Davis v. State of Florida

2024-0224Fladistctapp1

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FIRST DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-0224
_____________________________
J ERDARRIUS D AVIS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF F LORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Tiffany Baker-Carper, Judge.
December 23, 2025
PER C URIAM.
A FFIRMED.
K ELSEY and L ONG, JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., concurs with
opinion.
2
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
T ANENBAUM, J., concurring.
The 	appellant 	was 	convicted 	of 	manslaughter 	under 	a
principal theory. Though the offense itself is a second-degree
felony, it was reclassified to be a first-degree felony because,
ostensibly, 	the 	appellant 	“carr[ied], 	display[ed], 	use[d], 	[or]
threaten[ed] to use” a firearm “during the commission of such
felony.” § 775.087(1)(a)–(b), Fla. Stat. He then was sentenced on
that conviction to thirty years in prison as a prison releasee
reoffender. 	See 	§ 775.082(9)(a), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	It 	is 	true 	that 	the
reclassification could not be “based on the conduct of” a criminal
cohort through a “theory of constructive or vicarious” possession or
use. State v. Rodriguez, 602 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 1992). Put
another way, there must be evidence that the appellant himself
had a firearm in connection with the offense.
According to the appellant, the trial court erred when it
reclassified 	his 	conviction 	offense 	because 	the 	verdict 	form’s
interrogatory 	to 	the 	jury 	regarding 	firearm 	aggravation 	was
deficient. The pertinent verdict interrogatory went as follows:
If 	you 	find 	JERDARRIUS 	J. 	DAVIS 	guilty 	of
MANSLAUGHTER, you must then answer the following
questions:
Did the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that while
committing 	Manslaughter, 	JERDARRIUS 	J. 	DAVIS,
JAHIEM 	I. 	NIXON, 	·EDWARD 	D. 	JOHNSON, 	or
“GENE” personally carried, possessed, displayed, used,
or, threatened to use a firearm?
__Yes
__No
3
(emphasis supplied).
On this front, the appellant is correct: the jury’s verdict using the
disjunctive—determining, then, only that the State proved beyond
a doubt either the appellant or one of his cohorts used a firearm
while 	committing 	manslaughter—was 	legally 	insufficient 	to
support reclassification.
Still, 	we 	cannot 	address 	that 	error 	in 	this 	appeal. 	The
appellant did not challenge the verdict form at trial. In fact, as will
be discussed in a moment, his counsel affirmatively agreed to it.
Before raising it on appeal, the appellant presumably attempted
to preserve the issue using Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(b). A motion under that rule cannot circumvent the invited-
error rule, which applies here.
On at least two occasions during the charge conference, the
appellant’s trial counsel agreed to both the defective verdict form
and a commensurate defect in the related instruction. To provide
some 	context, 	consider 	the 	following 	firearm 	aggravator
instruction given to the jury:
AGGRAVATION OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER BY
CARRYING, DISPLAYING OR USING A WEAPON
If you find that JerDarrius J. Davis, Jaheim I. Nixon,
Edward D. Johnson, or “Gene”, [sic] committed First
Degree Murder and you also find beyond a reasonable
doubt that during the commission of the crime, at least
one 	of 	them 	personally 	carried, 	displayed 	or 	used 	a
weapon, you should find the defendant guilty of First
Degree Murder with a weapon.
* * *
If you find that JerDarrius J. Davis committed First
Degree Murder, but you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that he personally carried, displayed or
used a weapon, then you should find him guilty only of
First Degree Murder.
(emphases supplied).
4
The highlighted text in the above-quoted verdict form and
instruction was the subject of an extended colloquy between the
trial judge and counsel. During the charge conference, the trial
judge pointedly asked counsel what interrogatory needed to be on
the verdict form to support firearm “aggravation.” Because the
State conceded that the appellant did not possess a firearm during
the charged offense, the trial judge asked about including all the
“co-defendants” (meaning, the accomplices) in the interrogatory.
Here is the pertinent exchange:
THE COURT: . . . [A]ggravation of first-degree murder by
carrying, displaying, or using a weapon.
I guess we need to go over the verdict form too. I don’t
think I have that ready yet.
[PROSECUTOR]: But I do think we need the aggravation
language, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You think so?
[PROSECUTOR]: 	Based 	on 	the 	principal 	theory.
Obviously, it wouldn’t be under 10-20-Life --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.
[PROSECUTOR]: 	-- 	but 	it 	would 	be 	under 	weapon
enhancement.
THE COURT: Right. The use of a firearm during the
commission?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Also I’m thinking that we should include
under the principal theory not just Davis’s name here but
also the co-defendants.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s fine.
THE COURT: Mr. Mood?
5
[PROSECUTOR]: I would defer to the Defense and the
Court.
THE COURT: And I say that because it goes on to say,
“. . . he personally carried, displayed, or used a weapon,
you should find him guilty of first-degree murder with a
weapon.”
And the State is seeking or acknowledging that he did not
possess a weapon but that the co-defendants did.
[PROSECUTOR]: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So I think it would be appropriate to use
all of the co-defendants.
[DEFENSE 	COUNSEL]: 	And 	my 	understanding 	is
there’s 	still 	gonna 	be 	specific 	interrogatories 	as 	to
possessing and discharging a firearm on the verdict form.
[PROSECUTOR]: Well, I don’t know that we have to have
discharging. 	I 	think 	just 	during 	the 	course 	of 	the
commission of the crime that a firearm was --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.
[PROSECUTOR]: 	-- used, carried, displayed, because
that would indicate -- that would aggravate it.
[DEFENSE 	COUNSEL]: 	Right. 	And 	it 	may 	seem
miniscule, but I do think there needs to be something that
can differentiate who possessed the firearm, even though
I know we conceded it, as to a factual finding by them.
THE COURT: Well, does it matter? And I --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Not on a first-degree murder
conviction it wouldn’t necessarily matter, but there are
circumstances if they came back with some crazy lesser
in which he didn’t possess a firearm, it could matter, even
though we’ve conceded it in terms of the actual findings
they make. If they came back with a manslaughter for
some reason and he didn’t possess a firearm.
6
THE 	COURT: 	So, 	then, 	you’re 	proposing 	the
interrogatory specifically ask the question of whether he
possessed a firearm? Yes? No? Was a firearm possessed
by one of the co-defendants, or was a firearm possessed
during the commission of the manslaughter? Yes? No?
[DEFENSE 	COUNSEL]: 	Yes. 	As 	long 	as 	it 	can
distinguish on the interrogatory whether he possessed a
firearm or not. I mean, I don’t necessarily believe there
would 	have 	to 	be 	an 	interrogatory 	of 	anyone 	else
possessing a firearm based on the evidence that we have.
I mean, the only evidence is that the guy died of a gunshot
wound. But in terms of whether he possessed a firearm,
because of how the principal theory is applicable -- if that
makes sense -- because they could come back guilty on
something based on principal theory in a situation which
obviously he didn’t possess or discharge a firearm. And
the importance of that is, at sentencing, if we get there
when you sentence him, as to what’s applicable or not.
THE COURT: Right. And that’s what I’m wondering. And
I honestly don’t know if the possession of a firearm by the
co-defendant could be used as an aggravating factor at
sentencing for him even if they find that he did not
personally possess the firearm.
[DEFENSE 	COUNSEL]: 	Right. 	I 	don’t 	think 	it’s 	a
statutory 	aggravator 	in 	which 	it 	would 	increase 	the
exposure or what you would have to sentence him to.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t. That’s why I think the
interrogatory, as it would apply to him, would be the most
important. But if I’m wrong, I’m sure Mr. Mood will
correct me or get Mr. Evans.
THE COURT: I think that’s something we can look into.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma’am.
7
[PROSECUTOR]: 	That’s 	what 	I’m 	looking 	at 	now
because. . . .
***
. . . So I think there needs to be an interrogatory that says,
During the course of the commission of the crimes, was a
firearm used?
THE COURT: Right. Now, the question, though, becomes,
does there need to be another interrogatory to say that
the defendant actually possessed the firearm? And if not,
can the -- I don’t think that goes far enough to answer the
question of whether or not a co-defendant’s possession of
a firearm be used to enhance the defendant's sentence. Or
does that --
[PROSECUTOR]: . . . In Lopez, the defendant was -- there
was a special finding by the jury he did not personally
carry, which would preclude a 10-20-Life sentence but
would not preclude --
THE COURT: The aggravation.
[PROSECUTOR]: -- the aggravation.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think they asked both in that
case.
***
THE 	COURT: 	All 	right. 	Okay. 	So 	-- 	but 	we’re 	good
underneath 	aggravation. If you 	find that Jer’Darrius
Davis -- and include the names of the co-defendants.
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Okay. And all of the other information
under red; is that correct? Or in red. I’m sorry.
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, ma'am.
8
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.
(emphases supplied).
The next day, before recommencing trial, the judge asked
counsel whether they had any further changes to the instructions
or verdict form. The following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: Did you all get an opportunity to review it
in its entirety?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Did you see the portions in red?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: All right. So what is your position on and
or or?
[PROSECUTOR]: And, Your Honor, I do have some other
things that I -- in the instructions as well.
THE COURT: Okay.
[PROSECUTOR]: But I don't know if you want to take
those up now or if you --
THE COURT: Let’s do it all. Let’s start with the and and
or, though.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. I think the -- in terms of the and
ors, or is sufficient because it would mean any one of
them.
THE COURT: Right.
[PROSECUTOR]: And would include, certainly, if more
than one of them acted in conjunction.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would agree, Your Honor.
9
THE COURT: Okay. That was easy.
***
[PROSECUTOR]: 	Then 	I 	think 	we 	only 	have 	some
thoughts on the verdict form.
THE COURT: Yes. All right. So, Attorney Collins, are you
fine with everything else that was provided to you in the
jury instructions?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Moving on to the verdict form.
***
THE COURT: And then the interrogatories under that
would then be whether or not he possessed -- or one of the
co-defendants possessed a firearm and whether or not
that firearm was discharged.
[PROSECUTOR]: So the State is requesting that -- or it
believes -- we would contend that we’re not entitled to any
10/20/Life language --
THE COURT: Okay.
[PROSECUTOR]: 	-- 	on 	the 	discharge 	or 	great 	bodily
harm. So I believe that can be struck since 10/20/Life --
the minimum mandatory is not at issue --
THE COURT: Right.
[PROSECUTOR]: -- since the defendant is not alleged to
have 	personally 	carried, 	discharged 	or 	caused 	great
bodily harm. We just need a finding whether or not any
of the principals carried it as to the weapon enhancement.
THE COURT: You satisfied with that position, Attorney
Collins?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. I am.
10
Simply put, the appellant now “cannot successfully complain
about an error for which he [or his counsel] is responsible.” Gupton
v. Vill. Key & Saw Shop, Inc., 656 So. 2d 475, 478 (Fla. 1995).
During these colloquies, the appellant’s lawyer did more than
“merely acquiesce[] to the incomplete instructions” and verdict
form; counsel clearly was both “aware” of the erroneous instruction
and verdict form (because both were discussed in depth during the
charge conference) and “affirmatively agreed to” them. Lowe v.
State, 	259 	So. 	3d 	23, 	50 	(Fla. 	2018) 	(internal 	brackets 	and
quotations omitted); see also State v. Lucas, 645 So. 2d 425, 427
(Fla. 1994) (noting exception to fundamental error analysis when
“defense 	counsel 	affirmatively 	agreed 	to” 	an 	incomplete 	jury
instruction). It naturally follows that a rule 3.800 motion cannot
resurrect a moribund challenge to an agreed-to instruction or
verdict 	form 	otherwise 	barred 	by 	this 	invited-error 	rule. 	Cf.
Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 569 (Fla. 2008) (observing that
“for sentencing errors, to raise even fundamental error on appeal,
defendants must first file a motion under rule 3.800(b)”); State v.
Dortch, 317 So. 3d 1074, 1081 (Fla. 2021) (noting that “a defendant
has 	no 	constitutional 	due 	process 	right 	to 	the 	correction 	of
unpreserved error” and “that a constitutional right, or a right of
any other sort, may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases
by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it” (internal quotations
omitted)).
For this court to vacate the appellant’s sentence at this point,
we would have to conclude the trial court erred by denying the rule
3.800 motion. But that would mean, in essence, the trial court was
boxed in at sentencing by the erroneous verdict form to which the
appellant’s 	counsel 	affirmatively 	agreed—thereby 	having 	no
choice at that point but to sentence him based on an un-reclassified
manslaughter offense. Call it invited error or forfeiture, or even
estoppel—any way this approach is labeled, and regardless of
intent of trial or appellate counsel; to set aside the sentence now,
based 	on 	the 	appellant’s 	assertion 	that 	the 	verdict 	form 	is
insufficient to support reclassification—after agreeing to the form
after the trial court specifically asked about it—would smack too
much of sandbagging under the circumstances of this case to
11
warrant relief. Cf. Anderson v. State, 93 So. 3d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2012) (“Counsel cannot sandbag a trial judge by requesting
and approving something they know will result in an automatic
reversal, if given.” (internal quotations, brackets, and ellipsis
omitted)).
Affirmance is the only permitted disposition on this direct
appellate review.
_____________________________
Jessica 	J. 	Yeary, 	Public 	Defender, 	and 	Megan 	Lynne 	Long,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Christina Piotrowski,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2024-0224

JERDARRIUS DAVIS,
Appellant,
Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Tiffany Baker-Carper, Judge.
December 23, 2025
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.

KELSEY and LONG, JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., concurs with
opinion.

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter under a
principal theory. Though the offense itself is a second-degree
felony, it was reclassified to be a first-degree felony because,
ostensibly, the appellant “carr[ied], display[ed], use[d], [or]
threaten[ed] to use” a firearm “during the commission of such
felony.” § 775.087(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. He then was sentenced on
that conviction to thirty years in prison as a prison releasee
reoffender. See § 775.082(9)(a), Fla. Stat. It is true that the
reclassification could not be “based on the conduct of’ a criminal
cohort through a “theory of constructive or vicarious” possession or
use. State v. Rodriguez, 602 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 1992). Put
another way, there must be evidence that the appellant himself
had a firearm in connection with the offense.

According to the appellant, the trial court erred when it
reclassified his conviction offense because the verdict form’s
interrogatory to the jury regarding firearm aggravation was
deficient. The pertinent verdict interrogatory went as follows:

If you find JERDARRIUS J. DAVIS guilty of
MANSLAUGHTER, you must then answer the following
questions:

Did the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that while
committing Manslaughter, JERDARRIUS J. DAVIS,
JAHIEM I. NIXON, -EDWARD D. JOHNSON, or
“GENE” personally carried, possessed, displayed, used,
or, threatened to use a firearm?

(emphasis supplied).

On this front, the appellant is correct: the jury’s verdict using the
disjunctive—determining, then, only that the State proved beyond
a doubt either the appellant or one of his cohorts used a firearm
while committing manslaughter—was legally insufficient to
support reclassification.

Still, we cannot address that error in this appeal. The
appellant did not challenge the verdict form at trial. In fact, as will
be discussed in a moment, his counsel affirmatively agreed to it.
Before raising it on appeal, the appellant presumably attempted
to preserve the issue using Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(b). A motion under that rule cannot circumvent the invited-
error rule, which applies here.

On at least two occasions during the charge conference, the
appellant’s trial counsel agreed to both the defective verdict form
and a commensurate defect in the related instruction. To provide
some context, consider the following firearm aggravator
instruction given to the jury:

AGGRAVATION OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER BY
CARRYING, DISPLAYING OR USING A WEAPON

If you find that JerDarrius J. Davis, Jaheim I. Nixon,
Edward D. Johnson, or “Gene”, [sic] committed First
Degree Murder and you also find beyond a reasonable
doubt that during the commission of the crime, at least
one of them personally carried, displayed or used a
weapon, you should find the defendant guilty of First
Degree Murder with a weapon.

kk *

If you find that JerDarrius J. Davis committed First
Degree Murder, but you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that he personally carried, displayed or
used a weapon, then you should find him guilty only of
First Degree Murder.

(emphases supplied).

The highlighted text in the above-quoted verdict form and
instruction was the subject of an extended colloquy between the
trial judge and counsel. During the charge conference, the trial
judge pointedly asked counsel what interrogatory needed to be on
the verdict form to support firearm “aggravation.” Because the
State conceded that the appellant did not possess a firearm during
the charged offense, the trial judge asked about including all the
“co-defendants” (meaning, the accomplices) in the interrogatory.
Here is the pertinent exchange:

THE COURT: ... [A]ggravation of first-degree murder by
carrying, displaying, or using a weapon.

I guess we need to go over the verdict form too. I don’t
think I have that ready yet.

[PROSECUTOR]: But I do think we need the aggravation
language, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You think so?

[PROSECUTOR]: Based on the _ principal theory.
Obviously, it wouldn’t be under 10-20-Life --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.

[PROSECUTOR]: -- but it would be under weapon
enhancement.

THE COURT: Right. The use of a firearm during the
commission?

[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Also I’m thinking that we should include
under the principal theory not just Davis’s name here but
also the co-defendants.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s fine.
THE COURT: Mr. Mood?

[PROSECUTOR]: I would defer to the Defense and the
Court.

THE COURT: And I say that because it goes on to say,
“...he personally carried, displayed, or used a weapon,
you should find him guilty of first-degree murder with a
weapon.”

And the State is seeking or acknowledging that he did not
possess a weapon but that the co-defendants did.

[PROSECUTOR]: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I think it would be appropriate to use
all of the co-defendants.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And my understanding is
there’s still gonna be specific interrogatories as to
possessing and discharging a firearm on the verdict form.

[PROSECUTOR]: Well, I don’t know that we have to have
discharging. I think just during the course of the
commission of the crime that a firearm was --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.

[PROSECUTOR]: -- used, carried, displayed, because
that would indicate -- that would aggravate it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. And it may seem
miniscule, but I do think there needs to be something that
can differentiate who possessed the firearm, even though
I know we conceded it, as to a factual finding by them.

THE COURT: Well, does it matter? And I --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Not on a first-degree murder
conviction it wouldn’t necessarily matter, but there are
circumstances if they came back with some crazy lesser
in which he didn’t possess a firearm, it could matter, even
though we’ve conceded it in terms of the actual findings
they make. If they came back with a manslaughter for
some reason and he didn’t possess a firearm.

THE COURT: So, then, youre proposing’ the
interrogatory specifically ask the question of whether he
possessed a firearm? Yes? No? Was a firearm possessed
by one of the co-defendants, or was a firearm possessed
during the commission of the manslaughter? Yes? No?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. As long as it can
distinguish on the interrogatory whether he possessed a
firearm or not. I mean, I don’t necessarily believe there
would have to be an interrogatory of anyone else
possessing a firearm based on the evidence that we have.
I mean, the only evidence is that the guy died of a gunshot
wound. But in terms of whether he possessed a firearm,
because of how the principal theory is applicable -- if that
makes sense -- because they could come back guilty on
something based on principal theory in a situation which
obviously he didn’t possess or discharge a firearm. And
the importance of that is, at sentencing, if we get there
when you sentence him, as to what’s applicable or not.

THE COURT: Right. And that’s what I’m wondering. And
I honestly don’t know if the possession of a firearm by the
co-defendant could be used as an aggravating factor at
sentencing for him even if they find that he did not
personally possess the firearm.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. I don’t think it’s a
statutory aggravator in which it would increase the
exposure or what you would have to sentence him to.

THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t. That’s why I think the
interrogatory, as it would apply to him, would be the most
important. But if ’m wrong, ’m sure Mr. Mood will
correct me or get Mr. Evans.

THE COURT: I think that’s something we can look into.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma’am.

[PROSECUTOR]: That’s what [Im looking at now
because. ...

KKK

... 901 think there needs to be an interrogatory that says,
During the course of the commission of the crimes, was a
firearm used?

THE COURT: Right. Now, the question, though, becomes,
does there need to be another interrogatory to say that
the defendant actually possessed the firearm? And if not,
can the -- I don’t think that goes far enough to answer the
question of whether or not a co-defendant’s possession of
a firearm be used to enhance the defendant's sentence. Or
does that --

[PROSECUTOR]: .. . In Lopez, the defendant was -- there
was a special finding by the jury he did not personally
carry, which would preclude a 10-20-Life sentence but
would not preclude --

THE COURT: The aggravation.
[PROSECUTOR]: -- the aggravation.
THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think they asked both in that

case.

KKK

THE COURT: All right. Okay. So -- but we’re good
underneath aggravation. If you find that Jer’Darrius
Davis -- and include the names of the co-defendants.

[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Okay. And all of the other information
under red; is that correct? Or in red. I’m sorry.

[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, ma'am.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.

(emphases supplied).

The next day, before recommencing trial, the judge asked
counsel whether they had any further changes to the instructions
or verdict form. The following colloquy ensued:

THE COURT: Did you all get an opportunity to review it
in its entirety?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Did you see the portions in red?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: All right. So what is your position on and
or or?

[PROSECUTOR]: And, Your Honor, I do have some other
things that I -- in the instructions as well.

THE COURT: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: But I don't know if you want to take
those up now or if you --

THE COURT: Let’s do it all. Let’s start with the and and
or, though.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. I think the -- in terms of the and

ors, or is sufficient because it would mean any one of
them.

THE COURT: Right.

[PROSECUTOR]: And would include, certainly, if more
than one of them acted in conjunction.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. That was easy.

KKK

[PROSECUTOR]: Then I think we only have some
thoughts on the verdict form.

THE COURT: Yes. All right. So, Attorney Collins, are you
fine with everything else that was provided to you in the
jury instructions?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Moving on to the verdict form.

KKK

THE COURT: And then the interrogatories under that
would then be whether or not he possessed -- or one of the
co-defendants possessed a firearm and whether or not
that firearm was discharged.

[PROSECUTOR]: So the State is requesting that -- or it
believes -- we would contend that we're not entitled to any
10/20/Life language --

THE COURT: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: -- on the discharge or great bodily
harm. So I believe that can be struck since 10/20/Life --
the minimum mandatory is not at issue --

THE COURT: Right.

[PROSECUTOR]: -- since the defendant is not alleged to
have personally carried, discharged or caused great
bodily harm. We just need a finding whether or not any
of the principals carried it as to the weapon enhancement.

THE COURT: You satisfied with that position, Attorney
Collins?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. I am.

Simply put, the appellant now “cannot successfully complain
about an error for which he [or his counsel] is responsible.” Gupton
v. Vill. Key & Saw Shop, Inc., 656 So. 2d 475, 478 (Fla. 1995).
During these colloquies, the appellant’s lawyer did more than
“merely acquiesce[] to the incomplete instructions” and verdict
form; counsel clearly was both “aware” of the erroneous instruction
and verdict form (because both were discussed in depth during the
charge conference) and “affirmatively agreed to” them. Lowe v.
State, 259 So. 3d 23, 50 (Fla. 2018) Gnternal brackets and
quotations omitted); see also State v. Lucas, 645 So. 2d 425, 427
(Fla. 1994) (noting exception to fundamental error analysis when
“defense counsel affirmatively agreed to” an incomplete jury
instruction). It naturally follows that a rule 3.800 motion cannot
resurrect a moribund challenge to an agreed-to instruction or
verdict form otherwise barred by this invited-error rule. Cf.
Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 569 (Fla. 2008) (observing that
“for sentencing errors, to raise even fundamental error on appeal,
defendants must first file a motion under rule 3.800(b)”); State v.
Dortch, 317 So. 3d 1074, 1081 (Fla. 2021) (noting that “a defendant
has no constitutional due process right to the correction of
unpreserved error” and “that a constitutional right, or a right of
any other sort, may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases
by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it” (internal quotations
omitted)).

For this court to vacate the appellant’s sentence at this point,
we would have to conclude the trial court erred by denying the rule
3.800 motion. But that would mean, in essence, the trial court was
boxed in at sentencing by the erroneous verdict form to which the
appellant’s counsel affirmatively agreed—thereby having no
choice at that point but to sentence him based on an un-reclassified
manslaughter offense. Call it invited error or forfeiture, or even
estoppel—any way this approach is labeled, and regardless of
intent of trial or appellate counsel; to set aside the sentence now,
based on the appellant’s assertion that the verdict form is
insufficient to support reclassification—after agreeing to the form
after the trial court specifically asked about it—would smack too
much of sandbagging under the circumstances of this case to

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warrant relief. Cf. Anderson v. State, 93 So. 3d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2012) (“Counsel cannot sandbag a trial judge by requesting
and approving something they know will result in an automatic
reversal, if given.” (internal quotations, brackets, and ellipsis
omitted)).

Affirmance is the only permitted disposition on this direct
appellate review.

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Megan Lynne Long,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Christina Piotrowski,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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