Maricela Ramirez v. Kevin D. Shaw, et al.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
MARICELA RAMIREZ,
Appellant,
v.
KEVIN D. SHAW, et al.,
Appellees.
No. 4D2025-1535
[April 15, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward 	County; 	Betsy 	Benson, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
062024SC066136AXXXCE.
Maricela Ramirez, Miami, pro se.
No appearance for appellees.
GROSS, J.
Maricela Ramirez appeals an order denying her motion filed under
Florida Small Claims Rule 7.190(b)(2), which provides that a court may
“relieve a party” from a final judgment based on “newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial or rehearing.”
We 	affirm 	the 	order 	on 	appeal 	because 	Ramirez’s 	motion 	fails 	to
demonstrate that she exercised due diligence in uncovering the matters
that she hoped to raise at a new trial.
Two tenants, Kevin Shaw and Dadneek Destine-Shaw, brought a small
claims case against the landlords, Ramirez and MGF Property I, LLC,
seeking the return of a $3,300 security deposit.
In January 2025, after a non-jury trial, the county court entered a final
judgment 	against 	the 	landlords, 	awarding 	the 	tenants 	$3,300 	plus
prejudgment interest and costs. 	Ramirez moved for reconsideration,
which the trial court denied. 	The landlords did not appeal the final
judgment.

2
In April 2025, Ramirez moved to reopen the case pursuant to Florida
Small Claims Rule 7.190, asserting that she had “obtained new evidence
that was not available at the time of the original hearing,” including the
lease 	agreement, 	a 	2019 	check 	purportedly 	demonstrating 	that 	the
security 	deposit 	was 	only 	$1,650, 	and 	three-day 	notices 	allegedly
evidencing the tenants’ failure to pay the May 2024 rent. Ramirez alleged
that these documents “were not available or were overlooked” due to her
pro se status. 	The trial court denied the motion as legally insufficient.
On appeal, Ramirez makes arguments directed at the final judgment.
But she did not timely appeal that judgment, so we do not reach those
issues and focus instead on the propriety of the county court’s ruling on
the rule 7.190(b)(2) motion.
To avoid being summarily dismissed or denied, a motion for relief from
judgment must allege colorable entitlement to relief. 	Courts applying
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)—the counterpart to Florida Small
Claims Rule 7.190(b)—have explained that “the rule does not have as its
purpose or intent the reopening of lawsuits to allow parties to state new
claims or offer new evidence omitted by oversight or inadvertence.” Viking
Gen. Corp. v. Diversified Mortg. Invs., 387 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA
1980). 	“The necessary finality of litigation prohibits courts from giving
parties a second chance at proof they had available in the first instance
but overlooked or chose not to use.” 	Hooks v. Quaintance, 71 So. 3d 908,
911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “Relief from judgment based on newly discovered
evidence claim should be seldom granted and only when the party seeking
relief has exercised due diligence.” 	Id.
Similar to a movant’s burden under rule 1.540(b), a movant under rule
7.190(b)(2) has the burden “to establish the exercise of due diligence.”
Brown v. McMillian, 737 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). 	“It is not
sufficient to merely show that the evidence was not known or discovered”
by a small claims litigant prior to trial. 	Id. 	“[T]he movant must make his
or her vigilance apparent.” 	Id.
Here, the county court properly denied Ramirez’s rule 7.190(b) motion
because it failed to allege colorable entitlement to relief. 	The motion was
legally insufficient because it failed to demonstrate that the proffered
evidence constituted “newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could 	not 	have 	been 	discovered 	in 	time 	to 	move 	for 	a 	new 	trial 	or
rehearing.” 	Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.190(b)(2).
The 	documents 	cited 	in 	the 	motion—the 	2019 	check, 	the 	lease
agreement, and the three-day notices in May 2024—all predated the

3
January 2025 trial. 	These were the types of documents that a pro se
landlord, 	through 	reasonable 	diligence, 	would 	have 	uncovered 	and
brought to trial over a security deposit, or to support a timely motion for
rehearing. 	Ramirez 	was 	improperly 	attempting 	to 	obtain 	relief 	from
judgment based upon documents she necessarily “had available in the first
instance but overlooked or chose not to use.” 	Hooks, 71 So. 3d at 911.
The motion’s bare assertion that these documents “were not available
or were overlooked due to [her] pro se status” does not satisfy the due
diligence requirement under rule 7.190(b)(2). 	The motion failed to make
Ramirez’s 	vigilance 	apparent. 	The 	motion 	does 	not 	allege 	any 	facts
showing that Ramirez timely undertook diligent efforts to 	obtain the
documents.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Affirmed.
CIKLIN and C ONNER , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.