Jordan Dawkins v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
JORDAN DAWKINS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-2870
[March 25, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Indian 	River 	County; 	Robert 	B. 	Meadows, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	Nos.
312018CF000445A and 312020CF000875A.
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Devin Johnson, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah Koenig,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
LOTT , J.
Jordan Dawkins, the defendant below, was convicted of both first and
second-degree murder with a firearm (among other things). 	He was
sentenced to life in prison for both offenses. 	He asserts, and the State
concedes, a double jeopardy violation occurred. But the State argues that
the double jeopardy in which the defendant was admittedly placed was
harmless. 	We are constrained to disagree and reverse for correction.1
The defendant and a co-defendant were charged by the State with (1)
first-degree felony murder with a firearm, (2) attempted robbery with a
deadly weapon causing death, and (3) conspiracy to commit robbery with
a deadly weapon. The defendant was also charged, under a separate case
number, with second-degree murder with a firearm. 	The two sets of
charges were consolidated before proceeding to trial. The defendant’s case
was severed from his co-defendant’s case.
1 We summarily affirm on all other issues raised in the appeal.

2
The evidence at trial reflected the following. 	The victim robbed the
defendant and his pregnant girlfriend with a firearm. 	The next day, the
victim was shot and killed as he entered his hotel room. The State alleged
at trial that the defendant and his co-defendant had killed the victim while
attempting to recover the stolen money. Surveillance cameras at the hotel
captured the shooting. 	The first-degree felony murder and second-degree
murder charges both arose from the same homicide.
After trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged on all counts.
The defendant received a life sentence on first-degree felony murder (Count
One), with a 25-year mandatory minimum. On Counts Two and Three, he
received consecutive 20-year sentences. 	As to Count Four, he received a
life sentence, consecutive to the other three charges. 	This appeal follows.
Double jeopardy concerns involve a pure question of law and are
subject to de novo review. 	See Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla.
2002). 	“A double jeopardy violation is fundamental error that may be
addressed for the first time on appeal.” 	Richardson v. State, 387 So. 3d
490, 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
“[F]irst-degree felony murder and second-degree murder are degrees of
the same offense.” Gould v. State, 397 So. 3d 268, 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
Dual convictions for offenses which are “degrees of the same offense as
provided by statute” are barred. 	§ 775.021(4)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2018); see
also Velazco v. State, 342 So. 3d 614, 619 (Fla. 2022) (“Because [the two
criminal offenses] are degree variants of the same offense under section
775.021(4)(b)2., we hold that dual convictions for both offenses as to the
same victim arising from a single episode violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy.”); Gould, 397 So. 3d at 270 (“Because first-degree felony
murder 	and 	second-degree 	murder 	are 	degrees 	of 	the 	same 	offense,
Gould’s 	conviction 	and 	life 	sentence 	on 	both 	counts 	violates 	the
prohibition against double jeopardy.”).
The defendant argues fundamental error occurred as he was convicted
of two different murder charges—first-degree felony murder with a firearm
and second-degree murder with a firearm—stemming from one single
death. He argues that a conviction for two offenses that are degrees of the
same offense is barred by double jeopardy and requests a new sentencing
hearing.
The State concedes that the dual convictions for first-degree felony
murder 	and 	second-degree 	murder 	are 	improper 	and 	violate 	double
jeopardy, and that the conviction for second-degree murder must be
vacated. However, the State argues that resentencing is not necessary, as

3
the record suggests that the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence, and any error is harmless. 	The State points out that the
scoresheet did not contain the second-degree murder charge.2
But “[a] double jeopardy violation is not rendered harmless simply
because the defendant is not sentenced for both of the convictions or
because they were not both scored on the guidelines scoresheet.” Bolding
v. State, 28 So. 3d 956, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); see also Wilkes v. State,
123 So. 3d 632, 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“Therefore, allowing both
convictions to stand, yet withholding the imposition of sentence for one of
the offenses, does not cure the double jeopardy violation as it is ‘the record
of 	appellant’s 	conviction 	[that] 	constitutes 	the 	violation 	of 	double
jeopardy.’” (citations omitted)).
Also, 	while 	the 	second-degree 	murder 	charge 	was 	not 	explicitly
included on the scoresheet, the last page of the scoresheet, below “total
sentence imposed” reflects a checked box for “life” and “x2.” This suggests
the defendant was sentenced to life for each murder conviction.
Therefore, 	we 	reverse 	the 	defendant’s 	conviction 	of 	second-degree
murder (Count Four), and remand solely with directions to strike that
conviction 	and 	amend 	the 	defendant’s 	scoresheet 	accordingly. 	We
otherwise affirm.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.
GROSS and C IKLIN, JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
2 The scoresheet did not contain the second-degree murder charge, and it only
listed the charges of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon (Count Two) and
conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon (Count Three). 	It was
mentioned at sentencing that the first-degree felony murder charge was not listed
on the scoresheet because it carried a mandatory life sentence.