Jared Caribo v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
JARED CARIBO,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2023-2962
[January 14, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Martin 	County; 	Sherwood 	Bauer, 	Jr., 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
432018CF000583.
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Erika Follmer, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Marcus Russell Kelly
II, 	Assistant 	Attorney 	General, 	West 	Palm 	Beach, 	and 	Jeanine
Germanowicz, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
appellee.
FORST , J.
Appellant 	Jared 	Caribo 	appeals 	his 	conviction 	and 	sentence 	for
burglary 	of 	a 	dwelling 	following 	a 	jury 	trial.1 	Caribo 	raises 	several
arguments on appeal. We affirm on all issues but write to address Caribo’s
allegation that the trial court erred in informing the jury that Caribo had
twenty-three 	felony 	and 	five 	misdemeanor 	prior 	convictions 	involving
dishonesty. Caribo challenges the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel
had, in essence and perhaps inadvertently, “opened the door” to admission
of this record (with limiting instructions).
Background
The backyard of the victim’s house was fully enclosed by a six-foot-tall
fence. 	The only entrance from the backyard to the house was a sliding
1 Caribo was acquitted on a petit theft charge.

2
glass door that opened to the living room, kitchen, and dining room. 	A
master bedroom was accessible from the living room. 	The victim had a
home security surveillance system that featured a camera pointed directly
at the sliding glass door. 	The system was set up to notify the victim’s
phone when movement occurred in her house or at the glass door. 	The
system provided a live feed and saved the videos of any motion it detected.
While 	away 	from 	the 	house, 	the 	victim 	received 	a 	notification 	of
movement from her security system. 	She viewed the live feed and saw, in
the house, a man whom she did not recognize. 	The victim sounded an
alarm in the house and called 911 to report a break-in. 	The victim
returned home and found police already at the house. 	The victim did not
see any damage to the house, as no windows, doors, or locks were broken.
However, the victim saw that her jewelry box on her master bedroom
dresser had been opened and two pairs of earrings were missing.
The victim provided police with security system videos, which showed
a man wearing shorts, a black T-shirt, a shirt tied around his neck, and
gloves. In the videos, the man slides open the glass door from a crouched
position, walks into the house, puts his gloves in his pocket, and goes into
the master bedroom. He next goes to another area of the house off camera,
and soon thereafter exits the house through the glass door and runs away
as the alarm activated by the victim commences.
While two officers inspected the house, another officer found Caribo
walking in the parking lot of a plaza within walking distance of the victim’s
house wearing clothing that matched the attire of the man seen on the
security 	video. 	The 	officer 	detained 	Caribo. 	Meanwhile, 	the 	victim
informed the officers, and later testified at trial, that she did not know
Caribo and had not given him permission to enter her home. 	No items
from the victim’s house, including the earrings, were located. 	The police
later discovered that the shoes that Caribo had been wearing when he was
detained matched a footprint found in the victim’s house. 	The footprint
was determined not to match shoes owned by the victim or her husband.
The state charged Caribo with burglary of a dwelling and petit theft. At
trial, defense counsel did not argue that someone other than Caribo had
been the person recorded by the security camera entering the victim’s
home. 	Ultimately, the defense conceded Caribo was the person who was
filmed entering the home. 	The defense also did not challenge the victim’s
assertion that she did not know Caribo and had not invited him to enter
the home, nor did the defense argue that the victim’s husband knew
Caribo.

3
Instead, the defense maintained that the State had not established one
element of the burglary of a dwelling charge—an intent to commit a crime
inside the dwelling.2 	The defense noted that neither the security system
video nor the police search of Caribo indicated that Caribo had the earrings
or any other item from the home in his hands or on his person.
On cross-examination, the officer who had encountered Caribo testified
that he had patted him down and found no earrings or other jewelry. The
officer then had this exchange with defense counsel:
Q: Okay. So after the interview, you took a picture of the shoe,
was there any other things that you did with Mr. Caribo
regarding this case?
A: I asked him if he—I believe I asked him if he had any of
the jewelry concealed on him, at the time. Other than that,
I don’t believe I did anything else, just speaking to him.
Q: Okay. 	And did Mr. Caribo act, like, surprised or did he
say he had jewelry?
A: He said he didn’t have any jewelry on him.
(Emphasis added).
Following the cross-examination, the prosecutor requested a sidebar
conference. 	The prosecutor noted that defense counsel had admitted
Caribo’s self-serving hearsay statement (“[h]e said he didn’t have any
jewelry on him”) into evidence through another witness (the investigating
officer). Consequently, the State moved the trial court to instruct the jury
on the number of Caribo’s prior convictions for felonies and misdemeanors
involving 	dishonesty 	as 	impeachment 	evidence 	pursuant 	to 	sections
90.806(1) and 90.610, Florida Statutes (2023). 	Defense counsel objected,
arguing that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the
probative value of the prior conviction evidence under the balancing test
of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2023).
The trial court ruled in the State’s favor, reasoning that “a Defendant
not testifying, but obtaining exculpatory information through others by his
2 “The essential elements of burglary are: ‘(1) entering or remaining in, (2) a
structure or conveyance, and (3) with intent to commit an offense therein.’” Davis
v. State, 736 So. 2d 27, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting State v. Waters, 436 So.
2d 66, 69 (Fla. 1983)).

4
own statements does subject him to that credibility question,” and that
appellate 	courts 	which 	had 	considered 	the 	prejudicial 	effect 	of 	prior
conviction evidence have concluded such evidence is generally admissible
to impeach a declarant’s credibility.
The court then informed the jurors that because the defense had
introduced 	Caribo’s 	hearsay 	statement 	into 	evidence, 	the 	court 	was
instructing them that Caribo had previously been convicted of twenty-
three felonies and five misdemeanors involving dishonesty. 	The court
further instructed the jurors to consider the prior convictions only in
assessing the credibility of Caribo’s statement, not as substantive evidence
of the charged crimes.
Caribo elected not to testify. No witness testified that Caribo was seen,
on video or in-person, possessing the victim’s jewelry. 	The State never
mentioned 	Caribo’s 	prior 	convictions 	in 	closing 	or 	rebuttal, 	instead
emphasizing the video evidence showing that he “comes in, crouched
down” through the back door wearing gloves and runs away when the
alarm goes off, as well as the jury instruction allowing the jury to infer
criminal intent from his stealthy, surreptitious manner of entry.
The jury convicted Caribo of burglary of a dwelling but acquitted him
of theft. 	This appeal follows.
Analysis
We review a trial court’s ruling that a declarant can be impeached with
the declarant’s prior convictions for an abuse of discretion. 	See Mathis v.
State, 135 So. 3d 484, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). 	“If reasonable [people]
could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then
the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of
discretion.” 	Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980).
“However, the question of whether a statement is hearsay is a matter of
law and is subject to de novo review on appeal.” 	Joseph v. State, 336 So.
3d 218, 234 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Tundidor v. State, 221 So. 3d 587, 598
(Fla. 2017)).
“When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility
of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by
any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant
had testified as a witness.” 	§ 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2023). 	“A party may
attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence
that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which

5
the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false
statement regardless of the punishment[.]” 	§ 90.610(1), Fla. Stat. (2023).
However, evidence admitted under these statutes must also be admissible
under section 90.403’s balancing test: “Relevant evidence is inadmissible
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . . .” 	§ 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2023) (emphasis added).
After the officer had testified that he “asked [Caribo] if he had any of
the jewelry concealed on him,” defense counsel’s next question, “did
[Caribo] say he had jewelry?,” elicited the responsive answer, “[h]e said he
didn’t have any jewelry on him.” 	In the context of a trial for burglary and
theft of jewelry, a defendant’s statement denying possession of jewelry is
self-serving and exculpatory. Presumably, defense counsel would not have
asked this question if she did not think the answer would assist Caribo’s
defense. 	Having 	just 	heard 	the 	officer 	say 	he 	had 	asked 	Caribo 	a
potentially incriminating question, defense counsel followed up to ensure
the jury heard Caribo’s exculpatory answer.
This is not an issue of first impression. The Florida Supreme Court has
held that qualifying prior convictions are admissible as impeachment
evidence in similar circumstances:
Regarding Huggins’ argument that evidence of his nine prior
felony 	convictions 	should 	have 	been 	excluded 	under 	the
balancing test of section 90.403, this Court must determine if
the trial court abused its discretion. 	See Mansfield v. State,
758 So. 2d 636, 648 (Fla. 2000). Section 90.403 provides that
relevant evidence is inadmissible if “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion 	of 	issues, 	misleading 	the 	jury, 	or 	needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” 	The general principle
behind section 90.610, Florida Statutes (2002), which permits
the 	use 	of 	convictions 	for 	impeachment 	purposes 	under
certain circumstances, supports the conclusion that the fact
of 	Huggins’ 	prior 	felony 	convictions 	had 	probative 	value
regarding the credibility of the hearsay statement attributed
to him. The trial court attempted to limit any danger of unfair
prejudice by refraining from informing the jury of the nature
of 	Huggins’ 	crimes 	and 	by 	giving 	a 	limiting 	instruction
regarding the jury’s use of the information. 	On the basis of
these facts, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion 	in 	admitting 	this 	evidence 	for 	impeachment
purposes.

6
Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 756–57 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 545
U.S. 1107 (2005). Accord Gonzalez v. State, 948 So. 2d 877, 878 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2007) (“In this case, because the defense elicited Gonzalez’s own
statement, intended to be exculpatory, through [another witness], the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Gonzalez’s past felony
convictions and in giving a limiting instruction as to same.”).
As in Huggins and Gonzalez, the trial court here withheld any details
about the nature of Caribo’s prior convictions and gave a proper limiting
instruction. 	While 	the 	dissent 	emphasizes 	no 	evidence 	directly
contradicted Caribo’s statement that he “didn’t have jewelry on him,” that
premise does not necessarily support the dissent’s conclusion that the
statement did not put Caribo’s credibility at issue. A jury is free to accept
or reject even uncontroverted testimony if it finds that the testimony lacks
credibility. 	See State v. P.C.L., 332 So. 3d 4, 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); John
Caves Land Dev. Co. v. Suggs, 352 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1977) (“[A] fact finder
is not required to accept uncontroverted testimony which he does not
believe.”).
Caribo did not present either the trial court or this Court with a single
case from any jurisdiction in which an appellate court has affirmed a trial
court’s exclusion of prior conviction impeachment evidence, or reversed a
trial court’s admission of such evidence, on balancing grounds.3 	Caribo
has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating reversible error as to the
trial court’s providing the limited jury informational statement at issue.
The responsive answer which defense counsel elicited immediately after
3 The dissent references two Florida cases “to demonstrate the proper operation
of section 90.806.” Caribo did not cite either case on appeal or below, and neither
case is apposite. 	In Woods v. State, 295 So. 3d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), the
statements in question were those of Woods’ co-conspirator, who had been
wearing a wire, and whose remarks were only admitted to provide the context for
Woods’ incriminating responses. Id. at 920. That is not the case here. Caribo’s
statement was not offered to provide the “context” for anything else, but to
establish a defense to the theft charge—he didn’t possess the jewelry. Even less
apposite is Gudmestad v. State, 209 So. 3d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). There, the
defendant offered an insanity defense and introduced his statements about police
and other people being “green aliens” and an ambulance being “alien spacecraft.”
Id. at 604–05. 	Certainly, these statements were not offered for their truth, as
distinct from the instant case, wherein a man accused of stealing jewelry was
questioned by a police officer about whether he had stolen jewelry on him and
the man responded that he did not. 	Commentary on Caribo’s demeanor when
confronted was covered by the compound question’s first query—“And did Mr.
Caribo act, like, surprised[?]”—but defense counsel proceeded to request that the
officer divulge Caribo’s substantive statement as well.

7
the investigating officer had testified, “I asked him if he had any of the
jewelry concealed on him,” was exculpatory hearsay. 	A reasonable judge
could have ruled, as the trial court here did, that the probative value of
impeaching Caribo’s credibility was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice under the circumstances. See Huggins, 889 So.
2d at 756–57; Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203; Tagner v. State, 673 So. 2d
57, 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“[M]ost evidence that is admitted will be
prejudicial to the party against whom it is offered. 	Section 90.403 does
not bar this evidence; it is directed at evidence which inflames the jury or
appeals improperly to the jury’s emotions.” (quoting State v. McClain, 525
So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1988))).
Conclusion
The trial court properly ruled that defense counsel had “opened the
door” to admission of Caribo’s prior convictions for crimes of dishonesty.
After consideration of that issue and all other issues raised by Caribo in
his appeal, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.
S HEPHERD, J., concurs.
GROSS, J., dissents with opinion.
GROSS, J., dissenting.
It was error to admit Caribo’s 23 felony convictions as impeachment,
because the statement upon which the majority relies to trigger the
operation of section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2023), was not hearsay.
Section 90.806(1) is activated “[w]hen a hearsay statement has been
admitted in evidence[.]” 	Id. 	Section 90.801(1)(c)’s definition of hearsay
requires that a statement be “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.”
According to the majority opinion, the following exchange is what
generated the State’s right to impeach the defendant with his felony
convictions under section 90.806(1):
Defense attorney: And did Mr. Caribo act, like, surprised or
did he say he had any jewelry?
Police Sergeant: 	He said he didn’t have any jewelry on him.

8
At sidebar, the defense attorney explained that her purpose for asking
the question was to show Caribo’s demeanor and cooperation with law
enforcement.
Obviously, the quoted testimony was not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement—that the defendant had no contraband
on him at the time of his arrest. 	The police sergeant had already testified
that he had patted Caribo down and found no jewelry, laptops, fishing
rods, or cigarettes. 	The absence of contraband on Caribo at the time of
arrest was an undisputed fact.
The 	defense 	attorney 	identified 	the 	non-hearsay 	purpose 	of 	the
testimony—to show that Caribo cooperated with law enforcement. 	A
defendant’s showing that he cooperated with the police is as suggestive of
“not guiltiness,” as flight from the police, the subject of countless judicial
opinions, is probative of culpability. 	As Professor Irving Younger has
observed:
The 	evenhandedness 	of 	justice 	as 	between 	subject 	and
sovereign 	is 	a 	reassuring 	doctrine, 	and 	especially 	so 	its
corollary: that, at a minimum, the law of evidence regulates
the mode of proof impartially for the subject and for the
sovereign. 	The hearsay rule that troubles the former equally
vexes the latter; the exceptions to the hearsay rule that ease
the latter equally comfort the former.
Irving Younger, Sovereign Admissions: A Comment on United States v.
Santos, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 108, 115 (1968).
That the defense attorney offered the quoted statement for a non-
hearsay purpose means that the statement was not hearsay. 	If the
statement was not hearsay, then section 90.806(1) impeachment does not
come into play.
As Professor Ehrhardt has observed:
When an out-of-court statement is not hearsay because it is
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the
declarant, the credibility of the declarant is not an issue.
Therefore, the credibility of the declarant cannot be attacked
and section 90.806 is not applicable.
Charles W. Ehrhardt & Terry P. Lewis, Florida Evidence, § 806.1 (2025
ed.).

9
Two Florida cases demonstrate the proper operation of section 90.806.
In Woods v. State, 295 So. 3d 919, 920–21 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), an out-
of-court declarant’s statements were not offered “for their veracity or
truth,” but to “provide context” for other statements, so the court held that
section 90.806 impeachment was not appropriate.
Second, in Gudmestad v. State, 209 So. 3d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), the
defense relied upon an insanity defense. 	Id. at 604. 	The appellate court
determined that the defendant’s prior statements that the police and
prosecutor were aliens were not offered for their truth, but to show that
the defendant was insane. Id. at 605. Thus, the appellate court held that
a section 90.806(1) impeachment of the defendant’s statement by his prior
convictions was inappropriate. 	Id. at 606. 	See also United States v.
Stefonek, 179 F. 3d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that “impeachment
of an out-of-court declarant with a prior conviction . . . is inappropriate,
in fact impossible, if the credibility of the out-of-court declarant is not at
issue . . . which is to say if the declaration is not being placed in evidence
for its truth value”).4
Even if Caribo’s out-of-court statement were hearsay, the trial court
abused 	its 	discretion 	under 	section 	90.403 	by 	informing the 	jury 	of
Caribo’s prior convictions. 	The impeachment had little to no probative
value because it was offered solely to impeach the credibility of a single
out-of-court statement that Caribo had made regarding an undisputed fact
of the case—namely, that he did not have any jewelry on him when he was
detained. 	The majority characterizes Caribo’s statement as self-serving
and exculpatory, but it was merely cumulative to the sergeant’s testimony.
Notably, Caribo’s statement was not a denial that he had been in the house
or that he had stolen any jewelry. 	Therefore, any probative value of this
impeachment was substantially outweighed by the risk that the jury would
use Caribo’s extensive record as evidence of his propensity to commit
crimes.
The admission of the 23 felony convictions was hardly harmless error.
This case should be reversed for a new trial.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
4 Federal Rule of Evidence 806 is similar to section 90.806, Florida Statutes.