Florida Roof Masters, LLC, Carlucci, v. Page

FIRST DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-0132
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F LORIDA R OOF M ASTERS, LLC,
and N ICHOLAS D. CARLUCCI,
Appellants,
v.
BONNIE S. P AGE, an individual,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Columbia County.
Mark E. Feagle, Judge.
December 10, 2025
PER C URIAM.
Appellants Florida Roof Masters, LLC, and Nicholas Carlucci
appeal from the final summary judgment entered in favor of
Appellee Bonnie Page. There are two issues on appeal, only one of
which merits discussion. We agree with Roof Masters that the trial
court erred in ruling that it did not have standing to bring a breach
of contract claim against Page based on her refusal to make the
final payment provided for in their contract.
Roof Masters and Page signed a contract under which the
former would provide roofing services, and the latter would pay for
it. The total cost of the contract was $18,000. Page paid $9,000
prior to services being performed but refused to pay the balance

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upon completion. Roof Masters retained the services of a collection
company 	to 	pursue 	collection 	of 	the 	debt 	on 	its 	behalf. 	The
collection contract provided for the collection company’s pursuit of
the debt “on behalf of Roof Masters,” and if the company was
successful, 	it 	would 	keep 	a 	percentage 	of 	the 	recovery 	as
payment—the remainder, of course, going to Roof Masters. If the
company was unsuccessful, Roof Masters was not responsible for
the collection company’s costs.
Though the collection contract makes several references to the
“assigned debt,” there is nothing in the contract that has the
collection company purchasing the debt from Roof Masters, so
there 	was 	no 	full 	and 	unconditional 	assignment 	of 	all 	Roof
Masters’s 	interests 	in 	the 	roofing 	contract 	to 	the 	collection
company. Cf. Robinson v. Springfield Co., 21 Fla. 203, 217–18
(1885) (describing difference between an absolute assignment,
under which there is no remaining interest in the assignor, and an
assignment in which the assignor retains an interest in what is
due). Page’s alleged debt gave rise to an assignable chose in action.
Cf. Spears v. W. Coast Builders’ Supply Co., 133 So. 97, 97 (Fla.
1931). To the extent there was an assignment at all under the
collection contract, it was with respect to the chose in action to
allow the collection company to sue on Roof Masters’s behalf. The
assignment did not put the chose “beyond the future control of”
Roof Masters. Sammis v. L’Engle, 19 Fla. 800, 804 (1883). That is,
the collection contract’s terms do not state that Roof Masters gave
up all its rights to enforce its contract with Page. Cf. Cont’l Cas.
Co. v. Ryan Inc. E., 974 So. 2d 368, 376 (Fla. 2008) (“An assignment
has been defined as ‘a transfer or setting over of property, or of
some right or interest therein, from one person to another.’ . . .
[O]nce transferred, the assignor no longer has a right to enforce
the interest because the assignee has obtained all ‘rights to the
thing assigned.’”) (citations omitted).
“Standing is a legal concept that requires a would-be litigant
to demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected by
the outcome of the proceedings, either directly or indirectly.” Hayes
v. Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2006). In
other words, for Roof Masters to have standing to sue on its own
contract, all it had to show was that it had a “direct and articulable
stake in the outcome of a controversy.” Brown v. Firestone, 382 So.

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2d 	654, 	662 	(Fla. 	1980). 	Roof 	Masters 	has 	not 	received 	any
recompense for the debt that ostensibly remains outstanding. It
naturally stands to gain financially if its suit against Page is
successful. The collections contract gave a right to sue on behalf of
Roof Masters; it was not an absolute assignment. Notably, had the
collection company sued Page, Roof Masters would still have been
a necessary party. See Robinson, 21 Fla. at 217–18.
We therefore reverse the summary judgment as to the breach
of contract count brought by Roof Masters. We otherwise affirm.
AFFIRMED in part, R EVERSED in part, and R EMANDED for
further proceedings.
L EWIS, ROBERTS, and T ANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Jennifer 	Catherine 	Biewend 	and 	Kris 	Bradshaw 	Robinson 	of
Robinson, Kennon & Kendron, PA, Lake City, for Appellants.
Meagan Lindsay Logan of Douglas & Douglas, Lake City, for
Appellee.