Myrna Jad v. Chris Abinuman

FIFTH DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-2775
LT Case No. 16-2024-DR-3940
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MYRNA J AD,
Appellant,
v.
CHRIS A BINUMAN ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Eric C. Roberson, Judge.
Myrna Jad, Orange Park, pro se.
No Appearance for Appellee.
January 2, 2026
PER C URIAM.
Myrna Jad appeals the temporary injunction for protection
against stalking entered against her and in favor of Appellee,
Chris Abinuman. 	As explained below, though this temporary
injunction was entered by the trial court in violation of Jad’s due
process rights, we dismiss this aspect of the appeal because Jad
did not timely invoke our jurisdiction.

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Jad also appeals the trial court’s subsequent order that
denied her motion to terminate or vacate this injunction. Because
Jad’s initial brief fails to make sufficient argument to preserve her
claim for appellate review, we affirm the appeal of this order.
TRIAL COURT PROCEEDING
The litigation below was initiated when Jad filed a petition
for injunction against repeat violence against Abinuman who,
according to the petition, was her neighbor. The trial court did not
enter an ex parte temporary injunction under Florida Family Law
Rule of Procedure 12.610(c)(1)(A); instead, the petition was set for
final hearing.
Both parties personally appeared at this hearing and neither
was represented by counsel. 	The transcript filed of record from
this brief hearing shows that no sworn testimony was provided.
The hearing concluded with the trial court entering a temporary
injunction in favor of Abinuman and against Jad for protection
against stalking.
The entry of the injunction against Jad violated her right to
due process. Jad was not on notice that an injunction for protection
against stalking could be entered against her because Abinuman
had 	not 	filed 	a 	petition 	or 	any 	type 	of 	pleading 	seeking 	an
injunction. See Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC,
986 So. 2d 1244, 1252 (Fla. 2008) (“Florida law clearly holds that
a trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine matters
which are not the subject of proper pleading and notice,” and “[t]o
allow a court to rule on a matter without proper pleadings and
notice is violative of a party’s due process rights.” (alteration in
original) 	(emphasis 	and 	citation 	omitted)); 	see 	also 	Brooks 	v.
Basdeo, 336 So. 3d 423, 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“It is axiomatic
that 	a 	party 	defending 	against 	a 	claim 	[for 	injunction 	for
protection] is entitled to due process, including the right to proper
and adequate notice of the allegations which form the basis for the
relief sought.” 	(quoting Sanchez v. Marin, 138 So. 3d 1165, 1167
(Fla. 3d DCA 2014))).
Instead, 	the 	trial 	court, 	without 	having 	received 	sworn

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testimony, concluded that Jad was a “squatter” on the property
and sua sponte issued the temporary injunction. And, while titled
as a “temporary” injunction, the injunction specifically provided
that it is to remain in effect for five years. 	The temporary
injunction also directed the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office to remove
Jad, 	including 	any 	ward 	of 	hers, 	from 	the 	premises; 	and 	it
authorized Abinuman to remove Jad’s personalty from and to
change the locks on the residence.
JURISDICTION
Though not raised by either party,1 we first address our
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 	See Bialostozky v. GAHC3
Mount Dora Fl MOB II, LLC, 397 So. 3d 793, 797 (Fla. 5th DCA
2024). 	(“[A]n 	appellate 	court 	is 	required 	to 	assess 	its 	own
jurisdiction, even when not raised by the parties.”).
“It is well-established that a notice of appeal must be timely
filed with the appropriate court for jurisdiction to be conferred
upon an appellate tribunal.” 	Capone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
116 So. 3d 363, 369 (Fla. 2013). 	Stated slightly differently, “[a]n
appellate court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a cause where a
notice of appeal has not been timely filed.” Fisher v. Housing Auth.
of the City of Key West, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D2530 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov.
26, 2025) (quoting State ex. rel. Cantera v. Dist. Ct. of Appeal,
Third Dist., 555 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1990)).
To invoke the jurisdiction of this court to review a final order,
a notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal
within thirty days of the rendition of the order to be reviewed. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). Similarly, for our jurisdiction to be timely
invoked to review a nonfinal order, the notice of appeal must be
filed 	with 	the 	clerk 	of the lower court within 	thirty 	days of
rendition of the order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(b). 	Accordingly,
whether the temporary injunction for protection against stalking
here is a final order or a nonfinal order, for this court to have
1 Abinuman has not filed an answer brief or otherwise
participated in this appeal.

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jurisdiction, Jad’s notice of appeal must have been filed with the
clerk 	of 	the 	circuit 	court 	no 	later 	than 	thirty 	days 	after 	its
rendition.
Jad’s notice of appeal was filed with the clerk of the circuit
court on the thirty-fourth day. 	This untimely filing has resulted
in “an irremediable jurisdictional defect.” Tedder v. Est. of Tedder,
200 So. 3d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (quoting Bak v. Bak, 110
So. 3d 523, 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)). 	We therefore dismiss this
aspect of this appeal.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO TERMINATE OR VACATE
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
Prior to filing her notice of appeal, Jad had also filed a
motion to vacate or terminate the temporary injunction, see Fla.
Fam. L. R. P. 12.610(c)(6) (“The petitioner or respondent may move
the court to modify or vacate an injunction [for protection against
stalking] at any time.”); § 784.0485(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (“Either party
may move at any time to modify or dissolve the injunction [for
protection 	against 	stalking.]”), 	which 	the 	trial 	court 	denied
without a hearing. 	The notice of appeal that Jad filed thereafter
did 	include 	a 	separate 	and 	specific 	reference 	that 	Jad 	was
appealing this denial order, see Fletcher-Johnson v. Johnson, 50
Fla. L. Weekly D2447 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 12, 2025) (“An order
denying a motion to vacate [a final judgment of injunction for
protection against domestic violence] is separate from the final
judgment 	and 	is 	appealable 	separately.”), 	and 	was 	timely
regarding the order.
However, 	Jad’s 	initial 	brief, 	while 	raising 	meritorious
argument for the reversal of the temporary injunction, makes, at
best, conclusory argument for reversing the order denying her
motion to vacate or terminate the injunction, which is insufficient
to preserve appellate review. Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58, 59
(Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Claims for which an appellant has not
presented any argument, or for which he [or she] provides only
conclusory argument, are insufficiently presented for review and
are waived.” (citing Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482–83 (Fla.
2008); Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 217 n.6 (Fla. 1999))). 	And

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since “it is not the function of [an appellate court] to rebrief an
appeal [for a party],” nor are we to “extend a helping hand to
litigants not represented by counsel,” Figueroa v. Kossiver, 336 So.
3d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citations omitted), we are
constrained to affirm the order denying Jad’s motion to vacate or
terminate the injunction.
D ISMISSED, in part; A FFIRMED, in part.
L AMBERT , E DWARDS, and K ILBANE, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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