Musser, Sidner v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, Residential Credit Opportunities Trust VII-A, et al.

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-2714
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T RAVIS S. M USSER and R EGINA
A NN SIDNER ,
Appellants,
v.
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND
SOCIETY , FSB, as Owner Trustee
of the Residential Credit
Opportunities Trust VII-A, et
al.,
Appellees.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Jennifer J. Frydrychowicz, Judge.
May 6, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
Appellants 	challenge 	the 	trial 	court’s 	order 	granting
Appellee’s motion for a final summary judgment of foreclosure,
reestablishment of lost note, declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees.
The 	order 	also 	reformed 	Appellant, 	Travis 	Musser’s, 	loan
modification agreement with Appellee’s predecessor in interest to
include the signature of Appellant, Regina Musser, who is Mr.
Musser’s wife.

2
We turn first to the reformation of the loan modification
agreement. 	Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ.
P. 1.510(a). 	Florida courts have held that a writing should be
reformed when it fails to reflect the parties’ actual agreement due
to either (a) a mutual mistake of the parties or (b) a unilateral
mistake on the part of one party paired with inequitable conduct
by the other. See Smith v. Royal Auto. Group, Inc., 675 So. 2d 144,
150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (citing Providence Square Ass’n, Inc., v.
Biancardi, 507 So. 2d 1366, 1372 n.3 (Fla. 1987)).
In the proceedings below, Appellee supported its request for
reformation by arguing that Mrs. Musser’s signature was left off
of the loan modification due to a mutual mistake. 	Appellants
disputed that Mrs. Musser intended to sign the loan modification.
Based on Appellants’ arguments and the record before us, we find
that this dispute was both material and genuine. 	We therefore
find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
Appellee’s request for reformation, and we reverse the portion of
the 	trial 	court’s 	order 	that 	reformed 	the 	loan 	modification
agreement.
Turning next to the attorney’s fees, absent a stipulation or a
waiver, the reasonableness of attorney’s fees must be determined
at an evidentiary hearing. 	See Joyner v. Worley, 264 So. 3d 260,
261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (citing Giovanini v. Giovanini, 89 So. 3d
280, 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)). 	The trial court did not hold an
evidentiary 	hearing 	on 	the 	fees, 	and 	the 	record 	contains 	no
stipulation or waiver. 	Thus, we reverse the portion of the trial
court’s order that awarded attorney’s fees to Appellee.
Appellants 	raised 	several 	other 	arguments 	challenging
several other aspects of the order. 	We find that these arguments
were all either meritless or unpreserved, and so we affirm the
remainder of the trial court’s order. 	We remand this case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and B ILBREY and LONG, JJ., concur.

3
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Carrie Vaughn Cromey and 	Melissa 	Condon Onacki of 	Legal
Services of North Florida, Pensacola, for Appellants.
Melisa Manganelli of the Law Offices of Manganelli, Leider &
Savio, P.A., Boca Raton, for Appellee Wilmington Savings Fund
Society, 	FSB, 	As 	Owner 	Trustee 	of 	the 	Residential 	Credit
Opportunities Trust VII-A.