William Clay Dunn v. Veronica Andreina Flores

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed December 3, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-2263
Lower Tribunal No. 25-13224-FC-04
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William C. Dunn ,
Appellant,
vs.
Veronica A. Flores ,
Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, George A. Sarduy, Judge.
Bushell 	Law, 	P.A., 	and 	Daniel 	A. 	Bushell 	(Fort 	Lauderdale), 	for
appellant.
Ronald H. Kauffman, P.A., and Ronald H. Kauffman, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.
MILLER, J.

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Appellant, William C. Dunn, the husband, seeks review of an order
denying 	a 	stay 	of 	an 	emergency 	return 	order 	rendered 	in 	dissolution
proceedings initiated by appellee, Veronica A. Flores, the wife. See Fla. R.
App. P. 9.310(f). 	The trial court ratified a recommendation to order the
husband to expeditiously return the parties’ minor children to Florida from
Tennessee on the grounds that the husband unilaterally relocated with the
children without the wife’s consent. 	Because Florida’s child relocation
statute is inapplicable to a relocation occurring prior to the filing of a
dissolution action and the court has not yet rendered a “best interests”
determination, we stay the order on appeal. But noting the urgent nature of
this matter, we further relinquish jurisdiction for a period of thirty days for the
trial court to expeditiously convene a hearing and issue an order as to the
children’s best interests.
BACKGROUND
The parties wed and their union produced three children. 	After
experiencing financial challenges, the husband unilaterally relocated with the
children to Tennessee, where his parents co-own a property. 	He enrolled
the children in school and purportedly embarked on a new employment
venture.

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The wife filed for dissolution in Miami-Dade County, asserting the
marriage 	was 	irretrievably 	broken. 	She 	simultaneously 	sought 	the
emergency return of the children by way of an emergency pick-up order. The
trial 	court 	ratified 	a 	general 	magistrate’s 	recommendation 	to 	grant 	an
emergency return, and this motion followed.
ANALYSIS
“This court has authority to issue a stay . . . for the purpose of
preserving the status quo during an appellate proceeding.” Perez v. Perez,
769 So. 2d 389, 391 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Among the factors relevant in
considering whether to issue a stay are “the moving party’s likelihood of
success on the merits, and the likelihood of harm should a stay not be
granted.” Id.
We must review the stay motion through the deferential standard
afforded the underlying order directing the return of the children. See Hoff v.
Hoff, 100 So. 3d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (noting that appellate courts
defer 	to 	trial 	court’s 	exercise 	of 	discretion 	in 	temporary 	timesharing
decisions). 	But such discretion is not unfettered. 	As in any timesharing or
custody determination, “best interests” is the polestar. 	See Hassenplug v.
Hassenplug, 346 So. 3d 149, 152–53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).

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Florida’s child relocation statute is codified in section 61.13001 of the
Florida Statutes. The text provides, in pertinent part:
“Relocation” means a change in the location of the principal
residence of a parent or other person from his or her principal
place of residence at the time of the last order establishing or
modifying time-sharing, or at the time of filing the pending action
to establish or modify time-sharing. The change of location must
be at least 50 miles from that residence, and for at least 60
consecutive days not including a temporary absence from the
principal residence for purposes of vacation, education, or the
provision of health care for the child.
§ 61.13001(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2025).
Our sister courts have determined that the statute unambiguously self-
limits to post-dissolution relocation. 	As the First District Court of Appeal
observed in Rolison v. Rolison, 144 So. 3d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), “the
plain language of the relocation statute applies only where a parent’s
principal place of residence changes ‘at the time of the last order establishing
or modifying time-sharing’ . . . 	or ‘at the time of filing the pending action.’”
Id. at 612 (quoting § 61.13001(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013)); see also Essex v.
Davis, 116 So. 3d 445, 448–49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (finding that when the
mother moved before the paternity petition was filed or before the entry of
“any order establishing or modifying time-sharing, then she is not subject to
the relocation statute”); Lojares v. Silva, 353 So. 3d 699, 701 (Fla. 1st DCA
2023) (holding that “Florida’s relocation statute, section 61.13001, Florida

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Statutes, does not apply to a change of a parent’s principal place of
residence before any paternity order has been issued,” and “[a] parent may
move with the children without seeking permission from the court or the other
parent”).
This limitation does not render the trial court impotent to order a parent
to return children to the jurisdiction. The court has the authority to “approve
a parenting plan that would determine, inter alia, time-sharing in accordance
with the child's best interests.” 	Rolison, 144 So. 3d at 612. 	To this end,
section 61.13(2)(a) provides:
The court may approve, grant, or modify a parenting plan,
notwithstanding that the child is not physically present in this
state at the time of filing any proceeding under this chapter, if it
appears to the court that the child was removed from this state
for the primary purpose of removing the child from the court's
jurisdiction in an attempt to avoid the court's approval, creation,
or modification of a parenting plan.
§ 61.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025).
Turning to the case at hand, we appreciate the time constraints
confronted by both the magistrate and the trial court, particularly in light of
congested dockets occasioned by the approaching holidays. 	But as the
order 	here 	entails 	a 	pre-dissolution 	move, 	the 	relocation 	statute 	is
inapplicable and therefore a best interests inquiry is essential. Accordingly,

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we stay the order and relinquish jurisdiction for a period of thirty days for the
trial court to convene a hearing and conduct the requisite analysis.
Stay granted. Jurisdiction relinquished.