Renstrup v. Renstrup

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HEDYEH RENSTRUP v. JENS RENSTRUP
(AC 44489)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Vertefeuille, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s financial orders issued in
connection with the judgment dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff.
During the parties’ marriage, the defendant was the primary wage earner
for the family while the plaintiff remained at home and raised their two
minor children. At the time of dissolution, the defendant earned, inter
alia, a base salary and was eligible for a cash bonus targeted at 30
percent of his base salary. The defendant’s weekly net income exceeded
$4000. The trial court attributed to the plaintiff an earning capacity of
$40,000 per year, and, in light of the plaintiff’s earning capacity, a devia-
tion criterion under the Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines set
forth in the applicable regulations (§ 46b-215a-1 et seq.), the court used
that deviation in its calculation of the defendant’s child support obliga-
tion. The court added the plaintiff’s earning capacity to the defendant’s
net weekly income to arrive at a new, combined weekly income and
used the guidelines to determine a basic child support range. Rather
than adjusting the defendant’s basic child support obligation downward
from the original range to account for the plaintiff’s earning capacity,
the court ordered the defendant, the noncustodial parent, to pay a weekly
child support award of $1000 per week, which reflected a 5 percent
deviation upward from the top of the basic child support range based
on the parties’ combined weekly income. The court also ordered the
defendant to pay a supplemental child support payment equal to 17.71
percent of the after-tax amounts of any bonuses and other income he
earned. The court awarded the plaintiff alimony and a supplemental
alimony award in the amount of 17.71 percent of the after-tax amounts
of any bonuses and other income earned by the defendant in any year
in which he has an alimony obligation to the plaintiff. Held:
1. The trial court abused its discretion in calculating the defendant’s initial
child support obligation:
a. The trial court erred by increasing, rather than reducing, the defen-
dant’s obligation based on the plaintiff’s earning capacity; although the
court was permitted in its application of the deviation criteria to consider
the plaintiff’s earning capacity, its application of the criteria was inconsis-
tent with its reason for the deviation and with the principles on which
the guidelines are based, which contemplate that the noncustodial par-
ent’s basic child support obligation will account for each party’s pro rata
share of child support as calculated by the guidelines and should not
reflect the parties’ total child support obligation; moreover, once the
court decided to factor in the plaintiff’s earning capacity to determine
the parties’ child support obligations, it should have assigned at least a
portion of the joint obligation to the plaintiff based on her earning
capacity, rather than assigning the entire child support obligation to the
defendant.
b. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to pay
the plaintiff $1000 per week as basic child support as part of its initial
child support order without making the required findings to support its
application of the deviation criteria: although the court made a finding
of the presumptive child support amount in which consideration of the
plaintiff’s earning capacity erroneously justified an upward deviation in
the defendant’s basic child support obligation from $705 to $955 per
week, it did not make a specific finding to justify its further increase of
the defendant’s obligation from $955 to $1000 per week, and failed to
provide an explanation as to the deviation criteria on which it relied;
moreover, the court’s reliance on a statute (§ 46b-86) in finding that the
upward deviation from $955 to $1000 per week was permitted, as it
represented a deviation of less than 15 percent of the total amount, was
improper, as § 46b-86 governs modification of child support orders, not
initial child support orders.
2. The trial court’s supplemental child support order, which awarded the
plaintiff 17.71 percent of the defendant’s undetermined future income
above his base salary, was based on a clearly erroneous factual finding
and was in error: in the present case, although it was within the court’s
discretion to make a supplemental order with respect to income of an
indeterminate amount as the parents’ net weekly income exceeded
$4000, the error was not the amount awarded in the court’s order but,
rather, the court’s failure to provide an explicit justification as to how
the additional funds would be used for the benefit of the children and
how the award was related to the factors identified in the applicable
statute (§ 46b-84 (d)); moreover, there was no evidence in the record
to support the trial court’s factual finding that the defendant’s annual
cash bonus was ‘‘capped’’ at 30 percent of his base salary, as that finding
conflicted with the only evidence presented on that issue, the defendant’s
employment contract, and, thus, the court’s finding was clearly errone-
ous.
3. This court concluded that the trial court’s supplemental alimony award
failed for the same reason the supplemental child support award failed,
namely, because the order was based, in part, on the trial court’s errone-
ous finding that the defendant’s annual bonus was capped at 30 percent
of his annual salary; there was no evidence in the record to support the
court’s finding that the defendant’s bonus was capped at 30 percent of
his annual salary and, thus, the supplemental alimony order did not
have a reasonable basis in fact.
4. This court concluded that, because the trial court’s error with respect to
the supplemental alimony award was not severable from that court’s
property distribution, on remand, the court must reconsider the entirety
of the mosaic of financial orders: although under some circumstances
a child support award may be severable from the other financial orders,
in the present case, the court misapplied the child support guidelines
and improperly ordered supplemental child support and alimony awards
on an erroneous finding of fact, and, given the potential size of the
supplemental child support order and its link to the supplemental ali-
mony order, the court’s child support orders also were part of the mosaic
of financial orders issued by the court; accordingly, because it was
uncertain whether the court’s other financial awards would remain intact
after the court reconsidered the child support orders and the supplemen-
tal alimony order in a manner consistent with this court’s opinion,
the trial court, on remand, must reconsider all of the financial orders,
including the property distribution orders.
Argued September 13, 2022—officially released January 17, 2023

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Fairfield and tried to the court, Hon. Gerard I.
Adelman, judge trial referee; judgment dissolving the
marriage and granting certain other relief, from which
the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed in part;
further proceedings.
Campbell D. Barrett, with whom were Stacie L.
Provencher, and, on the brief, Johanna S. Katz and
Kelly A. Scott, for the appellant (defendant).
Kenneth J. Bartschi, with whom was Michael S. Tay-
lor, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The defendant, Jens Renstrup, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his mar-
riage to the plaintiff, Hedyeh Renstrup, and entering
certain financial orders. On appeal, the defendant claims
that the court improperly (1) calculated its basic child
support award, (2) issued an open-ended, uncapped
percentage based supplemental child support award,
(3) issued an open-ended, uncapped supplemental ali-
mony award, (4) based both of its supplemental awards
on a clearly erroneous finding that the defendant’s
bonus income had a ‘‘cap’’ of 30 percent of his base
salary, and (5) included certain unvested shares and
stock options in its distribution of marital property.1
We conclude that the court erred in its child support
and alimony orders and, accordingly, reverse in part
the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter
for a new trial on all financial orders.2
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of the present appeal. The defen-
dant was fifty-five years old at the time of trial. He holds
a medical degree, earned in 1991, as well as a master’s
degree in business, earned in 1993. The plaintiff was
thirty-eight years old at the time of trial. She earned a
bachelor’s degree in information technology in 2004.
In its corrected memorandum of decision, the court
found the following facts. ‘‘The parties first met each
other in Denmark in 2005, and thereafter began dating
and living together in that country. They subsequently
moved to New Jersey when the defendant accepted an
employment offer in the United States. In 2008, the
parties very briefly returned to Denmark for their wed-
ding ceremony, which took place on August 16. In 2010,
the defendant accepted an offer of employment from
. . . a pharmaceutical company. As a result, the parties
relocated to Belgium for five years. The parties had two
children born issue of the marriage while residing in
Belgium. . . .
‘‘In 2015, the parties and their children returned to the
United States when the defendant secured employment
with Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Alexion), located
in New Haven, Connecticut. The defendant was hired
as the head of the company’s global affairs. He held
that position for close to three years until the company
laid him off as part of a management change. His period
of unemployment coincided with [his] diagnosis of . . .
heart issues, and he received disability benefits for sev-
eral months. Once he had recovered, the defendant
was hired as the chief medical officer by Springworks
Therapeutics, Inc. (Springworks), a relatively new phar-
maceutical company located in Stamford, Connecticut.
Springworks went public on the NASDAQ exchange on
Friday, September 13, 2019.’’
Pursuant to the defendant’s written employment
agreement with Springworks, he was to receive a base
salary, an annual performance bonus, and incentive
equity in Springworks in the form of stock options. The
defendant’s base salary for 2019 was $403,650 and he
was eligible for a cash bonus targeted at 30 percent of
his base income, although Springworks could ‘‘make
upward adjustments in the targeted amount of [the]
annual performance bonus.’’ The defendant also
received 1,608,556 stock options. The defendant was
awarded 25 percent of his stock options on July 16, 2019,
and was entitled to receive the remaining 75 percent
in thirty-six equal monthly installments, so long as he
remained employed by Springworks. The defendant
also was awarded 92,775 shares of stock options per
the option grant dated March 28, 2019, and 620,602
stock options per the option granted April 22, 2019,
with a vesting commencement date of April 22, 2019.
Pursuant to the public offering of Springworks, at the
time of trial the defendant had rights to 244,424 shares,
14,097 stock options, and 94,302 stock options in
Springworks’ publicly traded stock. In addition to
income from employment, the defendant also received
annual income from a 25 percent ownership of a real
estate investment property. The plaintiff had not
worked outside of the home since March, 2009.3
On August 22, 2017, the plaintiff commenced the
underlying dissolution action against the defendant.
The matter was tried to the court, Hon. Gerard I. Adel-
man, judge trial referee, over the course of four days,
beginning on August 27, 2019, and concluding on Sep-
tember 18, 2019.4
In its memorandum of decision,5 the court dissolved
the parties’ marriage and entered child custody and
financial orders.6 As to custody, the court awarded the
parties joint legal custody of their two minor children
and ordered that the children’s primary residence be
with the plaintiff. As to child support, the court ordered
the defendant to pay the plaintiff (1) basic child support
in the amount of $1000 per week and (2) supplemental
child support equal to 17.71 percent of the after-tax
amounts of any bonuses and other income earned by
the defendant.
The court awarded the plaintiff alimony for a period
of ten years, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff
$1750 per week for the first 104 weeks, $1500 per week
for the next 104 weeks, and $1000 per week for the
remaining 312 weeks. In addition, the court ordered the
defendant to pay the plaintiff supplemental alimony in
the amount of 17.71 percent of the after-tax amounts
of any bonuses and other income earned by the defen-
dant in any year in which he has an alimony obligation
to the plaintiff.
In dividing the marital property, the court determined
that the defendant’s unvested Springworks shares and
stock options were marital property subject to distribu-
tion. The court awarded the plaintiff ‘‘50 percent of [the
defendant’s] remaining unvested Springworks stock, or
91,656 unvested shares, and 60 percent . . . of 14,097
stock options dated March 29, 2019, and 60 percent of
his 94,302 stock options dated April 22, 2019 . . . more
specifically 8458 and 56,581.’’ The court further ordered
that, if the defendant’s employment with Springworks
terminated before all of the unvested shares or stock
options to which he was entitled pursuant to his employ-
ment agreement vested, ‘‘then there shall be a rebutta-
ble presumption that any employment that the defen-
dant subsequently obtains with a new employer includes
compensation to the defendant for his Springworks
shares and/or options, and the defendant shall be obli-
gated to pay to the plaintiff an amount equal to the value
of the plaintiff’s interest in the [unvested] Springworks
shares and/or options as if they had vested in full.’’ This
appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as
necessary.
‘‘The standard of review in domestic relations cases
is well established. [T]his court will not disturb trial
court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal
discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in
the facts. . . . As has often been explained, the founda-
tion for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly
advantageous position to assess the personal factors
significant to a domestic relations case . . . . In
determining whether a trial court has abused its broad
discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every
reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of
its action. . . . Notwithstanding the great deference
accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a
trial court’s ruling . . . may be reversed if, in the exer-
cise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong
standard of law. . . . The question of whether, and to
what extent, the child support guidelines apply, how-
ever, is a question of law over which this court should
exercise plenary review.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Zheng v. Xia, 204 Conn. App.
302, 309, 253 A.3d 69 (2021); see also Dowling v. Szym-
czak, 309 Conn. 390, 399, 72 A.3d 1 (2013). Furthermore,
although the trial court is vested with broad discretion
in domestic relations matters, with respect to child sup-
port, ‘‘the parameters of the court’s discretion have
been somewhat limited by the factors set forth in the
child support guidelines.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Colbert v. Carr, 140 Conn. App. 229, 240, 57
A.3d 878, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926, 64 A.3d 333 (2013).
I
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred
in crafting its child support orders. Specifically, the
defendant claims that the court improperly (1) calcu-
lated his basic child support obligation by failing to
allocate properly the total amount of child support
among the parties as required by the child support
guidelines, (2) deviated from the child support guide-
lines without making the requisite findings, and (3)
ordered an open-ended, uncapped percentage based
supplemental child support award. We agree with all
of the defendant’s claims.
We begin with the child support guidelines; Regs.,
Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 et seq.; and our case
law interpreting the guidelines. General Statutes § 46b-
84 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Upon or subsequent
to the . . . dissolution of any marriage . . . the par-
ents of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain
the child according to their respective abilities, if the
child is in need of maintenance. Any post judgment
procedure afforded by chapter 906 shall be available
to secure the present and future financial interests of
a party in connection with a final order for the periodic
payment of child support. . . .
‘‘(d) In determining whether a child is in need of
maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of
the parents to provide such maintenance and the
amount thereof, the court shall consider the age, health,
station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and
sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employ-
ability of each of the parents, and the age, health, sta-
tion, occupation, educational status and expectation,
amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate and needs of the child. . . .’’
General Statutes § 46b-215a provides for a commis-
sion to oversee the establishment of child support
guidelines, which must be updated every four years,
‘‘to ensure the appropriateness of criteria for the estab-
lishment of child support awards.’’ General Statutes
§ 46b-215b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The . . .
guidelines issued pursuant to section 46b-215a . . .
and in effect on the date of the support determination
shall be considered in all determinations of child sup-
port award amounts . . . . In all such determinations,
there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount
of such awards which resulted from the application of
such guidelines is the amount to be ordered. A specific
finding on the record at a hearing, or in a written judg-
ment, order or memorandum of decision of the court,
that the application of the guidelines would be inequita-
ble or inappropriate in a particular case, as determined
under the deviation criteria established by the Commis-
sion for Child Support Guidelines under section 46b-
215a, shall be required in order to rebut the presumption
in such case.’’ See also Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn.
80, 118, 995 A.2d 1 (2010) (‘‘[t]he . . . guidelines shall
be considered in all determinations of child support
amounts within the state’’ (emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The guidelines consist of ‘‘the rules, schedule and
worksheet established under [the applicable sections]
of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies for
the determination of an appropriate child support
award . . . .’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-
1 (5). The guidelines are accompanied by a preamble
that is not part of the regulations but is intended to
assist in their interpretation. See Child Support and
Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble. The preamble
states that the primary purpose of the guidelines is
‘‘[t]o provide uniform procedures for establishing an
adequate level of support for children’’; id., § (c) (1), p.
v; and ‘‘[t]o make awards more equitable by ensuring
the consistent treatment of persons in similar circum-
stances.’’ Id., § (c) (2), p. v.
Moreover, ‘‘[§] 46b-215a-5c (a) of the Regulations of
Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part:
‘The current support . . . contribution amounts calcu-
lated under [the child support guidelines] . . . are pre-
sumed to be the correct amounts to be ordered. The
presumption regarding each such amount may be rebut-
ted by a specific finding on the record that such amount
would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular
case. . . . Any such finding shall state the amount that
would have been required under such sections and
include a factual finding to justify the variance. Only
the deviation criteria stated in . . . subdivisions (1) to
(6), inclusive, of subsection (b) of this section . . .
shall establish sufficient bases for such findings.’7
‘‘Our courts have interpreted this statutory and regu-
latory language as requiring three distinct findings in
order for a court to properly deviate from the child
support guidelines in fashioning a child support order:
(1) a finding of the presumptive child support amount
pursuant to the guidelines; (2) a specific finding that
application of such guidelines would be inequitable and
inappropriate; and (3) an explanation as to which devia-
tion criteria the court is relying on to justify the devia-
tion.’’ (Footnote added; footnote omitted.) Righi v.
Righi, 172 Conn. App. 427, 436–37, 160 A.3d 1094
(2017).
In Dowling v. Szymczak, supra, 309 Conn. 390, our
Supreme Court provided clear guidance for determining
child support obligations in high income situations. The
court explained that ‘‘the schedule sets forth a presump-
tive percentage and resultant amount corresponding
to specific levels of combined net weekly income; the
schedule begins at $50 and continues in progressively
higher $10 increments, terminating at $4000. . . . This
court has recognized that the guidelines nonetheless
apply to combined net weekly income in excess of that
maximum amount. . . . Indeed, the regulations direct
that, [w]hen the parents’ combined net weekly income
exceeds [$4000], child support awards shall be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, and the current support
prescribed at the [$4000] net weekly income level shall
be the minimum presumptive amount. . . .
‘‘While the regulations clearly demarcate the pre-
sumptive minimum amount of the award in high income
cases, they do not address the maximum permissible
amount that may be assigned under a proper exercise
of the court’s discretion. . . . [T]his court has
remained mindful that the guidelines . . . indicate that
such awards should follow the principle expressly
acknowledged in the preamble [to the guidelines] and
reflected in the schedule that the child support obliga-
tion as a percentage of the combined net weekly income
should decline as the income level rises. . . . We there-
fore have determined that child support payments . . .
should presumptively not exceed the [maximum] per-
cent [set forth in the schedule] when the combined net
weekly income of the family exceeds $4000, and, in
most cases, should reflect less than that amount. . . .
‘‘Either the presumptive ceiling of income percentage
or presumptive floor of dollar amount on any given
child support obligation, however, may be rebutted by
application of the deviation criteria enumerated in the
guidelines and by the statutory factors set forth in § 46b-
84 (d). . . . In order to justify deviation from this
range, the court must first make a finding on the record
as to why the guidelines were inequitable or inappropri-
ate . . . . Thus, this court unambiguously has stated
that, when a family’s combined net weekly income
exceeds $4000, the court should treat the percentage
set forth in the schedule at the highest income level as
the presumptive ceiling on the child support obligation,
subject to rebuttal by application of the deviation crite-
ria enumerated in the guidelines, as well as the statutory
factors described in § 46b-84 (d).’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 400–402; see also Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-
215a-2c (a) (2).8
The guidelines also permit courts, in appropriate
cases, to enter ‘‘a supplemental order . . . to pay a
percentage of a future lump sum payment, such as a
bonus. Such supplemental orders shall be entered when
a specific dollar amount of the future lump sum pay-
ment has not been ordered and such payment is of an
indeterminate amount, subject to clauses (i) and (ii) in
this subparagraph . . . (ii) for combined net weekly
incomes over $4000, the order shall be determined on a
case by case basis consistent with applicable statutes.’’
Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2c (c) (1) (B).
‘‘A supplemental order treats the unknown future lump
sum payment separately from the basic current support
order and is intended to account only for those
instances in which the parties have knowledge of an
anticipated future lump sum payment of an unknown
amount, such as a bonus.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gentile v. Carneiro, 107 Conn. App. 630, 643,
946 A.2d 871 (2008).
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the defendant’s claims. The court
awarded the parties joint legal custody of their two
children and granted the plaintiff primary physical cus-
tody of them. The court consequently turned to the
calculation of the defendant’s child support obligation.
Because the plaintiff was not employed, the court first
calculated the basic child support range using only the
defendant’s income. The court, relying on the defen-
dant’s net weekly base salary from Springworks plus
the weekly income he receives from his 25 percent
interest in a real estate investment, determined that the
parties’ joint net weekly income, assuming no income
for the plaintiff, was $4630. In calculating basic child
support, the court did not consider any bonuses the
defendant might receive from Springworks, which the
court described as both ‘‘a maximum annual cash bonus
of 30 percent’’ and ‘‘an annual cash bonus capped at
30 percent of the [defendant’s] base salary.’’ The court
stated that it would ‘‘use the defendant’s net weekly
income from any bonuses and other sources to calculate
a supplemental child support obligation as a percentage
of all other income.’’
Because the combined income the court calculated
for the purpose of basic child support was greater than
$4000, the court, using the guidelines, calculated a range
of basic child support, the low end of which was the
‘‘dollar amount shown [in the guidelines] at the $4000
level for two children’’ and the high end of which was
‘‘the percentage amount at that level for two children,
i.e., 17.71 percent.’’ Using this methodology, the court
calculated a range of basic child support between $708
and $820 per week.
The court then concluded that it should deviate from
the guidelines because the plaintiff has an earning
capacity of ‘‘$40,000 gross per annum.’’ The court, in
light of the plaintiff’s earning capacity, found ‘‘that it
would be inequitable and inappropriate to award the
presumptive amount.’’ The court then added the plain-
tiff’s earning capacity to the defendant’s net weekly
income of $4630 to arrive at a new combined weekly
‘‘income’’ of $5390. The court then used the same meth-
odology it had originally used in applying the guidelines
to determine a basic child support range. The bottom
of the range remained at $708 per week, but the top of
the range increased to ‘‘$955 per week (17.71 [percent]
of $5390).’’ Rather than adjusting the defendant’s basic
child support obligation downward from the original
range it had calculated to account for the plaintiff’s
earning capacity, the court ‘‘in its discretion’’ ordered
the defendant to pay weekly basic child support of
$1000, which the court described as ‘‘a deviation of
less than 5 percent.’’ The court further ordered the
defendant to ‘‘make a weekly supplemental child sup-
port payment equal to 17.71 percent of the after-tax
amounts of any bonuses and other income.’’
A
The defendant first claims that the court abused its
discretion in calculating his child support obligation by
increasing, rather than reducing, his obligation based
on the plaintiff’s earning capacity. We agree.
The child support guidelines set forth a worksheet
that provides specific instructions for calculating child
support. The worksheet explains that ‘‘each parent’s
share of the basic child support obligation is determined
by calculating each parent’s share of the combined net
weekly income . . . and multiplying the result for each
parent by the basic child support obligation.’’ Regs.,
Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2c (a) (4). The guide-
lines specifically provide that the court should: ‘‘(B)
Determine each parent’s percentage share of the com-
bined net weekly income by dividing the [net weekly
income] amount for each parent by the [total combined
net weekly income] and multiplying by one hundred
percent. . . . (C) Multiply [the amount as calculated
in (B), rounded to the nearest whole percentage] for
each parent by the [basic child support obligation (from
the Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations)]. . . .
These amounts are each parent’s share of the basic
child support obligation.’’ Id., § 46b-215a-2c (a) (4).
Accordingly, the child support guidelines specifically
contemplate that the noncustodial parent’s basic child
support obligation will account for each party’s pro rata
share of child support as calculated by the guidelines.
Put another way, the noncustodial parent’s child sup-
port obligation should not reflect the parties’ total child
support obligation as calculated by the guidelines, but
only each parent’s pro rata share of the total.
The plaintiff does not dispute that this pro rata meth-
odology must be followed when the child support calcu-
lations are based on both parties’ income. Rather, she
argues: ‘‘Unlike the calculation of the presumptive
amount of support based on income, § 46b-215a-5c (b)
(1) (B) [of the regulations], which delineates earning
capacity as a deviation criterion, does not direct the
court in how that deviation criteria should be applied.
Consequently, the court, in exercising its discretion
afforded by the deviation criteria and § 46b-84 (d), was
not . . . bound by the presumptive amount of support
pursuant to the guidelines.’’ We are not persuaded.
We recognize that ‘‘[i]t is well established that the
trial court may under appropriate circumstances in a
marital dissolution proceeding base financial awards
[pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46b-82 (a) and 46b-86]
on the earning capacity of the parties rather than on
actual earned income.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn.
105, 113–14, 70 A.3d 13 (2013). ‘‘A party’s earning capac-
ity is a deviation criterion under the guidelines, and,
therefore, a court must specifically invoke the criterion
and specifically explain its justification for calculating a
party’s child support obligation by virtue of the criterion
instead of by virtue of the procedures outlined in the
guidelines.’’ Fox v. Fox, 152 Conn. App. 611, 633, 99 A.3d
1206, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 945, 103 A.3d 977 (2014).
In the present case, the defendant asked the court
to deviate from the guidelines because the plaintiff had
engineering degrees from a prestigious university and,
hence, a significant earning capacity. Thus, the defen-
dant sought to reduce his child support obligation,
which otherwise would be based solely on his income,
by considering the plaintiff’s ability to earn income to
contribute to the financial support of their children. The
court, after hearing testimony regarding the plaintiff’s
earning capacity, found that the plaintiff had a gross
earning capacity of approximately $40,000 per year. The
court further found ‘‘that it would be inappropriate and
inequitable to perform the child support calculations
with no income attributed to the plaintiff.’’ Given these
findings, the expected outcome would be that the court
deviate from the guidelines downward to calculate the
defendant’s basic child support obligation. Applying the
principles behind the guidelines, once the court decided
to factor in the plaintiff’s earning capacity to determine
the parties’ child support obligations, it should have
assigned at least a portion of the joint obligation to
the plaintiff based on her earning capacity. In fact, the
record reflects that, after the court found that the plain-
tiff had an earning capacity of $40,000 per year, it treated
that figure as income to recalculate the parties’ joint
child support obligations. When including this addi-
tional ‘‘income’’ in its calculation, it increased the par-
ties’ joint basic child support obligation under the guide-
lines from $820 per week to $955 per week. Rather than
determining each party’s pro rata share of that amount,
however, the court simply assigned the entire child
support obligation to the defendant.
Although the court was permitted to deviate from
the guidelines to consider the plaintiff’s earning capac-
ity, its application of the deviation in this case was
inconsistent with its reason for the deviation and incon-
sistent with the principles on which the guidelines are
based. Consequently, the court abused its discretion in
the way it determined the defendant’s basic child sup-
port obligation given its findings that the plaintiff had
an earning capacity of $40,000 per year and that it would
be inappropriate and inequitable not to consider that
earning capacity when calculating the parties’ basic
child support obligations.
B
The defendant next claims that the court ‘‘com-
pounded [its calculation error] by deviating upward yet
again, this time based only on [its] ‘discretion.’ ’’ In
particular, the defendant claims that the court failed to
provide a justification for its departure from the top
end of its recalculated basic child support range of $955
per week to the $1000 per week it ordered the defendant
to pay. As noted previously in this opinion, the court
used the plaintiff’s earning capacity and the defendant’s
income to calculate a support range of $708 to $955
per week. After assigning this entire support obligation
to the defendant, the court ordered the defendant to
pay an amount above the upper end of the range, stating:
‘‘In its discretion, the court orders the defendant to pay
$1000 per week as basic child support, a deviation of
less than 5 percent.’’ As a result, the defendant’s child
support obligation was approximately 21.6 percent of
his net weekly income, 3.89 percent above the presump-
tive ceiling of 17.71 percent set forth in the guidelines.9
The court stated that ‘‘[t]he $45 difference between
the calculated high end of the guideline amount for a
family that exceeds the $4000 per week net combined
income represents a 5 percent increase over the $955
amount. The court has the discretion to increase or
decrease the calculated amount as long as it does not
exceed 15 percent of the original order amount.’’ The
defendant argues that the court had no such discretion,
in the absence of a finding—which the court did not
make—that the deviation is justified by one of the devia-
tion criteria set forth in § 46b-215a-5c (b) of the regula-
tions. The plaintiff argues that the court’s finding that
her earning capacity warranted a departure from the
guidelines supports the upward deviation in the court’s
basic child support order. We conclude that the court’s
second upward deviation, in the absence of a finding
that it was justified by one of the regulatory criteria,
was in error.
First, it appears that when the court stated that it had
the discretion to increase or decrease the presumptive
basic child support amount, so long as it did not exceed
15 percent of that amount, it was relying on § 46b-86,
governing modification of alimony and child support
orders, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘There shall be
a rebuttable presumption that any deviation of less than
fifteen percent from the child support guidelines is not
substantial and any deviation of fifteen percent or more
from the guidelines is substantial. . . .’’ General Stat-
utes § 46b-86 (a). Section 46b-86, however, is not appli-
cable to the present case, in which the court was enter-
ing the initial child support award. That a certain
deviation from the child support guidelines is not ‘‘sub-
stantial,’’ such that it may justify a modification of child
support, does not mean the court may disregard the
guidelines when ordering an initial child support obli-
gation.
Second, § 46b-215a-5c (a) of the regulations provides
in relevant part: ‘‘The current support . . . contribu-
tion amounts calculated under [the child support guide-
lines] . . . are presumed to be the correct amounts
to be ordered. The presumption regarding each such
amount may be rebutted by a specific finding on the
record that such amount would be inequitable or inap-
propriate in a particular case. . . . Any such finding
shall state the amount that would have been required
under such sections and include a factual finding to
justify the variance. Only the deviation criteria stated
in . . . subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of subsection
(b) of this section . . . shall establish sufficient bases
for such findings.’’ It is firmly established that ‘‘when
a family’s combined net weekly income exceeds $4000,
the court should treat the percentage set forth in the
schedule at the highest income level as the presumptive
ceiling on the child support obligation, subject to rebut-
tal by application of the deviation criteria enumerated
in the guidelines, as well as the statutory factors
described in § 46b-84 (d).’’ Maturo v. Maturo, supra,
296 Conn. 106. Our case law makes clear that said
criteria must be explicitly stated in the court’s analysis.
See Zheng v. Xia, supra, 204 Conn. App. 311 (‘‘any
deviation from the schedule or the principles on which
the guidelines are based must be accompanied by the
court’s explanation as to why the guidelines are inequi-
table or inappropriate and why the deviation is neces-
sary to meet the needs of the child’’ (emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Fox v. Fox,
supra, 152 Conn. App. 633. Thus, for the court to deviate
as it did, it was required to make three distinct findings:
‘‘(1) a finding of the presumptive child support amount
pursuant to the guidelines; (2) a specific finding that
application of such guidelines would be inequitable and
inappropriate; and (3) an explanation as to which devia-
tion criteria the court is relying on to justify the devia-
tion.’’ Righi v. Righi, supra, 172 Conn. App. 436–37. A
court’s failure to substantiate its decision to adjust the
presumptive basic child support order by making the
explicit findings in the record that are expressly
required by the guidelines constitutes an incorrect
application of the law and, therefore, an abuse of discre-
tion. See Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 367, 710
A.2d 717 (1998); see also Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos,
297 Conn. 358, 366, 370, 999 A.2d 721 (2010) (trial court
abused its discretion in awarding child support when
it did not make finding on record as to why guidelines
were inequitable or inappropriate and its application
of deviation criteria was improper); Maturo v. Maturo,
supra, 296 Conn. 89, 99–101 (same); Zheng v. Xia, supra,
204 Conn. App. 308, 312 (trial court abused its discretion
when its reason for deviating from child support guide-
lines failed as matter of law and court made no other
specific finding as to why child support guidelines were
inequitable and inappropriate).
In the present case, although the court made a finding
of the presumptive child support amount and stated
that the plaintiff’s earning capacity justified an upward
deviation in the defendant’s basic child support obliga-
tion to $955 per week, it did not make a specific finding
to justify its further increase of the defendant’s obliga-
tion to $1000 per week. Aside from referencing its ‘‘dis-
cretion,’’ the court failed to provide an explanation as
to which deviation criteria it was relying on to justify
its second upward deviation from $955 to $1000 per
week. Therefore, we conclude that the court abused its
discretion when it ordered the defendant to pay the
plaintiff $1000 per week as basic child support without
making the required findings.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s argu-
ment that the court’s finding that her earning capacity
warranted a deviation from the guidelines was sufficient
to justify any departure from the revised guideline
amount of $955 per week to $1000 per week. First, for
the reasons set forth in part I A of this opinion, use of the
plaintiff’s earning capacity to increase the defendant’s
child support obligation is illogical. Second, the court
did not base its upward deviation from $955 to $1000 on
the plaintiff’s earning capacity. The plaintiff’s earning
capacity was used only to justify a departure from the
guidelines from the top end of the range of $820 per
week to $955 per week. The court’s further adjustment
to $1000 per week appears to be based on the court’s
erroneous reliance on § 46b-86.
C
The defendant next claims that the court improperly
ordered ‘‘an open-ended, uncapped percentage based
supplemental child support award.’’ In particular, the
defendant claims that the order ‘‘conflicts with [our]
Supreme Court’s holding in Maturo v. Maturo, [supra,
296 Conn. 108] that . . . a supplemental award ‘must
be capped at a sum bearing some rational relation to
the ‘‘estate and needs of the child.’’ ’ ’’ (Emphasis omit-
ted.) The plaintiff disagrees, claiming that the court
followed the applicable guidelines in ordering the defen-
dant to pay 17.71 percent of his net bonus, which was
capped at 30 percent of his annual salary.
Our review of the record and applicable principles
leads us to conclude that the court’s supplemental child
support order, awarding the plaintiff 17.71 percent of
the defendant’s undetermined future income above his
base salary, was based on a clearly erroneous finding
and otherwise was in error.
1
In adjudicating child support cases, our courts have
been reminded to avoid wealth transfers when awarding
child support. In Maturo, for example, our Supreme
Court expressly warned against wealth transfers or dis-
guised alimony awards, explaining that ‘‘[t]he effect of
unrestrained child support awards in high income cases
is a potential windfall that transfers wealth from one
spouse to another or from one spouse to the children
under the guise of child support.’’ (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 105.
In Maturo, the dissolution court awarded a supple-
mental child support award of 20 percent of the defen-
dant’s indeterminate annual bonus but failed to provide
any justification related to the needs of the children.
Id., 88–89. Our Supreme Court determined that it was
error for the dissolution court to fail to provide ‘‘any
explicit justification for the award of bonus income that
was related to the financial or nonfinancial needs or
characteristics of the children under . . . § 46b-84 (d)
. . . . In fact, there is no evidence that the court consid-
ered anything other than the defendant’s income and
earning capacity in making the child support award.
Thus, absent a finding as to how the additional funds
would be used for the benefit of the children and how
the award was related to the factors identified in § 46b-
84 (d), we conclude that the court exceeded its legiti-
mate discretion.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 103.
Further, in Maturo, our Supreme Court distinguished
between two types of bonus income, stating: ‘‘[W]hen
there is a proven, routine consistency in annual bonus
income, as when a bonus is based on an established
percentage of a party’s steady income, an additional
award of child support that represents a percentage of
the net cash bonus also may be appropriate if justified
by the needs of the child. When there is a history of
wildly fluctuating bonuses, however, or a reasonable
expectation that future bonuses will vary substantially
. . . an award based on a fixed percentage of the net
cash bonus is impermissible unless it can be linked to
the child’s characteristics and demonstrated needs.’’
(Emphasis in original.) Id., 106.
In the present case, the defendant does not dispute
that his bonus income should be considered in determin-
ing his child support obligation. He also does not argue
that the court should not have ordered any supplemen-
tal child support order tied to his bonuses and additional
income. Rather, he claims that the court improperly
entered an open-ended supplemental order without
making any findings that the order was related to the
characteristics and needs of the children.
The court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff
‘‘a supplemental child support amount equal to 17.71
percent of all after-tax income from bonuses and other
sources, pursuant to the provisions of . . . § 46b-84.’’
Because the parties’ combined net weekly income,
using the defendant’s base salary income alone,
exceeded $4000, it was within the court’s discretion to
make a supplemental order with respect to income of
an indeterminate amount, as such orders in cases in
which the net weekly income exceeds $4000 are to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. See Regs., Conn.
State Agencies § 46b-215a-2c (c) (1) (B) (ii). In addition,
the percentage used, 17.71, was consistent with that
called for in the schedule for net weekly incomes
greater than $4000.
The court, however, failed to provide any explicit
justification for the award of bonus income that was
related to the financial or nonfinancial needs or charac-
teristics of the children under § 46b-84 (d). The court
simply stated that the supplemental award was ‘‘pursu-
ant to the provisions of . . . § 46b-84.’’ Therefore, in
the absence of a finding as to how the additional funds
would be used for the benefit of the children and how
the award was related to the factors identified in § 46b-
84 (d), we conclude that the court exceeded its legiti-
mate discretion. See Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296
Conn. 103; see also Barcelo v. Barcelo, 158 Conn. App.
201, 217, 118 A.3d 657 (‘‘[w]e conclude that the court
erred by failing to make explicit findings as to how the
additional funds would benefit the children and how
the supplemental award was related to the factors iden-
tified in § 46b-84 (d)’’), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 910, 123
A.3d 882 (2015).
The plaintiff argues that, to the extent that our
Supreme Court’s decisions in Maturo and Dowling pre-
cluded open-ended supplemental child support orders,
they have been superseded by the 2015 amendments
to the guidelines. She notes that the preamble to the
amended guidelines specifically provides in relevant
part: ‘‘In recognition of recent Supreme and Appellate
Court case law addressing households with combined
net weekly income of over $4,000 and further in recogni-
tion of the lack of sufficient economic data, courts
should exercise their discretion consistent with the
income scope as set forth in [§] 46b-215a-2c (a) (2) [of
the regulations] on a case by case basis where the
combined income exceeds the range of the schedule.
When the combined net weekly income exceeds $4,000,
the presumptive support amount shall range from the
dollar amount at the $4,000 level to the percentage
amount at that level applied to the combined net weekly
income consistent with statutory criteria, including
[General Statutes] § 46b-84 (d). . . . In exercising dis-
cretion in any given case, the magistrate or trial judge
should consider evidence submitted by the parties
regarding actual past and projected child support
expenditures to determine the appropriate order.’’ Child
Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble,
§ (e) (5), p. ix. She further relies on § (b) (6) of the
preamble, which provides: ‘‘Future income of unknown
amounts such as bonuses and other incentive based
compensation that is awarded in future years, or vests
in future years, or can be exercised in future years, is
required to be part of the child support award to be
included in the award for the year in which such
amounts are includible in income for tax purposes
through the use of supplemental orders.’’ Id., § (b) (6),
p. iii.
The plaintiff argues that the preamble makes clear
that the commission was fully aware of Maturo and
Dowling when it revised the guidelines, and ‘‘[t]hat the
commission declined to include a requirement for a cap
. . . indicates that the commission concluded such [a
requirement was] not necessary to accomplish the pur-
pose of the guidelines.’’ She further argues that the
court precisely followed the direction in the preamble
by including the defendant’s unknown future bonuses
in the supplemental order. We are not persuaded.
We agree with the plaintiff that, as to high income
families, the current guidelines no longer follow the
principle that the percentage of family income expected
to be spent on childcare declines as income rises. As
to that general principle, which the guidelines still fol-
low for families with income less than $4000 per week,
the preamble to the guidelines provides: ‘‘[T]he commis-
sion [has] no economic data that supports a conclusion
that this pattern continues when parents’ net weekly
income exceeds $4,000. This commission therefore
decided to not extend either the range of the schedule or
the application of the concept of declining percentages
beyond its current $4,000 upper limit.’’ Child Support
Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble, § (d), p. vi.
Thus, the trial court was not required, as the defendant
suggests, to use a declining percentage in calculating
the defendant’s supplemental support obligation. As
noted previously in this opinion, the court had the dis-
cretion to enter a supplemental order based on the
applicable percentage of 17.71 percent. Nevertheless,
the issue is not the amount awarded in the court’s order
but, instead, the court’s failure to provide an explicit
justification for entering it as required by Maturo. See
Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 103.
There is no indication that the commission intended
to overrule Maturo’s statutory analysis that was the
basis of its requirement that the court must make
explicit findings of the connection between the supple-
mental order and the needs and characteristics of the
children. To the contrary, the commission stated that
it was providing guidance ‘‘[i]n recognition’’ of recent
cases from the Supreme Court and this court. See Child
Support Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble, § (e)
(5), p. ix. We acknowledge that ‘‘[t]he task of promulgat-
ing provisions to cover [high income] situation[s] lies
with the legislature or its commission, [and] not with
the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling
v. Szymczak, supra, 309 Conn. 402. Indeed, as the court
noted in Dowling: ‘‘It may be that the commission,
which updates the guidelines every four years . . . will
account for the exceptionally affluent families in this
state in future revisions to the guidelines. Until that
day, however, the uppermost multiplier will provide the
presumptive ceiling that will guide the trial courts in
determining an appropriate child support award ‘on a
case-by-case basis’; Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-
215a-2b (a) (2); without the need to resort to deviation
criteria. We underscore, however, that, in exercising
discretion in any given case, the magistrate or trial
court should consider evidence submitted by the parties
regarding actual past and projected child support
expenditures to determine the appropriate award, with
due regard for the principle that such expenditures
generally decline as income rises.’’ (Emphasis omitted;
citations omitted.) Dowling v. Szymczak, supra, 402–
403.
It appears that the commission, in response to
Maturo and Dowling, studied whether the principle that
expenditures generally decline as income rises applied
with respect to high income families, and concluded
that it did not. Consequently, the commission provided
that explicit guidance in the preamble to the guidelines.
Significantly though, the commission did nothing to
suggest that trial courts do not need to make the explicit
finding as to the needs of the children required by
Maturo. Furthermore, the guidelines require that any
supplemental order be ‘‘consistent with applicable stat-
utes.’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2c (c) (1)
(B) (ii). In Maturo, our Supreme Court premised its
conclusion that a supplemental child support order
must be tied to the needs of the child on § 46b-84 (d),
which requires a court to ‘‘consider various characteris-
tics and needs of the child in determining whether sup-
port is required, the amount of support to be awarded
and the respective abilities of the parents to provide
such support.’’ Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 95.
There is nothing in the current guidelines that suggests
that the commission disagreed with the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of § 46b-84 (d) when it required
that any supplemental child support order be consistent
with applicable statutes.
Consequently, the court abused its discretion in issu-
ing its supplemental child support order without making
an explicit finding connecting it to the characteristics
or needs of the children.10
2
The defendant also claims that the court’s finding
that the defendant’s eligibility for an annual cash bonus
was ‘‘capped’’ at 30 percent of his base salary is clearly
erroneous. The defendant argues that this finding
‘‘clearly infected [the court’s] alimony and child support
supplemental award[s]’’ and, accordingly, those supple-
mental orders must be reversed. The plaintiff argues
that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support
the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s ‘‘eligibility
for an annual cash bonus [was] capped at 30 percent
of his base salary,’’ and therefore the supplemental
award was not uncapped. We agree with the defendant.
‘‘[T]his court will not disturb trial court orders unless
the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its
findings have no reasonable basis in the facts.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Zheng v. Xia, supra, 204
Conn. App. 309. ‘‘The trial court’s findings [of fact] are
binding upon this court unless they are clearly errone-
ous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the
record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erro-
neous when there is no evidence in the record to sup-
port it . . . or when although there is evidence to sup-
port it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Budrawich v. Budrawich, 200 Conn. App. 229,
246, 240 A.3d 688 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 909,
244 A.3d 561 (2021).
It is clear from the court’s reasoning that the defen-
dant’s ‘‘capped’’ bonus was a factor it considered in
crafting the child support order. In determining the
defendant’s income, the court stated: ‘‘The defendant’s
income is a little more complicated to calculate. As
previously stated, he is presently employed by
Springworks . . . . His base salary for 2019 is
$403,650 and he is eligible to receive a maximum
annual cash bonus of 30 percent. . . . The court will
use the defendant’s net weekly income from any
bonuses and other sources to calculate a supplemental
child support obligation as a percentage of all other
income.’’ (Emphasis added.) In describing the defen-
dant’s income, the court also described his bonus from
Springworks as ‘‘capped at 30 percent of his base sal-
ary.’’ The court then ordered ‘‘[t]he defendant [to] pay
to the plaintiff a base child support amount of $1000
per week for the two minor children, plus a supplemen-
tal child support amount equal to 17.71 percent of all
after-tax income from bonuses and other sources, pur-
suant to the provisions of . . . § 46b-84.’’ (Footnote
omitted.)
Affording the appropriate deference to the court’s
findings of fact, we conclude that there was no evidence
in the record to support the court’s finding that the
defendant’s annual cash bonus was capped at 30 per-
cent of his base salary. The defendant’s employment
contract with Springworks stated: ‘‘You will be eligible
to receive an annual performance bonus. The Company
will target the bonus at up to 30 [percent] of your annual
salary rate. The actual bonus percentage is discretion-
ary and will be subject to the Company’s assessment
of your performance, as well as the business conditions
at the company. The bonus will also be subject to your
employment for the full period covered by the bonus,
approval by and adjustment at the discretion of the
Company’s board of directors and the terms of any
applicable bonus plan. . . . The Company also may
make upward adjustments in the targeted amount of
your annual performance bonus.’’ (Emphasis added.)
There was no further evidence or testimony contra-
dicting the employment contract. Accordingly, the
court’s factual finding that the defendant’s annual bonus
was ‘‘capped at 30 percent of his base salary’’ conflicts
with the only evidence on the issue. Thus, the finding
was clearly erroneous.
Therefore, the court’s supplemental child support order
did not have a reasonable basis in fact. We thus con-
clude that the supplemental child support order can-
not stand.
II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
ordered an open-ended, uncapped percentage based
supplemental alimony award. Specifically, the defen-
dant argues that the supplemental alimony award fails
for the same reason the supplemental child support
award fails, namely, the order was based on a clearly
erroneous finding of fact.11 We agree.
In fashioning alimony awards, the court is required
to consider the criteria set forth in § 46b-82 (a), which
provides in relevant part: ‘‘In determining whether ali-
mony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount
of the award, the court shall consider the evidence
presented by each party and shall consider the length
of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of
the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation,
amount and sources of income, earning capacity, voca-
tional skills, education, employability, estate and needs
of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the
court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the
case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children
has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of
such parent’s securing employment.’’ Further, the fail-
ure to include bonuses in the determination of income
is error. See Bartel v. Bartel, 98 Conn. App. 706, 712–13,
911 A.2d 1134 (2006).
In the present case, the court ordered that, ‘‘[i]n addi-
tion to the base alimony previously ordered, the defen-
dant shall pay to the plaintiff, as supplemental alimony,
17.71 percent of all after-tax income from his employ-
ment above his base salary in any year in which he
has an alimony obligation to the plaintiff.’’ The court
reasoned that ‘‘[a] period of [ten] years of alimony
would assist the plaintiff to enter the work world in a
meaningful way especially while the two minor children
were young. A declining amount would encourage the
plaintiff to seek significant employment as the children
grew older and no longer needed as much daily care.
A supplemental order based on bonus payments would
fairly assist the plaintiff without burdening the defen-
dant with an excessive weekly order based on amounts
paid only once a year or sporadically.’’
As stated previously, the court’s supplemental ali-
mony award was based, at least in part, on its finding
that the defendant’s annual bonus was capped at 30
percent of his annual salary. For the reasons set forth
in part I C 2 of this opinion, that finding was clearly
erroneous. Thus, the court’s supplemental alimony
order did not have a reasonable basis in fact. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the supplemental alimony order
must be reversed.
III
We turn now to the appropriate relief. ‘‘Individual
financial orders in a dissolution action are part of the
carefully crafted mosaic that comprises the entire asset
reallocation plan. . . . Under the mosaic doctrine,
financial orders should not be viewed as a collection
of single disconnected occurrences, but rather as a
seamless collection of interdependent elements. Con-
sistent with that approach, our courts have utilized the
mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that allows
reviewing courts to remand cases for reconsideration
of all financial orders even though the review process
might reveal a flaw only in the alimony, property distri-
bution or child support awards. . . .
‘‘Every improper order, however, does not necessar-
ily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s
financial orders. A financial order is severable when it
is not in any way interdependent with other orders and
is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other
factors. . . . In other words, an order is severable if
its impropriety does not place the correctness of the
other orders in question.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Barcelo v. Barcelo, supra,
158 Conn. App. 226–27.
‘‘Determining whether an order is severable from the
other financial orders in a dissolution case is a highly
fact bound inquiry.’’ Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn.
194, 214, 61 A.3d 449 (2013).
In the present case, we have concluded that the trial
court misapplied the child support guidelines in fashion-
ing its basic child support order and, further, that it
improperly ordered supplemental child support and ali-
mony based on an erroneous finding of fact. Given that
the plaintiff was awarded ten years of alimony that
included a significant supplemental alimony award, we
conclude that the court’s error with respect to that
award is not severable from the court’s property distri-
bution. Furthermore, although this court and our
Supreme Court have held that, under some circum-
stances, a child support award may be severable from
the other financial orders; see Blondeau v. Baltierra,
337 Conn. 127, 174–75, 252 A.3d 317 (2020); Mistho-
poulos v. Misthopoulos, supra, 297 Conn. 390; Maturo v.
Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 124–25; Kavanah v. Kavanah,
142 Conn. App. 775, 785, 66 A.3d 922 (2013); Gentile v.
Carneiro, supra, 107 Conn. App. 650–51; this is not such
a case. The court issued a significant supplemental child
support order requiring the defendant to pay as supple-
mental child support 17.71 percent of any bonuses and
other income. The court then used this same 17.71 per-
cent as the basis for its supplemental alimony order.
Given the potential size of the supplemental child sup-
port order and its link to the supplemental alimony
order, the court’s child support orders also are part
of the mosaic of financial orders issued by the court.
Because it is uncertain whether the court’s other finan-
cial awards will remain intact after reconsidering the
child support orders and the supplemental alimony
order in a manner consistent with this opinion, we con-
clude that the entirety of the mosaic must be refash-
ioned. See, e.g., Tuckman v. Tuckman, supra, 308 Conn.
214–15; Finan v. Finan, 287 Conn. 491, 509, 949 A.2d
468 (2008). Accordingly, on remand, the court must
reconsider all of the financial orders, including the prop-
erty distribution orders.
The judgment is reversed only as to all financial
orders, and the case is remanded for a new trial on all
financial issues; the judgment is affirmed in all other
respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
The defendant claims that the court’s property distribution orders, which
classified the unvested shares and unvested stock options that the defendant
received from his employer, Springworks Therapeutics, Inc. (Springworks),
as marital property, were contrary to General Statutes § 46b-81 and relevant
decisional law. He further claims that the court improperly created a rebutta-
ble presumption that, should the defendant’s employment at Springworks
terminate, the defendant would be obligated to pay to the plaintiff an amount
equal to the value of the plaintiff’s interest in the Springworks shares and/
or options as if they had vested in full.
2
Because we conclude that the court erred with respect to the child
support and alimony orders, we need not reach the defendant’s claims
related to the court’s division of property orders. See part III of this opinion.
Furthermore, at oral argument before this court, the defendant conceded
that, should the case be remanded for a new trial on the financial orders,
the question of whether the stock options were compensation for future
performance or for past performance, and, therefore, whether they are
properly classified as marital property, would be a question of fact for the
court to consider anew. See, e.g., Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn.
508, 525, 752 A.2d 978 (1998); Hopfer v. Hopfer, 59 Conn. App. 452, 458, 757
A.2d 673 (2000). Consequently, we need not address whether the court’s
finding that the unvested stock options and shares were marital property
to be distributed was clearly erroneous. Finally, because the defendant no
longer works for Springworks, the hypothetical aspect of the property order
challenged on appeal; see footnote 1 of this opinion; is unlikely to arise on
remand. Therefore, we do not reach that issue.
3
According to the defendant’s testimony, which the plaintiff did not refute,
the university from which the plaintiff graduated was considered the ‘‘M.I.T.
of Scandinavia.’’ The plaintiff also earned what has been characterized as
a master’s degree in production from the same school.
4
Several pendente lite motions were heard in 2019. A mistrial of those
motions was declared after the hearing judge was injured in an accident
and was unable to issue a decision. The motions were reserved to be heard
at trial. The resolution of those motions is not at issue in this appeal.
5
After the court issued its initial memorandum of decision on January 6,
2020, the parties filed motions to reargue/reconsider the judgment. The court
granted both motions and held a hearing in February, 2020. At the hearing,
the court agreed with some of the issues raised and told the parties that it
would issue a corrected memorandum of decision. Due to the COVID-19
pandemic and the attendant restrictions, the court did not issue its corrected
memorandum of decision until December 21, 2020. In this opinion, references
to the court’s memorandum of decision refer to the December 21, 2020
corrected memorandum of decision.
6
The court first determined that the parties’ prenuptial agreement, which
was drafted pursuant to Danish law and which was executed in Denmark,
was unenforceable pursuant to the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act,
General Statutes § 46b-36a et seq. That conclusion is not challenged on
appeal.
7
The criteria enumerated in § 46b-215a-5c (b) of the regulations are: ‘‘(1)
Other financial resources available to a parent . . . (2) [e]xtraordinary
expenses for care and maintenance of the child . . . (3) [e]xtraordinary
parental expenses . . . (4) [n]eeds of a parent’s other dependents . . . (5)
[c]oordination of total family support . . . [and] (6) [s]pecial circum-
stances . . . .’’
Relevant to this appeal, a parent’s earning capacity is considered part of
the ‘‘[o]ther financial resources available to a parent’’ that would justify a
deviation. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-5c (b) (1) (B).
8
‘‘When the parents’ combined net weekly income exceeds $4,000, child
support awards shall be determined on a case-by-case basis, consistent with
statutory criteria, including that which is described in subsection (d) of
section 46b-84 of the Connecticut General Statutes. The amount shown at
the $4,000 net weekly income level shall be the minimum presumptive
support obligation. The maximum presumptive support obligation shall be
determined by multiplying the combined net weekly income by the applica-
ble percentage shown at the $4,000 net income level.’’ Regs., Conn. State
Agencies § 46b-215a-2c (a) (2).
9
As noted previously in this opinion, the upper end of the range was
calculated using the percentage—17.71 percent—set forth in the guidelines
for parents with a combined net weekly income exceeding $4000.
10
In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest that a trial court is
required to engage in detailed mathematical calculations to tie every dollar
of supplemental child support to some characteristic or need of the children.
All that is required is an explicit finding connecting the supplemental order
in some way to the children. Nevertheless, the court must do more than
merely mention § 46b-84 (d). The court should discuss ‘‘how the supplemen-
tal award was related to the factors identified in § 46b-84 (d).’’ Barcelo v.
Barcelo, supra, 158 Conn. App. 217. Pursuant to the guidelines, the court
also ‘‘should consider evidence submitted by the parties regarding actual
past and projected child support expenditures to determine the appropriate
order.’’ Child Support Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble, § (e) (5), p.
ix. Although the plaintiff argues that there is evidence in the record showing
that the court’s entire child support order, including the supplemental order,
required the defendant to pay less than what the parties collectively pay for
child expenses, the court did not mention this evidence in its comprehensive
memorandum of decision. Thus, we have no way of knowing if the court
credited this evidence or relied on it.
11
We note that the defendant also claims that the court’s supplemental
alimony award runs afoul of the principle articulated in Dan v. Dan, 315
Conn. 1, 11, 105 A.3d 118 (2014), in which our Supreme Court held that
‘‘[t]here is little, if any, legal or logical support . . . for the proposition that
a legitimate purpose of alimony is to allow the supported spouse’s standard
of living to match the supporting spouse’s standard of living after the divorce,
when the supported spouse is no longer contributing to the supporting
spouse’s income earning efforts.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Dan, however, is
inapplicable as that case involved a modification of an alimony award, not
the initial award itself.
In addition, this court has affirmed the use of supplemental alimony orders
based on future earnings. See Finan v. Finan, 100 Conn. App. 297, 306, 918
A.2d 910 (2007), rev’d on other grounds, 287 Conn. 491, 949 A.2d 468 (2008);
Burns v. Burns, 41 Conn. App. 716, 727–28, 677 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 239
Conn. 906, 682 A.2d 997 (1996); Lawler v. Lawler, 16 Conn. App. 193, 196–97,
547 A.2d 89 (1988), appeal dismissed, 212 Conn. 117, 561 A.2d 128 (1989).
Therefore, this claim is without merit.