Wethington v. Wethington

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ESTHER WETHINGTON v. JOSHUA WETHINGTON
(AC 45824)
Moll, Seeley and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and from certain orders finding
him in contempt. The plaintiff commenced the dissolution action in
November, 2019, and thereafter filed several motions for contempt pen-
dente lite alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had violated the auto-
matic orders through his financial transactions in October, 2019. During
the pendency of the action, the parties executed a stipulation pendente
lite providing, inter alia, that, following the sale of the marital residence,
the defendant would make weekly support payments to the plaintiff
and would also place $46,000 in escrow for the sole benefit of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged in a separate contempt motion that the
defendant had failed to make all of the agreed upon support payments.
In dissolving the marriage, the court found that the primary causes of
the breakdown of the marriage were the defendant’s excessive drinking
and abusive behavior toward the plaintiff and that the defendant was
not credible. The court granted, inter alia, several of the plaintiff’s
motions for contempt and summarily denied the defendant’s postjudg-
ment motions to reargue. Held:
1. The trial court improperly granted certain of the plaintiff’s motions for
contempt insofar as the court adjudicated the defendant in contempt
of the automatic orders for his conduct prior to the effective date of
those automatic orders and abused its discretion in denying the defen-
dant’s related motion to reargue: as a matter of law, the defendant could
not be adjudicated in contempt of the automatic orders for his actions
in October, 2019, as, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language
of our rule of practice (§ 25-5), the defendant was not subject to the
automatic orders until they had been served on him, through counsel,
in November, 2019; accordingly, the case was remanded with direction
to grant the defendant’s motion to reargue and to deny the plaintiff’s
motions for contempt relating to any of the defendant’s financial conduct
in October, 2019.
2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court, in
ordering him to pay $49,167 to the plaintiff as relief flowing from a
contempt adjudication for his underpayment of required unallocated
support, improperly failed to credit him for the $46,000 that he had
escrowed, following the sale of the marital residence, in accordance
with the parties’ stipulation; the clear and unambiguous language of the
stipulation demonstrated that the plaintiff was entitled to the $46,000
in addition to the weekly support payments, as the plain terms of the
provision requiring the defendant to escrow $46,000 did not place condi-
tions on the plaintiff’s right to access those funds or minimize the
defendant’s obligation in a separate provision requiring him to make
weekly support payments to the plaintiff, as those provisions imposed
independent financial obligations on the defendant.
3. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt alleging
that the defendant’s purchase of a motor vehicle during the pendency
of the action violated the automatic orders: this court rejected the
defendant’s proposition that the purchase of the motor vehicle was a
customary and usual expense authorized pursuant to the automatic
orders, particularly in light of the trial court’s finding that the defendant
owned another vehicle; moreover, insofar as the defendant contended
that his trial testimony established that his personal circumstances justi-
fied this purchase, this court noted that the trial court repeatedly did
not credit the defendant’s testimony, including testimony concerning
his finances.
4. This court concluded, after a review of the record, that the trial court
did not abuse its broad discretion in distributing the parties’ assets,
particularly in light of the trial court’s findings that the defendant was
at fault for the breakdown of the parties’ marriage and that he had
engaged in financial maneuvers that dissipated the parties’ funds and
left the plaintiff with less funds available in her bank accounts.
5. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying three of his motions to reargue: the defendant’s
motions relating to the trial court’s award of $49,167 to the plaintiff in
unallocated support and its distribution of the parties’ assets did not
raise any viable claims entitling him to reargument, as the record did
not reflect that the court overlooked any controlling principle of law
or misapprehended the facts in relation to these orders.
Argued October 16, 2023—officially released February 13, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Fairfield, where the plaintiff filed motions for
contempt; thereafter the case was tried to the court,
Egan, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting
certain other relief and finding the defendant in con-
tempt; subsequently, the court, Egan, J., denied the
defendant’s postjudgment motions to reargue, and the
defendant appealed to this court. Reversed in part;
judgment directed.
Dante R. Gallucci, for the appellant (defendant).
Christopher T. Goulden, with whom, on the brief, was
Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendant, Joshua Wethington, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his mar-
riage to the plaintiff, Esther Wethington. On appeal, the
defendant claims that the court improperly (1) granted
several motions for contempt pendente lite filed by
the plaintiff, (2) distributed the parties’ assets, and (3)
denied several of his postjudgment motions to reargue.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court only with
respect to the court’s (1) denial of one of the defendant’s
motions to reargue and (2) grants of two of the plaintiff’s
contempt motions, in whole or in part, insofar as the
court adjudicated the defendant in contempt of the
automatic orders pursuant to Practice Book § 25-5 (b)1
for actions that he committed before the automatic
orders had become effective against him. We affirm the
judgment in all other respects.
The following facts, which are not in dispute, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. The parties were married in 2010. One child
was born of the marriage in 2012. On November 21,
2019, the plaintiff commenced the present dissolution
action against the defendant on the ground that the
parties’ marriage had broken down irretrievably. On
December 20, 2019, the plaintiff filed her operative
amended complaint.
The matter was tried to the court, Egan, J., over the
course of four total days in September, 2021, and March,
2022. The court heard testimony from the parties and
admitted several full exhibits. At the outset of the first
day of trial, the court asked the parties to ‘‘confirm the
motions going forward.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel cited
six motions for contempt pendente lite that the plaintiff
had filed, namely, (1) two contempt motions filed on
March 11, 2020, (2) one contempt motion filed on Sep-
tember 11, 2020, (3) two contempt motions filed on
December 11, 2020, and (4) one contempt motion filed
on June 22, 2021.2 On April 11, 2022, each party filed
posttrial proposed orders.
On July 29, 2022, the court issued a memorandum of
decision dissolving the parties’ marriage.3 The court
found that the primary causes of the breakdown of the
marriage were (1) the defendant’s drinking, which the
court found to be ‘‘excessive,’’ and (2) the defendant’s
behavior toward the plaintiff, which included verbal
and physical abuse. In addition, the court repeatedly
stated that it deemed the defendant’s testimony at trial
to be not credible. The court entered several financial
orders as part of the dissolution judgment, including
awarding the plaintiff 60 percent of the net proceeds
from the sale of the parties’ marital residence in South-
port. The court also granted the plaintiff’s six motions
for contempt identified previously in this opinion.4 In
granting relief as to three of the contempt motions, the
court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff a total
of $76,895 out of his share of the net proceeds from
the sale of the marital residence. The court additionally
awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in attorney’s fees with
respect to the contempt motions.
Between August 16 and 17, 2022, the defendant filed
several motions to reargue, to which the plaintiff
objected. The court summarily denied the defendant’s
motions to reargue and summarily sustained the plain-
tiff’s objections.5 This appeal followed. Additional facts
and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
We begin with the defendant’s claims concerning the
trial court’s (1) grants of four of the plaintiff’s motions
for contempt, namely, (a) the two contempt motions
filed on March 11, 2020, (b) the contempt motion filed
on September 11, 2020, and (c) one of the contempt
motions filed on December 11, 2020, and (2) denial of
one of the defendant’s motions to reargue.6 We address
each claim in turn.
A
We first turn to the defendant’s claims regarding the
court’s (1) grants of the plaintiff’s motions for contempt
filed on March 11, 2020, docket entries ##110.00 and
111.00 (contempt motion #110.00 and contempt motion
#111.00, respectively), and (2) denial of one of the defen-
dant’s motions to reargue, docket entry #214.00 (motion
to reargue #214.00), which concerned the court’s adjudi-
cation of contempt motions ##110.00 and 111.00. With
regard to the court’s grants of contempt motions
##110.00 and 111.00, the defendant asserts that the court
improperly adjudicated him in contempt of the court’s
automatic orders because his conduct occurred before
the automatic orders had become effective against him.
As to the court’s denial of motion to reargue #214.00, the
defendant contends that, in granting contempt motions
##110.00 and 111.00, the court overlooked that, as a
matter of law, he could not be held in contempt of
the automatic orders until they had become effective
against him. We conclude that the court (1) improperly
granted contempt motions ##110.00 and 111.00 insofar
as the court adjudicated the defendant in contempt of
the automatic orders for his conduct prior to the effec-
tive date of those automatic orders against him, and
(2) overlooked that, as a matter of law, the defendant’s
actions in October, 2019, could not constitute contempt
of the automatic orders and, therefore, abused its dis-
cretion in denying motion to reargue #214.00.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. The state marshal’s
return of service filed in the present action reflects that,
on November 21, 2019, the state marshal served an
attorney representing the defendant with, inter alia, the
summons, the plaintiff’s original complaint, and notice
of the automatic orders. See Practice Book § 25-5 (ser-
vice of automatic orders is ‘‘made with service of pro-
cess of a complaint for dissolution of marriage’’).
On March 11, 2020, the plaintiff filed contempt
motions ##110.00 and 111.00. In contempt motion
#110.00, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant vio-
lated the automatic orders in failing to deposit certain
income into the parties’ joint checking account, includ-
ing $15,000 in monthly disability payments that the
defendant began receiving in October, 2019. In con-
tempt motion #111.00, the plaintiff contended that the
defendant violated the automatic orders in transferring,
between October 23 and 28, 2019, a total of $196,000
from the parties’ joint bank accounts into a personal
bank account ‘‘in contemplation of divorce and while
the parties’ marriage was in serious jeopardy and under-
going an irretrievable breakdown.’’ The court deter-
mined that the defendant’s actions violated the auto-
matic orders and granted both contempt motions. The
court did not order any specific relief vis-à-vis those
contempt motions. It awarded, however, the plaintiff
$25,000 in attorney’s fees in relation to the plaintiff’s
various contempt motions.
On August 16, 2022, the defendant filed motion to
reargue #214.00. The defendant sought reargument on
the basis that, as a matter of law, he could not be held
in contempt of the automatic orders for his actions in
October, 2019, which predated the effective date of the
automatic orders against him.7 The defendant further
argued that the $25,000 attorney’s fees award had to be
reduced to account for the court’s erroneous contempt
adjudication. The court summarily denied motion to
reargue #214.00.8
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court’s
grants of contempt motions ##110.00 and 111.00 cannot
stand insofar as the court adjudicated him in contempt
of the automatic orders for his actions in October, 2019,
which occurred prior to service of the automatic orders
on him in November, 2019. He contends that the auto-
matic orders were not in effect in October, 2019, and
that he ‘‘could not possibly have had notice of the auto-
matic orders’’ at that time. The defendant further claims
that the court abused its discretion in denying motion
to reargue #214.00, in which he asserted that the court
overlooked that, as a matter of law, he could not be
adjudicated in contempt of the automatic orders for his
conduct in October, 2019. We agree.
At the outset, we set forth the following relevant
legal principles and standards of review. ‘‘Contempt is
a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which
has power to punish for such an offense. . . . [C]ivil
contempt is committed when a person violates an order
of court which requires that person in specific and
definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or
series of acts. . . . In part because the contempt rem-
edy is particularly harsh . . . such punishment should
not rest upon implication or conjecture, [and] the lan-
guage [of the court order] declaring . . . rights should
be clear, or imposing burdens [should be] specific and
unequivocal, so that the parties may not be misled
thereby. . . . To constitute contempt, it is not enough
that a party has merely violated a court order; the viola-
tion must be wilful. . . . It is the burden of the party
seeking an order of contempt to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, both a clear and unambiguous
directive to the alleged contemnor and the alleged con-
temnor’s wilful noncompliance with that directive. . . .
The question of whether the underlying order is clear
and unambiguous is a legal inquiry subject to de novo
review. . . . If we answer that question affirmatively,
we then review the trial court’s determination that the
violation was wilful under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scott v. Scott,
215 Conn. App. 24, 38–39, 282 A.3d 470 (2022).
Whether the automatic orders were clear and unam-
biguous is not at issue; rather, the question before us
is whether the automatic orders applied to the defen-
dant in October, 2019, before they had been served on
him. This presents us with a legal question over which
we exercise plenary review. See Williams v. Mansfield,
215 Conn. App. 1, 10, 281 A.3d 1263 (2022) (‘‘[w]hen
. . . a court’s decision is challenged on the basis of a
question of law, our review is plenary’’). Moreover, to
the extent that we must interpret and apply the rules
of practice, our review is plenary. See In re Ryan C.,
220 Conn. App. 507, 524, 299 A.3d 308 (‘‘The interpretive
construction of the rules of practice is to be governed
by the same principles as those regulating statutory
interpretation. . . . The interpretation and application
of a statute, and thus a Practice Book provision,
involves a question of law over which our review is
plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023).
‘‘[I]n reviewing a court’s ruling on a motion to open,
reargue, vacate or reconsider, we ask only whether
the court acted unreasonably or in clear abuse of its
discretion. . . . When reviewing a decision for an
abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption
should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . As
with any discretionary action of the trial court . . . the
ultimate [question for appellate review] is whether the
trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.
. . . [T]he purpose of a reargument is . . . to demon-
strate to the court that there is some decision or some
principle of law which would have a controlling effect,
and which has been overlooked, or that there has been
a misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used
to address . . . claims of law that the [movant] claimed
were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to
reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity
to have a second bite of the apple . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) First Niagara Bank, N.A. v.
Pouncey, 204 Conn. App. 433, 440, 253 A.3d 524 (2021).
Practice Book § 25-5 provides in relevant part that
the court’s automatic orders ‘‘shall apply to both parties,
with service of the automatic orders to be made with
service of process of a complaint for dissolution of
marriage . . . . The automatic orders shall be effective
with regard to the plaintiff . . . upon the signing of
the complaint . . . and with regard to the defendant
. . . upon service and shall remain in place during the
pendency of the action, unless terminated, modified,
or amended by further order of a judicial authority
upon motion of either of the parties . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.)
Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of
Practice Book § 25-5, the defendant was not subject to
the automatic orders until they had been served on
him, through counsel, in November, 2019. It necessarily
follows that, as a matter of law, the defendant could
not be adjudicated in contempt of the automatic orders
for his actions in October, 2019, namely, (1) failing to
deposit his $15,000 monthly disability payment into the
parties’ joint checking account9 and (2) transferring
$196,000 out of the parties’ joint bank accounts. The
court overlooked this legal principle in adjudicating
contempt motions ##110.00 and 111.00 and, therefore,
abused its discretion in denying motion to reargue
#214.00.10 In light of the foregoing conclusions, the
court’s denial of motion to reargue #214.00 must be
reversed, along with the court’s judgment as to its
grants, in whole or in part, of contempt motions
##110.00 and 111.00 insofar as the court adjudicated
the defendant in contempt of the automatic orders for
his conduct in October, 2019, and the case must be
remanded to the court with direction (1) to grant motion
to reargue #214.00 insofar as the defendant alerted the
court that, in adjudicating contempt motions ##110.00
and 111.00, the court overlooked a controlling principle
of law, (2) to deny in part contempt motion #110.00, to
the extent that the court adjudicated the defendant in
contempt of the automatic orders for his actions in
October, 2019, and (3) to deny contempt motion
#111.00.11
B
Turning next to the court’s grant of the plaintiff’s
motion for contempt filed on September 11, 2020, the
defendant contends that, in ordering him to pay $49,167
to the plaintiff as relief flowing from the contempt adju-
dication, the court improperly failed to credit him for
funds that he had escrowed in accordance with a stipu-
lation pendente lite executed by the parties and
approved by the court. We disagree.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. On July 14, 2020,
the parties executed a stipulation pendente lite (stipula-
tion). Paragraph 3 of the stipulation provided: ‘‘Once
the marital residence [which was under binder at the
time] is sold, the [defendant] shall pay to the [plaintiff]
fifty (50%) percent of the total net weekly income
received from both Revlon Inc. [(Revlon)] and [Hair-
Club] for Men, LLC [(HairClub)].12 Said weekly support
payments represent unallocated alimony and [c]hild
[s]upport . . . . The [defendant] shall make said pay-
ments into an account of the [plaintiff’s] choosing on
the day the payments are received by the [defendant].
Said payments shall continue until March 15, 2021, when
the [defendant’s] severance payments from Revlon . . .
end.’’ (Footnote added.) Paragraph 4 of the stipulation
provided: ‘‘[U]pon the closing of the sale of the marital
residence, the [defendant] shall place forty-six thou-
sand ($46,000) dollars in escrow . . . for the sole bene-
fit of the [plaintiff]. Said amount guarantees the [plain-
tiff] at least four (4) months of support payments, even
if the [defendant] becomes unemployed. The [plaintiff]
shall be entitled to draw on these funds for moving
and living expenses when she moves from the marital
residence.’’ The court, Stewart, J., approved the stipula-
tion on July 23, 2020.
In the September 11, 2020 motion for contempt, the
plaintiff represented that (1) the marital residence was
sold on September 4, 2020, and (2) in accordance with
the stipulation, upon receiving the proceeds from the
sale, the defendant escrowed $46,000. The plaintiff then
asserted that, on September 10, 2020, in violation of
the stipulation, the defendant altered his direct deposit
authorization such that his HairClub paychecks would
be deposited into his personal bank account rather than
into the parties’ joint account. The plaintiff represented
that the defendant believed that she could access the
$46,000 held in escrow under the stipulation to pay for
her living expenses.
In its decision, the court, Egan, J., found that ‘‘[t]he
defendant admit[ted] that [pursuant to the stipulation]
he was supposed to deposit one half of the [net] weekly
income of both employers, Revlon and [HairClub]. How-
ever, he took actions such as unilaterally changing the
direct deposit of his paycheck to go into his personal
account instead of the parties’ joint account. The plain-
tiff did not receive any portion of the net weekly
income.’’ The court further found that ‘‘[t]he defendant
changed his withholdings, which resulted in a substan-
tial reduction in his combined net pay. He admit[ted]
that when the stipulation was entered his combined net
[weekly] pay was $5771. . . . [T]he defendant trans-
ferred [to the plaintiff] monthly amounts such as $4423
(September, 2020), $4861 (October, 2020), and $4760
(November, 2020) rather than [the full amount of]
$12,503.83 in each such month. Yet, he did deposit the
accurate net amount for the three pay periods in Febru-
ary, 2021, which was prior to an upcoming hearing,
although he denied that he did so based on the antici-
pated proceeding. . . . [T]he timing of such accurate
payments [is] an indication that the defendant under-
stood his obligation [under the stipulation].’’ The court
additionally found that, ‘‘[a]s a result of the defendant’s
actions in denying and limiting the plaintiff access to
the undisputed $5771 total net weekly income, the plain-
tiff was compelled to access the [$46,000] in escrow.
. . . [T]he plaintiff was entitled to the escrowed funds
in addition to the total net weekly income, which repre-
sented unallocated alimony and child support . . . .
The defendant continued to deposit less than required
at times when his income transitioned to be only from
[HairClub]. . . . [T]he defendant failed to pay the
plaintiff [unallocated] support as ordered [under the
stipulation]. He shall pay her the amount owed based
on the underpayments, which total $49,167.’’ (Emphasis
omitted.) Later in its decision, the court stated that the
plaintiff’s September 11, 2020 contempt motion was
granted and, as relief, ordered the defendant to pay the
plaintiff $49,167 from his share of the net proceeds from
the sale of the marital home.
On August 16, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to
reargue as to, inter alia, the court’s order requiring him
to pay the plaintiff $49,167. The defendant argued that
the court should have credited the $46,000 that he had
escrowed in accordance with the stipulation against
the $49,167 awarded to the plaintiff, as the $46,000 held
in escrow was intended to guarantee the plaintiff
approximately four months’ worth of unallocated sup-
port payments.13 The court summarily denied this
motion.14
On appeal, the defendant does not dispute that he
owed the plaintiff $49,167 in unpaid unallocated support
pursuant to the stipulation. The defendant contends,
however, that the court should have offset the $46,000
that he escrowed per the stipulation, which the plaintiff
accessed during the pendency of the present action,
against the $49,167 awarded to the plaintiff, leaving a
balance of $3167. According to the defendant, the
$46,000 escrow provision of the stipulation operated
only as security to protect the plaintiff in the event
that he failed to remit in full the unallocated support
payments owed to her. The plaintiff argues in response
that the clear and unambiguous language of the stipula-
tion demonstrated that she was entitled to the $46,000
escrowed amount, in addition to one half of the defen-
dant’s net weekly income. We agree with the plaintiff.
‘‘The order at issue is the stipulation, entered into by
the parties, which was made an order of the court.
In domestic relations cases, [a] judgment rendered in
accordance with . . . a stipulation of the parties is to
be regarded and construed as a contract. . . . It is well
established that [a] contract must be construed to effec-
tuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from
the language used interpreted in the light of the situation
of the parties and the circumstances connected with
the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to
be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction
of the written words and . . . the language used must
be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning
and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject
matter of the contract. . . . Where the language of the
contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to
be given effect according to its terms. A court will not
torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary
meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly,
any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the
language used in the contract rather than from one
party’s subjective perception of the terms. . . . Con-
tract language is unambiguous when it has a definite
and precise meaning . . . concerning which there is
no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion . . . .
In contrast, an agreement is ambiguous when its lan-
guage is reasonably susceptible of more than one inter-
pretation. . . . Nevertheless, the mere fact that the
parties advance different interpretations of the lan-
guage in question does not necessitate a conclusion
that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Bolat v. Bolat, 191 Conn. App. 293, 298,
215 A.3d 736, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 918, 217 A.3d
634 (2019).
We conclude that, pursuant to the clear and unambig-
uous terms of the stipulation, the plaintiff was entitled
to the $46,000 escrowed amount, as well as to one half
of the defendant’s net weekly income, following the
sale of the marital home. Paragraph 3 of the stipulation
required the defendant to pay the plaintiff one half of
his net weekly income. Separately, paragraph 4 of the
stipulation provided that the defendant would escrow
$46,000 ‘‘for the sole benefit of the [plaintiff],’’ with said
amount ‘‘guarantee[ing] the [plaintiff] at least four (4)
months of [unallocated] support payments, even if the
[defendant] becomes unemployed,’’ and that the plain-
tiff would ‘‘be entitled to draw on these funds for moving
and living expenses when she moves from the marital
residence.’’ We construe the plain language of para-
graphs 3 and 4 of the stipulation as imposing indepen-
dent financial obligations on the defendant. Moreover,
the plain terms of paragraph 4 did not place conditions
on the plaintiff’s right to access the $46,000 in escrowed
funds or minimize the defendant’s obligation pursuant
to paragraph 3 of the stipulation to transfer one half of
his net weekly income to the plaintiff. Accordingly,
we reject the defendant’s claim to an offset of $46,000
against the $49,167 awarded to the plaintiff.15
C
With respect to the court’s grant of one of the plain-
tiff’s motions for contempt filed on December 11, 2020,
in which she claimed that the defendant’s purchase
of a Mercedes-Benz E350 during the pendency of the
present action violated the court’s automatic orders, the
defendant contends that, on the basis of his testimony
at trial, his purchase of the Mercedes-Benz E350 consti-
tuted a customary and usual household expense that
the automatic orders permitted. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. On December 11,
2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt asserting
that, in violation of the automatic orders, the defendant
unilaterally purchased a Mercedes-Benz E350 for
$14,000 for his use while living in Florida. The plaintiff
further represented that (1) the defendant traveled from
Florida to Connecticut to have parenting time with the
parties’ child, (2) the defendant owned a motor vehicle,
a Mercedes-Benz ML350, that he kept in Connecticut,
and (3) on or about November 22, 2020, via email, the
defendant asked the plaintiff for permission to purchase
a second motor vehicle, which request she denied
because she questioned his need for two motor vehicles.
In its decision, the court found that, without the plain-
tiff’s permission or leave of the court, the defendant,
by his own admission, purchased the Mercedes-Benz
E350 for $14,000 in cash during the pendency of the
present action. The court further found that the defen-
dant also owned a Mercedes-Benz ML350 valued at
$32,000. The court proceeded to grant the December
11, 2020 motion for contempt and ordered the defendant
to pay the plaintiff $8400, which calculated to 60 percent
of the $14,000 expended by the defendant to purchase
the Mercedes-Benz E350, out of his share of the net
proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.
‘‘A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our
standard of review is to determine whether the court
abused its discretion in [finding] that the actions or
inactions of the [alleged contemnor] were in contempt
of a court order. . . . We are mindful that the court’s
automatic orders, applicable during the pendency of all
marital dissolution actions, are set forth in Practice
Book § 25-5 (b) and provide in relevant part: (1) Neither
party shall sell, transfer, exchange, assign, remove, or
in any way dispose of, without the consent of the other
party in writing, or an order of a judicial authority, any
property, except in the usual course of business or
for customary and usual household expenses or for
reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with this
action. . . . The purpose of the automatic orders in
marital dissolution actions is to maintain the status quo
of the assets within the marital estate so that they may
be distributed by the court at the time of dissolution.
. . . In light of these legal principles, it is clear that a
violation of the court’s automatic orders will not arise
when expenditures are used for customary and usual
expenses.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Grant v. Grant, 171 Conn. App. 851, 859–60,
158 A.3d 419 (2017).
On the basis of the record, we reject the defendant’s
proposition that his purchase of the Mercedes-Benz
E350 was a customary and usual expense authorized
pursuant to the automatic orders, particularly in light
of the court’s finding that the defendant owned another
motor vehicle, a Mercedes-Benz ML350, valued at
$32,000. Insofar as the defendant contends that his trial
testimony established that his personal circumstances
justified this expenditure, we note that the court repeat-
edly did not credit his testimony, including testimony
concerning his finances. See Delena v. Grachitorena,
216 Conn. App. 225, 231, 283 A.3d 1090 (2022) (‘‘[i]t is
the exclusive province of the trier of fact to weigh
the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all
or none of a witness’ testimony’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Thus, we conclude that the court prop-
erly granted the plaintiff’s December 11, 2020 motion
for contempt.
II
The defendant also claims that the trial court improp-
erly distributed the parties’ assets. We disagree.
‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-81 governs the distribution
of the assets in a dissolution case. . . . That statute
authorizes the court to assign to either spouse all, or
any part of, the estate of the other spouse. . . . In
fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to
be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence
presented by each party, shall consider the length of
the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution
of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employ-
ability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties
and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of
capital assets and income. The court shall also consider
the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of their respective
estates. . . . Moreover, [w]e have iterated that there
is no set formula the court is obligated to apply when
dividing the parties’ assets and . . . the court is vested
with broad discretion in fashioning financial orders.
. . . As a panel of this court once expressed, the court
has vast discretion in fashioning its orders.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fronsaglia
v. Fronsaglia, 202 Conn. App. 769, 777, 246 A.3d 1083
(2021). ‘‘Generally, we will not overturn a trial court’s
division of marital property unless it misapplies, over-
looks, or gives a wrong or improper effect to any test
or consideration which it was [its] duty to regard.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 776.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our disposition of this claim. In its decision, in
addition to finding that the breakdown of the parties’
marriage was caused by the defendant’s (1) excessive
drinking and (2) abusive conduct toward the plaintiff,
the court discredited the defendant’s testimony regard-
ing actions that he took in relation to finances and found
that ‘‘[h]is financial control and transactions resulted
in his accounts having substantially more funds than
the plaintiff’s accounts and dissipation of funds.’’ As
part of its orders allocating the parties’ assets, the court
awarded the plaintiff (1) $132,297.80, constituting 60
percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital
home, (2) 60 percent of the parties’ joint and individual
bank accounts,16 (3) 60 percent of the defendant’s retire-
ment accounts, subject to gains and losses,17 and (4)
$34,620, constituting 60 percent ‘‘of [certain] rent paid
[by the defendant] to his parents and reduction in bank
account funds.’’18 The court additionally awarded the
plaintiff (1) $76,895 in relief in granting three of the
plaintiff’s contempt motions, constituting (a) 60 percent
of the amount that the defendant paid for his Mercedes-
Benz E350, or $8400, (b) approximately 60 percent of
the payoff amount of a loan on the defendant’s Mer-
cedes-Benz ML350, or $19,328, and (c) the sum of the
unpaid unallocated support payments owed to the plain-
tiff pursuant to the stipulation, or $49,167, and (2)
$25,000 in attorney’s fees vis-à-vis the plaintiff’s con-
tempt motions.
The defendant maintains that the court’s orders allo-
cating the parties’ assets were ‘‘grossly inequitable’’ and
‘‘create[d] an unfair, and unjust division of marital
assets,’’ in part stemming from the court’s failure to
credit him for a $36,400 pendente lite payment that he
made to the plaintiff.19 After a careful review of the
record, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
broad discretion in distributing the parties’ assets, par-
ticularly in light of the court’s findings that the defen-
dant (1) was at fault for the breakdown of the parties’
marriage and (2) engaged in financial maneuvers that
dissipated the parties’ funds and left the plaintiff with
less funds available in her bank accounts. Thus, the
defendant’s claim fails.20
III
The defendant next claims that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying three of his motions to reargue,
docket entries ##215.00, 216.00, and 217.00 (motions to
reargue ##215.00, 216.00, and 217.00, collectively).21
This claim merits little discussion.
‘‘[I]n reviewing a court’s ruling on a motion to open,
reargue, vacate or reconsider, we ask only whether
the court acted unreasonably or in clear abuse of its
discretion. . . . When reviewing a decision for an
abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption
should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . As
with any discretionary action of the trial court . . . the
ultimate [question for appellate review] is whether the
trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.
. . . [T]he purpose of a reargument is . . . to demon-
strate to the court that there is some decision or some
principle of law which would have a controlling effect,
and which has been overlooked, or that there has been
a misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used
to address . . . claims of law that the [movant] claimed
were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to
reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity
to have a second bite of the apple . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) First Niagara Bank, N.A. v.
Pouncey, supra, 204 Conn. App. 440.
The defendant maintains on appeal that motions to
reargue ##215.00, 216.00, and 217.00 raised viable claims
entitling him to reargument22 with respect to the court’s
(1) failing to offset $46,000 against the $49,167 awarded
to the plaintiff in unpaid unallocated support; see part
I B of this opinion; and (2) entering its ‘‘unconscionable
cumulative’’ orders distributing the parties’ assets.23 See
part II of this opinion. As we have concluded previously
in this opinion, the court neither erred in awarding the
plaintiff $49,167 in unpaid unallocated support without
offsetting the $46,000 escrowed amount nor abused its
discretion in distributing the parties’ assets. The record
does not reflect that the court overlooked any control-
ling principle of law or misapprehended the facts in
relation to its orders. Accordingly, we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions
to reargue ##215.00, 216.00, and 217.00.
The judgment is reversed only as to the denial of the
defendant’s motion to reargue, docket entry #214.00,
and the grants of the plaintiff’s motions for contempt,
docket entries ##110.00 and 111.00, in whole or in part,
insofar as the defendant was adjudicated in contempt
of the automatic orders for actions that he committed
in October, 2019, prior to service of the automatic
orders on him, and the case is remanded with direction
to enter orders consistent with this opinion; the judg-
ment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
Practice Book § 25-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following automatic
orders shall apply to both parties . . .
‘‘(b) In all cases involving a marriage or civil union, whether or not there
are children:
‘‘(1) Neither party shall sell, transfer, exchange, assign, remove, or in any
way dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or an
order of a judicial authority, any property, except in the usual course of
business or for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable
attorney’s fees in connection with this action. . . .
‘‘(2) Neither party shall conceal any property. . . .
‘‘(4) Neither party shall cause any asset, or portion thereof, co-owned or
held in joint name, to become held in his or her name solely without the
consent of the other party, in writing, or an order of the judicial author-
ity. . . .’’
‘‘The automatic orders are intended to keep the financial situation of the
parties at a status quo during the pendency of the dissolution action.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fronsaglia v. Fronsaglia, 202 Conn.
App. 769, 778 n.5, 246 A.3d 1083 (2021).
2
Throughout the trial, the plaintiff’s counsel referred to the contempt
motions when presenting evidence to the court.
3
On November 16, 2022, the court issued a corrected memorandum of
decision, the purpose of which was to make a correction to its child support
orders, which correction is not germane to this appeal.
4
The court denied two other motions for contempt, one filed by the
plaintiff and the other filed by the defendant. Those rulings are not at issue
in this appeal.
5
In her objections to the defendant’s motions to reargue, the plaintiff
also requested that the court award her attorney’s fees. Although the court
sustained the plaintiff’s objections, it denied her requests for attorney’s fees.
The plaintiff has not filed a cross appeal claiming error as to the court’s
denial of her requests for attorney’s fees.
6
For ease of discussion, we address the defendant’s claims in a different
order than they are presented in his principal appellate brief.
7
In motion to reargue #214.00, the defendant cited to contempt motions
##110.00 and 111.00; however, his analysis referred only to his transfers of
the $196,000 in funds in October, 2019, which was the basis of contempt
motion #111.00. We construe motion to reargue #214.00 to encompass both
contempt motions ##110.00 and 111.00 insofar as they were predicated on
conduct in which the defendant engaged in October, 2019.
8
The court also summarily sustained the plaintiff’s objection to motion
to reargue #214.00, in which the plaintiff argued in relevant part that (1)
the defendant failed to present any case law to support his position, (2) the
court’s ‘‘decision is clear on its face that [the contempt adjudication] is
consistent with the relevant statutes supported by the evidence presented,’’
and (3) a trial court is authorized to award attorney’s fees without making
an adjudication of contempt.
9
In contempt motion #110.00, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant
began receiving $15,000 per month in disability payments in October, 2019,
and that he had failed to deposit any such payments into the parties’ joint
checking account through the date of the motion, or March 10, 2020. In
other words, the plaintiff contended that the defendant was in contempt of
the automatic orders for failing to deposit the $15,000 monthly disability
payments between October, 2019, and March 10, 2020. The plaintiff addition-
ally asserted in contempt motion #110.00 that the defendant violated the
automatic orders in (1) failing to deposit $12,500 in monthly income from
a consulting job, which began in December, 2019, and (2) creating a limited
liability company in January, 2020, without her consent. We construe the
defendant’s claim to be challenging the court’s grant of contempt motion
#110.00 only insofar as the court adjudicated the defendant in contempt of
the automatic orders for his actions in October, 2019.
10
The plaintiff argues that the issue of whether the court properly adjudi-
cated the defendant in contempt of the automatic orders for his conduct
in October, 2019, is unpreserved, and, therefore, we should decline to review
it because the defendant raised the issue for the first time in motion to
reargue #214.00. We disagree. As this court recently stated, although raising
an issue for first time in a motion to reargue ‘‘generally does not preserve
[the] issue for appellate review’’; Curley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 220 Conn. App.
732, 745, 299 A.3d 1133, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 914, 303 A.3d 260 (2023);
‘‘[a]lerting the trial court to matters that the court may have overlooked is
the proper use of a motion to reargue.’’ Id., 750. The record demonstrates
that (1) the defendant, in motion to reargue #214.00, raised the legal issue
of whether his conduct before service of the automatic orders on him
constituted contempt of the automatic orders, (2) the plaintiff filed an objec-
tion to motion to reargue #214.00, in which she acknowledged and briefly
addressed this legal issue, (3) the court denied motion to reargue #214.00, and
(4) the defendant on appeal is claiming that the court abused its discretion
in denying motion to reargue #214.00. Under these circumstances, we con-
clude that the issue of whether, as a matter of law, the court properly
adjudicated the defendant in contempt of the automatic orders for his con-
duct that predated service of the automatic orders on him is preserved for
our review in this appeal.
11
In its decision, the court cited Dobozy v. Dobozy, 241 Conn. 490, 497,
697 A.2d 1117 (1997), for the proposition that it was authorized to award
attorney’s fees without adjudicating the defendant in contempt. Although
the defendant’s briefs make isolated references to the court’s award of
$25,000 in attorney’s fees in relation to the plaintiff’s various contempt
motions, we do not construe the defendant’s claims on appeal to include a
request that we order the court on remand to recalculate, or to consider
recalculating, attorney’s fees. Even if such relief were encompassed in the
defendant’s claims, the defendant has not briefed on appeal the issue of
whether reversing the court’s contempt adjudications necessitates a reversal
or reconsideration of the attorney’s fees award. Moreover, in his principal
appellate brief, the defendant acknowledges that, ‘‘even in the absence of
a finding of contempt, a trial court has broad discretion to make whole any
party who has suffered as a result of another party’s failure to comply with
a court order.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326
Conn. 81, 99, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017).
12
With respect to the defendant’s employment history, the trial court
found in relevant part that (1) between December, 2016, and February, 2019,
the defendant was employed by Revlon, (2) a period of severance, short-
term disability payments, and long-term disability payments followed the
defendant’s separation from Revlon, (3) between December 15, 2019, and
March 29, 2020, the defendant, through his limited liability company, worked
as a consultant for HairClub, and (4) the defendant thereafter was employed
directly by HairClub.
13
In his posttrial proposed orders, the defendant also had requested that
the court credit him for the $46,000 that he had placed in escrow pursuant
to the stipulation.
14
The court also summarily sustained the plaintiff’s objection to the defen-
dant’s motion to reargue, in which the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s
motion constituted an attempt to have a ‘‘second bite at the apple . . . .’’
15
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant also contended that the
court improperly adjudicated him in contempt of the stipulation following
March 15, 2021, which, the defendant posited, was the date on which the
unallocated support payments were scheduled to end under the terms of
the stipulation. In his reply brief, however, the defendant states that he
‘‘recognizes that, at the time of the trial court’s decision, that figure [meaning
the amount of unpaid unallocated support] had risen to $49,167.’’ Likewise,
during oral argument before this court, the defendant’s counsel represented
that the defendant did not contest the court’s finding that he owed the
plaintiff $49,167 in unpaid unallocated support. We construe these state-
ments to be concessions by the defendant that he underpaid the plaintiff
$49,167 in unallocated support under the stipulation, which amount, on the
basis of the record, necessarily included underpayments remitted by the
defendant after March 15, 2021. In other words, we conclude that the defen-
dant has abandoned his claim regarding the propriety of the contempt
adjudication vis-à-vis the plaintiff’s September 11, 2020 motion for contempt.
16
The court found that the plaintiff had $3800 in her bank accounts and
that the defendant had $22,626 in his bank accounts.
17
The defendant’s financial affidavit, dated March 3, 2022, which was
entered into evidence at trial, reflected that the current total value of the
defendant’s retirement accounts was $605,572.
18
The court entered additional property allocation orders, including order-
ing that the parties would retain their respective motor vehicles and per-
sonal property.
19
Paragraph 7 of the stipulation; see part I B of this opinion; required the
defendant, inter alia, to transfer $36,400 to the plaintiff, constituting the
cost of one year of rent and a security deposit for an apartment for the
plaintiff and the parties’ child.
20
The defendant separately claims that the court abused its discretion in
failing to credit him $85,197, representing the value of his premarital retire-
ment assets less $53,000 of the plaintiff’s premarital retirement assets that,
the court found, the parties had utilized during their marriage. Although he
concedes that allocating the parties’ premarital assets was within the ambit
of the court’s authority, the defendant maintains that awarding the plaintiff
60 percent of his premarital retirement assets was inequitable. For the same
reasons set forth in part II of this opinion, we discern no abuse of discretion
by the court in its allocation of the defendant’s premarital retirement assets.
21
We address the defendant’s distinct claim concerning a fourth motion
to reargue, motion to reargue #214.00, in part I A of this opinion.
22
Motions to reargue ##215.00, 216.00, and 217.00 also requested permis-
sion to present additional evidence. As the defendant’s counsel clarified
during oral argument before this court, the defendant is not claiming on
appeal any error by the trial court in failing to open the record and to permit
him to introduce additional evidence.
23
In his reply brief, the defendant states that ‘‘[a] substantial reason for
filing [motions to reargue ##215.00, 216.00, and 217.00] is that, rather than
schedul[ing] and hear[ing] the pending motions for contempt that remained
at the time of trial, the . . . court, without notice to the parties, decided
the [contempt] motions at the conclusion of trial, apparently based upon
the evidence presented at trial. The difficulty with that is that the defendant
had no opportunity to specifically address the motions for contempt, and
[to create] a record as needed.’’ During oral argument before this court, the
defendant’s counsel clarified that the defendant is not claiming that the
court committed error by not holding a separate hearing on the plaintiff’s
contempt motions. Thus, we do not discern the defendant to be pursuing
a claim of error on appeal contesting the court’s procedure in resolving
the plaintiff’s contempt motions. Moreover, as we noted previously in this
opinion, (1) the court asked the parties on the first day of trial to ‘‘confirm
the motions going forward,’’ (2) the plaintiff’s counsel identified six pending
contempt motions filed by the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff’s counsel referred
to the contempt motions when presenting evidence to the court throughout
the trial.