Diana Blakeslee v. Quermin Madrigal

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed December 3, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D24-2301
Lower Tribunal No. 15-15812-FC-04
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Diana Blakeslee ,
Appellant,
vs.
Quermin Madrigal ,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Christina
Marie DiRaimondo, Judge.
Marro Law, P.A., and Meaghan K. Marro (Plantation), for appellant.
Law 	Office 	of 	Elena 	Vigil-Farinas, 	P.A., 	and 	Elena 	Vigil-Farinas
(Tavernier), for appellee.
Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and GOODEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

2
Appellant Diana Blakeslee challenges the trial court’s order granting
Appellee 	Quermin Madrigal’s 	request 	to 	relocate the minor child from
Tavernier, 	Florida, 	to Cape Coral, Florida. 	The trial court 	found that
relocation was in the best interests of the child. 	In doing so, it made
numerous findings of fact which tracked the relocation statute, including
credibility findings of the parties. § 61.13001(7)(a)–(k), Fla. Stat. (2024). We
affirm the order in all respects. 	See Ness v. Martinez, 249 So. 3d 754, 757
(Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“An order on a petition for relocation is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, and the appellate court considers whether competent,
substantial 	evidence 	supports 	the 	court’s 	findings 	under 	section
61.13001(7), Florida Statutes.”); Greenwood v. Greenwood, No. 3D24-1585,
2025 WL 2656234, at *1 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 17, 2025) (“But the trial court
simply did not abuse its discretion. 	Instead, it properly exercised that
discretion. Its findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence.
This evidence was ‘reasonable and logical.’ To hold otherwise would require
us to reweigh evidence and substitute our judgment and findings for those of
the trial court. This we cannot do.”) (internal citations omitted).
Affirmed.