Heule v. Humphrey

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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Nos. 1D2024-2186
1D2024-2187
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F RANK H EULE and JUDY H EULE ,
Appellants,
v.
EDITH KNAPP H UMPHREY ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Michael Jones, Judge.
December 3, 2025
P ER C URIAM.
Appellants, a married couple, appeal permanent injunctions
for protection against stalking that the trial court entered against
them in favor of Appellee, their next-door neighbor. We agree with
Appellants that the evidence was legally insufficient to justify the
entry of the injunctions. We, therefore, reverse.
Factual Background
In her injunction petitions, Appellee alleged that Appellants,
since October 2019, had placed numerous homemade signs in their
windows and had hung a skeleton, which they would dress in
outfits that corresponded to events in the lives of Appellee and her

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teenage daughter, on their front door. This began after Appellee’s
vehicle 	accidently 	rolled 	into 	Appellants’ 	dining 	room, 	which
resulted in physical damage to Appellants’ home and emotional
distress. 	Appellants kept a daily tally on one of their signs with
the number of days that had elapsed since the accident. 	Other
homemade signs talked about May being mental health awareness
month, one referenced the movie One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest
and included a photograph of actor Jack Nicholson, one mentioned
perimenopause and empty nest syndrome, one said “[h]ere comes
da judge” around the time that Appellee had a divorce hearing, and
one read, “Just because you are paranoid doesn’t mean they are
watching (or listening) sometimes a steak out is just a barbeque
right?” Another sign included the language “[h]ere’s looking at you
kid” and contained a photo of Humphrey Bogart. 	Appellants
dressed the skeleton in things like a straitjacket and a black dress.
After the trial court denied both petitions, Appellee filed a
supplemental 	affidavit 	in 	which 	she 	claimed 	that 	Appellants’
behavior had caused her substantial emotional distress. 	During
the subsequent hearing, Appellee explained that she had moved
from her property for a period of approximately three years after
the accident but returned in July 2023. 	She testified about the
signs and the skeletons as well as Appellants’ installation of some
sort of solar device. 	She stated, “Whether it’s listening I’m not
really sure.” 	She also testified about how difficult it had been for
her to see Appellants’ signs and knowing that her daughter, who
claimed to have had nightmares about Appellants, was affected by
them. She described one verbal altercation she had with Appellant
Frank 	Heule 	over 	the 	fence 	that 	separated 	their 	properties.
Appellee’s daughter testified that she had never spoken to either
of Appellants, and she could give no example of a time when
something she had said to either her mother or a friend became
the subject of one of Appellants’ “displays.” Appellant Frank Heule
testified that he and his wife posted the signs and skeletons in
response to things they heard about in the news. 	He claimed to
have pointed a camera down his driveway, not at Appellee’s home.
Appellant Judy Heule testified about the distress that the accident
with Appellee’s vehicle had caused her and her husband, about
how the couple chooses to “put [their] thoughts out there,” and
about how she had looked up Appellee’s name in court records.

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In granting Appellee’s petitions and entering the injunctions,
the 	trial 	court 	found 	that 	Appellee 	and 	her 	daughter 	had
experienced “emotional distress.” 	The court rejected Appellants’
testimony that their signs were not targeting Appellee, while
recognizing that Appellants’ ill will towards Appellee stemmed
from the accident. The court set forth in part:
Admittedly if it was just one thing in isolation, if on
one day there was a prom dress and it happened to be at
the time of prom for the Petitioner’s daughter, that would
be one thing.
But it’s the collective of things which seem to –
because they are – they have a – an – an – a connection
with events in the neighbors’ lives that – not saying every
sign is directed at the Petitioner. Not saying that at all.
But there is a consistency that some are. 	And it
seems that there is a willingness and that’s not just to
speak to society generally. That is not what it is, despite
the 	representation 	that 	that’s 	what 	it 	was 	by 	the
Respondent.
. . . .
And so – and they – they – the [Appellants] have a
right 	to 	– 	to 	make 	public 	comment 	about 	political
matters, and express their First Amendment right.
What they don’t have a right to do is to invade the
privacy of the Petitioner by posting things that – that can
be directly connected to the Petitioner like this whole
truck thing and the count down and – and – and the
things that have been mentioned.
When Appellee’s counsel stated that the sign reflecting the time
that had elapsed since the accident was probably constitutionally
protected, the court replied, “I – I would agree with you, but for the
fact that I found it’s a part of a pattern of harassment.” 	When
Appellant Frank Heule stated, “I’m trying to decide for myself . . .
what constitutes harassment – I don’t know what she’s going to –

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determine in . . . her mind as being harassment and what isn’t
based on the little contact that I’ve had with her over the years,”
the court replied in part, “So . . . if there’s a question about it, you
either choose not to do that thing or choose to do that thing, and if
she takes action on it then let some other judge or court decide in
the future she’s – she acted too sensitively or no, so she was
justified 	in 	doing 	it 	because 	that 	was 	a 	continuation 	of
harassment.” The court denied Appellants’ motions for rehearing.
These consolidated appeals followed.
Analysis
In 2012, the Legislature created a cause of action for an
injunction for protection against stalking. 	See § 784.0485(1), Fla.
Stat. (2012). 	“Stalking” is defined as “willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly 	follow[ing], 	harass[ing], 	or 	cyberstalk[ing] 	another
person.” 	§ 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2024). 	“Harass” means “to
engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which
causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2024). “Course of
conduct” means “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity
of purpose.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024). A petitioner seeking
a stalking injunction is only required to prove “a single incident of
stalking.” Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018). This is because stalking requires proof of repeated acts. Id.
at 	1144. 	The 	petitioner 	must 	prove 	stalking 	by 	competent,
substantial evidence. 	Id. at 1146. 	As we have explained, a trial
court has broad discretion to grant an injunction. 	Id. at 1143–44.
As such, an appellate court reviews an order granting a permanent
injunction “for a clear abuse of that discretion.” 	Id. at 1144; see
also Stone v. McMillian, 270 So. 3d 510, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)
(noting that a trial court’s imposition of a stalking injunction is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion and must be supported by
competent, 	substantial 	evidence). 	However, 	the 	question 	of
whether evidence is legally sufficient to justify the imposition of an
injunction is a question of law that is reviewable de novo. Pickett,
236 So. 3d at 1146.
Here, the trial court entered the stalking injunctions based
upon what it found to be Appellants’ harassment of Appellee by

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posting signs in their windows and hanging a skeleton on their
front door that they would dress and decorate in various ways to
correspond to events in Appellee's life. But this case lacks evidence
of Appellee suffering “substantial emotional distress” due to the
signs and ornaments hanging in Appellants’ house that justifies
the imposition of a stalking injunction. See Savage v. Bustillo, 397
So. 	3d 	1198, 	1201 	(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	2024) 	(recognizing 	that
substantial emotional distress is more than being weirded out or
uncomfortable); Venn v. Fowlkes, 257 So. 3d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018) (recognizing that the substantial emotional distress that is
necessary to support a stalking injunction is greater than just an
ordinary feeling of distress).
Accordingly, we reverse.
R EVERSED.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LEWIS and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Jason Cromey of Cromey Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellants.
Jessica L. Scholl of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola,
for Appellee.