G.B. v. J.B.

IN THE FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
G------ B-------, )
)
Petitioner, ) File No. CN25-02519
) Case No. 25-18033
v. )
)
J-------- B-------, )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
PURSUANT TO FAMILY COURT CIVIL RULE 12(b)(6)
Patrick J. Boyer, Esquire, MACELREE HARVEY, LTD., 5721 Kennett Pike,
Centreville, DE 19807, pboyer@macelree.com, Attorney for Petitioner
Leslie B. Spoltore, Esquire, OBERMAYER REBMANN MAXWELL & HIPPEL LLP,
123 South Justison Street, Suite 100, Wilmington, DE 19801,
leslie.spoltore@obermayer.com, Attorney for Respondent-Movant
ARRINGTON, Judge.

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The Delaware General Assembly has vested the Family Court with equitable
authority over matters ancillary to divorce, statutorily defined as dividing marital
property, awarding permanent and temporary alimony during a period of
dependency, and requiring a party to pay all or part of the cost to the other party
of maintaining or defending the divorce proceedings. Petitioner contends that the
Family Court’s equitable powers in ancillary proceedings extend beyond this
statutory grant of authority. To this end, Petitioner requests the Court to judicially
recognize independent doctrines of equitable reimbursement and unjust
enrichment in the divorce context, and grant her declaratory relief. Petitioner, in
essence, seeks to change the statutory confines for divorce proceedings by
expanding the marital estate through a claw-back of funds that the parties decided
to apply to Respondent’s law school loans, and by requiring Respondent to pay
Petitioner from future non-marital earnings that she expects he will receive.
The Delaware Legislature has provided detailed guidelines for determining
the equitable distribution of the marital estate and awarding alimony to a
dependent former spouse. The Supreme Court of Delaware has limited prior
Family Court decisions expanding the marital estate to include debts incurred “in
anticipation of marriage.” This Court declines to override these clear definitions
and limitations absent direction from the Legislature or Supreme Court.

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I. BACKGROUND1
Petitioner G------ B------- and Respondent J-------- B------- married on June
11, 2017, and divorced on July 29, 2025.2 Prior to marrying Petitioner, Respondent
had graduated from law school with “approximately $300,000” of student loan
debt.3 After the date of marriage, the parties “decided to aggressively pay down”
Respondent’s non-marital law school loans.4 The parties also purchased their
marital home in 2018, funded in part by a $100,000 contribution from Petitioner’s
Father.5
By the time Respondent filed for divorce on April 22, 2025, the parties had
“paid down [Respondent]’s law school loans almost if not completely.”6 The
parties intended to purchase a bigger home after the law school loans were paid.7
As of the date of separation, the parties’ marital estate consisted of “the equity in
the home…, minimal savings, and some retirement savings.”8
1 For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the Petitioner as the non-moving party.
2 Pet. for Equitable Reimbursement, Unjust Enrichment, and Declaratory Relief ¶ 1 (hereinafter
“Petition”); Dkt. 11.
3 Petition at ¶ 4.
4 Id. at ¶ 9.
5 Id. at ¶ 8.
6 Id. at ¶ 10.
7 Id. at ¶ 11. Petitioner confirms in her Response to Motion to Dismiss that the parties did, in
fact, start their search for a larger home shortly before the Petition for Divorce was filed.
8 Id. at ¶ 12.

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Respondent “earned over $218,000 in 2024 working as an associate [lawyer]
at Bayard, P.A.”9 Petitioner “earns less than $40,000 annually” through part-time
employment as a clinical psychologist.10 Petitioner alleges that Respondent
“anticipates making partner at Bayard within the next year or two, where, upon
information and belief, his earnings would increase substantially.”11
The parties were married for eight years and do not have any children.12
Petitioner’s period of eligibility to receive alimony is statutorily limited to four
years, and Petitioner cannot receive any child support.13 Petitioner will receive an
equitable distribution of marital property (yet to be determined), and seeks
“additional sums [ ] awarded to [her] to achieve a holistically fair result.”14
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent moves to dismiss the suit on procedural and substantive
grounds, relying on Family Court Civil Rule 12(b) and binding Supreme Court case
law. He argues that filing this action is duplicative of the pending case in which
Petitioner invokes similar equitable relief, and that Petitioner’s request exceeds the
Family Court’s authority.
9 Id. at ¶ 5
10 Id. at ¶ 7.
11 Id. at ¶ 6.
12 Petition at ¶¶ 1, 2; Dkt. 11.
13 Petition at ¶ 17; 13 Del.C. § 1512(d).
14 Petition at ¶ 17.

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a. Standard of Review
“The standard of review for a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is
well established in Delaware: (i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as
true; (ii) even vague allegations are ‘well-pleaded’ if they give the opposing party
notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party; and (iv) dismissal is inappropriate unless the plaintiff would
not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceived set of circumstances
susceptible of proof.”15
b. Petitioner’s Claim is Duplicative of the Ancillary Case
Respondent asserts that the Court should not recognize independent
“equitable reimbursement” or “unjust enrichment” claims as pleaded, because they
are duplicative of the statutorily authorized claims for property division and
alimony currently pending before the Court. Petitioner has already requested
property division, alimony, attorney’s fees and costs in her answer and
counterclaim to the divorce petition. She will receive an equitable portion of the
marital estate and, if dependent, alimony for her period of statutory eligibility.
Respondent argues that allowing Petitioner to proceed separately with her
petition “would allow for duplicative claims.”16 He suggests that “[a] disgruntled
15 L.M.S. v. C.M.G., No. CN04-08601, 2006 WL 5668820, at *12 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 27, 2006)
(citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Del.2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16 Mot. to Dismiss at ¶ 22.

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party… could… raise…claims for equitable relief in the form of a disproportionate
division of the marital estate…Then, after receiving the benefits of those
arguments, that same party would be able to use those very same arguments again
to seek an even greater recovery.”17
The Delaware General Assembly already requires the Family Court to
consider the duration of the marriage; prior marriages; the physical condition of
both parties; the employability of each party; whether the property award is in lieu
of or in addition to alimony; the opportunity of each for future acquisitions of
capital assets and income; the contribution or dissipation of marital property by
the parties, the value of property set apart to each party; the economic
circumstances of each party at the effective date of property division; whether
property was acquired by gift, the debts of the parties; and tax consequences.18
These statutorily mandated considerations duplicate the separate analysis for
equitable reimbursement and unjust enrichment, if allowed.
Respondent correctly notes that the Court already “considers [the claims]
together – at the same time – and is able to weigh all of the equities consistently
across the spectrum of claims and relief” without recognizing a distinct and
separate equitable doctrine.19
17 Id.
18 13 Del.C. § 1513(a).
19 Resp’t Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss p. 8.

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Delaware case law supports Respondent’s position as well. In reviewing this
argument, the Court looks to Condon v. Neighborcare, Inc.20 In Condon, the
Superior Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that filing of a second suit against
the same defendant would be duplicative of the first and would have to be
dismissed. In this case, the parties are the same. The facts are the same. The
arguments are the same. The only difference here is that Petitioner asks the Court
to expand the marital estate by negating the parties’ joint decision to pay a portion,
or all, of the primary breadwinner’s debt -- a debt that provided sufficient income
to enable the parties to qualify for a loan on their marital home, to accumulate
their (admittedly limited) savings, and to prepare them to search for a larger
home.
Petitioner is not prejudiced by requiring her to present her claims in the
divorce action. The marital estate must be divided equitably, without regard to
marital misconduct (if there is any in this case), in such proportions as the Court
deems just and equitable after considering all of the relevant factors. Among those
factors are the length of the marriage; the age, health station, amount and sources
of income; the amount of alimony to be awarded; the value of property set aside to
each party; the gift status of the contribution from Petitioner’s father toward
purchase of the home; and the debts of the parties. Allowing Petitioner to proceed
20 Condon v. Neighborcare, Inc., 2006 WL 307501, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb 3, 2006).

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on her additional suit would negate the equitable division of the marital estate,
and granting her “additional sums of money”21 above any alimony and her share of
the property division would be contrary to the intent of applicable statutes.
Following Condon, this Court finds that the complaint is duplicative of
Petitioner’s earlier filed counterclaim seeking relief, and the suit must be
dismissed. The Court is consci0us of the Delaware Divorce and Annulment Act22
and the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act, and declines to
expand those limitations absent direction from the Legislature or Supreme Court.
Equitable reimbursement and unjust enrichment is not an independent avenue to
a monetary award beyond the marital estate, and Petitioner must assert her
position in the pending case.
c. Petitioner Failed to State a Claim
i. Equitable Reimbursement
Petitioner incorrectly claims that “the doctrine of equitable reimbursement
appears to neither have been endorsed nor rejected by the Family Court or the
Delaware Supreme Court.” The Court discusses three relevant cases in this
analysis.
21 Petition at ¶ 17 (Prayer for Relief).
22 13 Del.C. § 1501 et seq.

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In Scott v. Scott, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court
denial of the husband’s claim for equitable reimbursement.23 In the Family Court,
“Husband contend[ed] that he [was] entitled to equitable reimbursement for some
of the proceeds of the sale of Wife's premarital residence” because he made
financial contributions towards improving the property prior to its sale.24 The
Family Court denied the request as the financial contributions were comingled in a
marital account, and fully addressed the claim in the divorce proceedings.
In the trial court decision, recognized by the Supreme Court as well-
reasoned and supported by the record, the Family Court adhered strictly to the
statutory definitions of marital assets and debts, rejecting the husband’s separate
claim for equitable reimbursement. On appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed that
the Family Court’s wide discretion applies to “divid[ing] marital property under
title 13, section 1513 of the Delaware Code.”25
In the later decided case of Garrison v. Downing,26 the Delaware Supreme
Court reversed a Family Court decision that included non-marital debts in the
division of the marital estate because they were incurred “in anticipation of
marriage.” Prior to Garrison, “all of the cases where the Family Court has applied
the ‘contemplation of marriage’ rule involve[d] real property acquired by one of
23 Scott v. Scott, 12 A.3d 1155, 2011 WL 378901, at *2 (Del. 2011).
24 W.D.S. v. S.A.S, No. CN08-32950, 2010 WL 1443900, at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar 1, 2010).
25 Scott, 2011 WL 378901, at *1.
26 Garrison v. Downing, 226 A.3d 195 (Del. 2020).

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the parties prior to the marriage which was not titled in both parties' names.”27
Thus, the Garrison Court was presented with the question of whether the
contemplation of marriage doctrine extended to pre-marital debts. In answering
the question in the negative, the Court explained:
Due regard must be given to the fact that the rule is an exception
to the Family Court's statutory jurisdiction. In the future, the
Family Court should limit the equitable exception to cases
involving real property where the evidence shows that it was the
parties' intention that the property, although acquired in the
name of one party prior to marriage, was to become marital
property upon their marriage. Any enlargement of the equitable
exception beyond that must come from the General Assembly.28
The Garrison Court clearly and definitively stated that the Courts are
proscribed from extending the contemplation of marriage doctrine in the absence
of approval from the General Assembly. Here, the Petitioner is asking for an even
greater alteration of the statutory scheme. If merely extending an existing
equitable exception requires a grant of authority from the legislature, recognition
of an entirely new equitable cause of action certainly does as well.
In the case of Snyder v. Scott,29 the Family Court considered wife’s request
for reimbursement that she made during the marriage toward husband’s student
loans and other non-marital items. The Court considered the argument in the
divorce ancillary case and denied it, stating,
27 Id. at 199 (internal citations omitted).
28 Id.
29 Snyder v. Scott, No. CV97-08632, 1999 WL 1456944 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 12, 1999).

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This Court generally does not go back and compensate
spouses for financial decisions made during the course of the
parties’ marriage and will not do so in this situation.… The Court
could have taken into consideration Wife’s contribution in
allocating the percentage distribution of the marital assets and
debts but since Wife has agreed to a 50%-50% distribution of
assets and debts, the Court will not disturb that agreement.30
As evidenced in Snyder, Petitioner is not without a legal avenue of redress.
Petitioner already has staked her position in her counterclaim and prayers for
property division, alimony, attorney’s fees, and court costs in the divorce case
currently scheduled for trial. Petitioner’s claim that resolving her ancillary
requests exclusively through the Chapter 15 statutory framework would necessarily
contravene “principles of basic fairness” is incorrect. Rather, Petitioner’s “factual
allegations may be heard in the routine course of a claim for the equitable division
of marital property…She does not need…to seek a second action.”31
To the extent that Petitioner’s claims may be considered in the division of
marital property, the Court is positioned to receive testimony and consider the
facts in the pending divorce case. Taken in a light most favorable to the Petitioner,
there is no reasonably conceived set of circumstances susceptible of proof that
would entitle Petitioner to recover, and the petition fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
30 Id. at *4.
31 Resp’t Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss p. 7-8.

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ii. Unjust Enrichment
“Unjust enrichment is the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of
another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice or equity and good conscience.”32 A party claiming unjust
enrichment must prove “(1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a
relationship between the enrichment and the impoverishment, (4) the absence of
justification, and (5) the absence of a remedy provided by law.”33
Petitioner’s claim for unjust enrichment has problems similar to the
equitable reimbursement claim. The allegations in the complaint, presumed to be
true for purposes of this motion, do not address these elements. For sake of
argument, the Court will assume that Petitioner is claiming that payment of
Respondent’s law school debts constitutes an enrichment; that payment using
marital funds constitutes an impoverishment; and that the two are related.
However, justification is present as shown in Petitioner’s admission that the
parties “decided to aggressively pay down Husband’s law school debt.”
Respondent was justified in paying down his student loan debt because, as
Petitioner concedes, both parties “decided” to make the loan payments. In other
words, “[t]he repayment was made with [Petitioner’s] knowledge and consent.”34
32 In re Verizon Ins. Coverage Appeals, 222 A.3d 566, 577 (Del. 2019) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
33 Otto v. Gore, 45 A.3d 120, 138 (Del. 2012).
34 Id.

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As in Snyder, the Court generally does not go back and compensate spouses
for financial decisions made during the course of the parties’ marriage. Petitioner
admits that the decision to pay the school loans was made during the marriage as
part of their marital strategy. It cannot be reasonably inferred from any of
Petitioner’s allegations that the parties’ decision resulted from Respondent’s
wrongdoing. If the parties made a joint decision to pay down school loans when
they were married, it is illogical to allege at the same time that only one party is
responsible for the decision. Justification defeats the claim in this case.
Taken in a light most favorable to the Petitioner, there are no reasonably
conceived set of circumstances susceptible of proof that would entitle Petitioner to
recover. Consequently, the petition fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
III. CONCLUSION
Today, the Court is yet again reminded that its role is to interpret the law
rather than create it. Any recognition of causes of action in the Family Court for
equitable reimbursement and unjust enrichment beyond the scope of marital
property must be authorized by the Delaware General Assembly. Under the facts
of this case, there is no reasonably conceived set of circumstances under which the
Court can find that Petitioner is fairly due compensation outside of the marital

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estate, or that there was no justification for the parties’ decision to pay off
Respondent’s student loans. Thus, the Petition for equitable reimbursement,
unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of December 2025.
THIS IS A FINAL ORDER.
/s/Michael W. Arrington
Honorable Michael W. Arrington
Judge
Date of Written Order: 12/31/2025
Date E-Mailed to Counsel: 12/31/2025