Denny O. Taylor, Jr. v. Raquel Mazariego, as Expected Personal Representative of the Estate of Edgar Mazariego, and as Expected Legal Guardian of Jesus Del Carmen Mazariego, Haddock Timber, Inc., and Dasher Trucking, LLC

FIFTH DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-3462
LT Case No. 2023-CA-000349
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DENNY O. T AYLOR, J R.,
Appellant,
v.
RAQUEL M AZARIEGO, as
E XPECTED P ERSONAL
R EPRESENTATIVE of the E STATE
of E DGAR M AZARIEGO, and as
E XPECTED L EGAL G UARDIAN of
J ESUS D EL C ARMEN M AZARIEGO,
H ADDOCK T IMBER, I NC., and
D ASHER T RUCKING, LLC,
Appellees.
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Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau County.
Marianne Lloyd Aho, Judge.
Lauren V. Purdy and Rebecca A. Maturo, of Gunster, Yoakley &
Stewart, P.A., Jacksonville, and Edward McCarthy, III, Jason D.
Holbrook, and Angelo M. Patacca, Jr., of Rogers Towers, P.A.,
Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Aaron Sprague, Dana A. Jacobs, and Stefano D. Portigliatti, of
Coker Law, Jacksonville, and Michael A. Hersh and Ian M.
Kirtman, of Hersh Kirtman Injury Law, for Appellee, Raquel
Mazariego.
No Appearance for Remaining Appellees.

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December 5, 2025
E DWARDS, J.
Denny O. Taylor, Jr. appeals the trial court’s order denying
his motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction in this
personal injury and wrongful death suit. The trial court found that
Appellant waived the right to assert the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction for two reasons. 	First, it found that he waived the
defense because he failed to timely assert it in accordance with
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b); specifically, he did not
assert lack of personal jurisdiction in his initial motion or pleading.
Second, the trial court found that Appellant consented to the
court’s jurisdiction because he sought affirmative relief by filing a
motion for enforcement of an alleged settlement agreement, which
is essentially a claim for breach of contract. We affirm.
Background Facts and Case History
In the operative complaint, Appellee, Raquel Mazariego, as
expected personal representative of her parents’ estates, alleged
that 	Appellant, 	while 	driving 	a 	truck 	for 	his 	employer, 	co-
defendant Haddock Timber, Inc., caused a wreck by colliding with
the 	vehicle 	occupied 	by 	three 	members 	of 	Appellee’s 	family,
resulting 	in 	the 	death 	of 	both 	of 	Appellee’s 	parents.1 	The
complaint alleged that Appellant was a resident of Georgia who
regularly worked and drove commercially within Florida and that
Appellant’s 	co-defendants 	were 	companies 	licensed 	and 	doing
business in Florida. 	Suit was filed in the circuit court in Nassau
County, Florida.
During 	the 	course 	of 	the 	litigation, 	Appellant 	has 	been
represented at the trial level sequentially by three (3) different law
firms, an irrelevant fact that we mention only because Appellant’s
1 Haddock Timber allegedly owned the truck at the time of the
wreck. 	A third defendant, Dasher Trucking, LLC, allegedly sold
the subject truck to Haddock Timber. 	A default judgment was
entered against Dasher.

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third trial counsel and its appellate counsel think it is important.
His first law firm, Tyson & Mendes, LLP, filed a motion to dismiss
or transfer based on a claim of improper venue. That motion failed
to assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. 	Later, his
first counsel withdrew that motion and filed an answer to the
complaint admitting that Appellant regularly worked in Florida
and venue in Nassau County was proper. 	A lack of personal
jurisdiction was not asserted among the affirmative defenses in
that original answer. 	Appellant’s first law firm moved to amend
that answer to admit liability; however, the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction was not asserted in that proposed, amended
answer. 	Appellant’s first law firm then filed a motion to enforce
settlement.
The 	first 	defense 	law 	firm, 	Tyson 	& 	Mendes, 	LLP, 	was
replaced as Appellant’s counsel by Cole, Scott & Kissane several
months later. This second law firm filed an amended answer, still
admitting that Appellant regularly worked in Florida and venue
was properly laid but denying liability. The answer filed by Cole,
Scott & Kissane asserted ten affirmative defenses—none of which
referred to a lack of personal jurisdiction. 	The motion to enforce
settlement for policy limits was denied by the trial court following
an evidentiary hearing and affirmed on appeal by this Court. See
Haddock Timber, Inc. v. Mazariego, 403 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 5th DCA
2025) (mem.).
Next, the law firm of Rogers Towers, P.A., 	current trial
counsel for Appellant, made a general appearance on behalf of
Appellant and defendant Haddock Lumber. 	One month later,
Appellant filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal
jurisdiction. 	In the motion filed by Appellant’s third law firm, he
asserted 	that 	he 	had 	“virtually 	no 	connection 	to 	Florida,”
Haddock’s insurer assigned counsel to him, he never was informed
by counsel that he could raise a lack of personal jurisdiction as a
bar to suit, he never knowingly and voluntarily waived any defense
to 	being 	sued 	in 	Florida, 	and 	never 	expressly 	or 	impliedly
authorized counsel to do so on his behalf. 	In support, Appellant
included a declaration, which did not state that Appellant never
transported material on behalf of Haddock to Florida or otherwise
refute Appellee’s assertion that he worked “regularly” in Florida
as a driver for a commercial carrier.

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Appellee filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to
dismiss based on Appellant having waived the right to assert any
personal jurisdiction defense by failing to timely raise that defense
and having sought affirmative relief by seeking enforcement of the
alleged settlement. 	Appellee further noted that Appellant, a
Georgia resident, had voluntarily appeared for his deposition in
Nassau County, Florida, during which he relied upon his lawyer’s
advice and specific instructions to refuse to answer every question
posed by asserting his Fifth Amendment rights. Appellant filed a
reply restating what was already set forth in the motion as if to
excuse the fact that the defense of personal jurisdiction was not
timely raised because Appellant, a truck driver, was not aware of
his right to contest personal jurisdiction; thus, he should get a do-
over now that his third law firm explained this concept to him. As
noted above, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss
based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The appeal was timely filed,
and we have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
Analysis
Every first-year law student in Florida is required to study the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and spend a good deal of time
learning 	about 	the 	defense 	of 	lack 	of 	personal 	jurisdiction,
including how and when to raise that defense if applicable. 	Rule
1.140(b) provides that the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction
over a defendant must be raised in the very first motion or
pleading which a defendant files. 	That rule states in pertinent
part:
[e]very defense in law or fact to a claim for relief in a
pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading,
if one is required, but the following defenses may be
made by motion at the option of the pleader: . . . (2)
lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . . A motion
making any of these defenses must be made before
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. . . . Any
ground not stated must be deemed to be waived except
any ground showing that the court lacks jurisdiction
of the subject matter may be made at any time. . . .

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Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) (emphasis added).
Interpretation of a rule of civil procedure is done in much the
same way as the interpretation of a statute. See Koppel v. Ochoa,
243 So. 3d 886, 891 (Fla. 2018) (citing Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc.
v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 2006)); see also Metcalfe v. Lee,
952 So. 2d 624, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that courts must
interpret rules of civil procedure in accord with their “plain and
ordinary meaning” (quoting Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956, 958
(Fla. 1993))).
Here, Appellant clearly did not assert the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction in his initial motion, which only challenged
venue. Nor did he raise the defense in his first answer, nor in the
proposed first amended answer, nor in his filed amended answer.
Appellant has not provided this Court with any Florida case that
would find this defense to be timely raised in a motion filed at such
a late stage in the proceedings. 	Thus, the trial court was correct
in ruling that Appellant waived the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction 	by 	failing 	to 	timely 	raise 	it 	as 	required 	by 	Rule
1.140(h)(1). 	That waiver provides a sufficient basis by itself for
denying the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm.
Second, Florida law is clear that a defendant waives the right
to assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction when the
defendant seeks affirmative relief from the court in which the
action is pending. Dep’t of Rev. v. Castro, 786 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla.
3d DCA 2001) (citing Babcock v. Whatmore, 707 So. 2d 702, 704
(Fla. 1998)). We need not decide whether Appellant’s filing of the
motion to enforce settlement constitutes affirmative action that
waived the defense of personal jurisdiction, as Appellant’s failure
to comply with Rule 1.140(h)(1), by itself, constitutes a sufficient
basis for denying the motion to dismiss.
Florida courts usually refrain from pontificating on matters
that are not necessary to deciding a case. 	Having made that
general statement, we nevertheless address Appellant’s argument
that he should be excused from complying with the applicable rules
and 	case 	law 	regarding 	asserting 	the 	defense 	of 	personal
jurisdiction because he is a truck driver who was not personally
aware of those matters and that his first two law firms failed to

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advise him properly of the possible availability of that defense. If
the argument that his prior counsel was ineffective were to be
accepted 	as 	an 	excuse 	for 	not 	complying 	with 	procedural 	or
substantive law in the arena of civil litigation, then trial courts
would be forced to conduct an in-person colloquy under oath with
every party regarding every pleading and every motion, every
stipulation, and every objection, that was, or could have been filed
or raised, to ensure that the party understood all the potential
claims or defenses that the party’s counsel did, could, should, or
shouldn’t assert. While the Sixth Amendment may be interpreted
to require similar colloquies at various critical stages in a criminal
case, Florida law does not recognize a parallel in civil matters. The
argument made by Appellant both below and on appeal, would
require civil trial judges to repeatedly ask parties about their
attorneys’ 	specific 	authority 	to 	file 	pleadings, 	motions, 	or
stipulations on their behalf is unsupported by Florida law not to
mention being illogical and unworkable.2 Adopting such a practice
or procedure would certainly bring civil litigation to a halt.3 	It is
the duty of counsel to provide advice to clients in civil cases. 	If
counsel negligently fails to carry out this duty, and harm results
to the client, there are readily available remedies.4
2 Furthermore, adopting Appellant’s argument might mean
that an unrepresented, non-lawyer party could raise any issue at
any stage of a civil proceeding based upon becoming “enlightened”
or “informed.”
3 	We 	note 	that 	Appellant’s 	counsel 	did 	not 	include 	any
statement or other proof that Appellant had specifically authorized
and “approved every word written” in the briefs filed on his behalf
in this Court. 	See Kinsey v. State, 179 So. 2d 108, 112 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1965).
4 The trial court made no ruling on the merits of Appellant’s
claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. We likewise make no finding
on the merits of that defense nor as to whether Appellant’s counsel,
allegedly hired by Haddock’s insurance company, provided proper
representation and advice.

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Conclusion
A FFIRMED.
M AKAR and L AMBERT , JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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