In re Josyah L.-T.

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IN RE JOSYAH L.-T.*
(AC 46679)
Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the
trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
child. She claimed that this court should recognize her right to be the
child’s legal guardian because she would be a better caregiver to him
than the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The
trial court granted the termination petition, concluding by clear and
convincing evidence that the Department of Children and Families had
made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the child but
that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts
and had not achieved the degree of personal rehabilitation that would
encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, considering
the child’s age and needs, she could assume a responsible position
in his life. Held that the judgment of the trial court terminating the
respondent’s parental rights was affirmed, as the respondent abandoned
any possible claim related to the judgment by failing to identify in her
brief to this court any claim of legal or factual error that the trial court
made in its decision; accordingly, as the respondent’s status as a self-
represented party did not permit this court to overlook that omission,
this court was unable to afford her any relief in connection with this
appeal.
Argued February 28—officially released March 20, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, Juvenile Mat-
ters at Middletown, and tried to the court, Sanchez-
Figueroa, J.; judgment terminating the respondent
father’s parental rights and denying the petition as to
the respondent mother; thereafter, the petitioner filed
a petition to terminate the respondent mother’s parental
rights with respect to her minor child, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex,
Child Protection Session at Middletown, and tried to the
court, Burgdorff, J.; judgment terminating the respondent
mother’s parental rights, from which the respondent
mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Celina T., self-represented, the appellant (respondent
mother).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The respondent, Celina T., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court terminating her
parental rights with respect to her minor child, Josyah
L.-T. (Josyah). The respondent, who is self-represented
in this appeal, asserts that this court should recognize
her right to be the legal guardian of Josyah because
she would be a better caregiver to him than the peti-
tioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families.
Because the respondent has failed to identify any cogni-
zable claim of error in relation to the court’s decision
terminating her parental rights as to Josyah, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Josyah
was born in July, 2016. In its May 12, 2023 memorandum
of decision terminating the respondent’s parental rights
as to Josyah, the trial court, Burgdorff, J., found the
following: ‘‘[The Department of Children and Families’
(department)] involvement with this family commenced
in August, 2016. A neglect petition was filed on Josyah’s
behalf on October 7, 2016. The identified concerns at
that time included [the respondent’s] homelessness and
transience, substance abuse issues, and [her] unad-
dressed mental [health] issues that impacted her ability
to parent and care for . . . Josyah. Josyah was adjudi-
cated neglected [on December 15, 2016] and removed
from [the respondent’s] care on November 13, 2017, due
to a domestic dispute involving a physical and verbal
altercation with Josyah’s current foster mother in the
foster mother’s home where [the respondent] was also
residing.1 Josyahwaspresentwhenthealtercationoccurred.
[The respondent] was criminally charged, and a protec-
tive order was issued through March, 2018, with the
foster mother as the protected person.’’ (Footnote added.)
On November 16, 2017, the petitioner filed an ex parte
motion for an order of temporary custody. On Novem-
ber 22, 2017, the court, Woods, J., sustained the order
of temporary custody. On June 28, 2018, Josyah was
committed to the care and custody of the petitioner, and
the court issued specific steps to the respondent to facili-
tate her reunification with Josyah.
In its memorandum of decision, the court, Burgdorff,
J., further stated: ‘‘[The respondent] was discharged
from . . . [a] housing [assistance] program in Decem-
ber, 2018, and has not demonstrated the ability to obtain
and sustain consistent housing since that time. . . .
[The respondent] has never been married and reported
that she was not in a relationship with [the biological]
father. She has had several romantic relationships with
the most recent being with Kelsey B., which involved
intimate partner violence . . . concerns and resulted in
two arrests with [the respondent] reported as the aggres-
sor.’’
On January 15, 2019, the petitioner filed a termination
of parental rights petition against both the respondent
and the biological father. A trial was held on January
14 and 23, 2020. On June 3, 2020, the court, Sanchez-
Figueroa, J., issued a memorandum of decision grant-
ing the petition as to the biological father2 and denying
the petition as to the respondent. The court also ordered
the petitioner to continue making efforts to reunite
Josyah with the respondent and to increase visitation
between them.
The petitioner made continued efforts without suc-
cess and, on September 9, 2021, filed a subsequent peti-
tion seeking to terminate the respondent’s parental
rights as to Josyah. In its memorandum of decision grant-
ing the petition, the trial court, Burgdorff, J., stated:
‘‘The petition allege[s] that the parental rights of [the
respondent] should be terminated on the ground that
Josyah has been found in a prior proceeding to have
been neglected or uncared for, and [the respondent]
has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabili-
tation as would encourage the belief that within a rea-
sonable period of time, considering the age and needs
of Josyah, she could assume a responsible position in
the life of Josyah.’’ The court held a trial over the course
of four nonconsecutive days between April 5 and 12,
2023. The court heard testimony from multiple wit-
nesses, including the respondent and two expert wit-
nesses. In addition, twenty-eight exhibits were offered
by the petitioner and entered into evidence as full exhib-
its.
In its memorandum of decision terminating the respon-
dent’s parental rights as to Josyah, the court found by
clear and convincing evidence that ‘‘[the respondent]
was born [in July, 1996] and is presently twenty-six
years of age. . . . [The respondent] had an extensive
history of abuse and neglect as a child and was in [the
department’s] care from 2009 to 2014. She was placed in
residential, group home, and foster care settings. During
her childhood, she presented with significant mental
health and behavioral issues. She was diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder . . . attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder . . . oppositional defiant disor-
der, and bipolar disorder.’’ (Footnote omitted.) The
court also found by clear and convincing evidence that
the department made reasonable efforts to reunify
Josyah with the respondent, that the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from those reunification
efforts, and that the respondent ‘‘has not achieved the
requisite degree of personal rehabilitation that would
encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period
of time, considering Josyah’s age and needs, [she] could
assume a responsible position in [his] life . . . .’’ This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the respondent asserts that this court
should recognize her right to be the legal guardian of
Josyah because she would be a better caregiver to him
than the petitioner. The respondent’s appellate brief
does not identify any claim of legal or factual error that
the court made in rendering judgment terminating her
parental rights.
It is well established that, ‘‘[a]lthough self-represented
parties are not excused from complying with relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law, [i]t is the estab-
lished policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous
of [self-represented] litigants when it does not interfere
with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of
practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party.
. . . Thus, like the trial court, [this court] will endeavor
to see that such a litigant shall have the opportunity to
have [her] case fully and fairly heard so far as such
latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse
party. . . . Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow [self-rep-
resented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-repre-
sentation provides no attendant license not to comply
with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law
. . . and [w]e repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief.
. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstraction, is required
in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to
brief the issue properly. . . . For a reviewing court to
judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of
error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and
fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Olivia W., 223 Conn.
App. 173, 182–83, 308 A.3d 571 (2024).
By failing to identify any cognizable claim of error in
the trial court’s decision, the respondent has abandoned
any possible claim related to the judgment from which
she has appealed. The respondent’s status as a self-
represented party does not permit us to overlook such
omission. Because the respondent has abandoned any
claim of error related to the judgment, we are unable
to afford her any relief in connection with this appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** March 20, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1
On November 13, 2017, when he was fifteen months old, Josyah was
placed in a special study fictive kin medically complex foster home. He
continues to reside in that home and has a close attachment with his fos-
ter mother.
2
Josyah’s biological father did not appeal from the June 3, 2020 judgment
terminating his parental rights. All references to the respondent in this
opinion pertain only to Celina T.