Larry Stercula v. Violet Wengert, Bruce Heimbach, Beth Anne Roberts, & Jay K Wilson

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
DAVID HUME, IV COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE
MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY 34 THE CIRCLE
GEORGETOWN, DE 19947

Report: February 27, 2026
Date Submitted: January 15, 2026

John S. Whitelaw, Esquire Dean A. Campbell, Esquire
100 W. 10th St., Suite 801 703 Chestnut St.
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Milton, Delaware 19968
Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendants Wengert and
Heimbach

Richard Berl, Esquire
309 Rehoboth Avenue
Rehoboth Beach, Delaware 19971
Attorney for Defendant Wilson

RE: Larry Stercula v. Violet Wengert, Bruce Heimbach and Jay K. Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667

Dear Counsel:

This is the Court’s decision on Plaintiff Larry Stercula’s action to recover real estate,

establish a constructive trust, and related relief.

I. BACKGROUND 1

1
The facts set forth herein were proven by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. Factual
citations are to: the Pre-Trial Stipulation and Order, D.I. 76 (“PTO”); the Draft Trial
Transcript (“Tr._”); Individual Trial Exhibits (cited by party name and exhibit number) and
Joint Trial Exhibits (cited by “JX” number). Additional citations are to Plaintiff’s Post-
Trial Opening Brief (POB), Defendants Wengert’s and Heimbach’s Post-Trial Opening
Brief (DOB-Wengert), Defendant Jay Wilson’s Post-Trial Opening Brief (DOB-Wilson),
Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Reply Brief (PRB), Defendants Wengert’s and Heimbach’s Post-Trial
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 2 of 19

Larry Stercula seeks return of real estate located at 12 Holly Leaf Drive,

Georgetown, Delaware (“the Property”), claiming that it was transferred via forged

deed. 2 He contends that his former paramour, Defendant Violet Wengert, conspired

with Defendant Bruce Heimbach to forge Stercula’s name on the deed when it was

transferred to Wengert in 2016. Stercula asserts that Wengert sold it to Defendant

Jay Wilson, an innocent purchaser, in 2019. He requests that proceeds from the sale

be placed in a constructive trust. Stercula contends that the sale to Wilson is void

ab initio because of the alleged deed forgery. Because I find that Plaintiff has not

proven that the deed was forged, I rule in favor of Defendants.

A. Stercula and Wengert Meet in Pennsylvania
Stercula lived in a home in Pottstown, Pennsylvania with his wife. 3 Wengert

was a friend of Stercula’s wife.4 Wengert and her two daughters moved in with

Stercula and his wife. 5 Stercula encountered challenges in his marriage, and he and

Reply Brief (DRB-Wengert), and Defendant Wilson’s Post-Trial Reply Brief (DRB-
Wilson).
2
Petition for Recovery of Real Estate Due to Forgery, For Constructive Trust, and for
Related Relief (“Pet.”). D.I. 1.
3
Tr. 6.
4
Id. 6:24.
5
Id. 7:4–9.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 3 of 19

his wife separated. 6 After his wife moved out, Stercula and Wengert became a

couple.7

B. Stercula and Wengert Purchase 12 Holly Leaf Drive

Stercula visited Delaware to fish for decades. 8 He decided it would be easier

to sell his home in Pennsylvania and move to Delaware rather than traveling on

weekends.9 In 2006, he purchased the property at 12 Holly Leaf Drive.10 Stercula

made a $40,000 down payment and had a $100,000 mortgage. 11 Stercula included

Wengert’s name on the deed and the mortgage. 12 The mortgage included a balloon

payment, so it would have to be refinanced within seven years to avoid the

payment.13 Stercula and Wengert split the mortgage payments and living

expenses. 14

6
Id. 8-9.
7
Id. 9:17–19.
8
Id. 10.
9
Id.
10
Id. 9–10.
11
Id. 11.
12
Id. 12; JX 1–2.
13
Id. 13.
14
Id. 12.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 4 of 19

C. Stercula Goes to Prison in 2010

Police arrested Stercula in 2010. 15 He left his wallet and identifying

documents at the Property.16 Stercula was convicted and sentenced to prison.17

While incarcerated, Stercula signed a Power of Attorney (POA) allowing Wengert

to refinance the Property.18 Wengert refinanced the Property with a $90,000

mortgage in 2013, signing the paperwork both personally and as Stercula’s agent

pursuant to the POA. 19 The promissory note for the refinancing lists Wengert’s

name as the sole borrower. 20 Wengert also spoke to Stercula about removing his

name from the deed to prevent them from losing the house if his victim’s family

sued him.21 Wengert never visited Stercula in prison. 22 After Stercula’s

15
Id. 15.
16
Id. 16.
17
Id. 16.
18
Id. 18–19.
19
JX 3.
20
Wengert Ex. 2.
21
Tr. 19.
22
Id. 17.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 5 of 19

incarceration, Wengert her allegations that he previously sexually abused her

daughters.23 He was released from incarceration in 2016.24

D. Stercula is Released from Prison in 2016 and 12 Holly Drive is
Conveyed from Stercula and Wengert to Wengert
Upon release from prison, Stercula went to a motel in Seaford, Delaware.25

Defendant Bruce Heimbach 26 visited him at the motel. 27 A deed dated March 14,

2016 transferred the Property from Stercula and Wengert to Wengert alone.28 The

document bears the purported signature of Stercula, as well as Defendant Bruce

Heimbach as a witness. 29

E. Stercula Never Returns to 12 Holly Leaf Drive.
Stercula never returned to the Property.30 Stercula moved from the Seaford

motel to two locations in Dover, Delaware, including the Dover Interfaith Mission.31

23
Tr. 155.
24
Id. 16.
25
Id. 21.
26
Heimbach was Wengert’s daughter’s boyfriend. Id. 29.
27
Id. 21–22.
28
JX 4.
29
Id.
30
Tr. 15:23-24.
31
Id. 26, 44.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 6 of 19

In May 2018, Stercula was re-arrested and returned to prison. 32 He was released

again in 2021. 33

F. Wengert Sells 12 Holly Leaf Drive to Wilson in 2019

Wengert sold 12 Holly Leaf Drive to Wilson on June 19, 2019 for $105,000.34

Wilson was a bona fide purchaser without notice. 35 Stercula received no money

from the sale.36 Stercula learned about the sale from his sister while he was

incarcerated in 2019. 37

II. ANALYSIS

I begin with the initial question presented by both sides: can Stercula prove

by clear and convincing evidence that his signature on the 2016 deed was forged?

This question must be answered in Plaintiff’s favor before I can consider the parties’

other arguments. As with a jury, when there is contradictory testimony, I should

32
Id. 27.
33
Id. 43–44.
34
JX 11, 13.
35
PTO § II(I).
36
Id. § II(B).
37
Tr. 44.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 7 of 19

make best efforts to make one harmonious story of it all. Mullin v. Ascetta, 2021

WL 4272063, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 20, 2021).

A. Wengert’s and Heimbach’s accounts of the deed transfer are more
reliable than Stercula’s.

1. Stercula’s testimony

The POA specifically granted Wengert the ability to execute documents

related to the sale and transfer of 12 Holly Leaf Drive. 38 Stercula testified that his

goal when he bought the house was to live there for the rest of his life. 39 He decided

not to go back to the house because it could “start trouble.”40

I found Stercula to be a fairly credible witness but significantly limited in his

ability to recall. Stercula suffered three strokes in 2022 resulting in memory issues.41

Stercula also admitted to being diagnosed with a form of dementia while

incarcerated from 2010 to 2016. 42 In 2019, Stercula wrote in a Superior Court filing

38
JX 15.
39
Tr. 25–26.
40
Id. 24:10-13.
41
Id. 49:18-23.
42
Id. 57.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 8 of 19

that he was “medically, mentally disabled.” 43 Stercula takes medication for his

memory.44

Stercula denied that he was concerned about losing the house to his victim’s

family because Wengert’s name was on the deed. 45 Despite reading the POA before

signing it, Stercula believed that it was limited and did not permit Wengert to sell

the house.46 This is wrong. The POA specifically contemplates sale and transfer of

the Property. 47 The POA states that Stercula makes Wengert his “true and lawful

Attorney-in-fact with the power and authority to act on [his] behalf, with respect to

the sale of the property known as 12 Holly Leaf Drive . . . .”48 Stercula believed that

the document presented in Court was missing a portion.49 Stercula had difficulty

remembering the POA that he signed.50 He testified, “I do regret it, you know, if

43
Wengert Ex. 1.
44
Tr. 56.
45
Id.19.
46
Id. 36–38.
47
JX 15.
48
Id.
49
Tr. 38–39.
50
Id. 36–40.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 9 of 19

this is all true,” referring to the Power of Attorney submitted during the trial.51 This

was indicative of Stercula’s failed memory.

I look to the surrounding facts to make sense of his testimony. When he was

arrested, Stercula left everything he owned at the Property, including his

identification and wallet.52 Stercula made no efforts to return to the house or have

anyone removed from it. 53 If Stercula did not intend to transfer the house to Wengert

and, instead, intended to retain the home himself, his actions are incongruous with

this alleged intent. After his release from prison, he did not return to the house even

though his wallet and other identification were there. Nor is there any indication

that he tried to pay the mortgage or inquired into how it was being paid. He lived in

a motel and several locations in Dover including the Dover Interfaith Mission.54

Although Stercula expressed discomfort with returning to the home in light of abuse

allegations involving Wengert’s daughters, he still fails to adequately explain his

abandonment of the property and failure to act as if he still owned the home. After

all, Stercula was essentially homeless after his release. Despite his claim at trial that,

51
Id. 40:1–2.
52
Id. 16.
53
Id. 42.
54
Id. 44.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 10 of 19

“I want my house back so I can die there,” 55 he took no steps to return to the property

or to withdraw his financial interest from it. It defies logic that he would act this

way if he believed he would one day again live in the house. The fact that he did

not have in-person or telephone contact with Wengert since his time in prison is also

indicative of a decision to move on from the property.56

2. Wengert’s testimony

Wengert has bias against Stercula because he allegedly abused her daughters.

Even so, she maintained contact with him for a time after he went to prison, including

putting money on his prison commissary account. 57 I found Wengert’s testimony to

be credible. She was unaware that the POA allowed her to sell the property. 58 This

is important because Wengert did not need to conspire to sell the property. Stercula’s

POA gave her the ability to sell the property at any time without his input. If

Wengert intended to steal the Property from Stercula, she already possessed legal

55
Id. 30.
56
Id. 41.
57
Id. 153–54.
58
Id. 141.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 11 of 19

power to obtain sole title to the property via the POA. The fact that she involved

Stercula in the 2016 deed buttresses her argument that Stercula agreed to have her

assume responsibility for the mortgage and the property. Her collaboration with

Stercula after executing the 2012 POA further indicates no intent to illicitly deprive

Stercula of lawful title.

Wengert learned via an application on her phone that Stercula was being

released from prison in 2016.59 Although there was no agreement to do so, Wengert

had the 2016 deed drawn up to remove Stercula’s name because she was paying the

mortgage.60 She was hoping he would sign the house over to her.61 Wengert made

the mortgage payments on the property from 2016 to 2019. 62 The attorney who

drafted the 2016 deed instructed Wengert that Stercula would have to sign off on the

deed. 63 Heimbach acted as a go-between to get the deed signed.

3. Heimbach’s testimony

59
Id. 140.
60
Id. 138, 148, 161.
61
Id. 148.
62
Id. 141–42.
63
Id. 161.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 12 of 19

Heimbach met Stercula at the motel in Seaford after his release. 64 Heimbach

provided Stercula with a check from Wengert and drove him to a bank where

Stercula deposited the check. 65 The parties diverge on what happened next. Stercula

testified that they returned to the hotel after the bank visit and Heimbach left.66

Heimbach says that after they returned, they discussed the drafted deed and Stercula

agreed to sign in order to avoid losing the home if they were sued.67 Heimbach

drove Stercula to the UPS store in Seaford where they both signed the deed and it

was notarized.68 Even considering Heimbach’s potential for bias based on his

relationship with Wengert’s daughter, I found his testimony credible.

A discrepancy present in the transaction is that the deed was signed and

notarized on March 14.69 The redemption check that Stercula deposited is dated

March 14, 2016, but the reverse side of the check appears to contain a deposit

date/time of March 17, 2016.70 Stercula argues that this discredits Heimbach’s

64
Id. 174.
65
Id.
66
Id. 23.
67
Id. 174.
68
Id. 175–76.
69
JX 4.
70
JX 7, Exemplar K-11.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 13 of 19

testimony because Heimbach testified that both the bank and UPS store visits

occurred the same day. 71 Defendants contend that Heimbach may have

misremembered the chain of events because they occurred almost 10 years ago. 72 I

note that the redemption check was not submitted as an independent exhibit. Rather,

it was part of the package of handwriting exemplars reviewed by Plaintiff’s

handwriting expert. No bank official testified about reasons for the difference

between the date on the front of the check, the alleged deposit date, and the date on

the back. Both Stercula and Heimbach have bias to testify as they did. Stercula

wanted his property back and Heimbach was aligned with Wengert. On balance, I

give more weight to Heimbach’s testimony because his recall at trial was superior

to Stercula’s.

B. The Handwriting Opinions
Both parties provided handwriting experts—Katherine Koppenhaver for the

Plaintiff and David Sexton for the Defendants. I find neither particularly helpful in

determining the authenticity of Stercula’s signature on the 2016 deed. The experts

produced reports that were introduced at trial. 73

71
POB 7–8.
72
DRB 2.
73
JX 6, 8.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 14 of 19

Koppenhaver opined that the signature on the 2016 deed74 was not Stercula’s.

Koppenhaver was cross-examined about an article she authored for the 2015

International Association of Document Examiners Journal where she explained

recommendations for proper handwriting analysis.75 First, the examiner should

obtain sufficient information about the subject to enable the examiner to draw

conclusions.76 She admitted to neither meeting nor interviewing Stercula about his

signature or the 2016 deed and knew nothing about him.77 Second, her article

recommended that an examiner have 20 to 25 reference signatures for comparison.78

Koppenhaver had 11 reference signatures in this case. Third, she wrote that the

compared documents should be similar in nature. 79 She admitted that the documents

in this case varied, including signatures on checks, court documents, and financial

documents.80 Fourth, she wrote that the examiner should request original exemplars

74
JX 4.
75
Ms. Koppenhaver founded the International Association of Document Examiners. Tr.
89-90.
76
Id. 98–99.
77
Id.
78
Id. 99.
79
Id. 101.
80
Id.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 15 of 19

for comparison. 81 She requested originals but none were provided. 82 Her article

reflects that photocopies may be used, but when using photocopies a “conditional

opinion” should be given.83 When asked about this at trial, she had the following

exchange:

Q: And so is this report of yours conditional?
A: It’s highly probable that the signature is not genuine.
Q: That’s not what I asked. I asked if this report of yours is conditional
or not.
A: Basically, in my mind it is, yes.
Q: So your testimony here today is conditional as well?
A: No. It is my professional opinion based upon the writing that I had
for comparison purposes.84

I give Koppenhaver’s opinion little weight. By her own standards she

possessed limited ability to make a finding of authenticity. She lacks the requisite

number and type of exemplars. None of the exemplars examined are original

documents. As she wrote in her article, use of photocopied exemplars requires a

conditional opinion. Yet she marched forward to an unconditional finding,

admitting that her report was conditional “in my mind” but that her testimony was

81
Id. 101–02.
82
Id.
83
Id. 102.
84
Id. 102:8–19.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 16 of 19

not conditional. It is illogical to derive an unconditional opinion from a conditional

report.

David Sexton, like Koppenhaver, testified that 20 to 25 handwriting

exemplars in the chronological period around the questioned signature were

needed. 85 He noted that only three or four exemplars were submitted around the

2016 time frame. Based on the lack of exemplars, Sexton found that it was

“impossible” to determine whether the questioned signature was authentic or a

forgery. 86 Sexton concluded that if he made a finding under the circumstances, “they

would run me out of town if I did this in the forensic document examination in the

community and made an identification based on three or four exemplars compared

to a sample signature.” 87 Where both experts coalesce is that they examined fewer

than an ideal number of exemplars necessary to render an opinion on the authenticity

of Stercula’s signature on the 2016 deed. Neither expert’s opinion was helpful in

determining authenticity.

C. The Notary Public Confirmed that She Notarized the Signatures
and Followed Standard Procedures

85
Id. 212, 220.
86
Id. 221, 228; JX 8.
87
Tr. 221:14-17.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 17 of 19

Laura Rogers was employed at the Seaford UPS store in 2016. 88 She was a

notary public concurrent with her employment in 2016.89 Although there were no

notarial recordkeeping requirements at the time, Rogers maintained her own

procedures.90 Those procedures required that all signers show identification and that

all signatures occur before her. 91 She made no exceptions. 92 She compared each ID

to the signer standing before her. 93 If a document was pre-signed, she required the

customer to retrieve a clean copy before she would notarize it.94 She was not familiar

with Stercula or Heimbach before their appearance in the UPS store.95 She

confirmed that the notarial signature on the 2016 deed was hers. 96

D. The Notarial Presumption
In Krapf v. Krapf, this Court adhered to the notarial presumption:

88
Id. 190.
89
Id. 191.
90
Id. 191–92.
91
Id.
92
Id. 193; see D.R.E. 406 (“Evidence of a person’s habit . . . may be admitted to prove that
on a particular occasion the person . . . acted in accordance with the habit or routine
practice.”).
93
Tr. 200.
94
Id. 193.
95
Id. 198.
96
Id. 194; JX 4. Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Opening Brief also conceded that Rogers
“undisputedly notarized” the 2016 deed. POB at 7.
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 18 of 19

An acknowledgment of a signature by a notary gives rise to a
presumption of the genuineness of that signature. This presumption
flows from a notary public’s duty, in making an acknowledgment, to
determine that the person who signs the document is the person whose
signature appears on the document.

2015 WL 230457 at *4 (Del Ch. Jan. 16, 2015) (citation omitted). I have found the

testimony of Wengert and Heimbach more credible and of greater value than

Stercula’s. Rogers followed her procedures, obtained identification from Heimbach

and Stercula, compared that identification to the people standing before her, and

watched them sign the 2016 deed. The signatures on the deed, including Stercula’s,

are presumed to be authentic. I do not find that Stercula has proven by clear and

convincing evidence that his signature was forged to overcome the notarial

presumption. Bradford v. Vinton, 153 A. 678, 682 (Del. Ch. 1930).

Based on my trial assessment of the parties’ credibility and ability to recall, I

have found the Defendants’ testimony more reliable. Even if I discount the parties’

contradictory testimony and the lack of reliable expert handwriting opinions on

Stercula’s signature authenticity, the notarial presumption carries the day. The

signatures are presumed to be genuine. Plaintiff has failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that his signature was a forgery.

III. CONCLUSION
Stercula v. Wengert, Heimbach, and Wilson
C.A. No. 2022-0667-DH
February 27, 2026
Page 19 of 19

For the reasons explained above, I rule in favor of the Defendants. Having ruled

in Defendants’ favor, I find no bad faith or fraud on their part and do not award

Plaintiff attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff shall be responsible for all costs. This is a final

report under Court of Chancery Rule 144.

Sincerely,

/s/ David Hume, IV

David Hume, IV
Magistrate in Chancery

cc: All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)