Daniel Diaz v. State of Florida

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

DANIEL DIAZ,
Appellant,

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

No. 4D2025-2066
[January 7, 2026]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for
the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Martin S. Fein, Judge;
L.T. Case No. 17-003298-CF10A.

Lindsay L. Chase of Lindsay Chase P.L.L.C., Hollywood, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard C.
Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Daniel Diaz appeals an order summarily denying his motion for post-
conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in
which he raised five grounds for relief. We reverse and remand for an
evidentiary hearing as to Diaz’s claim in ground one that counsel failed to
sufficiently advise him of his sentencing exposure, which caused him to
reject a favorable plea offer. We otherwise affirm.

Background

Diaz was initially charged in this case with attempted first-degree
murder with a firearm (count one), possession of a firearm by a juvenile
delinquent (count two), and carrying a concealed firearm (count three).
The charge in count one was later reduced to attempted second-degree
murder with a firearm. In both versions of the information, the State
alleged as to count one that Diaz actually possessed and discharged a
firearm during the commission of the offense and caused great bodily harm
to the victim as a result, as necessary to support the imposition of a
mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years to life under the 10-20-life
statute. See § 775.087(2)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2016).

Diaz entered an open plea of no contest on count two and went to trial
on counts one and three. As to count one, the jury found Diaz guilty of
aggravated battery as a lesser-included offense and found that he actually
possessed and discharged a firearm and caused great bodily harm to the
victim as aresult. As to count three, the jury found Diaz guilty as charged.
The court sentenced Diaz to 25 years in prison as a mandatory minimum
on count one, with concurrent sentences of 15 years on count two and five
years on count three.

In ground one of his rule 3.850 motion, Diaz claimed counsel was
ineffective for failing to sufficiently explain the applicability of the 10-20-
life statute before he rejected an eight-year plea offer. Specifically, he
claimed counsel failed to explain that, if he went to trial, even if he were
convicted of a lesser-included offense on count one, the court still would
be required to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of at least 25 years
and up to life if the jury found that he actually possessed and discharged
a firearm and caused great bodily harm to the victim as a result. Diaz
alleged that he would have accepted the plea offer if he had been advised
of that fact. He further alleged that the State would not have withdrawn
the offer, the court would have accepted the plea, and his sentence would
have been less severe than the 25-year mandatory minimum he ultimately
received.

The trial court summarily denied ground one for two reasons: (1) there
was no record evidence that the State ever made an eight-year plea offer;
and (2) the court fully explained the applicability of the 10-20-life statute
when Diaz rejected a 15-year plea offer just before trial.

Diaz filed a timely notice of appeal.

Analysis
The summary denial of a claim raised in a rule 3.850 motion can be
upheld only if the claim is facially invalid or is conclusively refuted by the
record. Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).

Diaz pled a facially sufficient claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately explain his sentencing exposure under the 10-20-life
statute when he was considering the eight-year plea offer. See, e.g., Key
v. State, 357 So. 3d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); Louima v. State, 247
So. 3d 564, 566 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Diaz also sufficiently alleged
prejudice under Alcorn v. State, 121 So. 3d 419, 430 (Fla. 2013).

At this stage, the trial court was required to accept Diaz’s allegations

2

as true to the extent they were not refuted by the record, including the
allegation that the State made an eight-year plea offer at some point before
it made the 15-year offer. Peede, 748 So. 2d at 257; Tribbitt v. State, 339
So. 3d 1029, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022); but see Capalbo v. State, 73 So. 3d
838, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (recognizing that the court is not required to
accept as true an illogical or inherently incredible allegation). The court
did not attach any records refuting Diaz’s allegation that an eight-year plea
offer was made, and we reject the State’s unelaborated argument that the
allegation was inherently incredible.

Diaz’s claim that he was not sufficiently advised of the applicability of
the 10-20-life statute when he was considering the eight-year plea offer is
not refuted by the colloquy surrounding his rejection of the 15-year plea
offer just before trial. The fact that Diaz was aware of the applicability of
the 10-20-life statute at that time is immaterial to whether he was properly
advised at the time he was considering the eight-year plea offer, which he
alleged was made earlier in the case. See, e.g., Alcorn, 121 So. 3d at 432
(stating that the court must consider the defendant’s claim in light of the
circumstances as they existed at the time the plea offer was made).

Because Diaz’s claim in ground one was facially sufficient and is not
conclusively refuted by the record, the trial court erred in summarily
denying it. We therefore reverse the court’s order as to ground one and
remand for an evidentiary hearing on that ground only. We affirm the
summary denial of Diaz’s other four grounds for relief without comment.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
May, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.