Jose Antonio Barrios v. ARCPE Bahamas, LLC, Successor in Interest to CapitalSource International, LLC f/k/a CapitalSource International, Inc.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-1878
LT Case No. 2017-CA-627
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JOSE ANTONIO BARRIOS,
Appellant,
v.
ARCPE BAHAMAS, LLC,
Successor in Interest to
CapitalSource International,
LLC f/k/a CapitalSource
International, Inc.,
Appellees.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Flagler County.
Kathryn Diane Weston, Judge.
Glenn Burhans, Jr., and Christopher R. Clark, of Stearns Weaver
Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Tallahassee; and
Craig S. Barnett, of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff &
Sitterson, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
Nancy M. Wallace, of Akerman, LLP, Tallahassee; Marc J.
Gottlieb, of Akerman, LLP, Fort Lauderdale; and Christian P.
George, David Otero, and Adam C. Remillard, of Akerman, LLP,
Jacksonville, for Appellee.
November 14, 2025
KILBANE, J.

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This appeal relates to a series of cases stemming from a
failed luxury development in the Bahamas. After successfully
enforcing a promissory note used to purchase a lot in the
proposed resort community, the parties proceeded to trial only to
determine the amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded to
the note holder. Because the prejudgment interest award was
not supported by competent substantial evidence, we reverse.1
Facts
Jose Antonio Barrios (“Barrios”) executed an adjustable-rate
balloon promissory note to buy an undeveloped lot at a proposed
community titled “Ginn Sur Mer” on Grand Bahama Island.
After the community failed to develop on schedule, Barrios
defaulted on his note. ARCPE Bahamas, LLC (“ARCPE”)—
successor in interest to the original lender—filed suit to collect
sums due under the note. Significant issues were resolved via
summary judgment for ARCPE,2 who then moved for final
summary judgment. Barrios opposed the motion and asserted,
among other things, that ARCPE’s prejudgment interest
calculation lacked evidentiary support. The trial court found
ARCPE was entitled to prejudgment interest, but the amount
remained an issue of fact.
A trial was held to determine the amount of prejudgment
interest. Barrios’s note was admitted into evidence. Barry
Brecher, ARCPE’s asset manager—who was listed and presented
as a fact witness—provided the only testimony. Brecher
admitted the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) Index
was necessary to calculate the annual interest rate and total
amount of prejudgment interest owed. In calculating Barrios’s
interest rates, Brecher relied on ARCPE’s interest rate database.3
1. We affirm the remaining issues without further
discussion.
2. Cases brought by ARCPE against Barrios and other
defaulting borrowers were eventually consolidated for pretrial
proceedings.
3. Brecher testified ARCPE kept a record of the LIBOR
Index in a database. After the LIBOR Index ceased to be

3
He verified the rates by comparing them with an “industry
standard website” that he did not recall the name of. To testify to
the total amount of prejudgment interest, Brecher refreshed his
recollection with a chart he prepared with ARCPE’s counsel.
Neither the database, the website, nor the chart were entered
into evidence.
Barrios objected4 to Brecher’s testimony asserting he had no
personal knowledge of the applicable interest rates and his
testimony on the subject would be inadmissible hearsay. The
objections were overruled and Brecher testified to the total
amount of prejudgment interest owed by Barrios. In closing,
Barrios argued there was no evidence in the record that would
provide the applicable interest rates to determine the total
amount of prejudgment interest.
The trial court entered final judgment for ARCPE awarding
prejudgment interest in the amount Brecher testified was owed
on the note: $268,125.00. Barrios timely appeals.
Merits
Contract interpretation and entitlement to prejudgment
interest are reviewed de novo. See Robertson v. Hochstatter, 369
So. 3d 716, 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Additionally, “whether
evidence falls within the statutory definition of hearsay is a
matter of law, subject to de novo review.” Bugg v. State, 295 So.
3d 1238, 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (quoting Anderson v. State,
230 So. 3d 175, 176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). Still, “[t]he lower
court’s ultimate factual determinations during a non-jury trial
may not be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be unsupported
by competent and substantial evidence or to constitute an abuse
of discretion.” Wright v. Guy Yudin & Foster, LLP, 176 So. 3d
published, ARCPE used the Secured Overnight Financing Rate
(“SOFR”) Index as a substitute. Brecher testified that he did not
know how the database acquired its data.
4. The parties agreed that objections made by any of the
consolidated defendants would be applied to and preserved for
the other defendants.

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368, 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Zupnik Haverland, L.L.C.
v. Current Builders of Fla., Inc., 7 So. 3d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2009)).
“Where a disputed claim becomes liquidated by the trier of
fact as to the amount recoverable, interest should be awarded
from the date the payment was due.” Id. (quoting
Reimbursement Recovery, Inc. v. Indian River Mem’l Hosp., Inc.,
22 So. 3d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). The trial court
calculates the amount of prejudgment interest to award. See
Mem’l Health Sys., Inc. v. Hamilton Staffing Sols., Inc., 414 So.
3d 350, 351 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (“[T]he issue of prejudgment
interest is a discrete issue to be determined by the trial court, not
the finder of fact.” (quoting Westgate Mia. Beach, LTD. v.
Newport Operating Corp., 55 So. 3d 567, 576 (Fla. 2010))).
In its calculation, the trial court applies a default statutory
interest rate unless the parties’ contract provides otherwise. See
§ 687.01, Fla. Stat. (2024) (“In all cases where interest shall
accrue without a special contract for the rate thereof, the rate is
the rate provided for in s. 55.03.”); DSLRPros, Inc. v. Lalo, 339
So. 3d 379, 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“[T]he statutory rate applies
when the contract is silent on the matter.” (quoting Republic
Srvs., Inc. v. Calabrese, 939 So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 5th DCA
2006))). Prejudgment interest is often a simple mathematical
calculation. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.
2d 212, 215 (Fla. 1985) (“Once a verdict has liquidated the
damages as of a date certain, computation of prejudgment
interest is merely a mathematical computation. . . . [I]t is a
purely ministerial duty of the trial judge or clerk of the court to
add the appropriate amount of interest to the principal amount of
damages awarded in the verdict.”). However, the issue becomes
more complex when a contract requires recalculation of variable
interest rates over time. See Gonzalez v. Onewest Bank, FSB,
204 So. 3d 167, 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“Because the note
required recalculation of interest on change dates, calculation of
the interest amount was not a simple ministerial function.”). If
this calculation also depends on the presentation of evidence,
such as a necessary variable, interest is not liquidated. Cf.
Fogarty v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 224 So. 3d 313, 315 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2017) (“Damages are liquidated when the proper amount to

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be awarded can be determined with exactness from the cause of
action as pleaded, i.e., from a pleaded agreement between the
parties, by an arithmetical calculation or by application of
definite rules of law.” (quoting Asian Imports, Inc. v. Pepe, 633
So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994))).
The note provided for the accrual of interest “until the full
amount of Principal has been paid.” An initial interest rate was
provided as well as the formula for determining the variable rate
as of a specified date each year (“Change Date”). This formula for
the annual variable rate (“Change Rate”) was equal to the LIBOR
Index5 plus specified percentage points, subject to rounding and
limitations:
Before each Change Date, the Note Holder
will calculate my new interest rate by adding
THREE AND 250/1000 percentage points
(3.250%) to the Current Index.6 The Note
Holder will then round the result of this
addition up to the nearest one-eighth of one
percentage point (0.125%). Subject to the
limits stated in Section 4(D) below, this
rounded amount will be my new interest rate
until the next Change Date.
The notes capped the amount of variance each year as well as an
overall maximum rate but did not provide a minimum rate.
Under the notes, these rates would apply both pre- and post-
default.
Because the parties’ contract provided interest rates that
would apply after maturity and default, the calculation of
interest had to be based on the contractual rates. See Calabrese,
5. The note specifically provided that the variable rate
would be based on the LIBOR Index “as published in the Wall
Street Journal.” If it ceased to be available, a substitute index
could be used with notice to the borrower.
6. The “Current Index” was “the most recent [LIBOR] Index
available as of the date 45 days before each Change Date.”

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939 So. 2d at 226 (“As the parties agreed to use the LIBOR rate,
that is the rate that should govern.”); see also DSLRPros, Inc.,
339 So. 3d at 383 (“[F]or a contract rate to apply in lieu of the
statutory rate, the contract must actually provide for a specific
post-maturity/default interest rate.” (quoting Trigeorgis v.
Trigeorgis, 240 So. 3d 772, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018))). Although
the contract provided a specified initial interest rate, the parties
admitted the rate had changed prior to Barrios’s default. Thus,
the trial court needed the contract’s formula to determine each
applicable Change Rate and confirm it was within the note’s
expressed variance and maximum limitations. But, as Brecher
admitted, the adjustable interest rate could not be calculated
without evidence of a variable: the Wall Street Journal’s LIBOR
Index.
At trial, ARCPE did not provide evidence of the LIBOR
Index associated with any proposed Change Date or Change
Rate. Instead, it relied on Brecher’s testimony about his
calculation of the total amount of interest owed by Barrios.
ARCPE asserts Brecher’s testimony was sufficient7 and that the
LIBOR/SOFR Indices on which he relied fell under either the
business records or commercial publications hearsay exceptions.
See § 90.803(6), (17), Fla. Stat. (2024). But ARCPE failed to
admit evidence of the Indices themselves and Brecher’s testimony
about its contents was hearsay. See Roberts v. Direct Gen. Ins.
Co., 337 So. 3d 889, 891–92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“[W]hile the
business-records exception . . . allows the admission of ‘[a]
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,’ it does not
authorize hearsay testimony concerning the contents of business
records which have not been admitted into evidence.” (quoting
Thompson v. State, 705 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998))).
As ARCPE failed to provide evidence of the LIBOR variable,
it was impossible for the trial court to calculate the adjustable
interest rates or total amount of prejudgment interest to award.
See Miami-Dade Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. Elec. Transaction
7. Notably, Brecher testified he did not review the entire
historical LIBOR Index and did not know whether it had ever
been a negative number.

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Consultants Corp., 300 So. 3d 291, 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)
(“Under Florida law, ‘the plaintiff must present evidence
regarding a reasonable certainty as to its amount of damages.’”
(quoting Gonzalez v. Barrenechea, 170 So. 3d 13, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015))); Jenkins v. Plaza 3000, Inc., 134 So. 3d 1127, 1132 (Fla.
4th DCA 2014) (“Evidence of the amount of damages cannot be
based on speculation and conjecture.”). Thus, the trial court’s
award was not supported by competent substantial evidence.
See, e.g., Gonzalez, 204 So. 3d at 168 (reversing interest award
where the evidence revealed a range of possible rates and no
testimony was presented “about the relevant LIBOR Index on
any change date”); Salauddin v. Bank of Am., N.A., 150 So. 3d
1189, 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (reversing interest award where
no evidence was presented as to adjustable interest rate).
Despite being entitled to prejudgment interest and holding a
trial solely to determine the appropriate amount, ARCPE failed
to present the trial court with a variable essential to the
calculation of the adjustable interest rates. Due to this failure—
and because the note did not provide for an overall minimum
interest rate—the trial court could not compute the amount of
prejudgment interest to award.8 ARCPE will not be given a
8. When a party fails to establish adjustable rates, appellate
courts have remanded prejudgment interest awards for
recalculation when the proper amount could be determined
without any additional evidence by applying the minimum
contractual rate. See, e.g., U.S. Bank N.A. v. Engle, 311 So. 3d
197, 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“[W]here an interest rate is
adjustable, the interest rate may be calculated using the lowest
rate if that was the only proof adduced at trial.”); Michel v. Bank
of N.Y. Mellon, 191 So. 3d 981, 983–84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
(applying minimum interest rate where plaintiff failed to
establish interest rate and witness “testified only to a total
amount of outstanding interest”); Salauddin v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 150 So. 3d 1189, 1190–91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“[S]ince the
note stated that the interest rate would not drop below five
percent, this percentage was the only proof the bank supplied at
trial, and the trial court should have used this interest rate to
calculate the amount of interest . . . .”). When a trial court
awards prejudgment interest without a party having been given

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second bite at the apple. See, e.g., Foot & Ankle Ctr. of Fla., LLC
v. Vargas, 412 So. 3d 825, 829 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (“[W]here a
party seeking fees and costs has been afforded an evidentiary
hearing, it is not entitled to a second bite at the apple to prove its
claim.” (quoting Winter Park Imps., Inc. v. JM Fam. Enters., Inc.,
77 So. 3d 227, 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011))).
Because the trial court’s calculation of prejudgment interest
was not possible based on the evidence presented below, we
reverse the portion of the judgment awarding interest with
instruction for the trial court to remove the prejudgment interest
award. See Jenkins, 134 So. 3d at 1132 (reversing final judgment
with instruction to remove interest amount because the trial
court could not calculate the interest based on the evidence
presented).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
the opportunity to put in evidence on the contractual interest
rate, courts have reversed the matter for further proceedings.
See Gonzalez v. Onewest Bank, FSB, 204 So. 3d 167, 168 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2016) (remanding for new trial where note provided for
adjustable rate, no testimony was presented about LIBOR Index
on relevant change dates, and “calculation of the interest amount
was not a simple ministerial function”); Boyette v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP, 164 So. 3d 9, 10 n.1, 10–11 (Fla. 2d DCA
2015) (remanding for evidentiary hearing or trial “to establish
the remaining amounts due and owing” and permitting evidence
about prejudgment interest where no prior evidence was
presented as to how interest accrued under adjustable rate rider).
Neither circumstance is applicable here where the note did not
provide for a minimum rate and ARCPE was provided an
opportunity to present evidence of the LIBOR Index and proposed
Change Dates/Rates to support the amount of total interest due
under the note.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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