Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. State

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SCHAGHTICOKE TRIBAL NATION V. STATE—CONCURRENCE

PALMER, J., concurring. I agree with, and join, the
majority opinion. I write separately only to note my
agreement, in addition, with the determination of the
trial court that the plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation,
does not have standing with respect to its claims of a
breach of fiduciary duty by the defendants, the state
of Connecticut and the Commissioner of Energy and
Environmental Protection.
As the majority has explained, the trial court properly
rejected the plaintiff’s claims seeking just compensation
for the state’s alleged unconstitutional taking of land
that the plaintiff contends belongs to it, concluding
that sovereign immunity bars those claims because the
plaintiff has no cognizable property right in that land.
See Tamm v. Burns, 222 Conn. 280, 284, 610 A.2d 590
(1992) (‘‘[t]o survive a motion to dismiss on the ground
of sovereign immunity, a complaint must allege suffi-
cient facts to support a finding of a taking of land in a
constitutional sense’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). With respect to the plaintiff’s fiduciary claims,
the trial court thereafter dismissed those claims upon
concluding that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring
them for essentially the same reason that the plaintiff
cannot prevail on its underlying takings claims, that is,
because the plaintiff has no ownership interest in the
property that it claims the state took from it. On appeal,
the majority has not addressed the trial court’s conclu-
sion regarding standing, electing, instead, to affirm the
court’s dismissal of the fiduciary claims on the ground
of sovereign immunity. I agree with the majority’s con-
clusion in that regard because, as this court discussed
in Bloom v. Dept. of Labor, 93 Conn. App. 37, 888 A.2d
115, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 912, 894 A.2d 992 (2006),
equitable claims against the state that have been
brought for the sole purpose of facilitating a money
judgment against the state are barred by sovereign
immunity to the same extent that the money judgment
itself is barred by that doctrine. Id., 41.
Nevertheless, I also agree with the trial court’s hold-
ing that the plaintiff has an insufficient interest in the
land at issue for standing purposes. To establish stand-
ing, a party must make at least a threshold or colorable
showing of aggrievement. See, e.g., May v. Coffey, 291
Conn. 106, 112, 967 A.2d 495 (2009). For present pur-
poses, ‘‘aggrievement requires a two part showing. First,
a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal
interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as
opposed to a general interest that all members of the
community share. . . . Second, the party must also
show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuri-
ously affected that specific or legal interest.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lazar v. Ganim, 334 Conn.
73, 85, 220 A.3d 18 (2019). Having correctly concluded
that the plaintiff lacked a property interest sufficient
to support a takings claim because the state, not the
plaintiff, owns the land, the trial court also correctly
concluded that the plaintiff has not made a colorable
showing that it is entitled to the equitable relief it seeks
in connection with that takings claim. For that reason,
as well, I agree with the majority that the trial court
properly dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims, including
its fiduciary claims.