Aaron Billman v. Cassie Billman

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2025-1313
LT Case No. 2023-DR-003120
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AARON BILLMAN,

Appellant,

v.

CASSIE BILLMAN,

Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County.
Charles L.W. Helm, Judge.

Clayton M. Emrick, of Emrick Family Law Firm, Clermont,
for Appellant.

W. Scott Wynn, Groveland, for Appellee.

June 19, 2026

SOUD, J.

Appellant Aaron Billman appeals the final judgment
dissolving his three-year marriage to Appellee Cassie Billman. 1
We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App.
P. 9.030(b). We affirm in all points, save one. We reverse and
remand for entry of a new final judgment that corrects—in a

1 Cassie Billman has not filed an answer brief in this appeal.
manner deemed appropriate by the trial court—certain internal
inconsistencies within the judgment that appear to be the result of
final drafting or editing of the judgment before us.

While Aaron Billman raises numerous claims of error, his
failure to provide a transcript of pertinent proceedings is fatal to
all but one of his claims. It is a “fundamental principle of appellate
review” that Aaron Billman as the appellant must demonstrate
reversible error in a manner sufficient to overcome the weighty
presumption of correctness that adorns a trial court’s judgment
under review. See Casiano v. Casiano, 370 So. 3d 991, 995 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2023) (quoting Thurman v. Davis, 321 So. 3d 341, 343–44
(Fla. 1st DCA 2021)). To that end, he “has the burden of providing
a proper record to the reviewing court, and the failure to do so is
usually fatal to the appellant’s claims.” Id. at 996 (quoting Esaw
v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261, 1264–65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)).

In the absence of a proper record, our review is limited to those
errors appearing on the face of the judgment. See id. at 995; see
also Hill v. Calderin, 47 So. 3d 852, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
(“Notwithstanding the absence of a transcript, however, an
appellate court may review a lower court judgment for error
apparent on its face.”); Mobley v. Mobley, 18 So. 3d 724, 725 (Fla.
2d DCA 2009). Aaron Billman argues that the trial court erred in
entry of that final judgment because, inter alia, certain findings
and/or provisions regarding parental responsibility and
timesharing are “internally inconsistent.”

Initially, we note that after weighing the factors required by
section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2023), and concluding that those
factors weigh in favor of Cassie Billman, the trial court determined
in its judgment that “[t]he Parenting Plan . . . proposed by [Cassie
Billman] is appropriate.” The judgment does not expressly adopt
or otherwise attach the parenting plan. Nonetheless, Aaron
Billman in his arguments asserts that the parenting plan was
adopted by the trial court.

While not attaching a parenting plan, the final judgment does
provide numerous provisions regarding parental responsibility
and timesharing with the parties’ two minor children. Pertinent
for our purposes, the judgment provides:

2
The parties shall have Shared Parental
Responsibility of their minor children pursuant to
61.13, Florida Statutes regarding all major issues
effecting [sic] the general welfare of the minor
children which shall include, but shall not be
limited to, future issues regarding school;
education; third party care; extracurricular
activities; travel; and any other future issued [sic]
materially effecting [sic] the general welfare of the
minor children.

In the next paragraph, however, the judgment also states that
Cassie Billman “shall have Sole Parental Responsibility of their
minor children pursuant to 61.13, Florida Statutes[,] regarding all
medical, dental or healthcare decisions or matters effecting [sic] the
general welfare of the minor children.” These two provisions
plainly conflict with one another.

Later in its final judgment, the trial court established the
timesharing schedule with the minor children, including that
which is to apply during the “traditional school year.” The
“traditional school year” schedule provides that “the minor
children shall be with the Mother during the week and alternating
weekends and with the Father every other weekend.” Yet, when
providing timesharing for the children’s “traditional summer
school break,” the court provided that:

[The “traditional school year” provision] shall be
suspended. The parties shall continue with the
traditional school year time sharing whereby the
minor children are with the Mother during the
week and alternating weekends and with the
Father every other weekend. exercise [sic] week to
week timesharing the entire summer until such
time as summer break concludes at which time [the
traditional school year timesharing schedule] shall
be reinstated. [sic].

Thus, while we may be able to anticipate what the trial court
intended, this provision concerning timesharing during the
summer break is unclear and fails to adequately declare to the
parties the timesharing by which they are to be guided.

3
As a result of the failure to attach a parenting plan and the
inconsistencies that create a material deficiency in the final
judgment’s provisions governing parental responsibility and
timesharing, the final judgment is legally insufficient to comply
with the requirements of section 61.13(2)(a)–(b), Florida Statutes.
See Magdziak v. Sullivan, 185 So. 3d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 5th DCA
2016).

Accordingly, the final judgment of dissolution of marriage is
REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the trial court for entry of a
final judgment to include a parenting plan or provisions contained
within the judgment that fully satisfy the dictates of section
61.13(2)(a)–(b), Florida Statutes. 2

It is so ordered.

JAY, C.J., and HARRIS, J., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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2 We emphasize that we do not conclude that a particular
decision of the trial court was erroneous, but rather that the final
judgment as written fails to comply with Chapter 61, Florida
Statutes.

4