Shushanna Hill-Becton v. MIA Aesthetics Clinic, LLC, et al.

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed January 7, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-0072
Lower Tribunal No. 24-10823-CA-01
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Shushanna Hill-Becton,
Appellant,
vs.
MIA Aesthetics Clinic, LLC, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, William Thomas, Judge.
Russomanno & Borrello, P.A., and Christopher Russomanno and
Robert J. Borrello; Wasson & Associates, Chartered, and Roy D. Wasson,
for appellant.
Falk, Waas, Hernandez, Solomon, Mendlestein & Davis, P.A., and
Scott L. Mendlestein and Jessica M. Hernandez, for appellees MIA
Aesthetics Clinic, LLC and Sol Plastic Surgery, LLC.
Before SCALES, C.J., and EMAS and MILLER, JJ.

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PER CURIAM.
Appellant Shushanna Hill-Becton, the plaintiff below, appeals a non-
final order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by the defendants
below, appellees Lauren M. Wright, D.O., Mia Aesthetics Clinic, LLC and Sol
Plastic Surgery, LLC. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(I).
“Courts must consider three elements when ruling on a motion to
compel arbitration: ‘(1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists;
(2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration
was waived.’” Lemos v. Sessa, 319 So. 3d 135, 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)
(quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999)). In this
appeal, as below, Hill-Becton challenges only the first element, claiming that
the parties do not have a valid agreement to arbitrate because the arbitration
provisions contained in the parties’ contract are purportedly unconscionable.
Because, on our de novo review,1 we agree with the trial court that Hill-
Becton failed to establish that the subject arbitration provisions are both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, we affirm the challenged
1 See Concierge Auctions, LLC v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate,
LLC, 394 So. 3d 119, 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“Generally, we review de
novo an order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration.”).

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order that compels arbitration of Hill-Becton’s underlying claims. See M.P. v.
Guiribitey Cosmetic & Beauty Inst., Inc., 389 So. 3d 598, 603 (Fla. 3d DCA
2023) (“Florida case law provides concrete guidance as to the burden
assumed by a litigant seeking to avoid arbitration. The litigant must establish
both procedural and substantive unconscionability.”); SheddF2-FL3, LLC v.
Penthouse S., LLC, 314 So. 3d 403, 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“[B]ecause
there was absolutely no evidence of procedural unconscionability, the
Obligors’ claim of unconscionability fails as a matter of law.”); see also
Massage Envy Franchising, LLC v. Doe, 339 So. 3d 481, 484 (Fla. 5th DCA
2022) (“[A] clickwrap agreement occurs when a website directs a purchaser
or user to the terms and conditions of the sale and requires the user to click
a box to acknowledge that they have read those terms and conditions. These
agreements are generally enforceable.”).
Affirmed.2
2 We decline Hill-Becton’s invitation to decide, in the first instance, whether
the contract’s arbitration provisions are violative of public policy. We express
no opinion regarding this separate and distinct issue that the record reflects
remains unadjudicated by, and pending in, the trial court.