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Matter of H-A-A-V-, Respondent
Decided September 11, 2025
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
If the factual allegations underlying a claim for asylum, withholding of removal, or
protection under the Convention Against Torture, viewed in the light most favorable to the
respondent, do not establish prima facie eligibility for relief or protection, an Immigration
Judge may pretermit the applications without a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the
claim.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Reuben S. Kerben, Esquire, Kew Gardens, New York
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate
Immigration Judge.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
In a decision issued on May 8, 2025, the Immigration Judge pretermitted
the respondent’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the regulations implementing the Convention Against
Torture 	(“CAT”).1 	Sections 	208(b)(1)(A) 	and 	241(b)(3)(A) 	of 	the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A),
1231(b)(3)(A) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2025). The respondent appeals
the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	decision. 	Because 	we 	conclude 	that 	the
Immigration Judge did not err in pretermitting applications that did not
present a prima facie claim for relief, the appeal will be dismissed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent is a native and citizen of Peru. He was placed in removal
proceedings 	and, 	through 	counsel, 	subsequently 	filed 	a 	Form 	I-589
Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, based on extortion by
criminal gangs in Peru. At his initial master calendar hearing, the respondent
entered oral pleadings and conceded removability. 	At the next master
calendar hearing on May 8, 2025, DHS made an oral motion to pretermit the
respondent’s applications for relief. 	After confirming that there were no
1 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994).

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factual 	issues 	in 	dispute, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	determined 	that 	the
respondent had not established prima facie eligibility for asylum or related
relief, pretermitted his applications, and ordered him removed to Peru. The
respondent argues on appeal that the Immigration Judge’s decision is
contrary to existing Board precedent and that the Immigration Judge violated
his right to due process of law and his statutory and regulatory rights by
pretermitting his applications for relief.
II. ANALYSIS
Whether the Immigration Judge erred in pretermitting the respondent’s
applications 	for 	asylum 	and 	related 	relief 	is 	a 	question 	of 	law 	the
Board 	reviews 	de 	novo. 	See 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1003.1(d)(3)(ii) 	(2025).
Section 240(b)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2018), provides
that an alien in removal proceedings “shall have a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s
own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.”2
Relatedly, section 240(c)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B), sets
forth standards for evaluating whether the respondent has met the burden of
proof on any applications for relief, noting that the Immigration Judge should
evaluate the testimony of the respondent and any witnesses and “weigh the
credible testimony along with other evidence of record.” 	The regulations
implementing these statutory provisions in the context of asylum and
withholding of removal applications provide that Immigration Judge will
decide such applications for relief “after an evidentiary hearing to resolve
factual issues in dispute,” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3) (2025), and that at such
an evidentiary hearing, the respondent “shall be examined under oath on his
or her application and may present evidence and witnesses in his or her own
behalf,” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3)(iii). 	Those regulations also apply to
applications for withholding or deferral of removal under the CAT. 	See
Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888, 890–91 (BIA 2012).
The statutory and regulatory provisions above ensure that the respondent
has the opportunity to present evidence in support of any applications
for relief and to respond to any evidence presented by DHS. 	These
provisions, however, do not require a full evidentiary hearing if there are
no factual issues in dispute. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3). 	Immigration
Judges 	have 	broad 	discretion 	to 	conduct 	and 	control 	immigration
proceedings and may determine the length and type of hearings held.
2 	The statute includes an exception that pertains to national security information, which
is not relevant here.

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See Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010); see also
INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(c) (2025).
Immigration Judges are not required to hold merit hearings on applications
that are incomplete or where an applicant is ineligible for relief and may
pretermit those applications.3 See, e.g., Matter of C-A-R-R-, 29 I&N Dec. 13,
15 (BIA 2025) (holding that Immigration Judges need not consider the merits
of Form I-589 applications that are incomplete); Matter of J-G-P-, 27 I&N
Dec. 	642, 	643, 	650 	(BIA 	2019) 	(affirming 	an 	Immigration 	Judge’s
pretermission of a cancellation of removal application based on a criminal
conviction).
We are unpersuaded by the respondent’s argument that the Immigration
Judge did not properly review the respondent’s applications for relief from
removal. First, the respondent had a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence on his own behalf, as he was represented by counsel and the
Form I-589 instructions and corresponding regulations provide notice of the
importance of submitting a complete asylum application and additional
supporting evidence. 	See INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B);
8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(a) (2025); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(c)(3) (2020);4 see also Matter
of C-A-R-R-, 29 I&N Dec. at 15.
Second, the respondent had an abbreviated hearing on the claim at the
master calendar stage. The Immigration Judge confirmed with counsel that
there were no disputed issues of fact and gave the respondent’s counsel the
opportunity to proffer any particular social group(s) in support of his asylum
claim. The respondent’s counsel, however, did not articulate any particular
3 	Federal courts also have procedures to resolve cases that do not require a full evidentiary
jury trial or bench trial. In civil litigation, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be granted when a judge, after assuming that all
factual allegations contained in the complaint are true and giving the plaintiff the full
benefit of the doubt, determines that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See generally McChesney v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 900 F.3d 578,
583–84 (8th Cir. 2018). Also, a judge may grant summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the judge determines that, considering the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any
material facts that require a trial or evidentiary hearing and that a party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	See Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 388
(5th Cir. 2019).
4 	As noted in Matter of C-A-R-R-, 29 I&N Dec. at 15 n.1, the currently effective version
of this regulation is the 2020 version as modified by the Procedures for Credible Fear
Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection
Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 18078, 18221 (Mar. 29, 2022) (codified at
8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1208, 1235, 1240).

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social groups for the Immigration Judge to consider and did not present any
reasons why a full evidentiary hearing was necessary. The respondent does
not claim on appeal that any material facts remain in dispute or that he was
not given a sufficient opportunity to proffer the basis for his claim for relief.
We agree with the Immigration Judge that the undisputed facts of the
respondent’s case do not meet the requirements to establish a claim for
asylum, 	withholding 	of removal, or 	protection under the 	CAT. 	The
respondent’s claim is based on extortion by criminal gangs, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case
arises, has repeatedly held that it “do[es] not recognize economic extortion
as a form of persecution under immigration law.” Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch,
794 	F.3d 	485, 	493 	(5th 	Cir. 	2015) 	(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting
Castillo-Enriquez v. Holder, 690 F.3d 667, 668 (5th Cir. 2012)); accord
Gonzalez-Soto v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2016); Garcia v. Holder,
756 F.3d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 2014). As the respondent’s past extortion does
not rise to the level of persecution, it also does not meet the “higher bar of
torture.” 	Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 140 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted).
The respondent’s Form I-589 does not describe suffering other past harm
besides extortion and does not identify other specific forms of violence that
he fears in the future. 	The respondent also did not articulate a particular
social group or other protected ground as the basis of his claim when given
the opportunity to do so. See Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189,
191 (BIA 2018) (“Where an applicant raises membership in a particular
social group as the enumerated ground that is the basis of her claim, she has
the burden to clearly indicate ‘the exact delineation of any particular social
group(s) to which she claims to belong.’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly,
the respondent did not present a prima facie case for asylum, withholding of
removal, or protection under the CAT. 	See Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N
Dec. 413, 419 (BIA 1996) (holding that prima facie eligibility requires a
reasonable likelihood of satisfying the requirements for relief). Thus, a full
evidentiary hearing on the merits was unnecessary.
We recognize that in Matter of Fefe, 20 I&N Dec. 116, 118 (BIA 1989),
the Board held that an Immigration Judge “should not . . . adjudicate a written
application for asylum if no oral testimony has been offered in support of that
application.” 	The Board stated that the “full examination of an applicant”
ordinarily will be necessary for reasons of fairness and to prevent applicants
from being presumed credible when the claim is fabricated. Matter of Fefe,
20 I&N Dec. at 118. 	The Board further stated that at a minimum the
applicant should “be placed under oath[] and be questioned as to whether the

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information in the written application is complete and correct.” 	Id. 	The
Board later reaffirmed Matter of Fefe in Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I&N
Dec. 319, 324 (BIA 2014), holding that an applicant for asylum and
withholding of removal was entitled to a hearing on the merits of his or her
applications even without having established prima facie eligibility. 	The
Board’s 	decision, 	however, 	was 	vacated 	by 	the 	Attorney 	General 	in
Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I&N Dec. 266 (A.G. 2018).
The respondent’s reliance on Matter of Fefe is misplaced. Matter of Fefe
predated the enactment of section 240(b)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 	1229a(b)(4)(B). 	See 	Illegal 	Immigration 	Reform 	and 	Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 304(a)(3),
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-590. 	Moreover, Matter of Fefe, 20 I&N Dec. at
117–18, relied on regulations that are no longer in effect. 	See also
Ramirez v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 764, 771 n.1 (8th Cir. 2018) (calling into
question the continued relevance of Matter of Fefe). Thus, Matter of Fefe is
no longer binding precedent.
The ability of Immigration Judges to act on facts conceded by counsel is
well established.5 	See 	generally 	Martinez 	v. Bally’s 	Louisiana, Inc.,
244 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[a] judicial admission is a
formal concession in the pleadings or stipulations by a party or counsel that
is binding on the party making them” and has the “effect of withdrawing a
fact from contention”); Matter of Velasquez, 19 I&N Dec. 377, 382–83
(BIA 1986) (holding that aliens are generally bound by the admissions and
concessions 	of 	their 	counsel). 	It 	was 	therefore 	permissible 	for 	the
Immigration Judge to rely on counsel’s assertion that if the Immigration
Judge accepted the facts as included in the application, there were no factual
issues in dispute.
Contrary to the respondent’s assertion on appeal, the Immigration Judge
did not deprive him of his due process right to a full and fair hearing. Due
process requires that respondents in immigration proceedings be given an
“opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citation omitted).6 	An
5 	If the respondent had appeared pro se, the Immigration Judge would have needed to
place him under oath to affirm that his application was complete and correct before
determining whether he established a prima facie claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3)(iii).
6 	The Board has the authority to evaluate constitutional issues, including whether a
respondent’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution have been violated. See, e.g., Matter of M-D-C-V-, 28 I&N Dec. 18, 29–30
(BIA 2020) (concluding that the respondents’ due process rights were not violated).

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applicant’s 	fundamental 	due 	process 	rights 	are 	not 	violated 	when 	an
Immigration Judge pretermits an application for asylum or related relief or
protection if the applicant appeared at a hearing before an Immigration
Judge, had the opportunity to plead to the charges and submit an application
for 	relief 	and 	supporting 	evidence, 	and 	the 	applicant 	or 	his 	legal
representative did not, either in writing or orally, show prima facie eligibility
for the relief or protection sought. 	See Okpala v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 965,
971 (5th Cir. 2018) (stating that as a general rule, due process requires that
an alien be afforded a fair opportunity to be heard).
Nor 	are 	we 	persuaded 	by 	the 	respondent’s 	contention 	that 	the
Immigration Judge was not a “neutral arbiter” or “acting independently.”
While the respondent alleges that the Immigration Judge prejudged his
asylum claim, we have already concluded that in the absence of any factual
disputes, the Immigration Judge was authorized to pretermit the respondent’s
applications where he did not establish prima facie eligibility for his claims.
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (holding that judicial
rulings alone rarely show bias); see also Matter of Exame, 18 I&N Dec. 303,
306 (BIA 1982) (“[A]n applicant is not denied a fair hearing merely because
the immigration judge has a point of view about a question of law or
policy.”). 	Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Immigration Judge did
not act as a neutral arbiter or act independently, and we conclude that the
respondent’s due process rights were not violated in this respect.
We recognize that many claims for asylum and related relief and
protection 	contain 	disputed 	factual 	issues 	relevant 	to 	a 	respondent’s
eligibility for asylum or related relief and thus will warrant a full hearing and
cross-examination of the respondent and witnesses before the case is
resolved. However, if the factual allegations underlying a claim for asylum,
withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT, viewed in the light
most favorable to the respondent, do not establish prima facie eligibility for
relief or protection, an Immigration Judge may pretermit the applications
without a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the claim. In this case, the
Immigration Judge conducted the hearing appropriately, complied with the
applicable statutes and regulations, and provided the respondent with the
requisite due process.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Immigration Judge’s denial of
the respondent’s applications for asylum and related relief. We also conclude
that the record reflects that the respondent’s proceedings were fair and
complied with the INA and regulations.

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ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025).