Super Green Air Control, LLC a/a/o Karen Roshell v. Universal Property and Casualty Insurance Company

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-3044
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S UPER GREEN A IR C ONTROL ,
LLC, a/a/o KAREN R OSHELL ,
Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSAL PROPERTY AND
C ASUALTY I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the County Court for Escambia County.
Ronald Scott Ritchie, Judge.
May 6, 2026
KELSEY , J.
Super Green Air Control (the Contractor), appeals a final
order dismissing its action seeking payment for services rendered
to 	an 	insured 	of 	Appellee, 	Universal 	Property 	and 	Casualty
Insurance Company (the Insurer). The insured home sustained
damage from Hurricane Sally, in September of 2020. The insured
homeowner hired the Contractor to test for mold and, if found,
clear the home. The insured executed an assignment of benefits
(AOB) authorizing the Contractor to undertake the necessary work
and 	bill 	it 	to 	the 	Insurer. 	The 	issue 	is 	whether 	the 	insured
homeowner’s 	AOB 	to 	the 	Contractor 	satisfied 	the 	governing
requirements of section 627.7152, Florida Statutes (2022).

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Our standard of review is de novo. See Air Quality Experts
Corp. v. Fam. Sec. Ins. Co., 351 So. 3d 32, 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)
(applying de novo review under comparable facts). At the motion-
to-dismiss stage, our review includes both the four corners of the
complaint and its attachments. See Santiago v. Mauna Loa Inv.,
LLC, 189 So. 3d 752, 756 (Fla. 2016). We find that the AOB
satisfied 	the 	statute, 	and 	reverse 	and 	remand 	for 	further
proceedings on the Contractor’s claim.
Section 627.7152 requires an assignment agreement to “[b]e
in writing and executed by and between the assignor and the
assignee” and “[c]ontain a written, itemized, per-unit cost estimate
of 	the 	services 	to 	be 	performed 	by 	the 	assignee.”
§ 627.7152(2)(a)1.4., Fla. Stat. “An assignment agreement that
does not comply with this subsection is invalid and unenforceable.”
§ 627.7152(2)(d), Fla. Stat.
In the AOB before us, the insured acknowledged receipt of the
Contractor’s “written, per-unit cost estimate of the services to be
performed,” 	tracking 	the 	language 	of 	section 	627.7152(2). 	A
separate document dated the same date as the AOB and titled
“Invoice” referenced the claim number the insurer had already
designated for the homeowner’s claims, and listed two charges.
The 	first 	was 	titled 	“Protocol,” 	described 	as 	“Environmental
Testing: 	Limited 	visual 	observations, 	multi-location
environmental sampling and report. If additional samples are
required, they will be billed at $95 per each additional sample.”
This work was priced at $995. The second charge was titled
“Clearance,” 	and 	again 	described 	as 	“Environmental 	Testing:
Limited 	visual 	observations, 	multi-location 	environmental
sampling and report.” This item was priced at $795, and the
combined total invoiced was $1,790. The trial court accepted the
Insurer’s argument that this invoice was facially invalid under the
statute in describing the contemplated work, but we disagree.
We construe the Contractor’s invoice in pari materia with the
related AOB contract of the same date. See Kidwell Grp., LLC v.
Safepoint Ins. Co., 376 So. 3d 48, 51–52 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)
(accepting contractor’s comparable contract and approving use of
two documents—a contract and an invoice—bearing the same

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date, and incorporated together). Both the invoice and the AOB list
the insured’s individual name and residence, by street address;
and 	both 	include 	the 	claim 	number 	the 	Insurer 	had 	already
created. The AOB expressly references the invoice of the same
date, and elaborates on the mold-related services needed due to
water damage, which we find legally sufficient. See id. at 52
(holding that invoice satisfied the statute by describing the service
to be provided and cost, and did not require separate execution).
The invoice also provides legally sufficient information. The
first section, titled “Protocol,” states what the Contractor will do,
and the reference to “additional samples” provides further context
and clarity: the Contractor will search, take samples, and test for
problems in multiple areas of the home as needed. The second
section, titled “Clearance,” repeats the “environmental testing”
language from the “Protocol” section, but is not fatally flawed in
doing so as the Insurer mistakenly argues. In the context of the
facts then known to the contracting parties and obvious from the
context, 	it 	references 	the 	next 	step 	after 	any 	problems 	are
identified: they will be “cleared.” Finally, contrary to the Insurer’s
argument that the paperwork was flawed for failing to state the
number 	of 	“units” 	subject 	to 	the 	proposed 	work, 	there 	is 	no
evidence of multiple “units” at the insured’s address—a fact that
would be well-known to the Insurer—so there would be no reason
to reference “per-unit” work in this case. See MVP Plumbing, Inc.
v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 359 So. 3d 885, 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)
(accepting 	as 	valid 	an 	assignment 	that, 	while 	not 	expressly
mentioning 	number 	of 	units, 	clearly 	contemplated 	a 	single
service).
The 	documents 	adequately 	complied 	with 	the 	statutory
requirements. Perhaps two teams of lawyers poring over such
documents in advance for their respective clients would write the
contract/invoice 	differently, 	but 	that 	is 	not 	an 	appropriate
standard for an ad-hoc repair agreement between a homeowner
and a contractor, particularly where the homeowner does not
allege the agreement is invalid. See Well Done Mitigation, LLC v.
Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 416 So. 3d 369–70 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025)
(interpreting statute to protect contractor’s “ability to receive fair
compensation 	for 	its 	work 	pursuant 	to 	an 	otherwise 	valid
assignment agreement”). We find that the documents satisfy the

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statute, and therefore the Contractor is entitled to proceed with its
claim on remand.
R EVERSED.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and R OBERTS, J., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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William Derek Mueller and Elliot Burt Kula of Kula & Associates,
P.A., Miami; Amy E. Ruiz and Steven Jon Getman of Ruiz Getman
Law, PLLC, Miami, for Appellant.
Kara 	Rockenbach 	Link 	and 	David 	Andrew 	Noel 	of 	Link 	&
Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach; Kristina Hatem Kamel of
Farah & Farah, Middleburg, for Appellee.