Jones v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2025-1984
_____________________________
C HRISTOPHER JONES,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Respondent.
_____________________________
Petition Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel—
Original Jurisdiction.
May 20, 2026
W INOKUR , J.
Christopher Jones files a petition alleging that appointed
counsel in an appeal from his convictions and sentences was
ineffective, 	under 	the 	provisions 	of 	Florida 	Rule 	of 	Appellate
Procedure 9.141(d). We dismiss the petition.
In 2023, a court adjudicated and sentenced Jones for first-
degree felony murder by distributing fentanyl, sale or delivery of
fentanyl, and sale or delivery of methamphetamine. On direct
appeal, 	Jones’s 	appointed 	counsel 	filed 	an 	“Anders 	brief,”
indicating that the record disclosed no arguable issues, under the
provisions of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(g)(2). This
Court affirmed the judgment and sentence.

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Jones 	alleges 	in 	this 	petition 	that 	appellate 	counsel 	was
ineffective 	for 	failing 	to 	argue 	that 	he 	was 	not 	the 	actual
distributor of the fentanyl, so he could not be guilty of felony
murder. We rejected a claim made under similar circumstances in
Mack 	v. 	State, 	380 	So. 	3d 	1248 	(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	2024), 	which
addressed whether a petitioner could make a cognizable ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim in a case where counsel filed
an “Anders brief” on appeal. There we noted that “[t]here simply
cannot be a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel in this situation because the panel in the underlying
appeal presumably conducted its own full and independent review
of the record to discover any arguable issues apparent on the face
of 	the 	record.” 	Id. 	at 	1248 	(quotations 	omitted). 	“Under 	this
mandated process [set forth in rule 9.140(g)(2)], an affirmance by
the appellate court in essence is the court’s determination that the
appellant has received his constitutionally guaranteed right to
effective assistance from [appellate] counsel.” Id. at 1249. In this
circumstance, a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel constitutes an improper “second bite of that apple[.]” Id.
When 	appointed 	counsel 	and 	the 	appellate 	court 	have
performed their duties under 9.140(g)(2), and the court issues an
affirmance, it means that the record discloses no arguable issues
for 	which 	the 	appellant 	would 	have 	a 	constitutional 	right 	to
argument by appointed counsel. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 743–44 (1967) (establishing a procedure, when appointed
appellate counsel finds no arguable issue to raise, to ensure the
State’s obligation to “furnish petitioner with counsel acting in the
role of an advocate”). An affirmance following the Anders process
does 	not, 	however, 	necessarily 	mean 	that 	the 	court 	has
affirmatively 	found 	that 	appellate 	counsel 	rendered 	“effective
assistance,” only that the appellant’s right to appointed counsel
has been honored despite the lack of argument. See Penson v. Ohio,
488 	U.S. 	75, 	88 	(1988) 	(noting 	that 	the 	Anders 	procedure 	is
designed 	to 	ensure 	that 	an 	indigent 	appellant 	received 	his
constitutionally 	required 	appointed 	counsel, 	not 	to 	determine
whether 	appointed 	counsel 	rendered 	ineffective 	assistance).
Nonetheless, the result is essentially the same: if the appellate
court has already determined that its review of the record discloses
no arguable issues, it is nearly impossible for the appellant to
demonstrate in a petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel

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that there were “specific errors or omissions of such magnitude
that it can be said that they deviated from the norm or fell outside
the range of professionally acceptable performance[.]” Johnson v.
Wainwright, 463 So. 2d 207, 209 (Fla. 1985). In that respect, we
agree with Mack that a rule 9.141(d) petition is subject to dismissal
in this situation.
DISMISSED.
R OWE and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Christopher Jones, pro se, Petitioner.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.