State v. Turner

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) Crim. ID. No. 2310008139
)
JAVON TURNER )

Submitted: October 13, 2025
Decided: January 12, 2025

Upon Javon Turner’s
Motion for Postconviction Relief,
DENIED.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Zachary D. Rosen, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Attorney for the State of Delaware

Javon Turner, Self Represented

Lugg, J.
Javon Turner has filed a motion seeking postconviction relief in which he

challenges his attorney’s performance at various stages of his case. The Court has

reviewed Turner’s motion,1 memorandum, 2 and addendum, 3 the affidavit of Trial

Counsel,4 and the State’s response.5 Turner’s motion for postconviction relief is

denied.

BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2023, the Wilmington Police Department (“WPD”) received

a “ShotSpotter” alert of multiple shots fired in the area of the 800 Block of West 7th

Street in the City of Wilmington.6 WPD Officer Wilson, patrolling nearby, heard

gunshots in the area of 7th Street and North Monroe Street and ran in that direction

to investigate. 7 Officer Wilson saw three males running eastbound on West 6th

1
D.I. 51 (“Def. Mot.”).
2
D.I. 52 (“Def. Mem.”).
3
D.I. 61 (“Def. Addendum”).
4
D.I. 57 (“Aff. Trial Counsel”).
5
D.I. 65 (“State’s Resp.”).
6
D.I. 1, Aff. ¶ 3. Because Turner pled guilty, the Court draws the facts from the
affidavit of probable cause supporting his arrest. “Shotspotter” is the name of a
company that provides gunshot alerts to law enforcement through a “network of
gunfire-detecting acoustic sensors.” ShotSpotter v. VICE Media, LLC, 2022 WL
2373418, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 30, 2022). When gunfire is detected, the system
“provides a location of the gunfire” to the police department.
7
Aff. ¶ 4.
2
Street toward North Madison Street.8 He ordered the three men to stop; one stopped,

and the other two continued to flee.9 The man who stopped was later released and

not charged in this incident.10 Meziah Thompson, one of the two men who ignored

police commands and fled on foot, was apprehended by another officer.11

Meanwhile, investigators found a young man “in the 800 Block of West 7th

Street, suffering from numerous gunshot wounds about his body.”12 The “victim

was treated on scene and transported to the Christiana Hospital Emergency Room

for treatment.” 13 As the investigation progressed, officers found 27 spent shell

casings, a live round, and 8 projectiles “within the 800 Block of West 7 th Street,”14

and collected video surveillance of that location.15

The video surveillance showed the victim running eastbound in the 800 Block

of West 7th Street as a masked man chased and shot him.16 The victim fell to the

8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Aff. ¶ 10.
11
Aff. ¶ 4.
12
Aff. ¶ 6.
13
Id.
14
Aff. ¶ 7.
15
Aff. ¶ 8.
16
Aff. ¶¶ 8, 9.
3
ground, and the masked man continued to shoot him from close range.17 Other video

surveillance showed two men, wearing face masks and armed with firearms, running

from the scene immediately after the shooting.18 The first man—the shooter—wore

black and white sneakers, black pants, and a dark colored hooded sweatshirt with

white lettering, underneath a black jacket.19 The second man wore gray sneakers,

dark colored pants, and a light gray hooded jacket with a logo on the left chest area,

underneath a black jacket. 20 Meziah Thompson’s attire at the time of his arrest

matched that of the second man seen fleeing the scene.21

Officers canvassed the area and found a firearm in the rear yard of 823 West

6th Street.22 That weapon matched the description of the firearm possessed by the

first man in the surveillance video.23 Further review of surveillance footage revealed

Javon Turner, a few minutes prior to the shooting, clad in the attire worn by the

17
Aff. ¶ 9.
18
Aff. ¶ 8.
19
Aff. ¶¶ 8, 12.
20
Aff. ¶ 8.
21
Aff. ¶ 10.
22
Aff. ¶ 11.
23
Id.
4
shooter.24 In the video preceding the shooting, Turner’s face was not masked and

officers identified him by comparing the video footage to known pictures of Turner.25

On January 16, 2024, a New Castle County grand jury returned an indictment

charging Turner with Attempted Murder First Degree, Possession of a Firearm

During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Conspiracy First Degree, Wearing

a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Firearm by a Person

Prohibited (“PFBPP”), and Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited

(“PABPP”).26 On April 8, 2024, Turner moved to suppress evidence found in the

search of an apartment27 and evidence secured from an iPhone.28 The hearing on

these motions was continued at the defendant’s request from August to November

2024 to allow the defendant to develop mitigation material to provide to the State

before it conveyed its final plea offer.29 On November 15, 2024, the Court heard

argument on Turner’s motions and took the matter under advisement.30 Meanwhile,

Turner’s trial was scheduled to begin on January 6, 2025.31

24
Aff. ¶ 12.
25
Aff. ¶ 13.
26
D.I. 5.
27
D.I. 13.
28
D.I. 14.
29
D.I. 29.
30
D.I. 33.
31
D.I. 46.
5
On December 3, 2024, the State informed the Court that it agreed “not to enter

any evidence obtained from Mr. Turner’s phone in its case-in-chief”32 rendering that

suppression motion moot.33 Then, on December 23, 2024, Turner pled guilty to

Attempted Murder in the First Degree. 34 At the parties’ mutual request and

recommendation, the Court sentenced Turner immediately to the minimum term of

fifteen years incarceration followed by decreasing levels of supervision.35 Turner

did not appeal his conviction or sentence.36

On January 30, 2025, Turner, acting pro se, filed a Motion for Postconviction

Relief 37 accompanied by a memorandum in support of his motion. 38 His Trial

32
D.I. 37.
33
D.I. 39.
34
D.I. 47 (“Plea Agreement”) Both Turner’s Plea Agreement and Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form are docketed as D.I. 47.
35
D.I. 48 (“Sentence Order”).
36
Turner filed a “Rule 35 Correction of Illegally Imposed Sentence” in which he
argued the Court’s sentence violated the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). D.I. 63. This Court denied the
motion, finding that “Turner’s sentence was authorized by his judgment of
conviction and is legal.” D.I. 66 ¶ 7.
37
Def. Mot.
38
Def. Mem.
6
Counsel submitted an affidavit responding to Turner’s allegations,39 and the State

filed a response.40 Turner did not reply. 41

Turner asserts two claims in his motion. First, he contends his Trial Counsel

was ineffective for failing to inform him of “newly discovered co-defendant’s

statements upon agreement with the State.” 42 Second, he asserts that his Trial

Counsel’s “failures to raise critical pretrial motions amount[ed] to an actual

prejudice in violation [of the] Due Process Clause.” 43 For the reasons set forth

below, the Court denies Turner’s motion.

ANALYSIS

“Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 provides the exclusive remedy for setting

aside a final judgment of conviction.”44 The Rule is “intended to correct errors in

the trial process, not to allow defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate their

39
Aff. Trial Counsel.
40
State’s Resp.
41
The Court’s May 19, 2025, Scheduling Order directed Turner to “file any reply to
the State’s response within 45 days of the docketing of the State’s response.” D.I.
58 ¶ 7. The State docketed its response on August 29, 2025. State’s Resp. Turner
did not reply. The Court considers this motion under consideration 45 days after the
docketing of the State’s response, October 13, 2025.
42
Def. Mem. at 1.
43
Id.
44
Jackson v. State, 2007 WL 2231072, at *1 (Del. Aug. 2, 2007).
7
convictions.”45 Rule 61 provides incarcerated individuals a procedure to seek to

have a conviction set aside on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction or to

collaterally attack their conviction.46 Before addressing any substantive issues this

Court must first consider and apply Rule 61’s procedural bars. The rule prohibits

the Court from considering a motion that is: (1) untimely (filed more than one year

after the judgment of conviction is final); 47 (2) repetitive; 48 (3) procedurally

defaulted; 49 or (4) formerly adjudicated. 50 Turner’s first, timely, ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are not procedurally barred.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Turner must meet

the two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington. 51 Under Strickland, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;”52 and (2) “that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

45
Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013).
46
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
47
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
48
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
49
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
50
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
51
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
52
Id. at 688.
8
result of the proceeding would have been different.”53 “A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”54

The Court may dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the

defendant fails to show a reasonable probability of a different result but for the

counsel’s alleged errors.55 “[A]ctual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in

attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant

affirmatively prove prejudice.” 56 A defendant must allege prejudice and then

substantiate that allegation. 57 Because a defendant must prove both parts of an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a failure to establish sufficient prejudice

alone is enough to defeat an ineffective assistance of counsel allegation. “It is not

enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.’”58 The “court must consider the ‘totality of the evidence,’ and ‘must

53
Id.
54
Id. at 694.
55
Id. at 697.
56
Id. at 693.
57
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996).
58
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
693).
9
ask if the [movant] has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would

reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.’”59

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a question of whether Trial

Counsel’s actions were adequate.60 A review of counsel’s representation is subject

to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable. 61 As

such, mere allegations will not suffice; instead, a defendant must make concrete

allegations of ineffective assistance, and then substantiate them, or risk summary

dismissal.62

Turner’s Claims

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – “Newly Discovered” Co-Defendant’s
Statement

Turner contends that his co-defendant, Meziah Thompson, used privileged

information to “get a lesser sentence” and he, Turner, was never informed of the

agreement.63 Turner fails to substantiate these allegations, and his recitation of the

circumstances surrounding Thompson’s guilty plea are belied by the record.

Thompson pled guilty on September 4, 2024; his plea was not premised on his

59
State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331, 343 (Del. 2017) (citing Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362,
384 (Del. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96)).
60
State v. Wright, 2023 WL 2128338, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2023).
61
Id.
62
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 553, 556 (Del. 1990).
63
Def. Mem. at 16.
10
cooperation with the State.64 Nor did Thompson provide any information to the State

to secure his plea. The State, responding to Turner’s allegation, stated “there was

never any information given to the State by the co-defendant that [Turner] was not

privy to. There was no agreement to testify.”65

Trial Counsel’s representation of Turner was professionally reasonable. On

October 20, 2024, after learning of Thompson’s plea, Trial Counsel met with

Turner.66 During this meeting, “Turner informed Counsel that he wished to accept a

plea that was the same as his co-defendant’s.” 67 So informed, Trial Counsel

negotiated a plea with the State on Turner’s behalf. 68 Trial Counsel’s efforts

convinced the State to extend a plea to Attempted Murder First Degree and to

recommend the statutorily required minimum term of incarceration for that

offense.69 Furthermore, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against

Turner.70

64
State v. Thompson, Crim. ID. No. 2310007956, D.I. 18.
65
State’s Resp. at 7.
66
Aff. Trial Counsel ¶2.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Sentence Order.
70
Plea Agreement.
11
Trial Counsel met with Turner several times before and after Thompson’s plea

and sentencing. She met with Turner to review discovery “on January 3, 2024;

February 9, 2024; March 15, 2024; May 2, 2024; June 1, 2024; June 17, 2024; [and]

August 14, 2024.”71 After learning of Thompson’s plea, Counsel met with Turner

by Zoom “on October 23, 2024; November 1, 2024 [the day of Thompson’s

sentencing]; November 17, 2024; and December 6, 2024” and “in December counsel

met with Mr. Turner at Howard R. Young Correction Institution on two (2)

occasions.” 72 On December 23, 2024, Turner appeared in the Superior Court,

tendered his plea and, with Trial Counsel at his side, engaged in a colloquy with the

Court.73 The record establishes that Turner was fully aware of Thompson’s plea and

sentence when he—Turner—chose to plead guilty. After accepting his plea, the

Superior Court sentenced Turner consistent with the parties’ agreement.74 “There

was no discovery, or no new information, that Counsel received near, at the time of,

or after Mr. Turner entered the plea regarding Mr. Thompson. Mr. Turner entered

71
Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 3.
72
Id. ¶ 4.
73
Plea Agreement.
74
Trial Counsel thoroughly investigated Turner’s “mental health concerns.” Aff.
Trial Counsel ¶ 8. While Counsel was satisfied Turner was competent to stand trial,
his “mental health evaluation was used for mitigation.” Id. And “[t]he Court
expressly referenced this mitigation when following the joint plea agreement
between the State and Mr. Turner.” Id.
12
the plea with full awareness of all discovery and the plea agreement his co-defendant

accepted.”75

Turner contends that, after his plea and sentencing, his attorney told his

parents “that she did not want to go to trial due to co-defendant Meziah Thompson’s

agreement to testify against defendant.”76 To be sure, on December 23, 2024, Turner

informed the Court of his satisfaction with counsel’s representation of him and that

his lawyer fully advised him of his rights.77 “Counsel was prepared to proceed to

trial, and litigated all issues believed to be with merit, prior to trial.”78 Trial Counsel

did not seek to avoid trial; to the contrary, she diligently prepared for trial while

simultaneously developing a mitigation case. And, of course, it was Turner’s

decision alone to plead guilty.79 Trial Counsel’s performance was professionally

reasonable.

To the extent Turner argues that Thompson entered into an agreement with the

State to testify against him in violation of their—Turner and Thompson’s—joint

75
Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 5.
76
Def. Mem. at 8.
77
Plea Agreement.
78
Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 9.
79
Taylor v. State, 28 A.3d 399, 406 (Del. 2011). (“A criminal defendant has ‘ultimate
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to
plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.’”
(quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983))).
13
defense agreement, that claim plainly lacks merit.80 Thompson’s plea agreement did

not call for Thompson to testify against Turner,81 nor was there a “joint defense.”82

Thompson “was not cooperating with the State, did not have an agreement with the

State to testify, did not give information to the State (for a lower plea offer or

otherwise), and was not acting as an agent for the State.”83

Turner alleges his Trial Counsel failed to show him an offer made by the

State.84 But there is no evidence that Trial Counsel failed to convey any plea or other

pertinent information to Turner. To the contrary, Trial Counsel met with Turner at

least fourteen times, reviewed Thompson’s plea with him on multiple occasions,

prepared a mitigation case, and negotiated a favorable resolution on Turner’s

behalf. 85 The record amply demonstrates Trial Counsel provided professionally

80
Within this claim, Turner asks the Court to order the State turn over all
communications with Thompson and his Counsel, including notes and times of
communications. Def. Addendum at 7. While there is no specific right to discovery
under Rule 61, this Court, possesses “inherent authority . . . to grant particularized
discovery for good cause shown.” Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1033 (Del.
2017) (internal citations omitted). There is no evidence that the State failed to
provide any information it was legally obligated to provide Turner. Thus, in the
absence of a showing of good cause, the Court declines to order the State to provide
any additional information to Turner.
81
State’s Resp. at 6.
82
Id. at 7.
83
Id. at 9.
84
Def. Mem. at 12.
85
See generally, Aff. Trial Counsel.
14
reasonable assistance. Turner “entered the plea with full awareness of all

discovery.”86

Turner’s assertion that he suffered a violation of an agreed-upon “joint

defense” with Thompson, too, lacks merit. In a criminal case it is common for

defendants to be indicted and tried together. 87 But, joinder for trial presents no

mutuality of defense. 88 For this reason, dual representation is strongly

discouraged.89 Where defenses diverge to become mutually antagonistic, individual

defendant’s trials are often severed.90 Of course, the State may not deploy an agent

to infringe upon a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel;91 but that did not

occur here. 92 Thompson and Turner were free to independently negotiate plea

86
Id. ¶ 5 (cleaned up).
87
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8(b); State v. Phillips, 2015 WL 5332388, at *9 (Del. Super.
Ct. Sept. 3, 2015) (citing Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 272 (Del. 1967).
88
See Phillips v. State, 154 A.3d 1146, 1157 (Joinder can exist where there is a
“presence of hostility between a defendant and his codefendant or ‘mere
inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies.’” (quoting Outten v. State, 650 A.2d
1291, 1298 (Del. 1994)).
89
State v. Morris, 1978 WL 183774, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29. 1978) (“Dual
representation must be approached with caution by the lawyer and the Court.”);
Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709, 712 (2000) (“The Comment to Rule 1.7 [of the
Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct] states ‘[t]he potential for conflict
of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant.’”).
90
Phillips, 2015 WL 5332388, at *10.
91
State v. Robinson, 209 A.3d 25, 47-48 (2019).
92
State’s Resp. at 9.
15
resolutions, and they did. There is no evidence Thompson encroached upon Turner’s

right to counsel to leverage a better deal on his—Thompson’s—behalf. And, to an

objective observer, each defendant’s plea reflects an attribution of responsibility

commensurate with the role of each actor. While the facts linked Thompson and

Turner as conspirators, evidence revealed Turner to be the individual who chased

down and shot the victim.93

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – “Critical Pretrial Motions”

Turner pled guilty.94 A judge of this Court accepted his plea after a thorough

colloquy.95 By pleading guilty, Turner waived any alleged errors occurring before

the entry of his plea. 96 In any event, Turner has failed to demonstrate deficient

performance or prejudice resulting from Trial Counsel’s representation.

a. Suppression Motions

Turner contends that his Trial Counsel “was in violation [of] the Due Process

Clause when she failed to raise fundamental objections during critical pretrial

stages.”97 According to Turner, Trial Counsel failed to “raise suppression to their

93
Aff. ¶ 12.
94
Plea Agreement.
95
Id.
96
Dollard v. State, 2020 WL 2393353, at *2 (Del. May 11, 2020) (citing Miller v.
State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003)).
97
Def. Mem. at 4.
16
fullest potential”98 by seeking to exclude “falsely included surveillance information

within the warrant/probable cause,” 99 the firearm found by police, 100 and certain

items seized during the search of an apartment and a cell phone.101

Turner largely ignores the fact that Trial Counsel sought to suppress evidence

obtained in the search of an apartment102 and evidence obtained from an iPhone.103

The Court heard argument on these motions on November 15, 2024, and took them

under advisement. 104 Following argument, the State agreed not to use evidence

found on the iPhone in its case-in-chief.105 Turner’s subsequent guilty plea rendered

the motions moot.106

Trial Counsel explained she did not file a motion to suppress the surveillance

footage because Turner lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy when walking

along the public roads captured in the surveillance footage.107 Further, she did not

98
Id. at 14.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
D.I. 13.
103
D.I. 14.
104
D.I. 33.
105
D.I. 37.
106
D.I. 39; Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 6.
107
Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 6.
17
file a motion to suppress the firearm because the weapon was found abandoned in

the rear yard of 823 West 6th Street.108

i. Surveillance Footage

Turner alleges that his Trial Counsel should have suppressed surveillance

footage capturing him in the area of the shooting.109 The Fourth Amendment affords

citizens a reasonable expectation of privacy.110 “It is well-established that what a

person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment

protection.”111 Turner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movement in

public areas and, thus, no Fourth Amendment protections as they relate to the

surveillance footage. Trial Counsel’s decision to forego a challenge to the

admissibility of the surveillance video was professionally reasonable.

ii. Abandonment

Next, Turner contends that Trial Counsel should have suppressed the firearm

found by police when they canvassed the area where the shooting occurred. 112

108
Id.; Aff. ¶ 11.
109
See Def. Mem. at 14.
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (J. Harlan concurring); Garnett v. State,
110

308 A.3d 625, 641 (Del. 2023).
111
State v. King, 2021 WL 211150, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2021) (cleaned up)
(quoting Kowalski v. Scott, 2005 WL 703757, at *1 (3d. Cir. Mar. 29, 2005) (citing
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351)).
112
Def. Mem. at 14-15.
18
“Property discarded by a suspect who refuses to submit to an officer’s authority and

flees is deemed abandoned. There is no legal basis under the Fourth Amendment to

suppress that abandoned property.” 113 Here, Turner refused to submit to officer

authority, fled the scene of the shooting, and discarded the weapon, abandoning it

and forfeiting any Fourth Amendment protections he otherwise possessed in the

weapon. Trial Counsel’s decision not to challenge the recovery of the abandoned

firearm was professionally reasonable.

“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential.”114 “Courts

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of professional assistance,” and the burden falls on the defendant to rebut this “strong

presumption.”115 Turner, through his unsubstantiated allegations, fails to meet this

burden. Trial Counsel’s informed decision not to seek suppression of legitimately,

and Constitutionally, acquired evidence was professionally reasonable.

b. Timeliness

Turner contends his Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel

because of “gross motions of continuances, that violated defendant’s indictment

113
Jackson v. State, 990 A.2d 1281, 1289 (Del. 2009) (citing California v. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991)); see King, 2021 WL 211150, at *6.
114
Cooke v. State, 338 A.3d 418, 455 (Del. 2025) (cleaned up).
115
Id.
19
challenges, and his counsel[ ] [failed] to request for a speedy trial.”116 Turner alleges

his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when she did not object to the

State’s failure to indict him within forty-five days of his arrest117 and to multiple trial

continuances.118

In fact, Trial Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Indictment on

January 9, 2024,119 but that motion was deemed moot on January 29, 2024, because

the State had indicted the case.120 Ninety days elapsed between Turner’s October

18, 2023 arrest 121 and his January 15, 2024 indictment; 122 this “delay” does not

amount to a speedy trial violation.123 Turner’s case proceeded to trial with alacrity

despite continuances to allow, in part, development of Turner’s mitigation case. And

Trial Counsel was prepared for trial.124 Turner chose to plead guilty. Turner’s claim

116
Def. Mem. at 11.
117
Id. at 12.
118
Id.
119
D.I. 4.
120
D.I. 19; Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 7.
121
D.I. 1.
122
D.I. 5.
123
State v. Moore, 2024 WL 2292230, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 2024) (The
Court found that a delay between arrest and indictment of 91 days was not a violation
of a defendant’s speedy trial rights.).
124
Aff. Trial Counsel ¶ 9.
20
that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because she failed to

address speedy trial issues is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Trial Counsel provided Turner constitutionally effective assistance of counsel.

Trial Counsel met with Turner on multiple occasions to guide him through the trial

process, discuss materials provided by the State, and assess Thompson’s plea. These

meetings culminated in Turner’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary election to

plead guilty. Trial Counsel’s diligent preparation of mitigation material prompted

the State to join Turner in recommending the minimum sentence required by law, a

sentence the Court imposed. The record evidences Turner’s awareness and

understanding of Thompson’s plea. And, while Turner’s plea forestalls any

challenges to the events that preceded it, Trial Counsel professionally considered

and lodged appropriate evidentiary challenges and chose not to pursue legal

arguments unsupported by extant law. Trial Counsel was not ineffective, and Turner

suffered no prejudice. Turner’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________
Sean P. Lugg, Judge

21