State v. Taylor

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) Crim. ID No. 1605012921A
) Cr. A. Nos. IN17-11-1505 & 1507
DIAMONTE TAYLOR, )
Defendant )

Submitted: March 2, 2026
Decided: March 17, 2026

Upon Defendant Diamonte Taylor’s
Motions for Correction of Sentence and Appointment of Counsel,
DENIED.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Defendant Diamonte Taylor’s Motion for

Correction of an Illegal Sentence (D.I. 229), and accompanying request for

appointment of Rule 35(a) counsel (D.I. 230), and the record in this matter, it

appears to the Court that:

(1) Through a series of superseding indictments returned in 2016 and

2017, the State charged Diamonte Taylor with one count of Gang

Participation supported by fifteen underlying offenses, one count of Robbery

First Degree, one count of Attempted Robbery First Degree, four counts of

Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), one

count of Assault First Degree, two counts of Reckless Endangering First

Degree, two counts of Aggravated Menacing, one count of Conspiracy
Second Degree, one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited

(“PFBPP”), one count of Conspiracy First Degree, and one count of Murder

First Degree.1 These charges arose from a purported gang feud in the City of

Wilmington between a street gang known as Shoot to Kill (“STK”) and its

alleged rival known as Only My Brothers (“OMB”).2 The ongoing gang

rivalry allegedly resulted in various violent events, including the 2016 murder

of Brandon Wingo.3

(2) After a ten-day trial in 2018—the centerpiece of which was the

slaying of Brandon Wingo—a jury convicted Mr. Taylor of first-degree

murder, gang participation, two counts of felony reckless endangering, two

count of PFDCF, two counts of aggravated menacing, and first-degree

assault.4

(3) Mr. Taylor appealed, and in September 2021, the Delaware

Supreme reversed his murder conviction and remanded the matter for a new

trial.5

1
D.I. 41 (Re-Indictment). These counts were part of a resultant indictment that included
other codefendants and counts against them.
2
See State v. Taylor, 2023 WL 8649421, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2023)
(explaining the then-extant factual and procedural background of Mr. Taylor’s case).
3
Id.
4
Id. Mr. Taylor was found not guilty of certain robbery-related offenses and their
associated counts of PFDCF. D.I. 78. Other counts of the indictment had been or were
eventually dismissed.
5
Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 619 (Del. 2021).

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(4) His re-trial commenced in December 2023.6 But due to events

that unfolded on the second trial day of that proceeding, a mistrial was

granted.7

(5) As motion practice was progressing towards a third trial, the

parties reached a plea agreement. Mr. Taylor pleaded guilty to the reduced

charge of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree conspiracy.8 In

his guilty plea papers and during his plea colloquy, he acknowledged that he

faced a sentence ranging from 15 years to life imprisonment for the murder

count.9 And the parties expressly agreed to a joint recommendation including

an unsuspended 15-year term of imprisonment.10 Though Mr. Taylor himself

acknowledged that no promises were made as to the sentence he would

actually receive.11

(6) Mr. Taylor was sentenced several months later for the murder in

the second degree count (IN17-11-1505) to 40 years at Level V suspended

6
D.I. 198.
7
State v. Taylor, 2023 WL 8649421, at *5.
8
See D.I. 221 (Plea Agreement and TIS Guilty Plea Forms).
9
Plea Agreement and TIS Guilty Plea Forms; Sept. 4, 2024 Plea. Hrg. Tr., at 12 (D.I.
233). He faced an additional term of up to five years for the conspiracy count. Id.
10
Plea Agreement at 1 (“STATE AND DEFENDANT AGREE to recommend . . . Count
18 (Murder Second Degree) – 30 years Level V suspended after 15 years Level V
(minimum mandatory) for . . .); Sept. 4, 2024 Plea. Hrg. Tr., at 4, 7.
11
Sept. 4, 2024 Plea. Hrg. Tr., at 7, 12.

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after 23 years for 2 years of intensive community supervision at various

levels.12 So, his sentence is wholly consistent with the prescribed statutory

sentence for second-degree murder.13 And while the sentencing judge did not

accept the parties’ recommendation to impose the 15-year minimum, there is

nothing in the record suggesting Mr. Taylor was subject to any statutory

enhancement of either the baseline minimum or maximum incarcerative term

therefor.14

(7) Nonetheless, Mr. Taylor now insists that his sentence is “illegal”

and need of correction under this Court’s Rule 35(a). That rule permits this

Court to correct an illegal sentence “at any time.”15 Relief under Rule 35(a)

is available when, inter alia, the sentence imposed: exceeds the statutorily-

authorized limits; omits a term required to be imposed by statute; is uncertain

12
D.I. 228 (Sentencing Order); Jan. 17, 2025 Sent. Hrg. Tr., at 44-45 (D.I. 234).
Mr. Taylor’s sentence for the conspiracy count was wholly suspended for probation, and
does not appear to be challenged in this application. See Sentencing Order, at 2; Jan. 17,
2025 Sent. Hrg. Tr., at 44.
13
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 635 and 4205(b)(1) (2015) (Murder in the second
degree is a class A felony for which one must receive “not less than 15 years up to life
imprisonment to be served at Level V”).
14
See Jan. 17, 2025, Sent. Hrg. Tr., at 41-42 (sentencing judge recognizing the statutory
minimum term of 15 years and the maximum sentence of life imprisonment as a
possibility); id. at 42 (rejecting the recommendation of the minimum 15-year term and
noting that, as a matter of her discretion, she “d[id] not believe a minimum mandatory
sentence is appropriate in this case”).
15
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a) (“Correction of sentence. -- The court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time . . .”).

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as to its substance; or, is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not

authorize.16

(8) Mr. Taylor avoids any specifics about his actual case or sentence

when joining many other sentenced inmates in filing the same handwritten

form motion complaining that his sentence is illegal and he is due resentencing

under the United States Supreme Court decision in Erlinger v. United States.17

(9) In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court considered a

sentence imposed under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act and stated

that “[v]irtually any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to

which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury

beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).”18 But

Erlinger is of no assistance to Mr. Taylor because his murder sentence

wasn’t—via some statutory mechanism—enhanced in any way on either the

minimum end or at the maximum end.19 In fact, there is no such statutory

16
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
17
See State v. Morrison, 2025 WL 1431931, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 19, 2025) (citing
State v. Archy, 2025 WL 1330215, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 7, 2025) which made note
of the “blizzard of pro se pleadings from inmates seeking relief” through resort to Erlinger
v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024)).
18
Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834 (emphasis added).
19
See Wheeler v. State, 2025 WL 3296176, at *2 (Del. Nov. 25, 2025) (holding that
Erlinger did not apply to the Rule 35(a) movant because his “sentencing judge made no
factual findings concerning [his] criminal history that exposed him to higher minimum or
maximum sentences” and his sentences were within the normal statutory range for the
crimes); Johnson v. State, 2025 WL 2452107, at *2 (Del. Aug. 25, 2025) (Erlinger did not

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enhancement mechanism for second-degree murder.20 And indeed,

Mr. Taylor’s 23-year term of imprisonment is well within the ordinary base

minimum and maximum incarcerative term—i.e., the normal “prescribed

range of penalties”21 for second-degree murder.22 So, Erlinger has no

applicability here.

(10) There is no demonstrable illegality in the substance of

Mr. Taylor’s sentence for second-degree murder. Accordingly, he is due no

relief under this Court’s Criminal Rule 35(a). That motion is DENIED. And

as this examination reveals he is manifestly ineligible for Rule 35(a) relief,

there’s no need to appoint him counsel to pursue his futile effort to press these

arguments and seek it.23

SO ORDERED,

/s/ Paul R. Wallace______________
Paul R. Wallace, Judge
Original to Prothonotary- Criminal

apply when there was no enhancement of sentence based on Rule 35(a) movant’s prior
convictions and the sentence imposed fell in the regular relevant statutory range);
Morrison, 2025 WL 1431931, at *2 (“[W]hile in his most recent prayer for sentencing
relief, [movant] has joined chorus with so many other sentenced inmates incanting the
United States Supreme Court decision in Erlinger v. United States, Erlinger can lend no
voice here because his [ ] sentence wasn’t enhanced in any way on either the minimum or
maximum end.”).
20
See n.13, supra.
21
Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834.
22
See n.13, supra.
23
See Morrison, 2025 WL 1431931, at *2 n.17 (collecting cases).

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cc: Mr. Diamonte Taylor, pro se
Benjamin S. Gifford, IV, Esquire
John A. Barber, Esquire
John S. Taylor, Deputy Attorney General
Isaac A. Rank, Deputy Attorney General
Investigative Services Office

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