The Florida Bar v. Bruce Jacobs

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2020-1602
____________

THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,

vs.

BRUCE JACOBS,
Respondent.

June 8, 2023

PER CURIAM.

Respondent, Bruce Jacobs, seeks review of a referee’s

amended report recommending that Jacobs be found guilty of

multiple violations of Rule Regulating The Florida Bar (Bar Rule) 4-

8.2(a) (Impugning Qualifications and Integrity of Judges or Other

Officers) and recommending that he be suspended from the practice

of law for 90 days. 1 Jacobs challenges the referee’s findings of fact

and recommendations as to guilt, arguing that while he did impugn

the integrity of members of the judiciary, his statements were

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
neither dishonest nor made with reckless disregard for the truth

and therefore did not violate Bar Rule 4-8.2(a). The Bar asks this

Court to approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations

as to guilt but challenges the referee’s recommendation as to

discipline, urging this Court to instead impose a two-year

rehabilitative suspension. For the reasons discussed below, we

approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to

guilt, but we disapprove the referee’s recommendation as to

discipline and instead impose a 91-day rehabilitative suspension.

BACKGROUND

Jacobs, a veteran foreclosure defense attorney, has developed

a set of legal theories that he has often argued on behalf of clients.

His theories are based on the premise that a party seeking to

foreclose on a defaulted mortgage should not be able to collect an

equitable remedy if it came to the court with unclean hands. More

specifically, Jacobs’ theory is that in cases where a homeowner who

borrowed money to purchase a home is now in default on

payments, the holder of the note should not be allowed to enforce

the note or foreclose on the mortgage if any faulty or defective

assignments occurred after the closing on the note and mortgage.

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Relevant to this case, Jacobs attempted to assert his theory in

three separate foreclosure proceedings below, but his arguments

were rejected. Jacobs then filed in those cases motions that

included negative comments and accusations about courts and

specific judges. This resulted in the Bar filing a three-count

complaint against Jacobs alleging that he had impugned the

qualifications or integrity of members of the judiciary. The Bar

complaint was referred to a referee, who held hearings on both guilt

and discipline and then submitted an amended report with the

following findings and recommendations.

Count I

Jacobs represented the defendant in a foreclosure action in

HSBC Bank USA, National Association v. Aquasol Condominium

Association, Inc., No. 2013-29724-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.). After

the circuit court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of

the plaintiff bank, Jacobs filed an appeal in the Third District Court

of Appeal. Jacobs argued that the bank had no standing to

foreclose because it was not both holder and owner of the note.

Although Jacobs was aware of binding Third District case law

stating that a party has standing in a foreclosure suit if it is either

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the holder or the owner of the note, he did not cite this authority in

his appeal.

When the Third District affirmed the judgment of foreclosure,

Jacobs moved for rehearing en banc. In that motion, Jacobs made

“numerous comments impugning the integrity of the judiciary,”

including:

This Court’s insistence on ignoring established
Florida Supreme Court law to benefit bad corporate
citizens is certain to cause chaos.
....
Ownership controls the right to enforce the
mortgage. This Court is acting illegally by instructing the
law is otherwise.
....
This is a biblical, spiritual journey for me. I have
faith I will be protected because I am acting so clearly
within the law and this Honorable Court is not.
....
Banks have all the resources to do it right but made
business decisions to do it fraudulently. It’s as if they
knew the Courts would always let them get away with it. .
. . I call those judges traitors to the constitution.
....
I’ve had to warn [clients] this broken system is
riddled with fraud and perjury. The judges decide the
rule of law, and whether any rule of law exists. Maybe
the rule of law only applies to the rest of us.
....
Any court that protects the monopoly over the rule
of law is a traitor to the constitution and should be tried
for treason.

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After issuing an order directing Jacobs to show cause why he

should not be sanctioned, the Third District issued an order

declaring that Jacobs had filed a frivolous bad faith motion and had

impugned the qualifications or integrity of the judiciary in violation

of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410(a). The Third District

referred the matter to the Bar for consideration of discipline.

Aquasol Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 43 Fla.

L. Weekly D2699 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 5, 2018).

Count II

Jacobs represented the defendant in a foreclosure action in

Bank of New York Mellon v. Atkin, No. 2009-87096-CA-01 (Fla. 11th

Cir. Ct.). During the proceedings, Bank of America, a named

subject in matters raised in that case, filed a petition for writ of

prohibition in the Third District, which prompted a response from

Jacobs along with a motion to disqualify the Third District. See

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Atkin, 303 So. 3d 583, 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

In his response to the bank’s petition, Jacobs made several negative

comments about the Third District and circuit court judges,

including:

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[T]his Court violated the standard of review, ignored
Florida Supreme Court precedent, and falsified the facts
in contradiction to the record.
....
The impartiality of this Court is objectively
questioned and it cannot issue a ruling with integrity in
this case.
....
A named circuit court judge acted with “blatant
disregard for the rule of law and the client’s
constitutional rights” in an unrelated case and was
upheld by this Court.
....
A different, unnamed circuit court judge changed a
favorable ruling because opposing counsel “threw a
fundraiser for the new judge who rotated into the
division.”

The Third District concluded that Jacobs’ statements, together

with statements he made in a brief filed in the United States

Supreme Court, impugned the qualifications and/or integrity of

members of the judiciary. After issuing an order to show cause, the

Third District entered an opinion referring Jacobs to the Bar for

consideration of discipline. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Atkin, 271 So. 3d

145, 147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

Count III

Jacobs represented the defendant in a foreclosure action in

Bank of New York Mellon v. Atkin. During the proceedings, Jacobs

filed a motion for judicial disqualification in which he made several

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negative comments about the circuit court and about the presiding

circuit court judge, Judge Michael Hanzman, including:

Judge Hanzman Has Repeatedly Ignored Obvious
Fraud on the Court by Large Financial Institutions in
Foreclosures While Abusing His Power to Chill Defense
Counsel’s Zealous Advocacy Against Those Financial
Institutions[.]
....
Judge Hanzman has made repeated statements on
the record and off the record that reflect his indifference
to large financial institutions presenting false evidence to
the court to obtain the equitable relief of foreclosure. His
personal finances appear to be heavily invested in the
financial services sector which gives Mr. Atkin a
reasonable fear Judge Hanzman will not be fair and
impartial because it will negatively impact his significant
personal financial holdings.
....
[The court] has allowed the most rich and powerful
segment of our society, the financial sector in which he is
personally heavily invested in, to engage in felony
misconduct and walk away without any punishment . . . .

The circuit court dismissed Jacobs’ motion to disqualify for

being untimely and legally insufficient. Later, in an order denying a

motion for attorney’s fees, Judge Hanzman noted Jacobs’ repeated

failure to cite adverse controlling authority and mentioned Jacobs’

“scurrilous motion to disqualify this Court.” Judge Hanzman

declared that Jacobs “is unrepentant, undeterred, and continues to

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engage in the exact same behavior he was sanctioned for and which

is now presumably being investigated by the Bar.”

The referee ultimately found as to all three counts that Jacobs

made statements that impugned the qualifications or integrity of

members of the judiciary and that he did so intentionally as a

litigation tactic to obtain relief when he was unable to obtain relief

without such attacks. The referee recognized that attorneys have

an obligation to advocate zealously on behalf of clients but found

that Jacobs’ actions crossed a line into name-calling and violated

Bar Rule 4-8.2(a). The referee further found that Jacobs did not

provide an objectively reasonable factual basis for making any of his

statements impugning the integrity of the judiciary.

Jacobs asserted a selective prosecution defense in the

disciplinary proceeding, but the referee rejected the defense, finding

that the presented evidence did not establish the elements of

selective prosecution articulated in Thompson v. Florida Bar, 526 F.

Supp. 2d 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2007). The referee explained that the

conduct of other attorneys described by Jacobs was not the same

type of conduct Jacobs had been charged with and that “the case

law is replete with lawyers from assorted and various practice areas

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who have been prosecuted and disciplined for the same rule

violations as those which have been alleged against respondent

herein.” The referee also found that Jacobs had been afforded due

process at every stage.

Jacobs asserted other defenses as well, based on his history of

mental health issues, his expressions of remorse, and his

subsequent corrective behavior. The referee rejected these

defenses, finding that they did not negate guilt, but she noted that

the underlying facts could serve as potential mitigation when

determining the appropriate discipline.

Based on these findings, the referee recommends that Jacobs

be found guilty of three counts of violating Bar Rule 4-8.2(a).

However, the referee found that the Bar failed to prove that Jacobs

violated Bar Rule 4-3.3(a)(3) (False Evidence; Duty to Disclose) and

so recommends that Jacobs be found not guilty of violating that

rule. Neither party challenges the referee’s findings or

recommendation as to Bar Rule 4-3.3. For discipline, the referee

recommends that Jacobs be suspended from the practice of law for

90 days.

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ANALYSIS

A. The Referee’s Findings of Fact and Recommendations as
to Guilt.

Jacobs challenges the referee’s findings of fact and

recommendation that he be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-

8.2(a). When we review a referee’s findings of fact, our review is

limited; when a referee’s findings are supported by competent,

substantial evidence in the record, we will not reweigh the evidence

and substitute our own judgment for that of the referee. See Fla.

Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 79 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Bar v.

Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000)). When reviewing a

referee’s recommendations as to guilt, the referee’s factual findings

must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the

recommendations. Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56, 61 (Fla.

2018). Ultimately, the party challenging a referee’s findings of fact

or conclusions as to guilt has the burden to demonstrate that there

is no evidence in the record to support the referee’s findings or that

the record evidence clearly contradicts the referee’s conclusions.

Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007).

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The case before us concerns Bar Rule 4-8.2(a), which provides:

“A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be

false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning

the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . .” Although the

language of Bar Rule 4-8.2(a) invites comparison to civil defamation

standards, we have held that the defamation test articulated in New

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), does not apply in

these circumstances. See Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla.

2001). Instead, we use an objective test, asking if the lawyer had

“an objectively reasonable factual basis for making the statements.”

Id. Thus, once the Bar presents evidence establishing that a lawyer

made statements concerning the qualifications or integrity of a

judge, the burden shifts to the respondent to provide an objectively

reasonable factual basis for making the statements. Id. at 558 n.3.

Here, we approve the referee’s findings of fact on the charged

violations of Bar Rule 4-8.2(a). Addressing Count III first, Jacobs

filed a motion in Bank of New York Mellon v. Atkin in which he made

several assertions about circuit court judge Michael Hanzman,

including that Judge Hanzman “repeatedly ignored obvious fraud

on the court by large financial institutions in foreclosures” and

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“made repeated statements on the record and off the record that

reflect his indifference to large financial institutions presenting false

evidence to the court.” Jacobs further asserted that Judge

Hanzman “has allowed the most rich and powerful segment of our

society, the financial sector in which he is personally heavily

invested in, to engage in felony misconduct and walk away without

any punishment in violation of the Judicial Canons and the rule of

law.”

These remarks (and others made in Jacobs’ motion) clearly

comment on the integrity of a member of the judiciary. In fact,

Jacobs admits that his statements impugned Judge Hanzman’s

integrity; he only denies that his statements were false or made

with reckless disregard for the truth. However, Jacobs did not

establish that he had an objectively reasonable basis for making the

offending statements. He did not introduce at the disciplinary

hearings any documents that were “obviously” fraudulent on their

face but admitted into evidence by Judge Hanzman. Nor did he

present evidence showing that Judge Hanzman’s personal finances

would have been substantially impacted by the outcome of Atkin

such as to potentially establish an objectively reasonable basis to

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accuse the judge of allowing banks to commit felony misconduct to

protect his own financial interests. And while some witnesses who

testified at the disciplinary hearings endorsed Jacobs’ legal theories

about foreclosure defense, no witness testified that Judge Hanzman

(or any judge) had knowingly accepted fraudulent evidence or

colluded with financial institutions.

However firmly held Jacobs’ interpretations of foreclosure law

may be, his specific legal theories about facts that purportedly

establish unclean hands are not supported by case law out of the

Third District. Even so, while the testimony elicited at the

disciplinary hearings might suggest that Jacobs had a basis to

believe his interpretations of foreclosure law and unclean hands

were legally correct, the question before us is not whether Jacobs

was right that the Third District misinterpreted foreclosure law.

The question is whether Jacobs was entitled to impugn the integrity

of judges who ruled against him. In the absence of evidence

showing misconduct, collusion, or defiance of established law,

Jacobs has not demonstrated that he had an objectively reasonable

factual basis to accuse Judge Hanzman of allowing banks to

commit felony misconduct to benefit his own financial interests,

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especially when Judge Hanzman’s actions could be explained as

simply following controlling case law out of the Third District.

As to Counts I and II, our analysis is largely the same. The

Bar introduced motions in which Jacobs accused both named and

unnamed judges of acting outside the law, allowing banks to

perpetrate fraud with impunity, and betraying the Constitution to

protect the interests of financial monopolies.

There is no dispute that Jacobs made the statements

identified by the referee, and those statements clearly concerned the

qualifications or integrity of members of the judiciary. Thus, the

burden shifted to Jacobs to show that he had an objectively

reasonable factual basis for making the offending statements. As

with Count III, Jacobs did not introduce any documents that were

either proven or obviously fraudulent/falsified, nor did he elicit any

testimony that actions taken by a criticized court were illegal or

done to shield a financial institution from consequences.

Instead, Jacobs elicited testimony from attorneys and judges

who spoke of Jacobs as a true believer, a man whose legal theories

had been met with some success at the trial court level. These

witnesses testified that some courts had been receptive to Jacobs’

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unclean hands defense while other courts had rejected it. These

witnesses essentially testified that there was legal support for

Jacobs’ unclean hands defense, and they opined that Jacobs’

arguments were made in good faith.

However, if Jacobs’ legal theories on foreclosure defense were

embraced by controlling case law, he could have presented copies of

relevant appellate decisions and trial court rulings that might show

he had a reasonable basis to criticize judges who refused to follow

that controlling law. But Jacobs did not present any evidence

showing that a circuit or district court judge had defied established

law to benefit a financial institution or that any judge’s finances

would have been substantially affected by the outcome of a case

such that he or she was required to be disqualified from it.

Accordingly, Jacobs did not meet his burden of establishing that he

had an objectively reasonable factual basis to make his statements

which impugned the integrity of those judges.

Ultimately, the record clearly supports the referee’s finding

that Jacobs made statements in three separate legal proceedings

that impugned the integrity of members of the judiciary, and Jacobs

has failed to show that he had an objectively reasonable factual

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basis for making the statements. Because the record evidence does

not clearly contradict the referee’s recommendation that Jacobs be

found guilty of three violations of Bar Rule 4-8.2(a), we approve the

referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt.

We also find no merit in Jacobs’ challenge to the referee’s

rejection of his selective prosecution defense. Jacobs argues that

the Bar failed to prosecute bank attorneys who purportedly

committed various Bar Rule violations, but even assuming those

bank attorneys did violate Bar Rules, their conduct does not excuse

misconduct by Jacobs, and their alleged violations are not the same

type of misconduct Jacobs is charged with here such as to suggest

a selective prosecution. Moreover, Jacobs does not address the

many attorneys in various practice areas who have been brought up

on similar disciplinary charges to those raised against Jacobs in

this case. We therefore approve the referee’s rejection of Jacobs’

selective prosecution defense.

B. The Referee’s Recommendation as to Discipline.

In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s

scope of review is broader than it is when we review a referee’s

findings of fact, for it is ultimately this Court’s responsibility to

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order the appropriate sanction. Fla. Bar v. Kinsella, 260 So. 3d

1046, 1048 (Fla. 2018); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854

(Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. Prior to making a

recommendation on discipline, a referee must consider this Court’s

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions (Standards), which are subject to aggravating and

mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Abrams, 919 So. 2d

425, 430 (Fla. 2006); Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla.

1999).

From our review of the referee’s report, we do not find that the

referee’s recommended 90-day non-rehabilitative suspension is

reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case.

However, we also reject the Bar’s recommended sanction of a two-

year rehabilitative suspension.

As to the Standards, the referee concluded that Standard

7.1(b) is applicable to this case. Standard 7.1(b) states that

suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in

conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and

causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal

system. Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs. 7.1(b). We agree that

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Standard 7.1(b) is applicable given the finding that Jacobs’ conduct

was a deliberate litigation tactic.

As to aggravation and mitigation, the referee found the

existence of three aggravating factors: a pattern of misconduct;

multiple offenses; and substantial experience in the practice of law.

See Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.2(b)(3), (4), (9). The referee

also found the existence of three mitigating factors: absence of a

prior disciplinary record; personal or emotional problems; and

character or reputation. See Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs.

3.3(b)(1), (3), (7).

Neither party challenges the referee’s findings on Jacobs’

substantial experience in the practice of law or multiple offenses as

aggravators. Moreover, the referee’s finding of a pattern of

misconduct is supported by the record, as evidence showed that

Jacobs engaged in similar tactics and used impugning language in

cases where judges rejected his theories of foreclosure defense.

The Bar argues, however, that the referee should have found

an additional aggravator under Standard 3.2(b)(7): refusal to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct. “Like other

factual findings, a referee’s findings of mitigation and aggravation

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carry a presumption of correctness and will be upheld unless

clearly erroneous or without support in the record. A referee’s

failure to find that an aggravating factor or mitigating factor applies

is due the same deference.” Germain, 957 So. 2d at 621 (internal

citation omitted).

We find that the referee’s rejection of “refusal to acknowledge

the wrongful nature of the conduct” as an aggravating factor is not

without record support, even though the referee rejected “remorse”

as a mitigating factor. Essentially, the Bar treats the absence of the

existing mitigating factor of remorse as being equivalent to the

existence of the aggravating factor of refusal to acknowledge the

wrongful nature of one’s conduct. But during the final hearing and

in his briefs on review, Jacobs admitted to behaving disrespectfully

by using strong and offensive language against judges, and he

testified that he has apologized to those judges and has sought

treatment for his anger. Thus, while the record supports that

Jacobs is not remorseful about violating Bar Rule 4-8.2(a) (because

he believes he did not violate the rule as worded), the record also

supports a finding that Jacobs has not refused to acknowledge “the

wrongful nature” of his conduct. Accordingly, the Bar has not

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shown that the referee’s rejection of this additional aggravating

factor was clearly erroneous or without record support.

As to mitigation, the Bar only challenges one of the found

mitigators: the existence of personal or emotional problems. The

Bar argues that if Jacobs’ long-term emotional problems were the

cause of his misconduct, then they should not be deemed a

mitigating factor. However, the referee did not find that Jacobs’

emotional problems were the cause of his behavior; she found that

Jacobs’ behavior was a tactical decision employed to frustrate

judges into disqualifying themselves. Because the Bar’s argument

is based on facts not found by the referee and because multiple

witnesses testified that Jacobs has a history of emotional issues,

the record supports the referee’s finding of this mitigating factor.

Turning to existing case law, the referee cited Florida Bar v.

Norkin, 132 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2013), where this Court rejected a

recommended 90-day non-rehabilitative suspension and instead

imposed a two-year suspension, which required the attorney to

demonstrate rehabilitation. Norkin does indeed bear many

similarities to the present case. The respondent in Norkin was

disciplined for (among other offenses) impugning the integrity of

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members of the judiciary, and the referee there found that the

respondent acted as he did to obtain judicial disqualifications that

he was unable to obtain otherwise. Id. at 80-81. In our decision in

Norkin, we compared the circumstances of that case to those in

Florida Bar v. Abramson, 3 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 2009), where similar

unprofessional behavior required a rehabilitative suspension. 132

So. 3d at 91. Notably, the referee in Norkin also found the existence

of multiple aggravating factors—including multiple offenses and

pattern of misconduct, both of which were found in this case. Id. at

87. We approved the referee’s findings and recommendations as to

guilt in Norkin, but we rejected the recommended 90-day non-

rehabilitative suspension and instead suspended the respondent for

two years. Id. at 93.

The Bar urges us to sanction Jacobs with a similarly lengthy

period of suspension in this case. However, it is important to note

why a two-year suspension period was appropriate in Norkin. While

some of the aggravators found in Norkin were also found in this

case, the referee in Norkin found four additional aggravators as well,

including that the respondent had previous disciplinary offenses.

Id. at 91. The referee here, by contrast, found that the absence of

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any prior disciplinary record was a mitigating factor for Jacobs.

Thus, while we agree with the Bar that Jacobs’ misconduct is of

such nature that a demonstration of rehabilitation is needed before

he is readmitted, particularly in light of his multiple offenses and

pattern of misconduct, we do not agree that two years is the

appropriate period of suspension.

The Bar directs this Court to other, more recent cases such as

Florida Bar v. Patterson, 330 So. 3d 519 (Fla. 2021), where we

imposed a two-year suspension on an attorney who violated Bar

Rule 4-8.2 and other Bar Rules. But like the attorney in Norkin, the

attorney in Patterson had significant prior disciplinary action; in

fact, we expressly declared that the appropriate sanction in

Patterson “turn[ed] largely on the relationship between th[at] case

and Patterson’s previous disciplinary proceeding . . . .” Id. at 521.

Recall that the absence of a prior disciplinary record in this case

was found to be a mitigating factor.

Accordingly, we find that the circumstances of this case,

including the relevant aggravation and mitigation, require that

Jacobs demonstrate rehabilitation before he is readmitted, but we

find that a two-year suspension is inappropriate in light of Jacobs’

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absence of previous disciplinary offenses. We therefore reject the

referee’s recommended 90-day non-rehabilitative suspension and

instead impose a 91-day rehabilitative suspension.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we approve the referee’s

report as to the findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt

but disapprove as to the recommended discipline. Bruce Jacobs is

hereby suspended from the practice of law for 91 days. The

suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion

so that Jacobs can close out his practice and protect the interests

of existing clients. If Jacobs notifies this Court in writing that he is

no longer practicing and does not need thirty days to protect

existing clients, this Court will enter an order making his

suspension effective immediately. Jacobs shall fully comply with

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 3-5.1(h) and 3-6.1, if applicable.

In addition, Jacobs shall accept no new business from the date this

order is filed until he is reinstated. Jacobs is further directed to

comply with all other terms and conditions of the report.

Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from

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Bruce Jacobs in the amount of $10,671.75, for which sum let

execution issue.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
SASSO, J., did not participate.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee,
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida, and Tonya L. Avery, Bar Counsel, The Florida
Bar, Miami, Florida; and Chris W. Altenbernd of Banker Lopez
Gassler P.A., Tampa, Florida,

for Complainant

Bruce Jacobs of Jacobs Legal, PLLC, pro se, Miami, Florida,

for Respondent

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