Monticello Elderly Housing Ltd. v. Borders, Kirksey

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-2007
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MONTICELLO ELDERLY HOUSING
LTD.,

Appellant,

v.

RUBY BORDERS and LARRY
KIRKSEY,

Appellees.
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On appeal from the County Court for Jefferson County.
Robert Ridgely Plaines, Judge.

June 3, 2026

PER CURIAM.

In this residential eviction case, Monticello Elderly Housing
Ltd. (“Landlord”) appeals a nonfinal order denying its Motion for
Default Judgment of Possession. We reverse the order and remand
for the reasons stated below.

On February 25, 2025, Landlord filed a two-count complaint
against Appellees Ruby Borders and Larry Kirksey (collectively,
“Tenants”). Count I seeks to evict Tenants, alleging (i) the terms of
the lease agreement expired on January 31, 2025; (ii) Landlord
elected not to renew the lease due to Tenants’ multiple material
violations of the lease agreement, such as insufficient rent
payments and the water utility being disconnected; and (iii)
notwithstanding an eighty-four-day notice of nonrenewal, Tenants
failed to vacate the property. Count II seeks damages for unpaid
rent and late fees. Following the nonrenewal, the rent increased
because Tenants no longer qualified for federal subsidies due to
their failure to recertify their income.

After being served with the complaint, Tenants filed a pro se
answer alleging “that some of the things are false” in the
complaint. Specifically, Tenants disputed that the water utility
was ever disconnected. Tenants also offered explanations for the
nonpayment of rent, including that Borders was hospitalized from
January 11, 2025, to February 13, 2025. The answer, however, did
not mention the federal re-certification process for rent subsidies
or even question the amount of rent owed.

Three months later, Landlord moved for entry of a default
judgment under section 83.60(2), Florida Statutes (2025), arguing
it was statutorily entitled to a default judgment because Tenants
had not alleged payment as a defense, had not deposited the
alleged rent in the court registry, nor moved to determine rent. Yet
after a non-evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court
interpreted Tenants’ answer to be “a pleading which requires a
determination of rent” based on the federal re-certification process
and denied the motion. Landlord argues on appeal, and we agree,
that the trial court’s interpretation of Tenants’ answer was
improper and that Landlord was entitled to a default judgment
under section 83.60(2).

This Court reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation
and the sufficiency of pleadings. Colby v. Zicarelli, 392 So. 3d 299,
300 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024); James v. Crews, 132 So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla.
1st DCA 2014).

Section 83.60 governs the available defenses in an eviction
action, and it provides that if a tenant raises any defense other
than payment, the tenant is required to pay into the registry of the
court the accrued rent as alleged in the complaint or as determined
by the court, as well as the rent that accrues during the pendency
of the proceeding. § 83.60(2), Fla. Stat. (2025). It further provides,

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Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the registry of
the court or to file a motion to determine the amount of
rent to be paid into the registry . . . constitutes an
absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses other than
payment, and the landlord is entitled to an immediate
default judgment for removal of the tenant with a writ of
possession to issue without further notice or hearing
thereon.

Id.

Tenants did not raise payment as a defense. Their pro se
answer offers other defenses and explanations for the unpaid rent
but never alleges that they, in fact, paid the rent. Tenants did not
even contest the rent owed. It is also undisputed that Tenants did
not deposit the alleged, accrued rent into the court registry, or file
a separate motion to determine the correct amount of rent, as
required by section 83.60(2). Nevertheless, the trial court
construed their answer as a motion to determine rent and denied
the Landlord’s motion for default judgment. In doing so, the trial
court reversibly erred.

While pro se filings are construed liberally, a court cannot
substantively change the assertions raised therein, because a court
cannot assist a pro se litigant to the detriment of the opposing
party. See James, 132 So. 3d at 899. Although the trial court
discussed at the hearing that Tenants could seek to be re-certified
and lower their rent, their answer did not mention Tenants’
renewed eligibility for federal subsidies or even question the
amount of rent owed. Thus, there was no reasonable basis for the
trial court to interpret the answer as a motion to determine rent.
Due to Tenants’ failure to pay the rent into the court registry or
file a motion to determine the amount of rent, Landlord was
entitled to an immediate default judgment for Tenants’ removal
with a writ of possession. § 83.60(2), Fla. Stat.

We REVERSE the order on appeal and REMAND for entry of a
default judgment on Count I, entry of a writ of possession, and
further proceedings on Count II for damages.

ROBERTS, RAY, and TREADWELL, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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William Grant Watson and Cynthia Fussell O’Donnell of Stone &
Gerken, P.A., Mount Dora, for Appellant.

Daniel Clibbon of Legal Services of North Florida, Tallahassee, for
Appellees.

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