In re Denzel W.

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In re Denzel W.

IN RE DENZEL W. ET AL.*
(AC 46612)
Suarez, Westbrook and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgments of the
trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
children. The court concluded that the mother had failed to achieve
such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that, within a reasonable time considering the ages and needs of the
children, she could assume a responsible position in their lives. The
mother began a relationship with the father of the children, T, in 2009,
and reported that domestic violence had occurred throughout the rela-
tionship and included both mental and physical abuse. The children had
been exposed to their parents’ intimate partner violence, including a
stabbing incident in which T stabbed the mother in the face, neck and
chest. Following the stabbing, T was arrested, and a full no contact
protective order was put in place with the mother as the protected
party. Although the protective order continued to be in effect, the mother
and T still had contact with each other, including over the phone while
T was incarcerated and while in the mother’s motor vehicle, which,
following a traffic stop, resulted in the arrest of both the mother and
T. The mother was also observed by family members with T in the
community. The mother denied that she had had any contact with T
since his release from prison. Following the removal of the children
from the mother’s care, the mother was provided with weekly visits.
During the visits, the mother struggled with the use of electronics and
the children’s behavioral needs, including allowing one child to play a
violent video game on her cell phone. The Department of Children and
Families referred the mother to a variety of services, and, although she
initially struggled with attendance, the mother did make some progress

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.
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In re Denzel W.
and appeared engaged in the sessions she attended. There were contin-
ued concerns, however, regarding the mother’s missed sessions, her
inconsistency, and her difficulty in managing her work schedule and the
children’s appointments. A licensed clinical psychologist, P, conducted
certain evaluations and explained that, although the mother had a gen-
eral understanding of child development and expectations for indepen-
dence, she had limitations regarding her ability to understand the chil-
dren’s emotional and psychological needs, as demonstrated by her
allowing one child to play the violent video game that depicted violence
and blood from the use of a knife. P opined that the mother failed to
recognize the instability in her romantic relationship that led to the
instability in the home for her children and that this lack of insight
would be detrimental to the children being in her care. P further opined
that the mother minimized how the intimate personal violence minimized
her strength as a parent, she failed to understand how T’s actions could
place her children at risk, and she continued to struggle to understand
how their cycle of violence over the years of their relationship created
a chaotic and hostile environment that was unsafe for her children. The
court concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination
of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests and
rendered judgments terminating her parental rights and appointing the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, as the children’s
statutory parent for the purpose of securing their adoption as expedi-
tiously as possible. Held:
1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial
court improperly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of personal
rehabilitation to her: although the mother referenced as evidence one
statement in the court’s memorandum of decision, namely, that she ‘‘has
not demonstrated that she is able to provide her children with a safe,
secure, and permanent home free from intimate personal violence at
the present time nor in the foreseeable future,’’ this court concluded,
upon reviewing the memorandum of decision as a whole, that the trial
court did not shift the burden of proving personal rehabilitation to the
mother and was aware of and applied the proper burden of proof that
required the petitioner to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the mother had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabili-
tation, as the court expressly stated that it had considered carefully,
inter alia, the criteria set forth in the General Statutes and the applicable
case law in granting the petitions to terminate parental rights on the
basis of the clear and convincing evidence; moreover, the petitioner
offered testimony from department social workers, a psychologist, and
police officers regarding the instances of intimate personal violence,
the mother’s efforts to continue and conceal her relationship with T,
even after he had stabbed her, her inability to maintain control and
meet the emotional needs of the children during visits, and her failure
to comply with requests to not bring her cell phone and allow her child
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In re Denzel W.
to play inappropriate video games during visits, and, on the basis of the
evidence presented by the petitioner, the court concluded that she had
met her burden with respect to the issue of failure to rehabilitate;
furthermore, the isolated use of the imprecise language that formed the
basis for the mother’s claim reflected the court’s rejection of the mother’s
evidence of personal rehabilitation only after it had determined that the
petitioner had met her burden.
2. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
improperly determined that she had failed to achieve such degree of
personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a
reasonable period of time and considering the ages and needs of the
children, she could assume a responsible position in the children’s lives:
there was sufficient evidence existing in the record to support the court’s
determination that the mother failed to rehabilitate as her continuing
efforts to maintain her relationship with T despite the significant history
of intimate partner violence, coupled with her efforts to conceal this
relationship from the department, her providers, and the police, sup-
ported the court’s conclusion that she had failed to address these issues,
which placed the children at risk of trauma, and that she would continue
to do so in the future; moreover, contrary to the mother’s argument,
the evidence reflected that the domestic violence issues had existed
consistently throughout the relationship, and that the mother had contin-
ued to prioritize and maintain her relationship with T despite its negative
effects on the children and the existence of a protective order.

Argued November 16, 2023—officially released May 9, 2024**

Procedural History

Petitions to terminate the respondents’ parental
rights with respect to their minor children, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex,
Child Protection Session at Middletown, and tried to
the court, Burgdorff, J.; judgments terminating the
respondents’ parental rights, from which the respon-
dent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
were Abhishek Mukund, assistant attorney general,
** May 9, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Denzel W.

and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

HARPER, J. The respondent mother, Stephanie B.,
appeals from the judgments of the trial court, rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating her parental rights with
respect to her minor children, Denzel W. and Ariel W.1
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improp-
erly (1) shifted the burden of proof on the issue of
personal rehabilitation to her and (2) determined that
she failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilita-
tion as would encourage the belief that, within a reason-
able period of time and considering the ages and needs
of the children, she could assume a responsible position
in the children’s lives. See General Statutes § 17a-112
(j) (3) (B). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.2
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our consideration of the respondent’s appeal.
The Department of Children and Families (department)
became involved with the family at issue, which is com-
prised of the respondent, the father Timothy W., and
their four children, in 2012.3 This involvement includes
fourteen referrals to the department’s Careline4 regard-
ing physical neglect of the children, an inability to meet
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the respondent father,
Timothy W., with respect to Denzel and Ariel. In addition to finding that he
had failed to rehabilitate, the court also determined that the petitioner
had proved abandonment as an additional ground to terminate Timothy’s
parental rights as to the two children. Because Timothy is not participating
in this appeal, we refer in this opinion to Stephanie as the respondent.
2
The attorney for the minor children has filed a statement adopting the
appellate brief of the petitioner. See Practice Book § 79a-6 (c).
3
In addition to Denzel and Ariel, the respondent and Timothy also have
two other children together, both of whom previously were adjudicated
neglected.
4
‘‘Careline is a department telephone service that mandatory reporters
and others may call to report suspected child abuse or neglect.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Anthony S., 218 Conn. App. 127, 136 n.9,
290 A.3d 901 (2023).
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In re Denzel W.

the basic needs of the children for supervision, the
children’s exposure to intimate partner violence
between the respondent and Timothy, and their expo-
sure to substance abuse by Timothy.5
On November 2, 2019, an incident of domestic vio-
lence occurred between the respondent and Timothy,
forming the basis for the department’s most recent
involvement with the family. ‘‘[The respondent]
reported that she has been stabbed by [Timothy] during
an argument while the children were present inside the
home. She sustained stab wounds to the face, neck,
and chest area. While the knife was imbedded in her
chest, [the respondent] checked on the children and
she followed [Timothy] outside at which time [Timothy]
pulled the knife out of her. [The respondent] called the
police to report the assault and then called the paternal
grandmother to come and care for the children. The
children reported hearing [the respondent and Timothy]
arguing but did not witness the assault. In her signed
statement to the police, [the respondent] reported that
[Timothy] had a knife and was threatening her, and
that he intentionally stabbed her with the knife. [The
department] was contacted by the police . . . [and the
children were removed] from the home. [Timothy] was
arrested . . . and a full no contact protective order
was put in place with [the respondent] as the protected
party. The protective order remains in place and does
not have an expiration date.’’
The petitioner filed neglect petitions as to all four
children on November 6, 2019, alleging that they were
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court noted that, on November
5

6, 2019, ex parte orders of temporary custody were filed with respect to
the parties’ other two children, and the orders were sustained on November
19, 2019. On July 8, 2021, the court approved the permanency plans for a
transfer of guardianship as to the parties’ other two children, and, approxi-
mately one month later, it granted the motion to transfer guardianship to
their maternal grandmother under six months of protective supervision,
which later was allowed to expire on February 19, 2022. These two children
are not the subject of this appeal.
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In re Denzel W.

denied proper care and attention and were permitted
to live under conditions, circumstances and/or associa-
tions injurious to their well-being. On that same date,
the petitioner also filed ex parte orders of temporary
custody. Ten days later, the court, Sanchez-Figueroa,
J., issued ex parte orders vesting temporary custody
of the children in the petitioner and ordered specific
steps for both the respondent and Timothy.6 Following
6
The respondent’s specific steps included the following: ‘‘[K]eep all
appointments set by or with [the department]; cooperate with [the depart-
ment’s] home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the children’s
court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; let [the department],
your attorney, and the attorney for the children know where you and the
children are at all times; take part in counseling and make progress toward
the identified treatment goals as to individual and family with the specific
goals creating and maintaining safe, stable, and nurturing home environment
free from domestic violence/criminal activity; address trauma history and
understand the impact on present functioning; understand the impact of
domestic violence on children; understand the danger that individuals pres-
ent to children and how to protect children from future abuse; identify your
own specific risk factors and develop a personalized plan for preventing
abuse in the future; do not get involved with the criminal justice system
and understand the current protective orders value and purpose; cooperate
with service providers recommended for parenting/individual/family coun-
seling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treat-
ment: New Horizons, IPV Fair; accept in-home support services referred by
[the department] and cooperate with them; cooperate with service providers
recommended for parenting/individual/family counseling, cooperate with
court-ordered evaluations or testing; sign releases allowing [the department]
to communicate with service providers to check on your attendance, cooper-
ation and progress towards identified goals, and for use in future proceedings
in this court. Sign the release within 30 days; sign releases allowing your
children’s attorney and guardian ad litem to review your children’s medical,
psychological, psychiatric and/or educational records; get and/or maintain
housing and a legal income; immediately let [the department] know about
any change in the makeup of the household to make sure the change does
not hurt the health and safety of the children; get and/or cooperate with
restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan approved
by [the department] to avoid more domestic violence incidents; attend and
complete an appropriate domestic violence program; not get involved with
the criminal justice system. Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation
or parole officer and follow your conditions of probation or parole; take
care of the children’s physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs,
including keeping the children’s appointments with their medical, psycholog-
ical, psychiatric, or educational providers; cooperate with the children’s
therapy; make all necessary childcare arrangements to make sure the chil-
dren are properly supervised and cared for by the appropriate caretakers;
keep the children in the State of Connecticut while the case is going on
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In re Denzel W.

a hearing, the court sustained the orders of temporary
custody on November 19, 2019.
Petitions to terminate the parental rights of the
respondent and Timothy as to Denzel and Ariel were
filed on September 9, 2021.7 As to the respondent, the
petitions alleged that, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)
(i), the two children previously had been adjudicated
neglected and the respondent had failed to achieve such
degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage
the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, given
the ages and needs of these two children, the respon-
dent could assume a responsible position in their lives.
A termination of parental rights trial was held on
February 21, 23 and 27, 2023. The court, Burgdorff, J.,
heard testimony from seven witnesses, including two
department social workers, the respondent’s therapist,
three members of law enforcement, and a court-
appointed psychologist. On April 19, 2023, the court
issued a comprehensive memorandum of decision in
which it terminated the parental rights of the respon-
dent and Timothy as to Denzel and Ariel. After setting
forth the procedural history and making the relevant
jurisdictional findings, the court initially observed that
it ‘‘has carefully considered the petitions, the criteria
set forth in the relevant Connecticut General Statutes,
unless you get permission from the [department] or the court to take them
out of state. You must get permission first. Visit the children as often as
[the department] permits; tell [the department] the names and addresses of
the grandparents of the children.’’
7
‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by § 17a-112.
. . . The [petitioner] . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must
allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds. . . . Subdivision
(3) of § 17a-112 (j) carefully sets out . . . [the] situations that, in the judg-
ment of the legislature, constitute countervailing interests sufficiently power-
ful to justify the termination of parental rights in the absence of consent.
. . . Because a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her child
is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly complied with before
termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ryder M., 211 Conn. App. 793, 806–807,
274 A.3d 218, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 931, 276 A.3d 433 (2022).
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the applicable case law as well as all of the evidence
and testimony presented, the demeanor of [the respon-
dent and Timothy], the demeanor and credibility of
the witnesses, the credibility of [the respondent’s and
Timothy’s] testimony, and the evaluation of their testi-
mony with all other testimony and documentary evi-
dence according to the standards required by law. The
court was able to clearly listen to and observe all of
the witnesses and determine the validity, cohesion, and
the credibility of their testimony. The court thoroughly
reviewed the documentary evidence. On the basis of
the clear and convincing evidence presented and for
the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of
the petitions and hereby terminates the parental rights
of the respondent . . . and . . . Timothy as to their
children, Ariel and Denzel, for the reasons stated in
detail [herein].’’
Relevant to the adjudicatory phase of the termination
proceeding,8 the court concluded, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the petitioner proved that the depart-
ment had used reasonable efforts to locate the respon-
dent and to reunify her with Denzel and Ariel prior to the
filing of the petitions to terminate her parental rights.9
8
‘‘Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights
consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 476
n.5, 308 A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024); see also
In re Tresin J., 334 Conn. 314, 322–23, 222 A.3d 83 (2019).
9
‘‘Section 17-112 (j) (1) provides in relevant part that the Superior Court
may grant a petition [for termination of parental rights] if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that . . . the [department] had made reasonable
efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent . . .
unless the court finds . . . that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit
from reunification efforts . . . . In construing that statutory language, our
Supreme Court has explained that [b]ecause the two clauses are separated
by the word unless, this statute plainly is written in the conjunctive. Accord-
ingly, the department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts
to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit
from reunification efforts. . . . [E]ither showing is sufficient to satisfy this
statutory element.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Autumn O., 218 Conn. App. 424, 432, 292 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 346
Conn. 1025, 294 A.3d 1026 (2023).
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In re Denzel W.

It further determined that she had failed to achieve the
degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage
the belief that, within a reasonable time considering the
ages and needs of Denzel and Ariel, she could assume
a responsible position in their lives. Specifically, the
court stated: ‘‘While [the respondent] attended and
engaged in her services, she has clearly failed to suffi-
ciently benefit from the services and attain sufficient
rehabilitation especially with regard to her long-stand-
ing domestic violence issues and ongoing voluntary
relationship with [Timothy] which includes violations
of the protective order. In addition, both [the respon-
dent and Timothy] are clearly unwilling and unable to
benefit from these reasonable efforts due to their failure
to address their longstanding intimate partner violence
issues which have placed Denzel and Ariel at risk. Sig-
nificantly, they have not achieved sufficient insight as
to their poor parenting skills and how their significant
history of personal violence has negatively impacted
the children. They have clearly put their own needs,
and their clear intention to maintain a relationship with
each other, over the safety, needs, and well-being of
Denzel and Ariel.’’
In support of its conclusions, the court made the
following relevant factual findings. The respondent’s
relationship with Timothy began in 2009, and they are
the biological parents of four children. The respondent
reported that domestic violence has occurred through-
out the relationship and included both mental and physi-
cal abuse. She further acknowledged that the children
have been exposed to intimate partner violence and
that it likely has contributed to their behavioral issues;
nonetheless, she stated that she and Timothy were
‘‘good parents.’’
Approximately eighteen months after the November
2, 2019 stabbing incident, the respondent ‘‘filed an
amended police report regarding the domestic assault
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In re Denzel W.

incident wherein she changed her statement and stated
that she had the knife in her possession prior to the
assault. She also stated that she did not believe that
[Timothy] intended to stab her or hurt her.’’ Further-
more, the department learned that the respondent and
Timothy were in contact with each other, in violation of
the protective order. Timothy was arrested in October,
2020, for violating the protective order as a result of
his contact with the respondent. ‘‘[The department] con-
firmed that [Timothy] called [the respondent] from his
place of incarceration and they engaged in subterfuge
to conceal their identities from prison staff. Telephone
records from the prison confirmed that [the respondent]
and [Timothy] were in contact with each other. They
discussed the pending [department] case in addition to
the domestic violence incident that led to [Timothy’s]
arrest in November, 2019, as well [as] plans on how
[the respondent] was to bail out [Timothy]. They also
discussed their ongoing commitment to one another.
[The respondent] has consistently and repeatedly
denied to [the department] that she has been in contact
with [Timothy].’’
Furthermore, both the respondent and Timothy were
arrested on May 25, 2021, following a traffic stop in
Hartford. Timothy was operating the respondent’s
motor vehicle, and she was a passenger. ‘‘[The respon-
dent] denied her identity to the police at least several
times during the stop and identified herself with her
sister’s name. [The respondent] was arrested for
interfering and resisting as a result of this incident and
a protective order was issued against [Timothy] with
[the respondent] as the protected party. She falsely
reported to the criminal court that she was not present
in the vehicle which led to the charges being dropped.
[The respondent] continued to lie about her presence
in the car to [the department] and her service providers,
as well as about her ongoing contact with [Timothy].
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In re Denzel W.

It was not until March, 2023, during her sworn testimony
at the trial of this matter that [the respondent] admitted
that she was in the car with [Timothy] on May 25, 2021.
In addition, [the respondent] repeatedly denied having
any contact with him or having a relationship with him
since that time nor having any contact with him at his
place of incarceration during 2019 to 2020, and most
recently in July, 2022, when she was observed by family
members with him in the community.’’
Pursuant to the court-ordered specific steps to facili-
tate the respondent’s reunification with Denzel and
Ariel, the department referred the respondent to a vari-
ety of services. During the period from 2018 to 2020, she
struggled with attendance, but did make some progress
and appeared engaged in the sessions she attended.
Despite her reports to her provider to the contrary, she
‘‘was continuing to remain in contact with [Timothy]
during his incarceration in violation of the full no con-
tact protective order. She also continued to minimize
the impact [that] the violence [in] their relationship
with each other had on the children. In addition, [the
respondent] has consistently told [the department] she
wanted [Timothy] to be part of the children’s lives.’’
From December, 2019, to July, 2020, the respondent
participated in and successfully completed a domestic
violence program. At the conclusion of the program,
the provider determined that the respondent’s ongoing
risk was low to moderate but cautioned that her risk
could increase to high if she engaged in contact with
Timothy ‘‘prior to completion of her treatment recom-
mendations and if she failed to demonstrate safe non-
abusive behaviors for at least six months.’’ The court
observed: ‘‘[I]n violation of her specific steps, [the
respondent] continued to remain in contact with [Timo-
thy] while he was incarcerated and while attending the
program.’’ The respondent also participated in individ-
ual therapy starting in 2020. The department ‘‘was not
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In re Denzel W.

able to determine if her treatment properly addressed
[her conduct with respect to the May 25, 2021 Hartford
arrest], or her ongoing voluntary contact with [Timo-
thy]’’ because the releases the respondent signed were
limited in nature. The respondent began another domes-
tic violence program in January, 2023, shortly before
the termination of parental rights trial.

Following the removal of the children in 2019, the
respondent was offered weekly in person and remote
visitation via video chats. Because of issues that arose
during these sessions, the department provided the
respondent with suggestions on how to engage the chil-
dren during the visits. ‘‘[Specifically, the respondent]
relied on the use of electronics, including her cell phone,
which negatively affected the children’s behavioral
needs and ability to maintain the children’s behavior
which often disrupted the visits. A notable concern was
[the respondent] permitting Denzel to play a violent
game on her phone . . . which depicted violence and
blood from the use of a knife. The game is rated for
children [thirteen] years of age and older. In addition,
[the respondent] brought a ‘fake’ knife to a visit for
Denzel. [The respondent] did not understand [the
department’s] concern in light of [Timothy’s] knife
attack on [the respondent] in 2019. [The respondent]
minimized the content of the game and reported that
Denzel had played the game since the age of three at
their home. In addition, [the respondent] attempted to
record the visits and interrogate the children at times
regarding the foster parents which caused the children
to feel conflicted and stressed. [The department]
instructed [the respondent] not to bring her phone to
the visits; however, she was observed using the phone
on at least several occasions thereafter. Another con-
cern was [the respondent] using her phone to allow
her and the children to converse with [Timothy] via
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In re Denzel W.

FaceTime on the phone during the visits.’’ The behav-
iors of Denzel and Ariel regressed before and after their
supervised visits with the respondent, including acting
out at school and having tantrums.
In August, 2020, the respondent continued to struggle
with her use of electronics and the children’s behavioral
needs during the visits. She would still bring her phone
to the visits despite being instructed not to, and she
would deny having done so. During the supervised visits
from September, 2020, to December, 2021, the respon-
dent ‘‘appeared overwhelmed and unorganized . . . .
She often struggled to assess the children’s emotional
needs and continued to struggle to recognize the impact
of the trauma and removal on the children. She also
struggled to incorporate the information she was pro-
vided during the sessions.’’ Concerns remained regard-
ing the respondent’s missed sessions, inconsistency,
and her difficulty in managing her work schedule and
the children’s appointments.
Ines M. Schroeder, a licensed clinical psychologist,
conducted a court-ordered evaluation of the respon-
dent, clinical interviews of the foster parents, develop-
mental screenings of Denzel and Ariel, interactional
evaluations between the respondent and the children,
and interactional evaluations between the children and
the foster parents. Schroeder contacted the respon-
dent’s service providers and reviewed the records pro-
vided by the court. In her evaluation, Schroeder noted
that the respondent ‘‘was hampered by her inability to
manage and process information well and react appro-
priately.’’ Schroeder explained that the respondent ‘‘felt
that she did not get the support she needed from [the
department] and that they ‘failed to help her’ and
expressed that ‘[t]hey are trying to break a family that
wants to be a family. We have a great bond. It does not
make sense to [terminate the parental relationship].’
[Schroeder] opined that this was concerning as this
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was an indication that [the respondent] was including
[Timothy] in the ‘family.’ She further noted that [the
respondent] had maintained a very long relationship
with [Timothy] despite her claim that he was manipula-
tive and hurtful, and that she was used to the cycle of
abuse in her relationships and that cycle was repeated
for her as an adult. She further opined that [the respon-
dent] . . . ‘does not believe that there are relationships
without the violence [and] emotional harm embedded.
. . . Sadly, [the respondent] failed [to] keep [the chil-
dren] in a safe, consistent, stable environment due to
the many changes where she lived, the intermittent
violence in her relationship with their father, and incon-
sistency in care. . . . Even with services provided to
[the respondent] about domestic violence and the
impact to [the] children . . . she still indicated she was
unsure how it affected them and felt that the behavioral
issues were the only concern.’ ’’
Next, the court stated that Schroeder had explained
that, although the respondent had a general understand-
ing of child development and expectations for indepen-
dence, ‘‘she had limitations regarding her ability to
understand their emotional and psychological needs as
demonstrated by her allowing Denzel to play a violent
video game which depicts intimate personal violence.
She noted that this suggests [a] lack of insight on [the
respondent’s] part and that [t]his would be detrimental
to the children to be in her care if she has a limited
ability to grasp the psychological impact of the trauma
to the children and ways to parent them effectively
while providing emotional support. Significantly,
[Schroeder] found that [the respondent] expressed that
her children were treated well and [were] never in
harm’s way. She felt she kept them safe and minimized
the incident when [Timothy] stabbed her with a knife
despite her descriptions [suggesting] she was covered
in blood and spoke to the children (with a knife sticking
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out of her) and left them inside alone. She also noted
that [the respondent] denied [that] the incident in
November, 2019, was an intentional act to her but acci-
dental in nature and that the potential for [Timothy]
to receive [twelve] years [of incarceration] due to the
charges seemed excessive. In addition, [the respondent]
reported that she and [Timothy] were strong parents
and that [Timothy] was a good parent because he was
willing to watch the children when she went to work.
[Schroeder] opined that [the respondent] failed to rec-
ognize the instability in her romantic relationship that
led to the instability in the home for her children and
this lack of insight would be detrimental to the children
[being] in her care. [Schroeder] further opined that [the
respondent] minimizes how the intimate personal vio-
lence minimized her strength as a parent and fails to
understand how [Timothy’s] actions can place her chil-
dren at risk; she continues to struggle to understand
how their cycle of violence over the years of their rela-
tionship created a chaotic and hostile environment that
was unsafe for her children. She remains defensive in
her posture and unable to successfully incorporate new
information offered across programs. Notably, with
regard to [the respondent’s] relationship with [Timo-
thy], [Schroeder] noted that [the respondent] denied
any contact with [Timothy] since his release from prison
and denied she was present . . . when they were
arrested in [the respondent’s] car in May, 2021.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.)

The court found, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the department had used reasonable efforts to
locate the respondent and that it had made reasonable
and ongoing efforts to reunify her with Denzel and Ariel
prior to the filing of the petitions. See General Statutes
§ 17a-112 (j) (1). Next, it concluded that neither parent
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had adequately or timely taken advantage of these ser-
vices.10
The court then turned to the question of the failure
to rehabilitate. See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B). It found that the petitioner had proved, by clear
10
Specifically, the court explained: ‘‘While [the respondent] attended and
engaged in her services, she has clearly failed to sufficiently benefit from
the services and attain sufficient rehabilitation especially with regard to her
long-standing domestic violence issues and ongoing voluntary relationship
with [Timothy], which includes violations of the protective order. In addition,
both [the respondent and Timothy] are clearly unwilling and unable to
benefit from these reasonable efforts due to their failure to address their
long-standing intimate partner violence issues which have placed Denzel
and Ariel at risk. Significantly, they have not achieved sufficient insight as
to their poor parenting skills and how their significant history of personal
violence has negatively impacted the children. They have clearly put their
own needs, and their clear intention to maintain a relationship with each
other, over the safety, needs and well-being of Denzel and Ariel.
‘‘As also discussed in detail [previously], [the respondent] was offered a
multitude of services which included case management, family team meet-
ings, counseling, exploration and assessment of family resources, parenting
services, individual therapy, intimate personal violence program, supervised
visitation, administrative case reviews, bus passes and transportation, foster
care services, [c]onsidered [r]emoval [f]amily [t]eam [m]eetings and referrals
for children’s therapy and education services. While she has attended most
of her supervised visits with the children, she struggled with maintaining
their behavior and allowed the children to converse with [Timothy] on [the
respondent’s] cell phone even after being instructed not to bring her phone
to the visits. This behavior during the visits clearly demonstrated her failure
to sufficiently engage in or benefit from her services with regard to her
intimate personal violence and parenting issues in a timely manner to the
extent that her children can safely return to her care. . . . In addition, [the
respondent] has consistently put her relationship with [Timothy] ahead of
her children’s needs. She has demonstrated a clear lack of insight as to the
risk her ongoing and voluntary relationship with [Timothy] has on the chil-
dren as well as to herself during the pendency of this matter. As such, she
clearly has not demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation to the extent that she
can safely care for . . . Denzel and Ariel within a reasonable period of
time. . . .
‘‘The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [the department]
made reasonable efforts to locate [the respondent] . . . and to reunify [her
with Denzel and Ariel], and, further that [she is] unable or unwilling to
benefit from the reunification efforts. The court further finds that services
offered to [the respondent] . . . were appropriate, reasonable, and timely
offered to assist them with reunification with Denzel and Ariel.’’ (Citation
omitted.)
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and convincing evidence, that Denzel and Ariel had
been adjudicated neglected on November 17, 2020, and
committed to the care of the petitioner. It further found
that the ‘‘clear and convincing evidence also clearly
shows that [the respondent] has failed to make suffi-
cient progress in her services and continues to be
unable to sufficiently and timely benefit from these
services to enable her to reunify with her children.’’
This conclusion was based on the physical neglect of
the children, the respondent’s inability to meet the chil-
dren’s basic needs for supervision, the exposure of the
children to intimate partner violence, and the respon-
dent’s mental health issues.
‘‘The clear and convincing evidence also clearly
shows that . . . [the respondent] has not demon-
strated that she is able to provide her children with a
safe, secure, and permanent home free from intimate
personal violence at the present time nor into the fore-
seeable future. [The respondent] has also clearly dem-
onstrated that she is unable and unwilling to benefit
from reunification efforts as she has failed to suffi-
ciently address her long-standing intimate partner vio-
lence issues which have placed the children at risk and
caused them trauma. [The respondent] has consistently
put her relationship with [Timothy] over and above the
needs and well-being of Denzel and Ariel. It is clear to
the court that she will continue to do so into the future.
She was not forthcoming with her service providers
as to her ongoing contact with [Timothy], including
advising them of the [traffic stop] incident on May 25,
2021. The court is deeply troubled by [the respondent’s]
significant lack of insight as evidenced by her desire
to maintain a relationship with [Timothy] and to keep
him part of the ‘family unit’ which is further demon-
strated by her ongoing willing violation of the court-
ordered protective orders between them. Thus, she has
clearly failed to benefit from the services in which she
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has engaged and will be unable to do so in the foresee-
able future.’’ Ultimately, the court determined that the
respondent was no closer to being able to safely parent
these two children than she was at the time of their
removal in November, 2019, and that the children ‘‘sim-
ply cannot wait for [the respondent] to rehabilitate.’’
In the dispositional phase of the proceedings, the
court made findings as to each of the seven factors
set forth in § 17a-112 (k). It concluded, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the termination of the respon-
dent’s parental rights was in the children’s best inter-
ests. Accordingly, the court rendered judgments termi-
nating her parental rights and appointing the petitioner
as the children’s statutory parent for the purpose of
securing their adoption as expeditiously as possible.
This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The respondent first claims that the court improperly
shifted the burden of proof on the issue of personal
rehabilitation to her. Specifically, she argues that the
court placed the burden of proof on her as evidenced
by the statement in its memorandum of decision that
she ‘‘has not demonstrated that she is able to provide
her children with a safe, secure, and permanent home
free from intimate partner violence at the present time
nor in the foreseeable future.’’ The petitioner counters
that, ‘‘[w]hen taken as a whole, the trial court’s decision
demonstrates that the court required the [petitioner] to
prove that [the respondent] failed to rehabilitate.’’ We
agree with the petitioner that the court did not shift
the burden of proof on the issue of personal rehabilita-
tion to the respondent.
At the outset, we identify the applicable standard of
review. ‘‘The question of whether a trial court has held
a party to a less exacting standard of proof than the law
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requires is a legal one. . . . Accordingly, our review is
plenary. . . . Similarly, plenary review applies to a
question of misallocation of a burden of proof. See . . .
Zabaneh v. Dan Beard Associates, LLC, 105 Conn. App.
134, 140, 937 A.2d 706 (applying plenary review to plain-
tiff’s claim that the [trial] court improperly required
that it, rather than the defendant, bear the burden of
proof regarding the existence of permission), cert.
denied, 286 Conn. 916, 945 A.2d 979 (2008); Wieselman
v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591, 596–97, 930 A.2d 768
(applying plenary review to claim that although the
court applied the clear and convincing standard of proof
required to establish a fraudulent transfer, it did so to
the wrong party), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930, 934 A.2d
245 (2007). . . . Furthermore, if it is not otherwise
clear from the record that an improper standard was
applied, the appellant’s claim will fail on the basis of
inadequate support in the record.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 306
Conn. 438, 452–53, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).
Additionally, ‘‘we are mindful that an opinion must
be read as a whole, without particular portions read in
isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding. . . .
Furthermore, [w]e read an ambiguous trial court record
so as to support, rather than contradict, its judgment.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 453; see also Natasha B. v. Dept. of Children and
Families, 189 Conn. App. 398, 407, 207 A.3d 1101 (2019).
It is well established that the petitioner bore the bur-
den of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the respondent had failed to achieve such degree of
personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that, within a reasonable amount of time, considering
the ages and needs of Denzel and Ariel, she could
assume a responsible position in their lives. See In re
Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628–29, 847 A.2d 883
(2004); In re Xavier H., 201 Conn. App. 81, 88, 240 A.3d
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1087, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 981, 241 A.3d 705, and
cert. denied, 335 Conn. 982, 241 A.3d 705 (2020). Simply
stated, ‘‘[t]he burden of proof is always on the state
when it seeks to remove children from the home.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.R., 161
Conn. App. 563, 570, 127 A.3d 1155 (2015).

The following details, as set forth in the court’s mem-
orandum of decision, inform our resolution of the
respondent’s claim. At the outset, the trial court specifi-
cally stated that it had, inter alia, ‘‘carefully considered’’
the criteria set forth in the General Statutes and the
applicable case law. This controlling authority placed
the burden of proof on the petitioner. At the start of
its discussion of the adjudicatory phase, the court
expressly stated that ‘‘the petitioner . . . is required
to prove any one of the grounds alleged in the termina-
tion of parental rights petitions by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.’’ (Emphasis added.) In support of this
statement, the court cited to controlling case law and
a rule of practice indicating that the burden of proving,
by clear and convincing evidence, a statutory ground
to terminate parental rights rested with the petitioner.11
These citations provide support for the conclusion that
the trial court was aware of and applied the proper
burden in this matter. See, e.g., In re J.R., supra, 161
Conn. App. 570. The court then repeated the petitioner’s
11
Specifically, the court cited to In re Jacob M., 204 Conn. App. 763, 777,
255 A.3d 918 (in adjudicatory phase, trial court determines whether one of
statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and
convincing evidence), cert. denied, 337 Conn. 909, 253 A.3d 43, and cert.
denied, 337 Conn. 909, 253 A.3d 44 (2021), In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131,
148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009) (in order to terminate parental rights, petitioner
required to prove, inter alia, by clear and convincing evidence that one of
seven grounds for termination set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) exists), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 754–55, 91 A.3d 862
(2014), and Practice Book § 35a-3 (when coterminous petitions are filed,
judicial authority must determine whether statutory grounds exist to termi-
nate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence).
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burden of proof and specifically noted that it was obli-
gated to strictly comply with the statutory criteria for
the termination of parental rights.
The court also observed that the petitioner was
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the department had used reasonable efforts to locate
the respondent and that it made reasonable and ongoing
efforts with respect to reunification prior to filing the
termination petitions. This further evidenced the court’s
awareness of the proper allocation of the burden of
proof and demonstrated that it applied the correct stan-
dard in the present case.
As to the issue of the failure to rehabilitate, the court
found that the evidence ‘‘clearly and convincingly
proves . . . [that, as] of the conclusion of the trial of
this matter,12 [neither the respondent nor Timothy has]
achieved the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation
that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable
period of time, considering Denzel’s and Ariel’s ages
and needs, [the respondent and Timothy] could assume
a responsible position in the children’s lives, as required
by . . . § 17a-112 [(j)] (3) (B).’’ (Footnote added.) It
then stated: ‘‘[The respondent] has not demonstrated
that she is able to provide her children with a safe,
secure, and permanent home free from intimate per-
sonal violence at the present time nor into the foresee-
able future.’’ (Emphasis added.) Ultimately, the court
concluded that the petitioner ‘‘has met [her] burden of
proof as to this ground by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that [the department] made reasonable efforts
to locate and reunify [the respondent and Timothy] with
12
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court observed that it ‘‘may
properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition when
considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that
the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reasonable
time.’’ See, e.g., In re Damian G., 178 Conn. App. 220, 238–39, 174 A.3d 232
(2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 902, 177 A.3d 563 (2018).
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Denzel and Ariel, and that [the respondent and Timothy]
have been unable to benefit from reunification efforts.’’
On appeal, the respondent contends that the court’s
statement that she had failed to demonstrate her ability
to provide her children with a safe, secure, and perma-
nent home free from intimate personal violence at the
present time or in the foreseeable future, indicates that
the court improperly shifted the burden of proof from
the petitioner to her. Specifically, she contends that the
‘‘directness of the trial court’s language’’ coupled with
other sections of the memorandum of decision establish
the improper burden shifting and warrant a reversal of
the court’s judgment. We are not persuaded.
The respondent, as the appellant in this matter, bears
the burden of establishing that the court applied an
incorrect legal standard, and we will not engage in spec-
ulation or presume such error. In re Paulo T., 213 Conn.
App. 858, 876, 279 A.3d 766 (2022), aff’d, 347 Conn.
311, 297 A.3d 194 (2023). Our appellate courts have
recognized that a court’s misstatement regarding the
correct legal standard does not require a reversal and
new proceeding in every instance. Id. Furthermore, we
iterate that ‘‘an opinion must be read as a whole, without
particular portions read in isolation, to discern the
parameters of its holding. . . . [W]e read an ambiguous
trial court record so as to support, rather than contra-
dict, its judgment.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Jason R., supra, 306 Conn. 453.
In reviewing the memorandum of decision as a whole,
we conclude that the court applied the proper burden
of proof and required the petitioner to prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the respondent had failed
to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilita-
tion.13 The court expressly stated that it had considered
13
We note that, at the outset of the trial, the court orally advised the
respondent and Timothy: ‘‘Because the [petitioner] filed the termination of
parental rights petitions and is asking the court to permanently sever your
legal relationship with your children, it is up to the [petitioner] to prove
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carefully, inter alia, the criteria set forth in the General
Statutes, and the applicable case law in granting the
petitions to terminate parental rights on the basis of
clear and convincing evidence. The court repeatedly
referred to the petitioner’s burden of establishing the
requirements for termination by clear and convincing
evidence, as well as the applicable case law detailing
the controlling precedent. For example, the memoran-
dum of decision states: ‘‘The court is next called upon
to determine whether [the petitioner] has met [her]
burden of proving the allegations presented in the pend-
ing termination of parental rights petitions . . . . Pur-
suant to § 17a-112 et seq., during the adjudicatory phase
of a [termination of parental rights] proceeding, the
petitioner . . . is required to prove any one of the
grounds alleged in the termination of parental rights
petitions by clear and convincing evidence.’’ To this
end, the court also observed that the department made
reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent and the
children and that, although she attended and engaged
in such services, ‘‘she has clearly failed to sufficiently
benefit from the services and attain sufficient rehabilita-
tion especially with regard to her long-standing domes-
tic violence issues and ongoing voluntary relationship
with [Timothy], which includes violations of the protec-
tive order. . . . Significantly, they have not achieved
sufficient insight as to their poor parenting skills and
how their significant history of personal violence has
negatively impacted the children. They have clearly put
their own needs, and their clear intentions to maintain
a relationship with each other, over the safety, needs
and well-being of Denzel and Ariel.’’
Further, the petitioner offered testimony from depart-
ment social workers, a psychologist, and police officers
regarding the instances of intimate personal violence,
[her] case at this termination of parental rights trial by clear and convincing
evidence.’’
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the respondent’s efforts to continue and conceal her
relationship with Timothy, even after he had stabbed
her, her inability to maintain control and meet the emo-
tional needs of the children during visits, and her failure
to comply with requests to not bring her cell phone and
allow Denzel to play inappropriate video games during
visits. On the basis of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, the court concluded that she had met her
burden with respect to the issue of the respondent’s
failure to rehabilitate. See In re Jason R., supra, 306
Conn. 453–55.
Reading the court’s decision as a whole, we conclude
that it did not shift the burden of proving personal
rehabilitation to the respondent. See In re Fayth C.,
220 Conn. App. 315, 325, 297 A.3d 601 (court’s analysis
of party’s failure to achieve sufficient personal rehabili-
tation, combined with citations to correct legal stan-
dard, evinces use of correct legal standard), cert.
denied, 347 Conn. 907, 298 A.3d 275 (2023). After our
careful review of the record, we are satisfied that,
despite the court’s isolated use of the imprecise lan-
guage that forms the basis for the respondent’s claim,
the court applied the proper standard. The challenged
language reflects the trial court’s rejection of the
respondent’s evidence of personal rehabilitation after
it had determined that the petitioner had met her burden
with respect to this issue. See In re Jason R., supra,
306 Conn. 455. The respondent’s claim, therefore, fails.
II
The respondent next claims that the court improperly
determined that she failed to achieve such degree of
personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that, within a reasonable period of time, considering
the ages and needs of the children, she could assume a
responsible position in the children’s lives. Specifically,
she argues that the last evidence of violence between
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her and Timothy occurred in 2019, and the department
‘‘had no hard evidence of contact between [Timothy and
the respondent] after 2021’’ and, therefore, the evidence
was insufficient to conclude that she had failed to
achieve personal rehabilitation at the time of the trial
in February, 2023. We are not persuaded by the respon-
dent’s sufficiency claim.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant
legal principles and our standard of review. With
respect to the former, ‘‘[p]ersonal rehabilitation as used
in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)] refers to the restoration of
a parent to [her] former constructive and useful role
as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the criti-
cal issue is not whether the parent has improved [her]
ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether
[she] has gained the ability to care for the particular
needs of the child at issue. . . . An inquiry regarding
personal rehabilitation requires us to obtain a historical
perspective of the respondent’s child-caring and parent-
ing abilities. . . . Although the standard is not full reha-
bilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabili-
tation. . . . Successful completion of the petitioner’s
expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to
defeat the petitioner’s claim that the parent has not
achieved sufficient rehabilitation. . . . [E]ven if a par-
ent has made successful strides in [her] ability to man-
age [her] life and may have achieved a level of stability
within [her] limitations, such improvements, although
commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of
whether, within a reasonable period of time, [she] could
assume a responsible position in the life of [her] chil-
dren.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Fayth C., supra, 220 Conn. App. 319;
see also In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 585–86, 122
A.3d 1247 (2015); In re Serenity W., 220 Conn. App.
380, 396–97, 298 A.3d 276, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 902,
300 A.3d 1166 (2023).
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Next, we set forth the applicable standard of review.
‘‘As clarified by our Supreme Court in In re Shane M.,
[supra, 318 Conn. 587–88], the standard of review of a
trial court’s determination that a parent has failed to
achieve sufficient rehabilitation is as follows: We have
historically reviewed for clear error both the trial
court’s subordinate factual findings and its determina-
tion that a parent has failed to rehabilitate. . . . While
we remain convinced that clear error review is appro-
priate for the trial court’s subordinate factual findings,
we now recognize that the trial court’s ultimate conclu-
sion of whether a parent has failed to rehabilitate
involves a different exercise by the trial court. A conclu-
sion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the
trial court’s factual findings and from its weighing of
the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the
failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in . . . § 17a-
112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly, we now believe that the
appropriate standard of review is one of evidentiary
sufficiency, that is, whether the trial court could have
reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the
cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to jus-
tify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying this
standard, we construe the evidence in a manner most
favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Lil’Patrick
T., 216 Conn. App. 240, 245–46, 284 A.3d 999, cert.
denied, 345 Conn. 962, 285 A.3d 387 (2022); see also In
re Kyreese L., 220 Conn. App. 705, 720, 299 A.3d 296
(although reviewing courts apply evidentiary suffi-
ciency standard of review to trial court’s ultimate deter-
mination on question of whether parent has failed to
rehabilitate sufficiently, clear error review applies to
court’s subordinate factual findings), cert. denied, 348
Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023); In re Kylie P., 218
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Conn. App. 85, 108, 291 A.3d 158 (same), cert. denied,
346 Conn. 926, 295 A.3d 419 (2023).14
Furthermore, ‘‘[i]t is not the function of this court to
sit as the [fact finder] when we review the sufficiency
of the evidence . . . rather, we must determine, in the
light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether
the totality of the evidence, including reasonable infer-
ences therefrom, supports the [judgment of the trial
court] . . . . In making this determination, [t]he evi-
dence must be given the most favorable construction
in support of the [judgment] of which it is reasonably
capable. . . . In other words, [i]f the [trial court] could
reasonably have reached its conclusion, the [judgment]
must stand, even if this court disagrees with it.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caiden B., 220
Conn. App. 326, 362–63, 297 A.3d 1025, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 904, 301 A.3d 527 (2023).
In the present case, the court found that the depart-
ment’s involvement with this family commenced in 2012
and included fourteen referrals regarding physical
neglect of the children, an inability to meet their basic
needs for supervision, and exposure to intimate partner
violence and mental health issues. As previously noted,
14
As we noted in In re Kyreese L., supra, 220 Conn. App. 720 n.8, ‘‘[p]rior
to In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 569, courts had applied the clear error
standard of review both to a trial court’s determination that a parent failed to
rehabilitate and to that court’s subordinate factual findings.’’ In her appellate
brief, the respondent argues that, ‘‘[f]or a variety of reasons, the respondent
asserts that the standard of review as established by our Supreme Court in
In re Shane M., should be replaced by the former clear error standard. . . .
The respondent is aware, however, that this court is not capable of overturning
Supreme Court precedent. This challenge is raised for the purpose of review
upon the grant of a petition for certification should it be necessary. The
respondent presents her argument to this court under the sufficiency stan-
dard articulated by our Supreme Court.’’ (Citation omitted.) It is axiomatic
that this court, as an intermediate body, is bound by the precedent from
our Supreme Court and is unable to modify it. In re Kyreese L., supra, 720
n.8; see also In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 490 n.19, 308 A.3d 604, cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024); In re Lil’Patrick T., supra, 216
Conn. App. 246 n.4.
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In re Denzel W.

the department’s ‘‘most recent involvement with this
family began in November, 2019, with the primary con-
cerns of ongoing intimate partner violence . . . and
the children’s continuous exposure to the violence,
resulting in their physical and emotional neglect, in
addition to the children’s exposure to [Timothy’s] ongo-
ing substance abuse issues while in a caretaking role for
the children.’’ The respondent reported that domestic
violence issues occurred throughout her relationship
with Timothy, which began in 2009. ‘‘She also reported
that the police were called frequently to their home and
multiple protective orders were issued by the court
with [the respondent] as the protected person.’’ Despite
this history, however, the respondent described herself
and Timothy as ‘‘good parents.’’

We emphasize that Denzel and Ariel were present in
the home at the time of the November, 2019 stabbing
of the respondent by Timothy, which resulted in
wounds to the respondent’s face, neck, and chest area.
Although the children did not witness the physical
attack, the respondent checked on the children while
the knife was imbedded in her chest. At that time, the
respondent reported that Timothy, in possession of a
knife, intentionally had stabbed her. Timothy was
arrested and a full no contact order was issued. In
March, 2021, however, the respondent filed an amended
police report in which she changed her statement,
claiming that she had the knife prior to the assault, and
Timothy had not intended to stab or hurt her.

Additional violations of the protective order fol-
lowed. The respondent and Timothy communicated by
telephone during his incarceration, and their discus-
sions involved the pending department case, the
November, 2019 stabbing, the respondent’s plans to
‘‘bail out’’ Timothy, and ‘‘their ongoing commitment to
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In re Denzel W.

each other.’’ Despite phone records of these communi-
cations, the respondent ‘‘has consistently and repeat-
edly denied to [the department] that she has been in
contact with [Timothy].’’ On May 25, 2021, the police
stopped a motor vehicle driven by Timothy with the
respondent in the passenger seat. The respondent
attempted to deceive the police officers as to her iden-
tity, and repeated this falsehood to the criminal court,
the department, and her service providers. Family mem-
bers observed the respondent with Timothy in July,
2022, in violation of the protective order. Despite her
participation in various programs and individual ther-
apy,15 the evidence supports the court’s conclusions
that she continued her relationship with Timothy,
despite the negative effects on the children and in viola-
tion of the specific steps, and that she consistently has
indicated to the department that ‘‘she wanted [him] to
be part of the children’s lives.’’ She also has made multi-
ple attempts to conceal this relationship.
Furthermore, the court found that the respondent
relied on electronic devices, including her cell phone,
during visits with the children, which negatively
impacted their behavior. She also brought a ‘‘fake’’ knife
to a visit, and allowed Denzel, to play a violent video
game depicting blood from the use of a knife. Despite
directions to not bring the phone to her in person visits
with the children, the respondent did so on several
occasions and used it to FaceTime with Timothy, again
violating the protective order.
Schroeder, who conducted the evaluations, expressed
concern that the respondent was including Timothy as
a member of the family based on her beliefs that the
15
We emphasize that ‘‘it is well settled that [a] determination with respect
to rehabilitation is not solely dependent on a parent’s technical compliance
with specific steps but rather on the broader issue of whether the factors
that led to the initial commitment have been corrected.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Blake P., 222 Conn. App. 693, 708, 306 A.3d 1130 (2023).
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In re Denzel W.

department had failed to provide support and help her,
and that it was attempting to break up the family. ‘‘She
further noted that [the respondent] had maintained a
very long relationship with [Timothy] despite her claim
that he was manipulative and hurtful, and that she was
used to the cycle of abuse in her relationships . . . .’’
Schroeder further opined that the respondent remained
‘‘unsure’’ as to how this violence affected the children.
Schroeder also noted that the respondent minimized
the November, 2019 stabbing, despite the fact that she
was ‘‘covered in blood and spoke to the children (with
a knife sticking out of her) . . . .’’ The respondent
denied that the assault was intentional and questioned
the necessity for Timothy to receive a period of incar-
ceration of twelve years. Schroeder indicated that the
respondent’s failure to recognize the instability of her
relationship with Timothy would be detrimental to Den-
zel and Ariel. Finally, the November, 2022 addendum
to the termination of parental rights social study stated
that ‘‘family members have seen [the respondent and
Timothy] both out together in the community, most
recently as [July, 2022].’’
On the basis of this evidence, the court found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the petitioner proved that
the respondent had not achieved the requisite degree of
personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief
that, within a reasonable period of time, considering the
ages and needs of Denzel and Ariel, she could assume
a responsible position in their lives. The court focused
on the intimate partner violence issue, as well as the
issue of the respondent placing her relationship with
Timothy over the needs and well-being of Denzel and
Ariel, and concluded that she will continue do to so in
the future. It also noted her ongoing lack of recognition
of the negative aspects of her relationship with Timothy.
We conclude that sufficient evidence existed in the
record to support the court’s determination of failure
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In re Denzel W.

to rehabilitate. The respondent’s continuing efforts to
maintain her relationship with Timothy despite the sig-
nificant history of intimate partner violence, coupled
with her efforts to conceal this relationship from the
department, her providers, and the police, support the
court’s conclusion that she has failed to address these
issues that placed the children at risk of trauma, and
that she will continue to do so in the future. A failure
to acknowledge and address the underlying personal
issue that formed the basis for the department’s con-
cerns indicates a failure to achieve a sufficient degree
of rehabilitation. See In re Angelina S., 223 Conn. App.
52, 67, 306 A.3d 1185 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
950, 308 A.3d 549 (2024); see also In re A’vion A., 217
Conn. App. 330, 352, 288 A.3d 231 (2023).
We are not persuaded by the respondent’s argument
that the court’s conclusion was improper because the
last evidence of intimate partner violence occurred in
2019, the last evidence of contact between the respon-
dent and Timothy was in 2021, and the psychological
report was based on the conditions as they existed in
December, 2021. The evidence reflects that the domes-
tic violence issues have existed consistently throughout
this relationship, which began in 2009, and that the
respondent has continued to prioritize and maintain her
relationship with Timothy, despite its negative effects
on Denzel and Ariel. Further, the evidence reflects that
she actively has attempted to conceal the relationship
from the department and others. Finally, we note that
the record contains evidence, which the court was free
to credit, that the respondent and Timothy were seen
together in the community in July, 2022. This evidence
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support
the court’s conclusion that the respondent has failed
to rehabilitate. See In re Nevaeh G.-M., 217 Conn. App.
854, 878–80, 290 A.3d 867 (evidence that respondent
was incapable of, or chose to ignore safety plans and
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In re Denzel W.

protective orders, repeatedly mislead department and
others about her continued relationship with individual
who had committed acts of intimate partner violence,
and despite awareness of potential physical and psycho-
logical harm to children that might result from their
presence during incident of intimate partner violence,
respondent repeatedly failed to take reasonable steps to
minimize risk of exposure to additional acts of intimate
partner violence, supported conclusion that respondent
had failed to rehabilitate), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 925,
295 A.3d 418 (2023); see also In re Blake P., 222 Conn.
App. 693, 709–710, 306 A.3d 1130 (2023) (despite ending
relationship, respondent’s failure to understand or gain
insight as to how intimate partner violence issues
impacted her role as mother and, notwithstanding her
participation in certain programs, coupled with pattern
of intimate partner violence relationships, supported
court’s conclusion that petitioner had demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence respondent could not
exercise judgment necessary to keep child safe and
healthy).
For these reasons, we conclude that the respondent
cannot prevail on her claim that the court’s determina-
tion that she failed to rehabilitate was not supported
by the evidence.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.