2024-1698•Fred Jay Campbell v. Erica Schulze Ising
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FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL S TATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2024-1698 _____________________________ F RED JAY C AMPBELL , Appellant, v. ERICA SCHULZE I SING, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. John Miller, Judge. December 23, 2025 P ER C URIAM. A FFIRMED. OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LONG, J., concur; W INOKUR , J., dissents with opinion.
2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ W INOKUR , J., dissenting. The evidence in this case was not sufficient to show that Campbell willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly harassed Ising to support an injunction for protection against stalking pursuant to section 784.0485, Florida Statutes. “Harass” means “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Even if we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Ising, the evidence did not support a finding that Campbell’s conduct was sufficient to cause “substantial emotional distress” under the reasonable-person standard we must apply. See Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 1995) (holding that an objective, reasonable-person standard applies to the phrase “substantial emotional distress”). For this reason, we should reverse. _____________________________ Jason Cromey of Cromey Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant. Erica Schulze Ising, pro se, Appellee.
OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA No. 1D2024-1698 FRED JAY CAMPBELL, Appellant, Vv. ERICA SCHULZE ISING, Appellee. On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. John Miller, Judge. December 23, 2025 PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LONG, J., concur; WINOKUR, J., dissents with opinion. Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. WINOKUR, J., dissenting. The evidence in this case was not sufficient to show that Campbell willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly harassed Ising to support an injunction for protection against stalking pursuant to section 784.0485, Florida Statutes. “Harass” means “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Even if we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Ising, the evidence did not support a finding that Campbell’s conduct was sufficient to cause “substantial emotional distress” under the reasonable-person standard we must apply. See Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 1995) (holding that an objective, reasonable-person standard applies to the phrase “substantial emotional distress”). For this reason, we should reverse. Jason Cromey of Cromey Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant. Erica Schulze Ising, pro se, Appellee.
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