Kenneth T. Simeone v. The Walt Disney Company

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KENNETH T. SIMEONE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2022-1120-LWW
)
)
THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, )
a Delaware corporation, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: March 15, 2023
Date Decided: June 27, 2023

Sean J. Bellew, BELLEW LLC, Wilmington, Delaware; Paul M. Jonna, LIMANDRI
& JONNA LLP, Rancho Santa Fe, California; Attorneys for Plaintiff Kenneth T.
Simeone

Blake Rohrbacher & Morgan R. Harrison, RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Kevin J. Orsini, Rory A. Leraris & Andrew D. Huynh,
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for
Defendant The Walt Disney Company

WILL, Vice Chancellor
This books and records action originates from The Walt Disney Company’s

response to Florida House Bill 1557. Disney initially took no public position on the

bill, which limits instruction on sexual orientation or gender identity in Florida

classrooms. After facing criticism from its employees, Disney reversed course and

spoke out against the legislation. Florida’s Governor took issue with Disney’s stance

and Florida’s legislature voted to dissolve a special tax district encompassing the

Walt Disney World Resort.

Afterwards, the plaintiff—a longtime Disney stockholder—was solicited by

counsel to serve a books and records demand. The demand asserts that Disney’s

directors and officers may have breached their fiduciary duties to the company and

its stockholders by opposing HB 1557. The plaintiff’s theory of wrongdoing is that

Disney’s fiduciaries either put their own beliefs ahead of their obligations to

stockholders or flouted the risk of losing rights associated with the special district.

Disney told the plaintiff that he lacked grounds to obtain books and records

because its directors and officers had not engaged in mismanagement. Nevertheless,

Disney produced certain board minutes and corporate policies to the plaintiff. The

plaintiff was unsatisfied and filed litigation.

Weighty public policy questions surround the margins of this lawsuit. But

when they are stripped away, the case becomes quite simple. The court must

1
determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a proper purpose to inspect books

and records. He decidedly has not.

Delaware law vests directors with significant discretion to guide corporate

strategy—including on social and political issues. Given the diversity of viewpoints

held by directors, management, stockholders, and other stakeholders, corporate

speech on external policy matters brings both risks and opportunities. The board is

empowered to weigh these competing considerations and decide whether it is in the

corporation’s best interest to act (or not act).

This suit concerns such a business decision by the Disney board—a decision

that cannot provide a credible basis to suspect potential mismanagement irrespective

of its outcome. There is no indication that the directors suffered from disabling

conflicts. Nor is there any evidence that the directors were grossly negligent or acted

in bad faith. Rather, the board held a special meeting to discuss Disney’s approach

to the legislation and the employees’ negative response. Disney’s public rebuke of

HB 1557 followed.

The plaintiff and his counsel may disagree with Disney’s position on

HB 1557. But their disagreement is not evidence of wrongdoing. Regardless, the

plaintiff has all necessary and essential documents relevant to his purpose. Judgment

must be entered for Disney.

2
I. BACKGROUND

This case was tried on a paper record consisting of 48 exhibits, including a

transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition.1 The facts described below have been proven

by a preponderance of the evidence, are drawn from admitted allegations in the

pleadings or stipulated facts in the pre-trial order, or are not subject to reasonable

dispute.2

A. HB 1557 and Disney’s Initial Silence

On February 24, 2022, the Florida House of Representatives voted to approve

House Bill 1557, titled the “Parental Rights in Education” bill.3 HB 1557 prohibits

teachers from discussing certain topics related to sexual orientation and gender

identity in kindergarten through third grade classrooms.4 For students in higher

1
Exhibits jointly submitted by the parties at trial are cited according to the numbers
provided on the parties’ joint exhibit list as “JX __,” unless otherwise defined. Pin cites
are to the last three digits of document Bates stamps absent internal pagination.
2
See In re Books-A-Million, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2016 WL 5874974, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct.
10, 2016) (explaining that the court may take judicial notice of “facts that are not subject
to reasonable dispute” (citing In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162,
170 (Del. 2006))); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 809 A.2d 1163, 1167 n.3 (Del.
Ch. 2002) (“The court may take judicial notice of facts publicly available in filings with
the SEC.”).
3
Fla. HB 1557 (2022) (codified at Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1001.42(8)(c)(3)); see also Pre-trial
Stipulation and Order (Dkt. 31) (“PTO”) ¶ 7; JX 14.
4
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1001.42(8)(c)(3); see also JX 14.

3
grades, the legislation prohibits lessons on these topics that are not “age-appropriate

or developmentally appropriate . . . in accordance with state standards.”5

Defendant The Walt Disney Company quickly came under scrutiny for its

financial backing of HB 1557’s sponsors.6 Disney, a leading media and

entertainment company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in California,

has a substantial presence in Florida where its Walt Disney World Resort is located.7

Disney is among the largest employers in Florida.8

On March 7, 2022, Robert Chapek—then Disney’s Chief Executive Officer—

circulated an internal memo to Disney employees expressing the company’s

“unwavering commitment to the LGBTQ+ community.”9 Chapek noted that

although the company had not made a public statement opposing HB 1557, Disney’s

“lack of statement” should not be mistaken “for a lack of support.”10 He wrote: “We

all share the same goal of a more tolerant, respectful world. Where we may differ is

5
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1001.42(8)(c)(3); see also JX 12.
6
E.g., JX 4.
7
PTO ¶¶ 4-5; see The Walt Disney Company, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/ (last
visited June 22, 2023); Walt Disney World, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/ (last
visited June 22, 2023).
8
See JX 10.
9
JX 4; see JX 14.
10
JX 4.

4
in the tactics to get there.”11 Chapek explained that Disney would “continue to be a

leader in supporting organizations that champion diversity.”12

Chapek’s memo was met with pervasive disappointment and frustration from

Disney employees and creative partners.13 Some—including actors, directors,

writers, and animators—called the memo “weak” and “unacceptable.”14 Others

demanded that Disney take a public stand against HB 1557.15

B. Disney’s Public Opposition to HB 1557

On March 8, 2022, the Florida Senate passed HB 1557 by a vote of 22 to 17.16

The bill was then sent to Governor Ron DeSantis for his signature.17

Also on March 8, Disney’s Board of Directors held a special meeting about

Disney’s “Political Engagement and Communications.”18 Chapek and Disney’s

then-Chief Corporate Affairs Officer Geoff Morrell “led a discussion with the Board

members relating to the communications plan, philosophy and approach regarding

11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See, e.g., id.
14
E.g., id. (quoting social media posts).
15
E.g., id. (quoting social media posts).
16
HB 1557, The Florida Senate, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2022/1557/?Tab=
VoteHistory (last visited June 22, 2023).
17
JX 14.
18
JX 24 at ‘051-053.

5
Florida legislation and employee response.”19 Chapek and Morrell “responded to

Board members’ questions and comments.”20

Disney’s annual stockholder meeting was held the next day, March 9,

beginning at 10:00 a.m. Pacific.21 There, Chapek acknowledged that “many are

upset that we did not speak out against the bill” and that the company’s original

approach to HB 1557 “didn’t quite get the job done.”22 He explained: “We were

opposed to the bill from the outset, but we chose not to take a public position on it

because we thought we could be more effective working behind the scenes, engaging

directly with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.”23 Chapek announced that Disney

was joining a petition against similar legislation and would be supporting efforts to

protect the LGBTQ+ community.24 He noted that he had spoken to Governor

DeSantis that morning to express “our disappointment and concern” with HB 1557.25

19
Id. at ‘052.
20
Id.
21
See JX 5; see also The Walt Disney Company, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A) (Jan. 19, 2022).
22
JX 5; JX 6; see also 2022 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, The Walt Disney Company
(Mar. 9, 2022), https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/app/uploads/2022/03/2022-ASM-
transcript.pdf.
23
JX 5.
24
Id.; JX 6.
25
JX 6 (“I [Chapek] look forward to visiting with the governor with a small delegation of
cast members who are involved in this movement.”).

6
In his 2023 memoir, Governor DeSantis recalls telling Chapek: “You will end

up putting yourself in an untenable position. People like me will say, ‘Gee, how

come Disney has never said anything about China, where they make a fortune?’”26

The Governor wrote that after speaking to Chapek, he thought “this clash with

Disney was over.”27

On March 9 at 11:50 a.m. Pacific, the Board held a regularly scheduled

meeting.28 Chapek “provided an update on Company matters, addressing: Company

values, approach to Florida legislation and [a] planned holistic review of political

engagement to be discussed at the June Board retreat.”29 Chapek “responded to

Board members’ comments and questions” throughout his presentation.30

26
JX 48 at 191. It is not obvious from the record when this conversation occurred, though
the book describes it as happening when “the controversy over the Parental Rights in
Education bill was coming to a head” and Disney was “getting a lot of pressure to weigh
in against the bill.” Id. at 190-91. Given the context, it seems more likely than not that
this was the conversation Chapek referenced during the March 9 annual stockholder
meeting. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27
Id. at 194.
28
JX 24 at ‘054-055.
29
Id. at ‘055.
30
Id.

7
On March 10, DeSantis publicly criticized companies “like [] Disney.”31 He

stated that Florida policy should be “based on the best interest of Florida citizens,

not on the musing of woke corporations.”32

Chapek sent another memo to Disney employees on March 11, thanking those

who reached out to share their “pain, frustration and sadness over the company’s

response” to HB 1557.33 Chapek promised to “become a better ally.”34

Governor DeSantis signed HB 1557 into law on March 28.35 The same day,

Disney issued a public statement opposing the bill:

Florida’s HB 1557, also known as the “Don’t Say Gay” bill, should
never have passed and should never have been signed into law. Our
goal as a company is for this law to be repealed by the legislature or
struck down in the courts, and we remain committed to supporting the
national and state organizations working to achieve that. We are
dedicated to standing up for the rights and safety of LGBTQ+ members
of the Disney family, as well as the LGBTQ+ community in Florida
and across the country.36
In response, Governor DeSantis said that Disney had “crossed the line.”37

31
JX 7.
32
Id.
33
JX 8.
34
Id.
35
PTO ¶ 9.
36
Id. ¶ 10; JX 9.
37
JX 10.

8
C. Effects on the RCID

Disney’s opposition to HB 1557 prompted Florida politicians to consider

revoking Disney’s ability to self-govern its lands within the Reedy Creek

Improvement District (RCID).38

Florida’s Reedy Creek Improvement Act (RCIA) was enacted in 1967.39 The

RCIA formed the RCID, a special district consisting of 25,000 acres of land on

which the Walt Disney World Resort was built .40 The RCID was granted the same

authority and responsibility as a county government.41 For example, it is authorized

to levy taxes, write building codes, and develop and maintain its own

infrastructure.42 The RCID is run by a five-member board of supervisors, who were

originally selected by landowners within the district.43

38
See JX 11.
39
Id.; see also History, Reedy Creek Improvement District, https://www.rcid.org/about
/history (last visited June 22, 2023).
40
JX 11.
41
See id.; see also About, Reedy Creek Improvement District, https://www.rcid.org/about
(last visited June 22, 2023).
42
JX 13; see also Ch. 67-764, 1967 Fla. Laws 256.
43
JX 13; see also Board of Supervisors, Reedy Creek Improvement District,
https://www.rcid.org/about/board-of-supervisors-2 (last visited June 22, 2023).

9
On March 30, a Florida state representative tweeted that he had met with

colleagues to discuss repealing the RCIA.44 During a speech the following day,

Governor DeSantis said that he supported a repeal of the law.45

On April 19, Governor DeSantis announced that he was expanding a special

legislative session to evaluate abolishing the RCID and five other special districts

unrelated to Disney.46 Within 48 hours, the Florida House of Representatives voted

70 to 38 in favor of dissolving the special districts at issue.47 Governor DeSantis

wrote in his memoir that “[n]obody saw it coming, and Disney did not have enough

time to put its army of high-powered lobbyists to work to try to derail the bill.”48

The dissolution was scheduled to go into effect in June 2023.49

On April 22, Governor DeSantis signed the dissolution bill into law. 50 He

announced that Disney would no longer control the RCID and would be held

responsible for certain Florida taxes.51 He also announced that he would release a

44
JX 11.
45
Id.
46
JX 14.
47
Id.; JX 15; Fla. SB 4-C (2022).
48
JX 48 at 199.
49
Fla. SB 4-C (2022).
50
Id.
51
JX 17.

10
proposal making Disney responsible for over $1 billion in debts owed by the RCID.52

Later, during a June 5, 2022 interview, Governor DeSantis recalled warning Disney

that it “shouldn’t get involved” with HB 1557 because “it’s not going to work out

well” for the company.53

Disney’s stock price fell during the summer from $145.70 per share on

March 1 to $91.84 on July 14.54 On November 9—the day after Governor DeSantis

was reelected—Disney’s stock fell to $86.75 per share.55

D. The Section 220 Demand and the First Document Production

On July 8, 2022, plaintiff Kenneth T. Simeone sent Disney a demand pursuant

to 8 Del. C. § 220 to inspect corporate books and records.56 The plaintiff has been a

Disney stockholder since 1973 and lives in Kissimmee, Florida.57

According to the demand, Simeone is “concerned that officers and directors

of Disney may have breached their fiduciary duties to the Company and its

stockholders by, inter alia, failing to appreciate the known risk that the Company’s

52
Id.
53
JX 18.
54
See The Walt Disney Company Common Stock Historical Data, Nasdaq, https://
www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/dis/historical (last visited June 22, 2023).
55
See id.; JX 26.
56
JX 19; PTO ¶ 11.
57
JX 19 Ex. 2 at 1; JX 36 (“Pl.’s Dep.”) at 6-8; PTO ¶ 3.

11
political stance would have on its financial position and the value of Disney stock.”58

He suspects that Disney officers and directors “plac[ed] their own political views

ahead of their duties to act in the best interests of Disney and its stockholders.”59

The demand listed four related, purported purposes for the inspection:

1. To investigate potential wrongdoing, mismanagement and breaches
of fiduciary duties by members of Disney’s Board, Company
executives, or others in connection with the Company’s decision to
publicly oppose the Parental Rights Act, despite being warned, and
therefore having knowledge, that such opposition would be harmful
to the Company and stockholder value;
2. To determine the extent to which the Company’s opposition, or
perceived opposition, to the Parental Rights Act has harmed the
Company’s value, including but not limited to, the loss or potential
loss of favorable tax benefits or other benefits the Company has
traditionally received from the State of Florida, whether in
connection with the Reddy [sic] Creek Improvement District, or
otherwise;
3. To assess the ability of Disney’s Board to impartially consider a
demand for action, including a request for permission to file a
derivative lawsuit on Disney’s behalf; and
4. To explore possible remedial measures, including, without
limitation, seeking a meeting with the Board to discuss proposed
reforms, communicating with other Disney stockholders, preparing
a stockholder resolution for Disney’s next annual meeting, and/or
taking appropriate legal action in the event that members of the
Board and/or Disney executives did not properly discharge their
fiduciary duties.60

58
JX 19 at 3.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 4.

12
Simeone sought four categories of documents pertaining to the subject matter

of the demand. These include: (1) director independence questionnaires and “any

other documents” reflecting ties among Disney directors; (2) Disney policies or

guidelines about charitable or political contributions, or public positions on

legislation or public policy issues; (3) meeting minutes and materials from the

Disney Board or any Board committee about the Parental Rights Act, Disney’s

March 28 press release, the dissolution of the RCID, the economic benefits to Disney

from the RCID, and the policies and guidelines that were the subject of request; and

(4) written correspondence “between or among any Disney directors (including

[Chapek] in his capacity as CEO)” about the relevant issues.61 He requested these

documents for a three-year time period.

On July 15, Disney’s outside counsel sent Simeone a written response to the

demand.62 This response explained that Simeone had failed to state a proper purpose

for inspection and that the requested documents were not necessary and essential to

any such purpose.63 The letter closed by offering to further discuss the demand.64

61
Id. at 5.
62
JX 20; PTO ¶ 12.
63
JX 20 at 2-3. The response also said that Simeone had failed to demonstrate he held
Disney stock during the time of the alleged wrongdoing. Id. at 3-4. Simeone subsequently
provided proof of continuous ownership. JX 21 at 3-5.
64
JX 20 at 4.

13
Between July 15 and October 28, the parties met and conferred on the scope

of a production of Disney books and records.65 During these negotiations, the parties

agreed that Disney could redact both privileged and non-responsive content from

any Board materials that Disney produced in response to the demand.66

On October 28, after the parties executed a confidentiality agreement, Disney

produced 73 pages of documents while “reserv[ing] all rights to challenge whether

the Demand satisfie[d] the threshold requirements for an inspection under 8 Del. C.

§ 220.”67 The documents were redacted for responsiveness and attorney-client

privilege in accordance with the parties’ agreement.68 The production included all

Disney policies concerning charitable or political contributions that were in effect

during the time period relevant to HB 1557, which were responsive to the second

category of requested documents.69 Disney also produced all formal Board

documents—specifically, minutes—concerning HB 1557 in response to the third

category of requests.70 Disney declined to produce director independence

questionnaires (category one) and email communications (category four).

65
PTO ¶ 13.
66
Id.
67
JX 23 (transmittal letter); see JX 24 (production Bates labeled DIS000001-73).
68
PTO ¶ 14.
69
JX 24 at ‘072-073.
70
Id. at ‘001-071.

14
E. The Litigation and the Second Document Production

On December 5, 2022, Simeone filed a Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del.

C. § 220 to Compel Inspection of Books and Records (the “Complaint”).71 Disney

answered the Complaint on December 27.72

Simeone served a set of document requests, interrogatories, and requests for

admission on Disney.73 He also served Disney with a notice of a Rule 30(b)(6)

deposition for a corporate representative to testify about the contents of the

documents at issue and the location and preservation of Board materials.74 Disney

refused to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) witness without a court order. 75 It subsequently

produced Board policies about the taking and preserving of meeting minutes, along

with a privilege log for the previously-produced materials.76

Disney correspondingly served discovery on the plaintiff.77 On February 10,

2023, Disney deposed Simeone. During the deposition, Simeone’s counsel

instructed him not to answer questions about the terms of his attorney engagement

71
Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”).
72
Dkt. 5.
73
Dkt. 7.
74
Dkt. 13.
75
PTO ¶ 20.
76
JX 34 (production Bates stamped DIS0000074-116); JX 44 (privilege log). The
production included Disney’s bylaws, as well as charters for the Board’s Audit,
Compensation, and Governance and Nominating Committees.
77
Dkt. 8; see JX 33.

15
agreement related to the demand and this action.78 After the deposition, Disney

renewed its request for the terms of Simeone’s counsel’s engagement.79 On

February 28, Simeone served a verified interrogatory response about his fee and cost

arrangements with counsel.80

A trial on a paper record was held on March 15.81 The matter was taken under

advisement at that time.

F. Additional Events

On November 20, 2022, the Board announced that Chapek would be

terminated as CEO.82 He was replaced by former Disney CEO Bob Iger.83

The Florida legislature eventually decided not to dissolve the RCID.84 On

January 8, 2023, it was reported that Governor DeSantis had proposed installing a

state-appointed board of supervisors to govern the district.85 Governor DeSantis

explained that the proposal would eliminate Disney’s “self-governing status” and

78
PTO ¶ 22; Pl.’s Dep. 38-39.
79
PTO ¶ 23.
80
Id. ¶ 24; JX 45.
81
Dkt. 35; Tr. of Mar. 15, 2023 Section 220 Trial (Dkt. 36) (“Trial Tr.”).
82
JX 28.
83
JX 29.
84
JX 41.
85
JX 30 (“The corporate kingdom has come to an end.”).

16
“special legal privileges.”86 In February, Governor DeSantis signed a bill that

effectively took control of the RCID (renamed the Central Florida Tourism

Oversight District) and appointed five members to a reconstituted board of

supervisors.87

According to media reports, the newly appointed board of supervisors

discovered that before DeSantis signed this bill, the prior board had passed

restrictive covenants and a development agreement giving Disney certain rights.88

On May 5, Governor DeSantis signed another bill that would purportedly allow the

new board of supervisors to void these agreements.89 Litigation (both by and against

Disney) regarding the district is ongoing.90

86
JX 35; see also JX 31.
87
Fla. HB 9-B (2023); see About Central Florida Tourism Oversight District, Reedy Creek
Improvement District, https://www.rcid.org/ (last visited June 22, 2023); Governor Ron
DeSantis Appoints Five to the Central Florida Tourism Oversight District, Ron DeSantis
46th Governor of Florida (Feb. 27, 2023), https://www.flgov.com/2023/02/27/governor-
ron-desantis-appoints-five-to-the-central-florida-tourism-oversight-district/. I note that
this development was not addressed at trial. It, along with the events described in the
remainder of this section, are included for the sake of context and completeness. These
events have no bearing on the outcome of this action.
88
See Joseph Ax & Dawn Chmielewski, DeSantis signs bill allowing Florida board to
cancel Disney deals, Reuters (May 5, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/desantis-
signs-bill-allowing-florida-board-cancel-disney-deals-2023-05-05/; Jesus Jiménez &
Brooks Barnes, What We Know About the DeSantis-Disney Dispute, N.Y. Times (May 19,
2023), https://www.nytimes.com/article/disney-florida-desantis.html.
89
Fla. SB 1604 (2023); Ax & Chmielewski, supra note 88; Jimenez & Barnes, supra
note 88.
90
See Compl., Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. v. DeSantis, No. 4:23-cv-00163,
2023 WL 3098088 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2023); Compl., Cent. Fla. Tourism Oversight
17
II. ANALYSIS

Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides stockholders

with a qualified right to inspect corporate books and records.91 To obtain inspection,

a stockholder must satisfy the statute’s form and manner requirements.92 The

stockholder must also prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence, a proper purpose

entitling the stockholder to an inspection of every item sought.”93 The stockholder

must further “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘each category

of books and records is essential to accomplishment of the stockholder’s articulated

purpose for the inspection.’”94

The plaintiff does not meet the standard for a Section 220 inspection for three

independent reasons. First, the purposes described in the demand are not the

plaintiff’s own purposes. Second, the plaintiff has not provided a credible basis from

which to infer possible wrongdoing. Third, the defendant has provided the plaintiff

with all necessary and essential documents.

District v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., No. 2023-CA-011818-O, 2023 WL
3178900 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 1, 2023).
91
See Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 119 (Del. 2006); see 8 Del. C.
§ 220.
92
8 Del. C. § 220(b). Disney does not dispute that the demand complied with Section
220’s form and manner requirements. PTO ¶ 25.
93
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., 681 A.2d 1026, 1028 (Del. 1996).
94
Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 2020 WL 132752, at *6
(Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020) (quoting Thomas & Betts, 681 A.2d at 1035), aff’d, 243 A.3d 417
(Del. 2020).

18
A. Whether the Stated Purposes Are the Plaintiff’s Purposes

The “propriety of the stockholder’s purpose” is the “paramount factor in

determining whether a stockholder is entitled to inspection of corporate books and

records.”95 Section 220 defines a proper purpose as one “reasonably related to such

person’s interest as a stockholder.”96 In rare circumstances, a defendant can prove

that a stockholder lacks a proper purpose where “the purposes for the inspection

belong to [the stockholder’s counsel]” rather than the stockholder himself.97 Disney

has prevailed in making that showing here.

Simeone testified that he did not consider pursuing litigation or making an

inspection demand after learning about HB 1557.98 His reaction to Disney’s

opposition to HB 1557 and the subsequent legislation rescinding the RCID was

concern that his property tax bill would increase.99 Simeone was later “contacted by

95
CM & M Grp., Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792 (Del. 1982).
96
8 Del. C. § 220(b).
97
Wilkinson v. A. Schulman, Inc., 2017 WL 5289553, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2017)
(explaining that although “[a] stockholder obviously can use counsel to seek books and
records,” the purposes for inspection must be the stockholder’s own “actual purposes”
rather than “counsel’s purposes”); see also Pershing Square, L.P. v. Ceridian Corp., 923
A.2d 810, 817 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A corporate defendant may resist demand where it shows
that the stockholder’s stated proper purpose is not the actual purpose for the demand.”);
Sutherland v. Dardanelle Timber Co., 2006 WL 1451531, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 16, 2006)
(“A defendant facing a Section 220 action may resist that demand by showing that the
plaintiff’s purpose, although a valid one, is not the actual purpose. In other words, the
defendant may try to show that the plaintiff has pursued its claim under false pretenses.”).
98
Pl.’s Dep. 38.
99
Id. at 24-26.

19
a lawyer” in his family—Brian McCall—who knew he was a Disney stockholder

and solicited him to serve a demand.100 After speaking to McCall, Simeone was

contacted by Paul Jonna.101 Jonna is Special Counsel to the Thomas More Society,

a “public interest law firm championing Life, Family, and Freedom.”102 The

plaintiff’s verified interrogatory response states that the Thomas More Society is

advancing costs for this litigation.103

The purposes stated in the demand are pretextual.104 Simeone testified that

his only purpose for inspection was to “know the person or persons who were

responsible for making th[e] political decision” at Disney to publicly oppose

HB 1557.105 He said that he “hope[s] it becomes public and the other shareholders

find out about” these identities.106 He confirmed that he has no other purpose.107

100
Id. at 26, 31-38; see JX 39; JX 40.
101
Pl.’s Dep. 35-36. Simeone assumes that McCall gave Jonna his contact information.
Id.
102
Thomas More Society, https://thomasmoresociety.org (last visited June 25, 2023); see
JX 38.
103
JX 45 at 2.
104
Wilkinson, 2017 WL 5289553, at *3 (concluding that a stockholder’s stated purposes
were pretextual where his counsel sought “to investigate different issues than what
motivated the stockholder to respond to the law firm’s solicitation”).
105
Pl.’s Dep. 40-42.
106
Id.
107
Id. (“Q: So is that the piece of information that you are seeking through this case, who
made the decision? A: Yes, the persons that made the decisions. Q: Is there any other
information that you believe you need as part of this litigation? A: No.”). Even if
identifying decision makers were a proper purpose, this information was already produced
20
The only evidence indicating that the purposes listed in the demand might belong to

Simeone is the testimony his counsel elicited through leading redirect questions.108

The plaintiff’s limited and non-substantive involvement in the demand and

litigation further reveals the lawyer-driven nature of this action.109 Simeone testified

that he could not recall reading a draft of the demand before it was sent to Disney.110

He reviewed but made no edits to the Complaint.111 He did not see the news articles

proffered as evidence in support of his claim.112

The plaintiff’s counsel and the Thomas More Society are entitled to their

beliefs. They are also entitled to pursue litigation in support of those beliefs. But a

Section 220 suit, which is designed to address the plaintiff’s interests as a

stockholder, is not a vehicle to advance them.113

to the plaintiff. JX 24 at ‘051-52 (stating that Chapek and Morrell “led a discussion with
the Board members” and listing the directors and officers in attendance at the meeting).
The identities of those involved in Disney’s opposition of HB 1557 were publicized when
the plaintiff filed an unredacted version of the Complaint. Dkt. 3 ¶ 36.
108
See Pl.’s Dep. 67-69. I give the testimony provided in response to these leading
questions no weight.
109
See Wilkinson, 2017 WL 5289553, at *3.
110
Pl.’s Dep. 43.
111
Id. at 43-44.
112
Id. at 48-49.
113
See Berkowitz v. Legal Sea Foods, Inc., 1997 WL 153815, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24,
1997) (discussing the impropriety of a personal purpose for Section 220 inspection); Lynn
v. EnviroSource, Inc., 1991 WL 80242, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 13, 1991) (denying an
inspection request because the plaintiff’s stated purpose was not of general interest to
stockholders).

21
B. Whether the Plaintiff Has Demonstrated a Proper Purpose

The plaintiff’s demand identifies four purposes; all center around the same

desire to investigate wrongdoing. The second and fourth purposes—to determine

whether Disney’s opposition to HB 1557 was harmful to the company and to

“explore possible remedial measures”114—are derivative of and dependent upon

whether there was mismanagement in the first place. The third purpose of assessing

the impartiality of the Board if presented with a litigation demand—though proper

in the abstract115—similarly focuses on whether the Board is interested in the alleged

underlying wrongdoing.116 Consequently, I focus on the first stated purpose: “[t]o

investigate potential wrongdoing, mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duties

. . . in connection with the Company’s decision to publicly oppose the Parental

Rights Act.”117

114
JX 19 at 4.
115
See In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., 2019 WL 2320842, at *16 (Del. Ch. May
30, 2019), as revised (May 31, 2019).
116
No additional conflicts are described in the demand. See Okla. Firefighters Pension &
Ret. Sys. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2022 WL 1760618, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 1, 2022) (stating
that a stockholder plaintiff seeking documents about director independence “must give the
court credible grounds to justify an inspection”); Hoeller v. Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc., 2019
WL 551318, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2019); cf. Paul v. China MediaExpress Hldgs., Inc.,
2012 WL 28818, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2012) (finding that a stockholder could obtain
books and records for the purpose of investigating whether the board could impartially
consider a demand because the stockholder set forth a credible basis to infer waste or
mismanagement).
117
JX 19 at 4.

22
“It is well established that a stockholder’s desire to investigate wrongdoing or

mismanagement is a ‘proper purpose.’”118 But “a bare allegation of possible waste,

mismanagement, or breach of fiduciary duty, without more, will not entitle a

stockholder to a Section 220 inspection.”119 “[A] stockholder seeking to investigate

wrongdoing must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis from

which the court can infer there is ‘possible mismanagement as would warrant further

investigation.’”120 This burden, though the lowest standard of proof in our law, is

neither “a formality”121 nor “inconsequential.”122 A stockholder must present “some

evidence to suggest a credible basis for wrongdoing.”123 Simeone has failed to do so.

The plaintiff’s theory is that Disney’s “decision to express public opposition”

to HB 1557 despite “the [G]overnor’s warning” amounts to a possible breach of

118
Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 121.
119
AmerisourceBergen, 243 A.3d at 426.
120
Id. (quoting Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 568 (Del.
1997)).
121
Haque v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 2017 WL 448594, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2017).
122
Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *6; see also Sec. First, 687 A.2d at 568 (“The
threshold for a plaintiff in a Section 220 case is not insubstantial.”).
123
Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 119; see Sec. First, 687 A.2d at 568 (“There must be some
evidence of possible mismanagement as would warrant further investigation of the matter.”
(quoting Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 525 A.2d 160, 166 (Del.
Ch. 1987))); Norfolk Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 2009 WL 353746, at
*6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2009) (explaining that a stockholder need not “prove mismanagement
actually occurred, but must make ‘a credible showing, through documents, logic, testimony
or otherwise, that there are legitimate issues of wrongdoing’” (quoting Sec. First, 687 A.2d
at 568)).

23
fiduciary duty by the Board and certain Disney officers.124 As a result of these

actions, the plaintiff avers that Disney lost (or at least risked the loss of) rights and

powers associated with the RCID.125 He alleges that Disney’s stock price dropped

and that Disney “continues to suffer” financial harm because of its “aggressive

position” on HB 1557.126

The plaintiff is not describing potential wrongdoing. He is critiquing a

business decision.127 “A stockholder cannot obtain books and records simply

124
Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. The plaintiff’s pre-trial brief suggests that he may also be interested in
investigating corporate waste. This request was not raised in the demand or the Complaint.
Had it been fairly presented, the argument would still fail because the plaintiff does not
state anywhere in the record that Disney transferred a corporate asset of value for
unreasonably small consideration. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)
(defining waste under Delaware law as “an exchange of corporate assets for consideration
so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might
be willing to trade”).
125
Compl. ¶¶ 1-2; JX 19 at 4-5.
126
Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25. No evidence is cited to support the plaintiff’s conjecture that Disney’s
stock price suffered because of its public stance on HB 1557. See Pl.’s Dep. 15-18. The
only analyst report cited in the Complaint attributes Disney’s decline in stock price to other
factors, including losses from the Disney+ steaming service and a general sector decline
across the media and entertainment industry. Compl. ¶ 22 (citing JX 26). The drop in
stock price alone is an insufficient basis from which wrongdoing can be inferred. See City
of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., 2009 WL 3086537, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 28, 2009) (stating that a plaintiff “must point the court to something other than a
precipitous drop in stock price before Section 220 inspection rights may be granted”), aff’d,
1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010).
127
Pl.’s Dep. 64 (“Q. Okay. So your view is the company and its executives and officers
used poor judgment in making this business decision to speak on this bill? A. Yes.”).

24
because the stockholder disagrees with a board decision, even if the decision turned

out poorly in hindsight.”128

Although choosing to speak (or not speak) on public policy issues is an

ordinary business decision, this case exemplifies the challenges a corporation faces

when addressing divisive topics—particularly ones external to its business.129

Individual investors have diverse interests—beyond their shared goal of corporate

profitability—and viewpoints that may not align with the company’s position on

political, religious, or social matters. Yet stockholders invest with the understanding

that the board is empowered to direct the corporation’s affairs.130 The board may

128
AmerisourceBergen, 2020 WL 132752, at *9; see also Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 120 (“The
Court of Chancery properly noted that a disagreement with the business judgment of [the
defendant’s] board of directors . . . is not evidence of wrongdoing and did not satisfy [the
plaintiff’s] burden under section 220.”); Deephaven Risk Arb Trading Ltd. v.
UnitedGlobalCom, Inc., 2005 WL 1713067, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jul. 13, 2005) (“Stockholders
cannot satisfy this burden merely by expressing a suspicion of wrongdoing or a
disagreement with a business decision.”); Hoeller, 2019 WL 551318, at *10
(“Disagreement with a business decision, in the absence of evidence from which the Court
may infer a possible breach of fiduciary duty, does not create a credible basis from which
the Court can infer mismanagement.” (quoting Marathon P’rs, L.P. v. M&F Worldwide
Corp., 2004 WL 1728604, at *7 n.40 (Del. Ch. Jul. 30, 2004))); High River Ltd. P’ship v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 2019 WL 6040285, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2019)
(“[D]isagreeing with a board’s business judgment, without more, is not enough to provide
a credible basis to infer mismanagement.”).
129
See generally Elizabeth Pollman, The Making and Meaning of ESG 1 (U. Pa. Carey L.
Sch. Inst. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 22-23), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=4219857 (describing the “notable trend” of “integrating ‘environmental,
social, and governance’ issues” into corporate governance as one of “the largest and most
contentious debates in contemporary corporate and securities law”).
130
See 8 Del. C. § 141(a). Disney stockholders were on notice that the company would
engage in political speech: “[Disney] believes that active participation in the political life
of the communities in which we do business is in the best interest of the Company and its
25
delegate implementation to management, but it alone bears the ultimate

responsibility for establishing corporate policy.131

Far from suggesting wrongdoing, the evidence here indicates that the Board

actively engaged in setting the tone for Disney’s response to HB 1557.132 The Board

did not abdicate its duties or allow management’s personal views to dictate Disney’s

response to the legislation. Rather, it held the sort of deliberations that a board

should undertake when the corporation’s voice is used on matters of social

significance.133

shareholders. As a result, we participate in public policy debates on many issues to support
the Company’s positions.” JX 24 at ‘072; see The Walt Disney Company, Political Giving
and Participation in the Formulation of Public Policy in the United States at 1 (July 2020),
https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/app/uploads/2020/07/Political-Giving-and-
Participation-in-the-Formulation-of-Public-Policy-2020.pdf.
131
See Grimes v. Donald, 1995 WL 54441, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1995) (“The board may
not either formally or effectively abdicate its statutory power and its fiduciary duty to
manage or direct the management of the business and affairs of th[e] corporation.”), aff’d,
673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996).
132
See supra notes 18-20 & 28-30 and accompanying text.
133
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Good Corporate Citizenship We Can All Get Behind? Toward a
Principled, Non-Ideological Approach to Making Money the Right Way, 78 Bus. Law. 329,
366 (2023) (“If the company purports to take positions on external public policy, its
positions should result from a deliberative process of the board of directors based on the
direct relevance of the policy question to the company, and not just reflect the personal
view of the CEO without board backing.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 87-89, 101-102 (2010)
(observing that existing law treats “a corporation’s decision to engage in political speech
[a]s governed by the same rules as ordinary business decisions” and advocating for
additional protections, such as requiring independent directors to approve or oversee
decisions about corporate political speech given the potential for diverging interests vis-à-
vis stockholders).

26
As Chapek told stockholders during Disney’s 2022 annual meeting, the

company’s original approach to HB 1557 “didn’t quite get the job done.”134 The

company, facing widespread backlash from its staff and creative talent, changed

course after the full Board held a special meeting about “Political Engagement and

Communications.”135 The Board discussed “the communications plan, philosophy

and approach regarding Florida legislation and employee response.”136 Only then

did Chapek announce that Disney opposed the bill.137

The Board’s consideration of employee concerns was not, as the plaintiff

suggests, at the expense of stockholders. A board may conclude in the exercise of

its business judgment that addressing interests of corporate stakeholders—such as

the workforce that drives a company’s profits—is “rationally related” to building

long-term value.138 Indeed, the plaintiff acknowledges that maintaining a positive

134
JX 10.
135
JX 24 at ‘052-055.
136
Id. at ‘052 (noting that Chapek responded to questions from the Board about the topic).
The Board discussed the issue again on March 9 after Chapek announced Disney’s
opposition to HB 1557. Id. at ‘055 (reflecting that the Board members made comments
and asked questions).
137
See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
138
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“A
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”); see also
Paramount Commc’ns v. Time, Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (noting
that though the record suggested directors acted out of concern “for the larger role of the
enterprise in society,” there was an “insufficient basis to suppose . . . that such concerns
ha[d] caused the directors to sacrifice or ignore their duty to seek to maximize in the long
27
relationship with employees and creative partners is crucial to Disney’s success.139

It is not for this court to “question rational judgments about how promoting non-

stockholder interests—be it through making a charitable contribution, paying

employees higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms like promoting a

particular corporate culture—ultimately promote stockholder value.”140

The plaintiff has not put forth any legitimate basis to question the Board’s

impartiality in responding to the legislation.141 He argues that Disney’s directors

were motivated by personal beliefs because “several Board members are actively

involved with ‘political organizations such as the Human Rights Campaign’” that

“adamantly opposed” HB 1557.142 That some directors may be involved with a non-

run financial returns to the corporation and its stockholders”), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989); Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“[D]irectors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a
corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment horizon.”); In
re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he duty of loyalty . . .
mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the
benefit of [stockholders].”); Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in
2020? The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 Bus. Law. 364, 379 (2021) (“[I]n
managing the business, the board of directors may consider the interests of other
stakeholders, so long as there is some ‘rational relation’ to shareholder value.”).
139
Pl.’s Dep. 26-28, 46-47.
140
eBay Domestic Hldgs., Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
141
Cf. Inter-Local Pension Fund GCC/IBT v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 2019 WL 479082, at
*11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2019) (concluding that the plaintiff had put forward a credible basis
to investigate potential wrongdoing, despite the fact that a single-bidder process “may be
within the ambit of reasonable Board determinations for a merger,” because the plaintiff
“sufficiently portray[ed]” the process as “infected and spurred by self-interest and
conflicts”).
142
Compl. ¶ 38 (quoting JX 19 at 4).

28
profit organization does not itself create a conflict of interest—much less undermine

the full Board’s deliberative process. In any event, there are no facts in the record

to infer that the directors’ personal beliefs caused them to act contrary to the interests

of Disney and its stockholders.143 The plaintiff cannot obtain books and records to

search for hypothetical conflicts.144

I also find deficient the plaintiff’s argument that the Board “ignored a known

risk” of negative consequences from opposing the legislation.145 Perhaps the Board

could have avoided political blowback by remaining silent on HB 1557. At the same

time, doing so could have damaged the company’s corporate culture and employee

143
Disney’s initial silence also undercuts the plaintiff’s theory. So does the plaintiff’s own
testimony that he has no reason to believe any Board member (including Chapek) acted
out of self-interest when Disney made comments about HB 1557. Pl.’s Dep. 63.
144
The plaintiff seeks director independence questionnaires to “determine whether any
Disney [d]irector is beholden to an outside organization that might influence that director
to oppose legislation, when the result of that opposition would be detrimental to Disney
and its stockholders.” Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. (Dkt. 18) at 30. But “[c]uriosity is an
insufficient reason to grant stockholders access to documents—particularly those that
might include personal information about topics such as a director’s finances or family.”
Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *10; see Hoeller, 2019 WL 551318, at *9 (explaining
that where a “demand seeks information regarding board interest or conflicts and yet
nothing he has presented by way of evidence (or argument) provides a credible basis to
suspect that [] fiduciaries were conflicted,” the request will be denied); see also Seinfeld,
909 A.2d at 120 (stating that inspection is not appropriate where the demand is made
“merely on the basis of suspicion or curiosity”).
145
Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. 26.

29
morale. The weighing of these key risks by disinterested fiduciaries does not

evidence a potential lack of due care, let alone bad faith.146

Moreover, even if a board’s defiance of a political threat could provide a

credible basis to suspect wrongdoing, there is no factual support for that conclusion

here.147 Neither the Complaint nor any of the sources relied on by the plaintiff

demonstrate that Disney was warned of financial repercussions or dissolution of the

RCID before Chapek’s March 9 announcement.148 According to the Complaint, it

was not until March 30—three weeks after Disney first publicly opposed HB 1557

and two days after its March 28 statement—that the specter of dissolving the RCID

was explicitly raised.149

146
See Hoeller, 2019 WL 551318, at *10 (“When a business decision or strategy forms the
basis of a Section 220 demand, and the stockholder proffers as his purpose for inspection
a desire to investigate a possible breach of the duty of care, he must present some credible
basis to suspect that the corporation’s fiduciaries acted with gross negligence. And a poorly
formulated or executed . . . strategy, without more, does not a gross negligence claim
make.”).
147
See Matthes v. Checkers Drive-in Rests., Inc., 2001 WL 337865, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar.
28, 2001) (denying inspection where the plaintiff’s assertions of wrongdoing were “without
factual support”).
148
The threats during this earlier period were vague. See supra notes 26 & 53 and
accompanying text.
149
Compl. ¶¶ 13-14; see supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also JX 18 (reflecting
that Disney was told public opposition would “not . . . work out well”); JX 48 at 191, 194,
199 (suggesting that Disney was encouraged to stay silent and was ultimately blindsided
by legislation to repeal the RCIA).

30
At bottom, the plaintiff disagrees with Disney’s opposition to HB 1557.150 He

has every right to do so. But “disagreement with [a] business judgment” is not

“evidence of wrongdoing” warranting a Section 220 inspection.151 Such an

inspection would not be reasonably related to the plaintiff’s interests as a Disney

stockholder; it would intrude upon the “rights of directors to manage the business of

the corporation without undue interference.”152

C. Whether the Plaintiff Has Proven He Lacks Essential Information

Even if the plaintiff had demonstrated a proper purpose, no further inspection

would be warranted. The plaintiff has not met his “burden of proving that the

150
See Pl.’s Dep. 31 (“Q: So at bottom what it boils down to is you disagree with Disney’s
decision to speak about HB 1557 because you believe that was not in the best interest of
stockholders? A: Correct, yes.”).
151
Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 120; see supra note 128 (citing cases).
152
Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 122 (“The evolution of Delaware’s jurisprudence in section 220
actions reflects judicial efforts to maintain a proper balance between the rights of
shareholders to obtain information based upon credible allegations of corporation
mismanagement and the rights of directors to manage the business of the corporation
without undue interference from stockholders.”); see also Hoeller, 2019 WL 551318, at *1
(“The right to inspection is qualified out of considerations that are practical rather than
equitable; if a stockholder were permitted to inspect records . . . to satisfy a desire to oversee
matters properly within the province of corporate management or the corporate board, a
considerable expense and distraction would be foisted upon the company . . . with likely
little value in return.”); Everett v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 1996 WL 32171, at *5-6 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 19, 1996) (rejecting demands to investigate business judgments where the plaintiff
failed to present a credible basis from which the court could infer waste or
mismanagement).

31
information [in the records sought] is essential to that purpose, taking into account

the books and records [the company] has previously furnished.”153

“Formal board-level documents are often the beginning and end of a

Section 220 production where a plaintiff aims to investigate” potential

mismanagement.154 Disney has repeatedly represented that it produced all

Board-level materials related to HB 1557, Disney’s response to the legislation, the

potential loss or modification of the RCID, and Disney’s policies on charitable and

political giving.155 Still, the plaintiff maintains that he needs three years of email

and correspondence “between and among Board members and CEO Chapek” about

the same topics.156

The Delaware Supreme Court has instructed that “the Court of Chancery

should not order emails to be produced when other materials (e.g., traditional

board-level materials, such as minutes) would accomplish the petitioner’s proper

153
Espinoza v. Hewlett Packard Co., 32 A.3d 365, 372 (Del. 2011).
154
Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *13; see also Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc.,
132 A.3d 752, 790 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“The starting point—and often the ending point—for
a sufficient inspection will be board level documents evidencing the directors’ decisions
and deliberations, as well as the materials that the directors received and considered.”),
abrogated on other grounds by Tiger v. Boast Apparel, Inc., 214 A.3d 933 (Del. 2019).
155
See Def.’s Pre-trial Opening Br. (Dkt. 17) at 15-16, 32-34; Def.’s Pre-trial Answering
Br. (Dkt. 23) at 15.
156
Pl.’s Pre-trial Opening Br. 30. As previously discussed, the plaintiff has not
demonstrated his entitlement to director questionnaires. See supra note 144 and
accompanying text.

32
purpose.”157 A deviation from this typical approach is not merited here. The Board

maintained formal records of its actions, and the relevant records were provided to

the plaintiff.158

The request for three years of documents is also “vastly overbroad.”159 The

plaintiff wishes to investigate Disney’s response to one piece of legislation that was

introduced and passed in 2022. That aside, the point is moot. Disney has confirmed

that no other Board-level documents on these subjects exist.160

The plaintiff also contends that Disney’s production is incomplete because the

Board minutes it produced were redacted.161 The parties agreed that Disney could

redact portions of documents that were not responsive to the demand.162 Irrespective

157
KT4 P’rs LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 752-53 (Del. 2019).
158
See id. at 758 (explaining that the production of email in a Section 220 action may be
appropriate where the company “conducts formal corporate business without documenting
its actions in minutes and board resolutions or other formal means”); see also In re Plains
All Am. Pipeline, L.P., 2017 WL 6016570, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2017) (declining to order
the production of emails because board-level materials were sufficient to establish that the
board was informed of the relevant facts); Sec. First, 687 A.2d at 570 (noting that Section
220 actions “are not the same and should not be confused” with Rule 34 discovery
requests).
159
Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *13 (concluding that a request for records spanning
a period more than three times longer than the events at issue was “vastly overbroad”).
160
See Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., 2001 WL 1334182, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct.
19, 2001) (“[I]f the records to which the Court has found the Plaintiffs are entitled do not
exist, the Defendant has no duty to do the impossible.”).
161
Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. 14-15, 31-32.
162
PTO ¶¶ 13-14.

33
of this agreement, irrelevant information cannot be “essential” to the purpose of the

demand.163

Disney’s redactions for responsiveness covered text that was also withheld as

attorney-client privileged. At the plaintiff’s request, Disney provided a log detailing

its privilege redactions.164 This privilege log not only substantiates Disney’s

privilege assertions. It also reflects that the redacted entries concern irrelevant

matters: discussions about stockholder correspondence, ongoing litigation or

regulatory matters that predate the passage of HB 1557, or privileged discussions

concerning the directors’ duties and rules as a general matter.165

163
Espinoza, 32 A.3d at 371-72; see Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *13
(“[R]edactions to material unrelated to the subject matter of a demand are proper because
Section 220 only entitles a stockholder to information essential to accomplishing its stated
purposes for inspection.”); Plains All Am. Pipeline, 2017 WL 6016570, at *1 (permitting a
defendant to redact non-responsive information from a Section 220 production); see also
Def.’s Answering Pre-trial Br. 17 n.4 (“To be clear, the redacted content concerns other
issues that the Board addressed during its meetings that had nothing to do with HB 1557.”).
The plaintiff argues that Disney should produce unredacted versions of the minutes because
the minutes reference Disney’s “approach to Florida legislation.” JX 24 at ‘055. Board
minutes routinely cover a variety of topics. A stockholder is not permitted to review
information about every subject discussed during a board meeting just because one portion
of the minutes covers a topic relevant to the stockholder’s demand.
164
See JX 44.
165
Id. Because the material is irrelevant, the plaintiff’s reliance on the Garner doctrine is
misplaced. See Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. 31-32; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ind.
Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund IBEW, 95 A.3d 1264, 1279-80 (Del. 2014) (noting that
“the Court of Chancery properly first made the predicate Section 220 finding that the
privileged information was necessary and essential before it then applied the Garner
doctrine”); KT4 P’rs v. Palantir Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0177-JRS, at 6, 9-10 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 19, 2020) (TRANSCRIPT) (observing that a plaintiff must first establish that the
34
The plaintiff therefore has all necessary and essential information. He would

not be entitled to additional books and records had he prevailed on the other elements

of his claim.

D. Whether the Plaintiff May Depose a Disney Witness

Finally, the plaintiff asks that Disney be ordered to produce a Rule 30(b)(6)

deponent to testify about “what type of documents exist, where they are located, and

whether Disney is asserting any privilege.”166 He has not demonstrated why a

deposition would be proportionate to the needs of this case.167

“Books and records actions are not supposed to be sprawling, oxymoronic

lawsuits with extensive discovery.”168 “[T]he discovery obligation typically

confronted by the corporate defendant is relatively minimal” and “has been

described as ‘narrow in purpose and scope.’”169 A deposition of a corporate

material sought is necessary and essential to a proper purpose, and then show good cause
under the multi-factor Garner test).
166
Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. 34; see Dkt. 13.
167
See Giarratano v. L Brands, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0437-JRS, at 51-57 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22,
2020) (addressing the need for proportionality in discovery in a Section 220 action); cf.
Wal-Mart Stores, 95 A.3d at 1282-84 (discussing Rule 30(b)(6) depositions ordered by the
Court of Chancery pertaining to discovering the locations of documents that could reside
across multiple offices worldwide).
168
Palantir Techs., 203 A.3d at 754.
169
Ravenswood Inv. Co. LP v. Winmill & Co., Inc., 2013 WL 396178, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan.
31, 2013) (rejecting a plaintiff’s request to depose the defendant’s directors) (quoting U.S.
Die Casting and Dev. Co. v. Sec. First Corp., 1995 WL 301414, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28,
1995)); see Edward P. Welch et al., Mergers and Acquisitions Deal Litigation Under
Delaware Law § 7.01[J][2], at 7-43 to 7-45 (Supp. 2022-2).

35
representative in a books and records action is not a matter of right.170 It is

particularly uncalled for in this case since the plaintiff did not prove a proper

purpose.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, I decline to grant the plaintiff’s request for a

further inspection of Disney books and records. Judgment will be entered for the

defendant.

170
See N. Gold Hldgs., LLC v. REM EQ Hldgs., LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0308-LWW, 2022
WL 4220426, at cmts. (Del.Ch. Sep. 12, 2022) (ORDER) (rejecting a request for a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition where the plaintiff had “not articulated a present need for a deposition
on what documents exist” given the company’s offer to produce responsive materials).

36