Marcus Tremayne Williams v. State of Florida

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-3330
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MARCUS TREMAYNE WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Jennie Kinsey, Judge.

June 10, 2026

ROBERTS, J.

Appellant Marcus Tremayne Williams appeals his 45.15-
month sentences on Counts 1 and 3 on double jeopardy grounds.
For the reasons below, we affirm.

In 2021, the State filed an information charging Appellant
with introducing contraband articles into a county detention
facility (Count 1), battery on a law enforcement officer (Count 2),
possession of a controlled substance—cocaine (Count 3), resisting
an officer without violence (Count 4), and possession of a controlled
substance—less than twenty grams of cannabis (Count 5). In 2022,
the parties entered into a negotiated plea agreement that provided
for a downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence of
40.95 months. Appellant pled no contest to Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5,
and the State dropped Count 2. The trial court adjudicated
Appellant guilty and sentenced him to ninety days in county jail
followed by thirty-six months of probation on Count 1, thirty-six
months of probation on Count 3, twelve months of probation on
Count 4, and twelve months of probation on Count 5. In 2023,
Appellant completed his probation on Counts 4 and 5.

In 2024, the State filed a violation of probation (VOP) affidavit
and report alleging that Appellant violated Conditions (5) and (7)
of his probation on Counts 1 and 3 by testing positive for cocaine.
At the VOP hearing, the trial court advised that with the VOPs,
the lowest permissible sentence was 45.15 months and it was
required to sentence Appellant to a minimum of 45.15 months.
Notably, the sentence computation section of the scoresheet
provided:

Appellant admitted the VOPs, and the trial court accepted his
admission as freely, knowingly, and voluntarily given.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court misstated that the
lowest permissible sentence was fifteen months, rather than 45.15
months as reflected in the scoresheet. Neither party corrected the
trial court. The trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty on Counts
1 and 3 and revoked his probation. When pronouncing sentence,
the trial court stated:

Then I’ll do lowest guideline. I’ll do 15 months state
prison with credit for 306 days. It’s not great, but it’s
better than ten years.

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The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The
prosecutor asked if the trial court said fifteen or fifty, and the trial
court replied, “One five.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
court repeated the sentence:

So that’s 15 months state prison, which is the bottom of
the guidelines, with credit for 306 days.

The trial court advised Appellant of his right to appeal, and the
sentencing hearing concluded.

During the lunch break, the State reached out to the trial
court, and Appellant’s case was recalled. The trial court explained
that it had misread the lowest permissible sentence on the
scoresheet and announced the guideline sentence as fifteen
months instead of 45.15 months. The trial court advised that
Appellant could withdraw his plea and start “fresh,” or he could be
sentenced to 45.15 months. Defense counsel objected to
resentencing, and the trial court gave the parties time to research
the issue.

At the resentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

When we had our VOP day in court, I specifically said
that I was sentencing him to a guideline sentence, and
then when I read the . . . scoresheet[,] and it had been half
typed and half written, I saw fifteen, but it was my intent
that day to do a guideline sentence. I don’t think anybody
in here thinks that it was anything but my intent to do a
guideline sentence. When I misread the scoresheet, I
believe the attorneys have a duty to the Court to correct
also because everybody knew the bottom of the guidelines
was 45.15. . . . [O]ver the lunch hour, the State said,
there’s a problem, asked to bring it in. . . . [T]he intent
was guideline, it was made very clear. I gave two
completely conflicting statements, guideline and fifteen
months, which absolutely was not correct.

....

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I announced a guideline sentence[,] and a guideline
sentence is 45.15. So the intent was always bottom [of]
the guideline. So I think that is the distinguishing factor
in [Appellant’s] case, and that is why I said -- when I
realized this mistake, if he wanted to withdraw his plea,
he could do so. But the intent has always been, as stated
at sentence, imposed for a guideline sentence.

The trial court explained that it did not find any legal grounds to
depart and, although it could modify, it chose not to under the
circumstances. The trial court vacated the fifteen-month sentence,
adjudicated Appellant guilty on Counts 1 and 3, revoked his
probation, and resentenced him to 45.15 months in prison on each
count, to run concurrently.

On appeal, Appellant argues that his 45.15-month sentences
violate double jeopardy. Based on the record before us, we find that
his argument is without merit. “A double jeopardy claim based
upon undisputed facts presents a pure question of law and is
reviewed de novo.” Dunbar v. State, 89 So. 3d 901, 904 n.3 (Fla.
2012) (quoting Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006)).

The application of the double jeopardy clause turns on the
extent and legitimacy of a defendant’s expectation of
finality in that sentence. If a defendant has a legitimate
expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence
is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. If, however,
there is some circumstance which undermines the
legitimacy of that expectation, then a court may
permissibly increase the sentence.

Dunbar, 89 So. 3d at 905 (cleaned up). “[S]imple human error is
inevitable in oral pronouncements[,] and . . . the constitutional
doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended to make sentencing
a game in which mental errors by judges and attorneys are
irreparable even when the error is discovered minutes later.”
Gardner v. State, 30 So. 3d 629, 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
(Altenbernd, J., dissenting).

In this case, there is no question that the trial court intended
to impose guideline sentences and not to downwardly depart. At

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the VOP hearing, the trial court advised Appellant that it was
required to sentence him to a minimum of 45.15 months. At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court simply misread the scoresheet
and stated fifteen months instead of 45.15 months. The error was
not brought to the trial court’s attention until the lunch break, but
the trial court promptly recalled the case to address the error on
the record.

Even though Appellant was taken out of the courtroom after
sentencing, he had no legitimate expectation of finality in the
fifteen-month sentences, and the trial court did not violate double
jeopardy principles by imposing the 45.15-month sentences. See
Coello v. State, 383 So. 3d 833, 835–36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)
(holding no double jeopardy violation occurred where the trial
court’s pronouncements at the original sentencing hearing were
unclear and inconsistent, and the trial court clarified the sentence
at the second hearing a few days later); Duncan v. State, 59 So. 3d
1197, 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (reversing and remanding for the
trial court to clarify the sentence where the Fifth District
suspected that either the transcript was incorrect or the trial court
simply misspoke when announcing the sentence). Furthermore, if
the trial court had not corrected its error, the State could have
appealed the departure sentence. See State v. Clark, 912 So. 2d
348, 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (concluding that the downward
departure was reversible error where the record revealed no oral
or written reason for the departure).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM Appellant’s sentences.

NORDBY, J., concurs; WINOKUR, J., concurs with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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WINOKUR, J., concurring.

I fully agree with the majority opinion but wish to emphasize
a single point.

The Criminal Punishment Code creates a lowest permissible
sentence and specifies that a “downward departure from the lowest
permissible sentence” without proper statutory support is
“prohibited” and “subject to appellate review.” § 921.0026(1), Fla.
Stat. See also § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (“A departure sentence is
prohibited unless there are mitigating circumstances or factors
present as provided in s. 921.0026 which reasonably justify a
departure.”). “A sentence that decreases an offender’s sentence
below the lowest permissible sentence is a departure sentence and
must be accompanied by a written statement by the sentencing
court delineating the reasons for the departure[.]” § 921.00265(2),
Fla. Stat. Accordingly, as the majority opinion notes, a sentence
below the lowest permissible sentence that is not accompanied by
a written statement providing valid reasons for the departure
constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Arnold, 948 So. 2d
910 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (reversing a downward departure
sentence because the court failed to provide any valid legal reason
for departure that is supported by competent, substantial record
evidence).

Clearly, the 15-month sentence originally imposed, without
any supporting valid departure reasons, was not authorized by
statute and would have constituted reversible error. Under these
circumstances, I conclude that Williams had no legitimate
expectation of finality in the impermissible sentence.

I recognize that a sentence that is below the lowest
permissible sentence, unlike the sentence imposed in Dunbar v.
State, is not one that the court “had no discretion to impose[.]” 89
So.3d 901, 906 (Fla. 2012). But while the court did have discretion
to impose the departure, the State had a corresponding right to
seek appellate review if it believed that the departure sentence
violated the statute. § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. Accordingly,
Williams’ expectation of finality in the improper downward
departure sentence was not legitimate “until the appeal is

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concluded or the time to appeal has expired.” United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980).

In this respect, I disagree with the conclusion of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Hobgood v. State, 166 So. 3d 840, 846
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015). In Hobgood, the sentencing court imposed an
improper departure sentence, and “some time later that same day”
recalled the case, indicated that it had overlooked the lowest
permissible sentence, and imposed a permissible sentence. Id. at
843. The Fourth District ruled that the resentence violated the
defendant’s protection against double jeopardy because she had
“begun serving her sentence” prior to the resentencing. Id. at 846.
While the court’s conclusion that the resentence violated double
jeopardy as soon as the defendant had “begun serving her
sentence” may apply when the original sentence is statutorily
authorized, it makes no sense when applied to a sentence that is
not statutorily authorized and is subject to reversal if the State
appeals. Under DiFrancesco, the defendant’s expectation of
finality in the statutorily unauthorized sentence did not become
legitimate when she began serving her sentence, it became
legitimate only “after the time to appeal has expired.”

In short, while I agree with the majority opinion that the
factual circumstances here belie a legitimate expectation of
finality in the improper 15-month sentence, I also conclude that
Williams had no legitimate expectation of finality in the
unauthorized 15-month sentence, because that unauthorized
sentence was subject to reversal on appeal. Either way, affirmance
is appropriate.

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Joel Daniel Arnold,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Amanda Bosman,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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