STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE CHILD SUPPORT PROGRAM EX REL. v. JOSEPH MICHAEL SERWE, III and ALISCIA MELISSA SERWE

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF F LORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 6D2025-0892
Lower Tribunal No. 2023-DR-003648
_____________________________
D EPARTMENT OF REVENUE CHILD SUPPORT PROGRAM E X REL.,
Petitioner,
v.
J OSEPH MICHAEL SERWE, III, and A LISCIA MELISSA SERWE,
Respondents,
_____________________________
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Orange County.
Elaine A. Barbour, Judge.
November 18, 2025
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
Appellant’s motion for clarification is granted. 	The prior opinion dated
October 3, 2025, is withdrawn, and the attached opinion is issued in its place.
STARGEL, J.
The Department of Revenue (“DOR”) seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the
portion of the March 27, 2025, “Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Officer
and Order Granting Motion for Contempt and Striking Notice of Redirection” that

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struck DOR’s notice of redirection of child support payments.1 However, certiorari
relief is not available since the order states that it is a “Final Order” and purports to
end judicial labor as to the contempt proceeding and DOR’s notice. See Fla. R. App.
P. 9.030(b)(2)(A) (“The certiorari jurisdiction of district courts of appeal may be
sought to review . . . nonfinal orders of lower tribunals other than as prescribed
by rule 9.130 . . . .”) (emphasis added). 	Therefore, pursuant to rule 9.040(c) and
DOR’s request that we treat the certiorari petition as an appeal should we determine
certiorari relief is unavailable, we treat the petition as a direct appeal from a final
order.
A final judgment of dissolution of marriage was rendered on May 21, 2024,
and contains a provision that the mother shall pay child support directly to the father
for the benefit of the parties’ minor child. On July 29, 2024, DOR filed its notice
pursuant to sections 61.13(1)(d)3., 61.181(1)(a), and 61.1824(1)(a), Florida Statutes
(2024), advising that the mother would be notified to send support payments to the
State Disbursement Unit because Title IV-D services were being provided in this
case. DOR also filed a motion for contempt based on the mother’s default. After
conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted the motion for contempt
1 This case initiated as an appeal of a nonfinal order, but DOR correctly
determined that the case did not qualify under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130 and subsequently filed a motion to have this appeal treated as a petition for
writ of certiorari.

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but, citing Boukzam v. Jugo, 293 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), sua sponte struck
DOR’s notice, finding that a modification to the way child support payments are
made must be pleaded and deemed to be in the best interest of the child. The trial
court erred in entering the portion of the order striking DOR’s notice. 	See §
61.13(1)(d)3., Fla. Stat. (“Upon notice by the department that it is providing Title
IV-D services in a case with an existing support order, the depository shall transmit
case data through, and set up appropriate payment accounts in, regardless of whether
there is a delinquency, the Clerk of the Court Child Support Enforcement Collection
System as required under s. 61.181(2)(b)1.”); see also § 61.1824(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
Although striking DOR’s notice and requiring the mother to continue to make
child support payments directly to the father was error, the record before us does not
demonstrate that DOR filed a motion to vacate the order under Florida Family Law
Rule of Procedure 12.491(f). As set forth in Roblero v. Velasquez, 414 So. 3d 463,
463-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), and Fluhart v. Rasmussen, 383 So. 3d 889, 890 (Fla.
5th DCA 2024), the failure to file a motion to vacate the recommended report
adopted by the trial court results in a failure to preserve the claimed error for

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appellate review.2 Accordingly, we are constrained to affirm.3 See Fluhart at 889-
90 (affirming rather than dismissing an appeal based on an appellant’s failure to
preserve an issue by moving to vacate the general magistrate’s recommended final
judgment adopted by the trial court). 	Our affirmance here is without prejudice to
any 	right 	DOR 	may 	have 	to 	file 	a 	subsequent 	notice 	pursuant 	to 	sections
61.13(1)(d)3., 61.181(1)(a), and 61.1824(1)(a).
AFFIRMED.
WOZNIAK and MIZE, JJ., concur.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Toni 	C. Bernstein, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, of the Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement,
Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
No Appearance for Respondents, Joseph Michael Serwe, III, and Aliscia Melissa
Serwe.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
2 Although these two cases address a party’s failure to file a motion to vacate
under rule 12.490(e)(3), which relates to general magistrates, the language regarding
a party’s ability to file a motion to vacate under rule 12.491(f), which relates to
support hearing officers, is identical.
3 Even if we treated this case as a petition for writ of certiorari, the result
would be the same. 	See, e.g., U. S. Auto. Ass’n v. Bay Area Inj. Rehab Specialists
Holdings, Inc., 311 So. 3d 172, 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (denying a certiorari petition
because the issue was not preserved for review).