Judicial Council of the Eighth Circuit order: 08-21-90043, 08-21-90044, 08-21-90045

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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JCP Nos. 08-21-90043, 90044, 90045
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In re Complaint of John Doe1
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Circuit Judge, LOKEN, L.R. SMITH, GRUENDER,
SHEPHERD, KELLY, ERICKSON, GRASZ, STRAS, KOBES, and JUSTIN D.
SMITH, Circuit Judges, and LANGE, WIMES, BAKER, ROSE, BROOKS,
WILLIAMS, TOSTRUD, CLARK, WELTE, and BUESCHER, District Judges.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
BY THE COUNCIL:
This is a complaint of judicial misconduct by a former court employee against
a former chief district judge and two other district judges, whom we will identify as
Judge A and Judge B. The former chief circuit judge appointed a special committee
under Rule 11(f) to investigate the complaint and to make a recommendation to the
judicial council. The special committee submitted a report with recommended factual
findings and a recommendation to dismiss the complaint. The judicial council has
considered the report and concludes that the complaint should be dismissed under
Rule 20(b)(1)(A)(i) and (iii).
1Under Rule 24(a)(2) and (a)(5) of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-
Disability Proceedings, the names of the complainant and the subject judges are not
disclosed. Citations or references herein to a “Rule” refer to these Rules.

The complaint concerns primarily a personnel decision by the district judges
to remove the complainant from a deputy unit executive position and the manner in
which the decision was implemented. The complainant pursued a separate complaint
under the district court’s employment dispute resolution plan, but that complaint was
dismissed as untimely.
In this proceeding, the complainant asserts that the judges engaged in “the
fabrication of the alleged and incredibly vague reasons for [the complainant’s]
dismissal,” and then “utilized the United States Marshal[s] Service as a tool to
intimidate me and the decisions that I would make that day.”
The complainant recounts that he was told to report to the chambers of the
then-chief district judge one morning, saw the unit executive for the complainant’s
unit being escorted out by deputy U.S. Marshals, and then met briefly with Judge B.
Judge B told the complainant that he was being removed from his position and
handed him a piece of paper with a front and back listing various reasons for the
adverse employment action. The complainant was allowed just two minutes to read
the paper before Judge B reentered the room with the chief district judge and Judge
A. The three judges refused to let the complainant contest matters in the letter and
allegedly demanded to know by 10 a.m. the next day whether he was retiring or being
fired.
The complainant asserts that Judge A and the chief judge threatened him during
the meeting. Judge A allegedly said, “you better not speak to anyone concerning this
or it will get ugly,” and the chief judge allegedly added that “he hears everything” and
that if the complainant spoke with others, “he will seriously regret it.” The judges
told the complainant that he was placed on administrative leave, and then had deputy
U.S. Marshals escort him out of the courthouse. The complaint then includes a
lengthy narrative disputing the reasons given by the judges for the personnel decision.
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Separate from the personnel action, the complainant alleges that the former
chief district judge used his position “to obtain special treatment for friends and
relatives,” particularly regarding the court unit’s hiring of a female employee who
was allegedly the fiancée of the judge’s son. The complainant also claims that the
chief district judge made “offensive and harassing comments” in front of court
employees about the appearance and skin tone from tanning of another female court
employee.
The subject judges responded jointly that after the departure of an unusually
high number of court unit employees, exit interviews with departing employees led
to an investigation of the leadership of the court unit. The three judges and a court
human relations officer met with seventeen court unit employees. All judges of the
district court then gathered and determined to remove the unit executive and the
complainant from their executive positions. The letter that Judge B provided to the
complainant when he was summoned to the chief judge’s chambers set forth
information gathered from employee interviews. When the three judges met with the
complainant, they gave him the option to retire in lieu of a demotion, and he chose
to retire.
Judge A denied threatening the complainant and disputed the complainant’s
characterization of her tone and what she said during the meeting with the
complainant. Judge A explained that she told the complainant not to talk to others
about the meeting out of concern that he might coerce, bully, or threaten those
employees who had complained about him. Some of the concerns with the
complainant’s job performance included alleged retaliation and abusive conduct
toward court unit employees. Judge B responded that his “singular interaction” as a
district judge with the complainant was on the date when the three judges notified the
complainant of the personnel decision.
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With respect to alleged use of office to obtain special treatment, the former
chief district judge responded that his son and the female court employee had dated
off-and-on since high school but were never engaged to be married. The judge told
the court’s human resources official that he could have no involvement with the
woman’s employment. On the allegation about inappropriate remarks about skin
tone, the former chief judge wrote that he served on a national committee with
jurisdiction over wellness programs, and the female court employee in his district
served on a different national committee on wellness. The judge said that in
discussions over the years about wellness programs, the judge chided the employee
about spending too much time outdoors without using sunscreen, such that it became
“a running joke.”
The special committee obtained a copy of the document that Judge B handed
to the complainant when the personnel decision was announced. The committee also
arranged for interviews of the district court’s human resources officer and of the
female court employee who served on the national wellness committee.2
The special committee determined that the human resources officer had been
involved in the exit interviews of court unit employees and the investigation of the
unit’s leadership. The committee found that the human resources officer provided
substantial information to support the judges’ decision to take adverse employment
against the complainant. The human resources officer also corroborated the statement
2The complainant submitted a report of a polygraph examination, but the
special committee observed correctly that polygraph results are not admissible in
court due to doubts about their reliability. See United States v. Bagola, 796 F.3d 903,
908 (8th Cir. 2015). The polygraph report evaluated the complainant’s statement that
two of the judges “verbally threaten[ed] him to remain silent” about the meeting.
Even if the results were properly considered, however, the council agrees with the
special committee that the question for the council is not whether the complainant felt
threatened, but whether the judges engaged in cognizable misconduct.
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of the former chief judge that he removed himself from involvement in the
employment relationship between the court unit and the woman who had dated the
judge’s son. The judicial council adopts these findings of the special committee.
The other female unit employee confirmed that she served on a national
wellness committee. She explained that the former chief judge had expressed concern
that she would get skin cancer and told her that she should wear sunscreen to avoid
cancer. When asked whether she considered the judge’s comments unwelcome or
offensive, she said “absolutely not,” that it was “not offensive whatsoever,” and that
she “never felt offended by anything” the former chief judge said to her. The special
committee credited this testimony, and the judicial council adopts this finding of the
special committee.
The complainant’s allegations relate primarily to the personnel decision to
remove him from his executive position—the basis for the letter addressing his work
performance, the refusal of the judges to provide more time for him to review the
letter and an opportunity to refute it, the alleged demand for him to retire or be fired,
the alleged directive for him to refrain from discussing the bases for the personnel
action with others, and the use of the U.S. Marshals Service to escort him out of the
building after the meeting.
The judicial council concludes that the actions of the judges in making and
carrying out the personnel decision are not cognizable misconduct. The judicial
misconduct process “cannot be used to second-guess [a] judge’s administrative
decision.” In re Judicial Misconduct, 726 F.3d 1060, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013). Like an
allegation that calls into question the correctness of a judge’s ruling in a case, see
Rule 4(b)(1), an allegation that calls into question the correctness of a judge’s
personnel decision is not cognizable misconduct. The judiciary maintains a separate
employment dispute resolution process that is available to employees who dispute a
personnel decision, and that is the proper avenue to challenge such a decision.
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The related allegations about implementation of the personnel decision
likewise do not establish cognizable misconduct. Offering an employee the option
of demotion or resignation in lieu of termination is a “useful management tool” and
is not misconduct. In re Judicial Misconduct, 726 F.3d at 1061. Nor is directing the
employee to refrain from discussing the matter with other employees where, as here,
there is no showing of improper motive or wrongful objective. Id. Arranging for an
escort by deputy marshals while emotions may be running high is within the range of
reasonable administrative decisions and is not cognizable misconduct.
On the complainant’s allegation that the former chief judge used his position
to secure employment for a friend of a family member, see Rule 4(a)(1)(A), the
special committee found that the complainant overstated the relationship between the
employee and the judge’s son, and that the judge excused himself from any personnel
actions relating to the woman’s employment. The judicial council adopts those
findings, and the facts refute the claim of judicial misconduct.
The special committee also found that the former chief judge’s comments about
a court employee’s skin tone and use of sunscreen did not create a hostile work
environment, and that the employee did not find the comments in any way unwanted,
offensive, or abusive. See Rule 4(a)(2). The judicial council adopts those findings,
and the facts again refute the claim of judicial misconduct.
For these reasons, the judicial complaint is dismissed. The complainant and
the subject judges may petition for review of this order under Rule 21(b).
Filed: July 23, 2026
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