filed by German Caraballo.
DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2026, in Tampa,
Hillsborough County, Florida.
S
MARY LI CREASY
Administrative Law Judge
DOAH Tampa Office
Division of Administrative Hearings
2001 Drayton Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32311
(850) 488-9675
www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 14th day of October, 2026.

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COPIES FURNISHED:
Elizabeth A. Miller, Chief Legal Counsel
(eServed)
Casey C. Snipes, Agency Clerk
(eServed)
German Dario Caraballo
(eServed)
Cindy T. Harper, Attorney Supervisor
(eServed)
Eric Alberto Rodriguez, Esquire
(eServed)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from
the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended
Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this
case.