Modzelewski's Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

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Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

MODZELEWSKI’S TOWING & STORAGE, INC.,
ET AL. v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.
(AC 47933)
Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting, on juris-
dictional grounds, motions to dismiss filed by the defendants in their action
asserting, inter alia, a claim of defamation through slander. They claimed
that the court improperly concluded that the complaints filed against them
by the defendants with the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to state
regulation (§ 14-63-45b) were entitled to absolute immunity under the litiga-
tion privilege. Held:

The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, as pub-
lic policy supports the application of the litigation privilege to complaints
filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to § 14-63-45b of the
regulations.

Argued October 23, 2025—officially released March 24, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, tortious
interference with business expectancies, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the plaintiff Ye Old
Station Auto Body, Inc., et al. withdrew from the action;
thereafter, the named plaintiff et al. filed a revised com-
plaint; subsequently, the court, Ozalis, J., granted the
defendants’ motions to dismiss and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the named plaintiff et al. appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, for the appellants (named plaintiff
et al.).
Sean Gorton, pro hac vice, with whom was Joseph M.
Busher, Jr., for the appellee (named defendant).
Ryan J. Roberts, with whom, on the brief, was John
W. Cannavino, Jr., for the appellees (defendant John
P. Vaz et al.).
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The plaintiffs, Modzelewski’s Towing &
Storage, Inc., Chris’ Auto Clinic, LLC, MyHoopty.com,
LLC, and Farmington Auto Park, LLC, appeal from
the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the
defendant Government Employees Insurance Company
(GEICO) and the individual defendants, John P. Vaz
and Patrick Capri, granting the defendants’ respec-
tive motions to dismiss the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim
that the court improperly concluded that the com-
plaints filed against them by the defendants with the
Department of Motor Vehicles (department) pursuant
to § 14-63-45b of the Regulations of Connecticut State
Agencies (regulations) were entitled to absolute immu-
nity under the litigation privilege.2 We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.3
1
Some of the initial plaintiffs, Elite Collision Center, LLC, Elmwood
Automotive, LLC, and Ye Old State Auto Body, Inc., withdrew from
this action prior to the filing of the operative complaint. Accordingly,
all references to the plaintiffs in this opinion are to Modzelewski’s Tow-
ing & Storage, Inc., Chris’ Auto Clinic, LLC, MyHoopty.com, LLC, and
Farmington Auto Park, LLC.
As noted herein, GEICO and the individual defendants filed separate
motions to dismiss and memoranda of law in support of those motions,
but the language and claims contained in their respective motions and
memoranda of law were largely identical. Accordingly, we refer to the
defendants collectively when addressing their claims and we refer to
them by name when discussing claims or facts unique to each party.
2
Section § 14-63-45b of the regulations provides, inter alia, that any
party filing a complaint with the department concerning the operations
of and services provided by dealer or repairer licensees shall include
certain information in a written complaint filed with the department.
We note that General Statutes § 14-63, pursuant to which the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles promulgated § 14-63-45b of the regulations,
was amended by the legislature in 2025; see Public Acts 2025, No.
25-55, § 11; which, inter alia, codified provisions similar to existing
department regulations, including the consumer complaints process for
nonconsensual towing, transporting, and storage of vehicles. Whether
and how No. 25-55, § 11, of the 2025 Public Acts would impact the
litigation privilege’s applicability to these communications is not at
issue before this court.
3
The plaintiffs also claim that the trial court erred by dismissing
the operative complaint because “the plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

The following facts, as alleged in the complaint4 or
as recited by the court, Ozalis, J., in its memoranda of
decision, and procedural history are necessary to the
resolution of this appeal.5 The court explained that “[t]he
plaintiffs are licensed automotive dealers and repairers
with operations and facilities throughout the state of
Connecticut. GEICO sells insurance policies to members
of the public in Connecticut. GEICO employs Vaz as an
insurance investigator. At all relevant times, Vaz man-
aged, directed, or otherwise worked with additional
insurance investigators at GEICO. . . . Capri was [also] an
employee of GEICO, who managed, directed, or otherwise
managed insurance claims and directed employees as to
the payment of property damage bills, including those
for recovery, towing, storage, and repair for services
conduct that exists outside the [department’s] complaint process. The
complaint alleges that Vaz and Capri encouraged customers to make
false or exaggerated complaints to the [department] in an effort to
recoup money for GEICO and to intimidate the plaintiffs.” In support
of this claim, the plaintiffs make only a general policy argument that
“[t]he scope of the defendants’ assertion [that these communications
are protected as preparatory communications in furtherance of the
quasi-judicial proceeding] is breathtaking and must be deemed to be
against public policy.” The plaintiffs make no substantive argument
beyond this bare assertion and point this court to no case law in sup-
port of this claim. In addition, the plaintiffs have not addressed the
court’s rejection of this precise argument or its conclusion that these
communications too were “made within the course of a quasi-judicial
proceeding.” We decline to address this claim because it is inadequately
briefed. See State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton, 229 Conn. App. 267, 304,
327 A.3d 982 (2024) (“[c]laims are . . . inadequately briefed when they
. . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant
authority and minimal or no citations from the record” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
4
It is well settled that, “[w]hen a . . . court decides a jurisdictional
question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it . . . must take the
facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts neces-
sarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most
favorable to the pleader.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche
Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120, 136, 314 A.3d 583 (2024).
5
On August 2, 2024, the court issued two separate memoranda of
decision addressing GEICO’s and the individual defendants’ motions to
dismiss independently. The language and analyses of the memoranda of
decision are largely identical and, accordingly, we address them together.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

rendered in Connecticut . . . [and had] a supervisory role
of Connecticut files for GEICO.”
The plaintiffs’ claims arise from allegations that the
defendants filed false and malicious complaints against
them with the department concerning the plaintiffs’
charges for nonconsensual towing, transporting, and
storage of several motor vehicles of the parties’ cus-
tomers pursuant to § 14-63-45b of the regulations or
conversations that the individual defendants had with
customers discussing the plaintiffs’ business practices
and encouraging them to file complaints with the depart-
ment. The court explained that the department “has
received hundreds of complaints from GEICO, requesting
that the [department] investigate claims of overcharging
or improper charges by the plaintiffs’ tow companies.
The plaintiffs allege[d] that, since at least 2017, through
2021 . . . the defendants have made the . . . complaints
and claims, which [were] baseless and without justifi-
cation. The plaintiffs allege[d] that GEICO also [made]
complaints and inform[ed] other jurisdictions, police
departments, and other governmental entities of these
alleged complaints in an attempt to claim that the plain-
tiffs’ businesses [were] charging ‘improperly.’ ”
In the operative complaint filed on December 9, 2022,6
the plaintiffs asserted claims of tortious interference
6
The operative complaint is the fourth revised amended complaint. The
plaintiffs revised their complaint three times to comply with GEICO’s
May 24, 2022 request to revise and the court’s September 12, 2022
order to comply with that request. After the plaintiffs filed the third
revised complaint, GEICO moved for nonsuit, claiming that the third
revised complaint was also noncompliant with its request to revise. On
November 17, 2022, the court concluded that the third revised complaint
was noncompliant and ordered the plaintiffs to revise their complaint
to comply with the request to revise. After the withdrawal of several
of the initial plaintiffs; see footnote 1 of this opinion; the plaintiffs
filed the operative complaint.
The operative complaint alleged eighty separate counts, asserting ten
separate causes of action against the defendants, including tortious
interference with business expectancies, defamation through libel,
defamation through slander, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

with business expectancies, defamation through libel,
defamation through slander, and promissory estoppel
based on the defendants’ alleged conduct.7 On February
23, 2024, GEICO and the individual defendants moved
Act, General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq. and violations of the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. On Febru-
ary 14, 2023, GEICO moved to strike multiple counts of the operative
complaint. On August 3, 2023, the court granted in part and denied
in part GEICO’s motion to strike. On August 9, 2023, the plaintiffs
withdrew the counts necessary to comply with the court’s order.
7
Specifically, all of the plaintiffs asserted claims of tortious interference
with business expectancies against GEICO. Modzelewski’s Towing & Stor-
age, Inc., and MyHoopty.com, LLC, also asserted claims of tortious inter-
ference with business expectancies against Vaz, and MyHoopty.com,
LLC, and Farmington Auto Park, LLC, alleged the same against Capri.
The court explained that the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
“intentionally interfered with the business relationships between . . .
[the plaintiffs] and their named customers in the following ways: mak-
ing, preparing, and filing fraudulent and/or baseless reports as to the
conduct of the plaintiffs; misrepresenting the actions of the plaintiffs in
documents filed with [the department]; intimidating customers through
coerced statements, making fraudulent statements to customers, or
misrepresenting facts to customers about what had occurred; informing
other jurisdictions, police departments, and other governmental entities
of these alleged complaints; attempting to persuade customers to make
complaints against the plaintiffs despite no reasonable basis to do so;
[and/or] maliciously and knowingly attempting to attack the business
relationships of the plaintiffs and their customers by attempting to
persuade customers to make statements in contradiction to their previ-
ously signed documents, by claiming that the customers may suffer a
financial penalty without cooperation . . . .”
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc., Chris’ Auto Clinic, LLC,
and MyHoopty.com, LLC, also asserted claims of defamation through
libel against GEICO based on written statements made in complaints
filed with the department. Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc., and
MyHoopty.com, LLC, alleged defamation through libel against Vaz
based on the same underlying facts. Against GEICO and Capri, Farm-
ington Auto Park, LLC, alleged defamation through slander based on
certain oral statements made by Capri to various customers discussing
the plaintiffs’ business practices and encouraging the customers to file
complaints with the department.
Finally, Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc., Chris’ Auto Clinic, LLC,
and Farmington Auto Park, LLC, asserted claims of promissory estop-
pel against GEICO. The court explained that “[t]he plaintiffs allege[d]
that GEICO . . . promised to pay the charges incurred and, relying on
that promise, the plaintiffs agreed to release the vehicles at issue to
. . . GEICO. The plaintiffs allege[d] that . . . GEICO paid the plaintiffs
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

separately to dismiss the remaining counts of the opera-
tive complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ claims were
barred by the litigation privilege.8 Although GEICO and
the individual defendants moved to dismiss the action
separately, the language and claims contained in their
motions and memoranda of law were largely identical. The
defendants argued, inter alia, that because the depart-
ment’s “complaint and hearing process for challenging
nonconsensual towing and storage charges qualifie[d]
as a quasi-judicial proceeding,” and because the filed
complaints and alleged conversations with customers
were statements made in the course of that quasi-judicial
proceeding, the litigation privilege barred the plain-
tiffs’ claims. In opposition to the motions to dismiss,9
the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the statements
contained in the complaints filed with the department
were not made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding
and therefore were not entitled to absolute immunity
under the litigation privilege.10 The plaintiffs asserted
the monies they were owed, but . . . it [later sought] a refund of these
monies in [its] . . . complaints [filed with the department].”
8
The defendants also moved to dismiss the remaining counts on the
ground that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1965); Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81
S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961). The court denied the defendants’
motions to dismiss on this ground, reasoning that, “[i]n the absence of
Connecticut appellate authority establishing that a motion to dismiss is
a proper procedural vehicle to address the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
this court declines to find that this defense raises a jurisdictional issue
that can be addressed in a motion to dismiss.” The court’s conclusion
as to the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not at issue
in this appeal.
9
On May 6, 2024, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposi-
tion to the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss. On May 10, 2024,
the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to GEICO’s
motion to dismiss.
10
The plaintiffs also claimed that the motions to dismiss should be
denied for the following reasons: an earlier denial of GEICO’s motion
to dismiss is the law of the case; the complaint specifically alleged that
the statements were not made in the course of a judicial proceeding and
therefore the litigation privilege did not apply; the repetitive nature of
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

that those statements, like statements made to the police
in connection with a criminal investigation, should be
entitled to qualified immunity, rather than the absolute
immunity afforded by the litigation privilege.
On August 2, 2024, the court granted the defendants’
respective motions to dismiss in two separate memo-
randa of decision. Although the decisions were issued
separately, the court’s legal analysis and conclusions
were largely identical in both memoranda of decision.
First, the court explained the department’s procedure
for challenging nonconsensual towing, transporting,
and storage charges, including both the department’s
procedure for investigating consumer complaints out-
lined in § 14-63-45c of the Regulations of Connecticut
State Agencies11 and the department’s rules of practice
the defendants’ filing of complaints was “sufficient to establish juris-
diction”; there was no evidence that the complaints submitted by the
defendants were pursued by the department and no judicial proceeding
was undertaken; and the complaints alleged statements were made to
entities other than the department, such as the National Insurance Crime
Bureau. The court rejected each of these arguments, and the plaintiffs
have not raised them on appeal.
11
Section 14-63-45c of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
provides in relevant part:
“(a) Within fourteen (14) days of receipt of a customer complaint, a
person within the [department], as designated, shall notify the customer
and the licensee that the complaint was received, and that it shall be
subject to further investigation. The investigation shall consist of:
“1. A determination of whether the complaint is complete and all
relevant documents are attached; and
“2. A determination of whether the complaint states facts which
if true, give rise to one or more violations of sections 14-51 through
14-66c, inclusive, of the Connecticut General Statutes, the regulations
adopted thereunder, or both. . . .
“(c) In the event that the complaint does not state facts that give rise
to a violation of sections 14-51 through 14-66c, inclusive, of the Con-
necticut General Statutes, the regulations adopted thereunder, or both,
the investigator shall notify the customer and the licensee in writing
that the department does not have jurisdiction over the matter, and
shall not proceed with the complaint.
“(d) If after investigation it is determined that a complaint is complete
and states one or more violations of sections 14-51 through 14-66c,
inclusive, of the Connecticut General Statutes, the regulations adopted
thereunder, or both, the investigator shall notify the customer and the
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

for hearings set forth in §§ 14-137-36 through 14-137-
39 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
The court then addressed the factors that our Supreme
Court, in Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 606 A.2d
693 (1992), explained are relevant to a determination of
whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial, namely, “whether
the body has the power to: (1) exercise judgment and
discretion; (2) hear and determine or to ascertain facts
and decide; (3) make binding orders and judgments; (4)
affect the personal or property rights of private per-
sons; (5) examine witnesses and hear the litigation of the
issues on a hearing; and (6) enforce decisions or impose
penalties.” Id., 567. The court determined that the first
two Kelley factors weighed in favor of determining that
the department’s complaint and hearing proceeding is
quasi-judicial in nature because “the [Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles (commissioner)] or the designated hear-
ing officer is vested with the discretion and judgment
to consider motions, subpoena witnesses, require the
licensee. The notification shall relate the particular matters involved
in the complaint, and shall inform the licensee that it shall respond to
the matters alleged in the complaint within ten (10) days of the date
of the notification.
“(e) Upon receipt of the licensee’s response, the investigator may:
“1. Mediate a voluntary resolution of the complaint that is acceptable
to the customer and the licensee;
“2. Recommend that the complaint proceed to an administrative
hearing; or
“3. Determine that no action is to be taken, and notify the customer
and the licensee in writing of the reason for that determination. . . .
“(h) If the investigator determines that there is one or more probable
violations of sections 14-51 through 14-66c, inclusive, of the Connecti-
cut General Statutes, or the regulations adopted thereunder, or both,
and the [department] determines that it will take action thereon, the
[department] shall notify the licensee and the customer and shall proceed
in accordance with the Department of Motor Vehicles Rules of Practice
as set forth in sections 14-137-36 through 14-137-39, inclusive, of the
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, regardless of whether the
matter has or has not been settled between the customer and licensee.”
We note that General Statutes § 14-63, pursuant to which the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles promulgated § 14-63-45c of the regulations, was
amended by the legislature in 2025. See 2025 Public Acts, No. 25-55,
§ 11. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

production of records, receive, consider, and evaluate
the evidence, limit the number of witnesses, permit
additional pleadings and evidence pre- and post-hearing,
and issue a final decision based on their consideration
of the entire record.” With respect to the third Kelley
factor, the court concluded that it too supported a find-
ing that the proceeding was quasi-judicial because the
hearing officer’s findings of fact and final decision and
“the investigator’s preliminary determination that the
facts in the complaint give or do not give rise to a probable
violation may . . . be considered a binding judgment.” The
court also found that the fourth factor further supported
this conclusion because “[a] possible consequence of a
consumer complaint is the revocation or suspension of a
license, which may restrict a business owner’s ability to
operate its business.” The court concluded that the fifth
factor was satisfied because “the hearing officer has the
authority to regulate the administrative hearing and
the proceeding has procedural safeguards to ensure the
reliability of the information presented.” The court did
not explicitly address the sixth Kelley factor.
In accordance with our Supreme Court’s guidance in
Kelley, the court then addressed “whether there [was] a
sound public policy reason for permitting the complete
freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity
provides in this context.” See Kelley v. Bonney, supra,
221 Conn. 567. The court, considered, inter alia, this
court’s discussion in Lucky 13 Industries, LLC v. Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App. 558, 574,
270 A.3d 188, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 905, 272 A.3d
1127 (2022), of the “imbalance [of power] inherent in
nonconsensual towing transactions” and of the public
policy motivations behind the legislature’s creation of
the regulations governing these transactions, and deter-
mined that public policy considerations supported the
application of the litigation privilege in this context.
The court therefore concluded that “a [department] com-
plaint and hearing proceeding challenging nonconsensual
towing and storage fees is quasi-judicial in nature and
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

[therefore that] statements made in the course of that
proceeding are subject to absolute immunity.”
Having determined that a department complaint and
hearing proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature, the court
then assessed whether the statements forming the basis
of the plaintiffs’ allegations were made in the course of
those proceedings. In addressing the statements con-
tained in complaints filed with the department, the court
explained that the litigation privilege protects state-
ments contained in a complaint in a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding and that the complaints at issue in the present
case were no different. The court further determined that
“these statements were relevant to the initial determina-
tions that the [department’s] investigator must make
when reviewing . . . [the defendants’] complaints . . . .”
Accordingly, the court concluded that the statements
contained in the complaints filed with the department
were made in the course of the quasi-judicial proceeding
and therefore were protected by the litigation privilege.
As to the statements made by the defendants to vari-
ous customers concerning the plaintiffs’ nonconsensual
towing, transporting, and storage of those customers’
vehicles, the court concluded that the defendants’
“alleged instructions to the plaintiffs’ customers to file
. . . complaints [with the department] and related com-
munications and misrepresentations as to the plaintiffs’
charges were directed toward the achievement of the
object of their filing . . . complaints [with the depart-
ment] and/or their goals in commencing . . . proceedings
[before the department] against the plaintiffs . . . . These
alleged statements were, therefore, made within the
course of quasi-judicial proceedings and were relevant to
the issues involved in the proposed and ongoing [depart-
ment] proceedings.”
Because the plaintiffs’ claims were predicated on the
statements contained in the complaint or made in con-
versation with various customers concerning the filing of
those complaints, the court concluded that the litigation
privilege barred the plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that public policy
considerations preclude the application of the litigation
privilege to complaints filed with the department pur-
suant to § 14-63-45b of the regulations.12 We disagree.
We begin with well established principles regarding
the litigation privilege and our standard of review. “The
litigation privilege provides absolute immunity from
suit and, therefore, implicates the court’s subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. . . . Whether the litigation privilege
applies in a given case is a question of law subject to de
novo review. . . . When deciding whether the privilege
applies, every presumption in favor of the court’s juris-
diction should be indulged. . . .
“The litigation privilege is a long-standing [common-
law] rule that communications uttered or published in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject
of the controversy. . . . The privilege . . . applies to every
step of the proceeding until [its] final disposition . . .
including to statements made in pleadings or other docu-
ments prepared in connection with [the] proceeding. .
. . The privilege originated in response to the need to bar
persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers for
defamation. . . . [It] then developed to encompass and bar
defamation claims against all participants in judicial pro-
ceedings . . . . Subsequently, the privilege was expanded
to bar a variety of retaliatory civil claims arising from
communications or communicative acts occurring in
the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding . . . .
“The policy underlying the [litigation] privilege is
that in certain situations the public interest in having
people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals
will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false
12
We reiterate that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the court’s decision
relating to the statements made outside of the complaints filed with
the department was inadequately briefed and we therefore decline to
review it. See footnote 3 of this opinion.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

and malicious statements. . . . Participants in a judicial
process must be able to testify or otherwise take part
without being hampered by fear of defamation [or other
retaliatory litigation].” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik,
349 Conn. 120, 136–38, 314 A.3d 583 (2024). “Put sim-
ply, absolute immunity furthers the public policy of
encouraging participation and candor in judicial . . .
proceedings. This objective would be thwarted if those
persons whom the common-law doctrine was intended to
protect nevertheless faced the threat of suit.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn.
459, 466, 935 A.2d 103 (2007).
To determine whether a statement is entitled to abso-
lute immunity on the basis of the litigation privilege,
courts must first determine whether the proceeding at
issue is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. Our Supreme
Court has explained that “a quasi-judicial proceeding is
one in which the entity conducting the proceeding has
the power of discretion in applying the law to the facts
within a framework that contains procedural protec-
tions against defamatory statements. As part of their
inquiry into whether a proceeding is truly quasi-judicial,
courts may consider the relevant factors enumerated
by [the] court in Kelley [v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn.
567] to determine whether the entity exercises powers
akin to a judicial entity. . . . Courts may also consider
other factors that are relevant to a given proceeding,
including the procedural safeguards of the proceeding
and the authority of the entity to regulate the proceed-
ing. Finally, courts must always carefully scrutinize
whether there is a sound public policy justification for
the application of absolute immunity in any particular
context.” (Citation omitted.) Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn.
636, 652–53, 280 A.3d 402 (2022). “[I]n most cases,
the policy considerations require balancing the public
interest of encouraging public participation and candor,
on the one hand, and the private interest of protecting
individuals from false and malicious statements, on the
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

other.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Khan v.
Yale University, 347 Conn. 1, 35, 295 A.3d 855 (2023).
Once a court has “concluded that the statements . . .
were made in the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial
process, [it] must next determine whether the alleged
defamatory statements were made in the course of
that proceeding and whether they related to its subject
matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kruger
v. Grauer, 173 Conn. App. 539, 548, 164 A.3d 764,
cert. denied, 327 Conn. 901, 169 A.3d 795 (2017). Our
Supreme Court “consistently has held that communi-
cations are afforded immunity if they are uttered or
published in the course of judicial [or quasi-judicial]
proceedings and are in some way pertinent to the subject
of the controversy. . . . For example, the privilege extends
to pleadings and other papers made a part of a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding . . . so long as the statements
are sufficiently relevant to the issues involved in a pro-
posed or ongoing judicial [or quasi-judicial] proceeding,
with the test for relevancy described as generous . . . .”
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1, 19–20,
266 A.3d 127 (2021). In other words, “[o]nce it is deter-
mined that a proceeding is [quasi-judicial] in nature, the
absolute privilege that is granted to statements made in
furtherance of it extends to every step of the proceeding
until final disposition.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Priore v. Haig, supra, 344 Conn. 646.
Here, as noted, the plaintiffs concede that a depart-
ment hearing challenging nonconsensual towing, trans-
porting, and storage fees is quasi-judicial in nature, and
they do not challenge the court’s analysis of the factors
identified in Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 567, but
they contend that the court incorrectly concluded that
public policy supported the application of the litigation
privilege in this case.
In addressing the relevant public policy considerations,
the court aptly explained, “a complaint to the [depart-
ment] alleging improper charges or excessive fees for
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

nonconsensual towing and storage, and the adminis-
trative procedures that follow from such complaints,
serve a public function of vital importance by provid-
ing a mechanism through which charges in excess of
the rates established by the . . . commissioner may be
reported to the proper authorities, and those subject to
such regulatory authority held accountable, and most
importantly, that such fees remain just and reason-
able. . . . Therefore, the possible harm a false consumer
complaint to the [department] regarding an excessive
nonconsensual towing and storage charge may cause
to a business’ reputation, despite the procedural safe-
guards provided by the regulatory scheme governing
such [department] hearings, is outweighed by the public’s
interest in encouraging the filing and investigation of
valid complaints.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) The court recognized that this court
previously has discussed the public policy considerations
motivating our legislature’s creation of a regulatory
framework for the department’s handling of complaints
concerning the nonconsensual towing, transporting,
and storage of motor vehicles. We have explained that
“[t]he regulations governing nonconsensual tows were
implemented to protect individuals whose vehicles have
been towed without their consent from exorbitant towing
and storage fees. Without regulation, a wrecker taking
possession of a vehicle pursuant to a request by the police
could charge whatever price the wrecker saw fit and the
owner of the vehicle would have little choice but to pay
the fee demanded to recover possession of the vehicle. .
. . Our legislature sought to address the imbalance [of
power] inherent in nonconsensual towing transactions
by directing the commissioner to establish reasonable
rates for the towing, transporting, and storing of motor
vehicles that fairly compensate wreckers for their ser-
vices.” (Citation omitted.) Lucky 13 Industries, LLC
v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 210 Conn.
App. 574.
In support of their claim that public policy precludes the
application of the litigation privilege to the complaints in
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

this case, the plaintiffs argue that the court mistakenly
confused the need for regulation of nonconsensual tow-
ing, transporting, and storage of motor vehicles with the
imbalance of power concerns motivating the application
of the litigation privilege.13 The plaintiffs contend that
the court improperly “equated the relationship between
a towing company and a citizen whose car has been towed
to that of the relationship between the police and the
citizenry being policed,” thereby “confus[ing] the need
for regulation of an industry . . . with the imbalance of
power created by the unique institutional powers of the
police recognized by our reviewing courts.”14 We dis-
agree. The court properly examined the public interests
motivating the legislature’s creation of the regulations
governing nonconsensual towing, transporting, and
storage transactions as part of its analysis of whether
public policy supported the application of the litigation
privilege.15 The legislature’s motivations certainly are
relevant to that determination because they reflect the
13
The defendants contend that we should not consider public policy at
this stage because “no court has ever even suggested the existence of a
free-floating public policy exception to the litigation privilege where (as
here) the existence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding had been
established . . . .” Even assuming, arguendo, however that the plaintiffs
are correct that public policy could function as a catch-all exception to
the applicability of the litigation privilege to communications made
in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, we agree with
the trial court that the public policy considerations in the present case
support the application of the litigation privilege to complaints filed
with the department.
14
The plaintiffs contend that “[t]he public policy of . . . Connecticut
should not be to allow large, national insurance companies to pepper
the [department] with complaints about local towing companies . . . .”
Although we recognize that, under the facts of this case, the complain-
ant is a national insurance company, our holding in the present case
would apply with equal force to individuals filing complaints and we
therefore must examine the public policy considerations as they would
impact similarly situated individuals as well.
15
The plaintiffs argue that to justify the application of the litiga-
tion privilege, the imbalance of power at issue must be as drastic as
the “unique” imbalance of power between police officers and citizens.
The court aptly noted, however, that our reviewing courts have never
suggested that to justify the application of the litigation privilege,
the imbalance of power at issue must be as severe as the imbalance of
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

public interest in encouraging participation and candor
in the proceeding. Moreover, the regulatory scheme
would be ineffective if “the possibility of incurring the
costs and inconvenience associated with defending a
defamation suit . . . deter[red] a citizen with a legitimate
grievance from filing a complaint.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc.,
271 Conn. 78, 95, 856 A.2d 372 (2004).
The plaintiffs also argue that complaints filed with the
department are akin to statements made to the police in
connection with a criminal investigation and, pursuant
to Gallo v. Barile, supra, 284 Conn. 467, are entitled to
only qualified immunity. This case, however, is read-
ily distinguishable from Gallo. In Gallo, our Supreme
Court held that informal statements made to the police
in connection with a criminal investigation are protected
only by qualified immunity rather than the litigation
privilege. Id., 471–72. Although the court acknowl-
edged that there were compelling arguments to support
a determination that “statements made to the police in
connection with a criminal investigation properly are con-
sidered ‘preparatory’ to the criminal judicial proceeding
that necessarily follows the filing of any formal charges
upon the conclusion of the investigation”; id., 470–71;
the court concluded that only a qualified immunity was
applicable. Id., 471. Taking public policy into consider-
ation, the court concluded that “a qualified privilege is
sufficiently protective of [those] wishing to report events
power between police officers and citizens. In fact, our Supreme Court
has applied the litigation privilege to statements made in the course
of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding where the same severity of
imbalance of power arguably is not implicated. See, e.g., Kelley v.
Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 552–53 (statements made in verified peti-
tion and complaint initiating teacher decertification proceeding were
protected by litigation privilege); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243,
250–51, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (letter sent by employer to state labor
department as part of processing unemployment compensation claim
was protected by litigation privilege). We agree with the court that the
public interest in encouraging individuals to file complaints with the
department outweighs the potential risk to the plaintiffs of having to
defend themselves from false and malicious complaints and, therefore,
supports the application of the litigation privilege.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

concerning crime . . . . There is no benefit to society or the
administration of justice in protecting those who make
intentionally false and malicious defamatory statements
to the police. The countervailing harm caused by the
malicious destruction of another’s reputation by false
accusation can have irreparable consequences.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 471–72.
Our Supreme Court distinguished its holding in Gallo
from Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., supra, 271
Conn. 78, in which it held that an investigation conducted
by the internal affairs division of a police department
constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding and, therefore,
that statements made in a complaint filed to initiate that
investigation were protected by the litigation privilege.
The court explained that “Craig does not control the
outcome of this case. In Craig, the allegedly defamatory
statements were published in a complaint that triggered
a quasi-judicial proceeding. It is well established that
allegations contained in a complaint in a quasi-judicial
proceeding, like allegations contained in a complaint
in a judicial proceeding, are absolutely privileged. .
. . Accordingly, the statements at issue in Craig fell
squarely within the privilege for statements made in the
course of a quasi-judicial proceeding.” Gallo v. Barile,
supra, 284 Conn. 474. The court further concluded that
public policy supported this distinction, reasoning that,
“[a]lthough the detection of crime and the apprehen-
sion of criminals are extremely important goals, their
achievement does not outweigh the harm that is likely
to inure to an individual who is falsely and maliciously
accused of criminal misconduct. Even after being cleared
of wrongdoing, the victim of a false criminal accusation
may suffer severe and long lasting emotional harm and
damage to his reputation.” Id., 475.
In the present case, a consumer complaint filed with
the department is necessary to initiate the department
proceeding that the plaintiffs concede is quasi-judicial
in nature. The trial court explained, and the plaintiffs
do not contest, that “[t]he [defendants’] alleged filing of
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

complaints with the [department] were part of the initial
steps in the ‘distinct possibility’ that the [department]
would commence proceedings against the plaintiffs.” A
complaint filed with the department pursuant to § 14-63-
45b of the regulations is, therefore, a complaint trig-
gering a quasi-judicial proceeding like the complaint
initiating the internal affairs investigation at issue in
Craig, and distinguishable from the informal statements
at issue in Gallo. See Gallo v. Barile, supra, 284 Conn.
474. Moreover, we conclude that, in the present case,
the strong public policy interests in encouraging indi-
viduals to file complaints with the department concern-
ing improper nonconsensual towing, transporting, and
storage transactions without the threat of suit weighs
in favor of the application of the litigation privilege. We
acknowledge that defending allegedly false and malicious
complaints filed with the department poses a burden for
the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, unlike statements made to
the police in connection with a criminal investigation,
we are persuaded that the public interest in encouraging
the filing of complaints with the department outweighs
the harm resulting from occasional false and malicious
complaints.16 Accordingly, we agree with the court that
public policy supports the application of the litigation
privilege to complaints filed with the department pur-
suant to § 14-63-45b of the regulations and, therefore,
conclude that the court properly granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
16
The plaintiffs also contend that the litigation privilege is inappli-
cable because a hearing before the department might result in criminal
sanctions, but the mere possibility of criminal sanctions alone does not
mean that a statement would not be protected by absolute immunity.
Such a blanket rule would be inapposite to our case law because it is
well settled that the litigation privilege applies to certain statements
made in the course of a criminal proceeding despite possible criminal
sanctions resulting from those statements. See, e.g., Harvin v. Yale
New Haven Health Services Corp., 225 Conn. App. 171, 188–89, 315
A.3d 365 (2024) (recognizing that witness testimony in criminal trial
is protected by litigation privilege).

************************************************
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************************************************
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

MODZELEWSKI’S TOWING & STORAGE, INC.,
ET AL. v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.
(AC 47933)
Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting, on juris-
dictional grounds, motions to dismiss filed by the defendants in their action
asserting, inter alia, a claim of defamation through slander. They claimed
that the court improperly concluded that the complaints filed against them
by the defendants with the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to state
regulation (§ 14-63-45b) were entitled to absolute immunity under the litiga-
tion privilege. Held:

The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, as pub-
lic policy supports the application of the litigation privilege to complaints
filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles pursuant to § 14-63-45b of the
regulations.

Argued October 23, 2025—officially released March 24, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, tortious
interference with business expectancies, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the plaintiff Ye Old
Station Auto Body, Inc., et al. withdrew from the action;
thereafter, the named plaintiff et al. filed a revised com-
plaint; subsequently, the court, Ozalis, J., granted the
defendants’ motions to dismiss and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the named plaintiff et al. appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, for the appellants (named plaintiff
et al.).
Sean Gorton, pro hac vice, with whom was Joseph M.
Busher, Jr., for the appellee (named defendant).
Ryan J. Roberts, with whom, on the brief, was John
W. Cannavino, Jr., for the appellees (defendant John
P. Vaz et al.).
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The plaintiffs, Modzelewski’s Towing &
Storage, Inc., Chris’ Auto Clinic, LLC, MyHoopty.com,
LLC, and Farmington Auto Park, LLC, appeal from
the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the
defendant Government Employees Insurance Company
(GEICO) and the individual defendants, John P. Vaz
and Patrick Capri, granting the defendants’ respec-
tive motions to dismiss the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim
that the court improperly concluded that the com-
plaints filed against them by the defendants with the
Department of Motor Vehicles (department) pursuant
to § 14-63-45b of the Regulations of Connecticut State
Agencies (regulations) were entitled to absolute immu-
nity under the litigation privilege.2 We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.3
1
Some of the initial plaintiffs, Elite Collision Center, LLC, Elmwood
Automotive, LLC, and Ye Old State Auto Body, Inc., withdrew from
this action prior to the filing of the operative complaint. Accordingly,
all references to the plaintiffs in this opinion are to Modzelewski’s Tow-
ing & Storage, Inc., Chris’ Auto Clinic, LLC, MyHoopty.com, LLC, and
Farmington Auto Park, LLC.
As noted herein, GEICO and the individual defendants filed separate
motions to dismiss and memoranda of law in support of those motions,
but the language and claims contained in their respective motions and
memoranda of law were largely identical. Accordingly, we refer to the
defendants collectively when addressing their claims and we refer to
them by name when discussing claims or facts unique to each party.
2
Section § 14-63-45b of the regulations provides, inter alia, that any
party filing a complaint with the department concerning the operations
of and services provided by dealer or repairer licensees shall include
certain information in a written complaint filed with the department.
We note that General Statutes § 14-63, pursuant to which the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles promulgated § 14-63-45b of the regulations,
was amended by the legislature in 2025; see Public Acts 2025, No.
25-55, § 11; which, inter alia, codified provisions similar to existing
department regulations, including the consumer complaints process for
nonconsensual towing, transporting, and storage of vehicles. Whether
and how No. 25-55, § 11, of the 2025 Public Acts would impact the
litigation privilege’s applicability to these communications is not at
issue before this court.
3
The plaintiffs also claim that the trial court erred by dismissing
the operative complaint because “the plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

The following facts, as alleged in the complaint4 or
as recited by the court, Ozalis, J., in its memoranda of
decision, and procedural history are necessary to the
resolution of this appeal.5 The court explained that “[t]he
plaintiffs are licensed automotive dealers and repairers
with operations and facilities throughout the state of
Connecticut. GEICO sells insurance policies to members
of the public in Connecticut. GEICO employs Vaz as an
insurance investigator. At all relevant times, Vaz man-
aged, directed, or otherwise worked with additional
insurance investigators at GEICO. . . . Capri was [also] an
employee of GEICO, who managed, directed, or otherwise
managed insurance claims and directed employees as to
the payment of property damage bills, including those
for recovery, towing, storage, and repair for services
conduct that exists outside the [department’s] complaint process. The
complaint alleges that Vaz and Capri encouraged customers to make
false or exaggerated complaints to the [department] in an effort to
recoup money for GEICO and to intimidate the plaintiffs.” In support
of this claim, the plaintiffs make only a general policy argument that
“[t]he scope of the defendants’ assertion [that these communications
are protected as preparatory communications in furtherance of the
quasi-judicial proceeding] is breathtaking and must be deemed to be
against public policy.” The plaintiffs make no substantive argument
beyond this bare assertion and point this court to no case law in sup-
port of this claim. In addition, the plaintiffs have not addressed the
court’s rejection of this precise argument or its conclusion that these
communications too were “made within the course of a quasi-judicial
proceeding.” We decline to address this claim because it is inadequately
briefed. See State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton, 229 Conn. App. 267, 304,
327 A.3d 982 (2024) (“[c]laims are . . . inadequately briefed when they
. . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant
authority and minimal or no citations from the record” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
4
It is well settled that, “[w]hen a . . . court decides a jurisdictional
question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it . . . must take the
facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts neces-
sarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most
favorable to the pleader.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche
Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120, 136, 314 A.3d 583 (2024).
5
On August 2, 2024, the court issued two separate memoranda of
decision addressing GEICO’s and the individual defendants’ motions to
dismiss independently. The language and analyses of the memoranda of
decision are largely identical and, accordingly, we address them together.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

rendered in Connecticut . . . [and had] a supervisory role
of Connecticut files for GEICO.”
The plaintiffs’ claims arise from allegations that the
defendants filed false and malicious complaints against
them with the department concerning the plaintiffs’
charges for nonconsensual towing, transporting, and
storage of several motor vehicles of the parties’ cus-
tomers pursuant to § 14-63-45b of the regulations or
conversations that the individual defendants had with
customers discussing the plaintiffs’ business practices
and encouraging them to file complaints with the depart-
ment. The court explained that the department “has
received hundreds of complaints from GEICO, requesting
that the [department] investigate claims of overcharging
or improper charges by the plaintiffs’ tow companies.
The plaintiffs allege[d] that, since at least 2017, through
2021 . . . the defendants have made the . . . complaints
and claims, which [were] baseless and without justifi-
cation. The plaintiffs allege[d] that GEICO also [made]
complaints and inform[ed] other jurisdictions, police
departments, and other governmental entities of these
alleged complaints in an attempt to claim that the plain-
tiffs’ businesses [were] charging ‘improperly.’ ”
In the operative complaint filed on December 9, 2022,6
the plaintiffs asserted claims of tortious interference
6
The operative complaint is the fourth revised amended complaint. The
plaintiffs revised their complaint three times to comply with GEICO’s
May 24, 2022 request to revise and the court’s September 12, 2022
order to comply with that request. After the plaintiffs filed the third
revised complaint, GEICO moved for nonsuit, claiming that the third
revised complaint was also noncompliant with its request to revise. On
November 17, 2022, the court concluded that the third revised complaint
was noncompliant and ordered the plaintiffs to revise their complaint
to comply with the request to revise. After the withdrawal of several
of the initial plaintiffs; see footnote 1 of this opinion; the plaintiffs
filed the operative complaint.
The operative complaint alleged eighty separate counts, asserting ten
separate causes of action against the defendants, including tortious
interference with business expectancies, defamation through libel,
defamation through slander, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

with business expectancies, defamation through libel,
defamation through slander, and promissory estoppel
based on the defendants’ alleged conduct.7 On February
23, 2024, GEICO and the individual defendants moved
Act, General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq. and violations of the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. On Febru-
ary 14, 2023, GEICO moved to strike multiple counts of the operative
complaint. On August 3, 2023, the court granted in part and denied
in part GEICO’s motion to strike. On August 9, 2023, the plaintiffs
withdrew the counts necessary to comply with the court’s order.
7
Specifically, all of the plaintiffs asserted claims of tortious interference
with business expectancies against GEICO. Modzelewski’s Towing & Stor-
age, Inc., and MyHoopty.com, LLC, also asserted claims of tortious inter-
ference with business expectancies against Vaz, and MyHoopty.com,
LLC, and Farmington Auto Park, LLC, alleged the same against Capri.
The court explained that the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
“intentionally interfered with the business relationships between . . .
[the plaintiffs] and their named customers in the following ways: mak-
ing, preparing, and filing fraudulent and/or baseless reports as to the
conduct of the plaintiffs; misrepresenting the actions of the plaintiffs in
documents filed with [the department]; intimidating customers through
coerced statements, making fraudulent statements to customers, or
misrepresenting facts to customers about what had occurred; informing
other jurisdictions, police departments, and other governmental entities
of these alleged complaints; attempting to persuade customers to make
complaints against the plaintiffs despite no reasonable basis to do so;
[and/or] maliciously and knowingly attempting to attack the business
relationships of the plaintiffs and their customers by attempting to
persuade customers to make statements in contradiction to their previ-
ously signed documents, by claiming that the customers may suffer a
financial penalty without cooperation . . . .”
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc., Chris’ Auto Clinic, LLC,
and MyHoopty.com, LLC, also asserted claims of defamation through
libel against GEICO based on written statements made in complaints
filed with the department. Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc., and
MyHoopty.com, LLC, alleged defamation through libel against Vaz
based on the same underlying facts. Against GEICO and Capri, Farm-
ington Auto Park, LLC, alleged defamation through slander based on
certain oral statements made by Capri to various customers discussing
the plaintiffs’ business practices and encouraging the customers to file
complaints with the department.
Finally, Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc., Chris’ Auto Clinic, LLC,
and Farmington Auto Park, LLC, asserted claims of promissory estop-
pel against GEICO. The court explained that “[t]he plaintiffs allege[d]
that GEICO . . . promised to pay the charges incurred and, relying on
that promise, the plaintiffs agreed to release the vehicles at issue to
. . . GEICO. The plaintiffs allege[d] that . . . GEICO paid the plaintiffs
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

separately to dismiss the remaining counts of the opera-
tive complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ claims were
barred by the litigation privilege.8 Although GEICO and
the individual defendants moved to dismiss the action
separately, the language and claims contained in their
motions and memoranda of law were largely identical. The
defendants argued, inter alia, that because the depart-
ment’s “complaint and hearing process for challenging
nonconsensual towing and storage charges qualifie[d]
as a quasi-judicial proceeding,” and because the filed
complaints and alleged conversations with customers
were statements made in the course of that quasi-judicial
proceeding, the litigation privilege barred the plain-
tiffs’ claims. In opposition to the motions to dismiss,9
the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the statements
contained in the complaints filed with the department
were not made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding
and therefore were not entitled to absolute immunity
under the litigation privilege.10 The plaintiffs asserted
the monies they were owed, but . . . it [later sought] a refund of these
monies in [its] . . . complaints [filed with the department].”
8
The defendants also moved to dismiss the remaining counts on the
ground that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1965); Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81
S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961). The court denied the defendants’
motions to dismiss on this ground, reasoning that, “[i]n the absence of
Connecticut appellate authority establishing that a motion to dismiss is
a proper procedural vehicle to address the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
this court declines to find that this defense raises a jurisdictional issue
that can be addressed in a motion to dismiss.” The court’s conclusion
as to the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not at issue
in this appeal.
9
On May 6, 2024, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposi-
tion to the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss. On May 10, 2024,
the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to GEICO’s
motion to dismiss.
10
The plaintiffs also claimed that the motions to dismiss should be
denied for the following reasons: an earlier denial of GEICO’s motion
to dismiss is the law of the case; the complaint specifically alleged that
the statements were not made in the course of a judicial proceeding and
therefore the litigation privilege did not apply; the repetitive nature of
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

that those statements, like statements made to the police
in connection with a criminal investigation, should be
entitled to qualified immunity, rather than the absolute
immunity afforded by the litigation privilege.
On August 2, 2024, the court granted the defendants’
respective motions to dismiss in two separate memo-
randa of decision. Although the decisions were issued
separately, the court’s legal analysis and conclusions
were largely identical in both memoranda of decision.
First, the court explained the department’s procedure
for challenging nonconsensual towing, transporting,
and storage charges, including both the department’s
procedure for investigating consumer complaints out-
lined in § 14-63-45c of the Regulations of Connecticut
State Agencies11 and the department’s rules of practice
the defendants’ filing of complaints was “sufficient to establish juris-
diction”; there was no evidence that the complaints submitted by the
defendants were pursued by the department and no judicial proceeding
was undertaken; and the complaints alleged statements were made to
entities other than the department, such as the National Insurance Crime
Bureau. The court rejected each of these arguments, and the plaintiffs
have not raised them on appeal.
11
Section 14-63-45c of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
provides in relevant part:
“(a) Within fourteen (14) days of receipt of a customer complaint, a
person within the [department], as designated, shall notify the customer
and the licensee that the complaint was received, and that it shall be
subject to further investigation. The investigation shall consist of:
“1. A determination of whether the complaint is complete and all
relevant documents are attached; and
“2. A determination of whether the complaint states facts which
if true, give rise to one or more violations of sections 14-51 through
14-66c, inclusive, of the Connecticut General Statutes, the regulations
adopted thereunder, or both. . . .
“(c) In the event that the complaint does not state facts that give rise
to a violation of sections 14-51 through 14-66c, inclusive, of the Con-
necticut General Statutes, the regulations adopted thereunder, or both,
the investigator shall notify the customer and the licensee in writing
that the department does not have jurisdiction over the matter, and
shall not proceed with the complaint.
“(d) If after investigation it is determined that a complaint is complete
and states one or more violations of sections 14-51 through 14-66c,
inclusive, of the Connecticut General Statutes, the regulations adopted
thereunder, or both, the investigator shall notify the customer and the
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

for hearings set forth in §§ 14-137-36 through 14-137-
39 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
The court then addressed the factors that our Supreme
Court, in Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 606 A.2d
693 (1992), explained are relevant to a determination of
whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial, namely, “whether
the body has the power to: (1) exercise judgment and
discretion; (2) hear and determine or to ascertain facts
and decide; (3) make binding orders and judgments; (4)
affect the personal or property rights of private per-
sons; (5) examine witnesses and hear the litigation of the
issues on a hearing; and (6) enforce decisions or impose
penalties.” Id., 567. The court determined that the first
two Kelley factors weighed in favor of determining that
the department’s complaint and hearing proceeding is
quasi-judicial in nature because “the [Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles (commissioner)] or the designated hear-
ing officer is vested with the discretion and judgment
to consider motions, subpoena witnesses, require the
licensee. The notification shall relate the particular matters involved
in the complaint, and shall inform the licensee that it shall respond to
the matters alleged in the complaint within ten (10) days of the date
of the notification.
“(e) Upon receipt of the licensee’s response, the investigator may:
“1. Mediate a voluntary resolution of the complaint that is acceptable
to the customer and the licensee;
“2. Recommend that the complaint proceed to an administrative
hearing; or
“3. Determine that no action is to be taken, and notify the customer
and the licensee in writing of the reason for that determination. . . .
“(h) If the investigator determines that there is one or more probable
violations of sections 14-51 through 14-66c, inclusive, of the Connecti-
cut General Statutes, or the regulations adopted thereunder, or both,
and the [department] determines that it will take action thereon, the
[department] shall notify the licensee and the customer and shall proceed
in accordance with the Department of Motor Vehicles Rules of Practice
as set forth in sections 14-137-36 through 14-137-39, inclusive, of the
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, regardless of whether the
matter has or has not been settled between the customer and licensee.”
We note that General Statutes § 14-63, pursuant to which the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles promulgated § 14-63-45c of the regulations, was
amended by the legislature in 2025. See 2025 Public Acts, No. 25-55,
§ 11. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

production of records, receive, consider, and evaluate
the evidence, limit the number of witnesses, permit
additional pleadings and evidence pre- and post-hearing,
and issue a final decision based on their consideration
of the entire record.” With respect to the third Kelley
factor, the court concluded that it too supported a find-
ing that the proceeding was quasi-judicial because the
hearing officer’s findings of fact and final decision and
“the investigator’s preliminary determination that the
facts in the complaint give or do not give rise to a probable
violation may . . . be considered a binding judgment.” The
court also found that the fourth factor further supported
this conclusion because “[a] possible consequence of a
consumer complaint is the revocation or suspension of a
license, which may restrict a business owner’s ability to
operate its business.” The court concluded that the fifth
factor was satisfied because “the hearing officer has the
authority to regulate the administrative hearing and
the proceeding has procedural safeguards to ensure the
reliability of the information presented.” The court did
not explicitly address the sixth Kelley factor.
In accordance with our Supreme Court’s guidance in
Kelley, the court then addressed “whether there [was] a
sound public policy reason for permitting the complete
freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity
provides in this context.” See Kelley v. Bonney, supra,
221 Conn. 567. The court, considered, inter alia, this
court’s discussion in Lucky 13 Industries, LLC v. Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App. 558, 574,
270 A.3d 188, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 905, 272 A.3d
1127 (2022), of the “imbalance [of power] inherent in
nonconsensual towing transactions” and of the public
policy motivations behind the legislature’s creation of
the regulations governing these transactions, and deter-
mined that public policy considerations supported the
application of the litigation privilege in this context.
The court therefore concluded that “a [department] com-
plaint and hearing proceeding challenging nonconsensual
towing and storage fees is quasi-judicial in nature and
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

[therefore that] statements made in the course of that
proceeding are subject to absolute immunity.”
Having determined that a department complaint and
hearing proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature, the court
then assessed whether the statements forming the basis
of the plaintiffs’ allegations were made in the course of
those proceedings. In addressing the statements con-
tained in complaints filed with the department, the court
explained that the litigation privilege protects state-
ments contained in a complaint in a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding and that the complaints at issue in the present
case were no different. The court further determined that
“these statements were relevant to the initial determina-
tions that the [department’s] investigator must make
when reviewing . . . [the defendants’] complaints . . . .”
Accordingly, the court concluded that the statements
contained in the complaints filed with the department
were made in the course of the quasi-judicial proceeding
and therefore were protected by the litigation privilege.
As to the statements made by the defendants to vari-
ous customers concerning the plaintiffs’ nonconsensual
towing, transporting, and storage of those customers’
vehicles, the court concluded that the defendants’
“alleged instructions to the plaintiffs’ customers to file
. . . complaints [with the department] and related com-
munications and misrepresentations as to the plaintiffs’
charges were directed toward the achievement of the
object of their filing . . . complaints [with the depart-
ment] and/or their goals in commencing . . . proceedings
[before the department] against the plaintiffs . . . . These
alleged statements were, therefore, made within the
course of quasi-judicial proceedings and were relevant to
the issues involved in the proposed and ongoing [depart-
ment] proceedings.”
Because the plaintiffs’ claims were predicated on the
statements contained in the complaint or made in con-
versation with various customers concerning the filing of
those complaints, the court concluded that the litigation
privilege barred the plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that public policy
considerations preclude the application of the litigation
privilege to complaints filed with the department pur-
suant to § 14-63-45b of the regulations.12 We disagree.
We begin with well established principles regarding
the litigation privilege and our standard of review. “The
litigation privilege provides absolute immunity from
suit and, therefore, implicates the court’s subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. . . . Whether the litigation privilege
applies in a given case is a question of law subject to de
novo review. . . . When deciding whether the privilege
applies, every presumption in favor of the court’s juris-
diction should be indulged. . . .
“The litigation privilege is a long-standing [common-
law] rule that communications uttered or published in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject
of the controversy. . . . The privilege . . . applies to every
step of the proceeding until [its] final disposition . . .
including to statements made in pleadings or other docu-
ments prepared in connection with [the] proceeding. .
. . The privilege originated in response to the need to bar
persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers for
defamation. . . . [It] then developed to encompass and bar
defamation claims against all participants in judicial pro-
ceedings . . . . Subsequently, the privilege was expanded
to bar a variety of retaliatory civil claims arising from
communications or communicative acts occurring in
the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding . . . .
“The policy underlying the [litigation] privilege is
that in certain situations the public interest in having
people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals
will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false
12
We reiterate that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the court’s decision
relating to the statements made outside of the complaints filed with
the department was inadequately briefed and we therefore decline to
review it. See footnote 3 of this opinion.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

and malicious statements. . . . Participants in a judicial
process must be able to testify or otherwise take part
without being hampered by fear of defamation [or other
retaliatory litigation].” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik,
349 Conn. 120, 136–38, 314 A.3d 583 (2024). “Put sim-
ply, absolute immunity furthers the public policy of
encouraging participation and candor in judicial . . .
proceedings. This objective would be thwarted if those
persons whom the common-law doctrine was intended to
protect nevertheless faced the threat of suit.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn.
459, 466, 935 A.2d 103 (2007).
To determine whether a statement is entitled to abso-
lute immunity on the basis of the litigation privilege,
courts must first determine whether the proceeding at
issue is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. Our Supreme
Court has explained that “a quasi-judicial proceeding is
one in which the entity conducting the proceeding has
the power of discretion in applying the law to the facts
within a framework that contains procedural protec-
tions against defamatory statements. As part of their
inquiry into whether a proceeding is truly quasi-judicial,
courts may consider the relevant factors enumerated
by [the] court in Kelley [v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn.
567] to determine whether the entity exercises powers
akin to a judicial entity. . . . Courts may also consider
other factors that are relevant to a given proceeding,
including the procedural safeguards of the proceeding
and the authority of the entity to regulate the proceed-
ing. Finally, courts must always carefully scrutinize
whether there is a sound public policy justification for
the application of absolute immunity in any particular
context.” (Citation omitted.) Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn.
636, 652–53, 280 A.3d 402 (2022). “[I]n most cases,
the policy considerations require balancing the public
interest of encouraging public participation and candor,
on the one hand, and the private interest of protecting
individuals from false and malicious statements, on the
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

other.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Khan v.
Yale University, 347 Conn. 1, 35, 295 A.3d 855 (2023).
Once a court has “concluded that the statements . . .
were made in the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial
process, [it] must next determine whether the alleged
defamatory statements were made in the course of
that proceeding and whether they related to its subject
matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kruger
v. Grauer, 173 Conn. App. 539, 548, 164 A.3d 764,
cert. denied, 327 Conn. 901, 169 A.3d 795 (2017). Our
Supreme Court “consistently has held that communi-
cations are afforded immunity if they are uttered or
published in the course of judicial [or quasi-judicial]
proceedings and are in some way pertinent to the subject
of the controversy. . . . For example, the privilege extends
to pleadings and other papers made a part of a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding . . . so long as the statements
are sufficiently relevant to the issues involved in a pro-
posed or ongoing judicial [or quasi-judicial] proceeding,
with the test for relevancy described as generous . . . .”
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1, 19–20,
266 A.3d 127 (2021). In other words, “[o]nce it is deter-
mined that a proceeding is [quasi-judicial] in nature, the
absolute privilege that is granted to statements made in
furtherance of it extends to every step of the proceeding
until final disposition.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Priore v. Haig, supra, 344 Conn. 646.
Here, as noted, the plaintiffs concede that a depart-
ment hearing challenging nonconsensual towing, trans-
porting, and storage fees is quasi-judicial in nature, and
they do not challenge the court’s analysis of the factors
identified in Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 567, but
they contend that the court incorrectly concluded that
public policy supported the application of the litigation
privilege in this case.
In addressing the relevant public policy considerations,
the court aptly explained, “a complaint to the [depart-
ment] alleging improper charges or excessive fees for
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

nonconsensual towing and storage, and the adminis-
trative procedures that follow from such complaints,
serve a public function of vital importance by provid-
ing a mechanism through which charges in excess of
the rates established by the . . . commissioner may be
reported to the proper authorities, and those subject to
such regulatory authority held accountable, and most
importantly, that such fees remain just and reason-
able. . . . Therefore, the possible harm a false consumer
complaint to the [department] regarding an excessive
nonconsensual towing and storage charge may cause
to a business’ reputation, despite the procedural safe-
guards provided by the regulatory scheme governing
such [department] hearings, is outweighed by the public’s
interest in encouraging the filing and investigation of
valid complaints.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) The court recognized that this court
previously has discussed the public policy considerations
motivating our legislature’s creation of a regulatory
framework for the department’s handling of complaints
concerning the nonconsensual towing, transporting,
and storage of motor vehicles. We have explained that
“[t]he regulations governing nonconsensual tows were
implemented to protect individuals whose vehicles have
been towed without their consent from exorbitant towing
and storage fees. Without regulation, a wrecker taking
possession of a vehicle pursuant to a request by the police
could charge whatever price the wrecker saw fit and the
owner of the vehicle would have little choice but to pay
the fee demanded to recover possession of the vehicle. .
. . Our legislature sought to address the imbalance [of
power] inherent in nonconsensual towing transactions
by directing the commissioner to establish reasonable
rates for the towing, transporting, and storing of motor
vehicles that fairly compensate wreckers for their ser-
vices.” (Citation omitted.) Lucky 13 Industries, LLC
v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 210 Conn.
App. 574.
In support of their claim that public policy precludes the
application of the litigation privilege to the complaints in
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

this case, the plaintiffs argue that the court mistakenly
confused the need for regulation of nonconsensual tow-
ing, transporting, and storage of motor vehicles with the
imbalance of power concerns motivating the application
of the litigation privilege.13 The plaintiffs contend that
the court improperly “equated the relationship between
a towing company and a citizen whose car has been towed
to that of the relationship between the police and the
citizenry being policed,” thereby “confus[ing] the need
for regulation of an industry . . . with the imbalance of
power created by the unique institutional powers of the
police recognized by our reviewing courts.”14 We dis-
agree. The court properly examined the public interests
motivating the legislature’s creation of the regulations
governing nonconsensual towing, transporting, and
storage transactions as part of its analysis of whether
public policy supported the application of the litigation
privilege.15 The legislature’s motivations certainly are
relevant to that determination because they reflect the
13
The defendants contend that we should not consider public policy at
this stage because “no court has ever even suggested the existence of a
free-floating public policy exception to the litigation privilege where (as
here) the existence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding had been
established . . . .” Even assuming, arguendo, however that the plaintiffs
are correct that public policy could function as a catch-all exception to
the applicability of the litigation privilege to communications made
in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, we agree with
the trial court that the public policy considerations in the present case
support the application of the litigation privilege to complaints filed
with the department.
14
The plaintiffs contend that “[t]he public policy of . . . Connecticut
should not be to allow large, national insurance companies to pepper
the [department] with complaints about local towing companies . . . .”
Although we recognize that, under the facts of this case, the complain-
ant is a national insurance company, our holding in the present case
would apply with equal force to individuals filing complaints and we
therefore must examine the public policy considerations as they would
impact similarly situated individuals as well.
15
The plaintiffs argue that to justify the application of the litiga-
tion privilege, the imbalance of power at issue must be as drastic as
the “unique” imbalance of power between police officers and citizens.
The court aptly noted, however, that our reviewing courts have never
suggested that to justify the application of the litigation privilege,
the imbalance of power at issue must be as severe as the imbalance of
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

public interest in encouraging participation and candor
in the proceeding. Moreover, the regulatory scheme
would be ineffective if “the possibility of incurring the
costs and inconvenience associated with defending a
defamation suit . . . deter[red] a citizen with a legitimate
grievance from filing a complaint.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc.,
271 Conn. 78, 95, 856 A.2d 372 (2004).
The plaintiffs also argue that complaints filed with the
department are akin to statements made to the police in
connection with a criminal investigation and, pursuant
to Gallo v. Barile, supra, 284 Conn. 467, are entitled to
only qualified immunity. This case, however, is read-
ily distinguishable from Gallo. In Gallo, our Supreme
Court held that informal statements made to the police
in connection with a criminal investigation are protected
only by qualified immunity rather than the litigation
privilege. Id., 471–72. Although the court acknowl-
edged that there were compelling arguments to support
a determination that “statements made to the police in
connection with a criminal investigation properly are con-
sidered ‘preparatory’ to the criminal judicial proceeding
that necessarily follows the filing of any formal charges
upon the conclusion of the investigation”; id., 470–71;
the court concluded that only a qualified immunity was
applicable. Id., 471. Taking public policy into consider-
ation, the court concluded that “a qualified privilege is
sufficiently protective of [those] wishing to report events
power between police officers and citizens. In fact, our Supreme Court
has applied the litigation privilege to statements made in the course
of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding where the same severity of
imbalance of power arguably is not implicated. See, e.g., Kelley v.
Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 552–53 (statements made in verified peti-
tion and complaint initiating teacher decertification proceeding were
protected by litigation privilege); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243,
250–51, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (letter sent by employer to state labor
department as part of processing unemployment compensation claim
was protected by litigation privilege). We agree with the court that the
public interest in encouraging individuals to file complaints with the
department outweighs the potential risk to the plaintiffs of having to
defend themselves from false and malicious complaints and, therefore,
supports the application of the litigation privilege.
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

concerning crime . . . . There is no benefit to society or the
administration of justice in protecting those who make
intentionally false and malicious defamatory statements
to the police. The countervailing harm caused by the
malicious destruction of another’s reputation by false
accusation can have irreparable consequences.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 471–72.
Our Supreme Court distinguished its holding in Gallo
from Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., supra, 271
Conn. 78, in which it held that an investigation conducted
by the internal affairs division of a police department
constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding and, therefore,
that statements made in a complaint filed to initiate that
investigation were protected by the litigation privilege.
The court explained that “Craig does not control the
outcome of this case. In Craig, the allegedly defamatory
statements were published in a complaint that triggered
a quasi-judicial proceeding. It is well established that
allegations contained in a complaint in a quasi-judicial
proceeding, like allegations contained in a complaint
in a judicial proceeding, are absolutely privileged. .
. . Accordingly, the statements at issue in Craig fell
squarely within the privilege for statements made in the
course of a quasi-judicial proceeding.” Gallo v. Barile,
supra, 284 Conn. 474. The court further concluded that
public policy supported this distinction, reasoning that,
“[a]lthough the detection of crime and the apprehen-
sion of criminals are extremely important goals, their
achievement does not outweigh the harm that is likely
to inure to an individual who is falsely and maliciously
accused of criminal misconduct. Even after being cleared
of wrongdoing, the victim of a false criminal accusation
may suffer severe and long lasting emotional harm and
damage to his reputation.” Id., 475.
In the present case, a consumer complaint filed with
the department is necessary to initiate the department
proceeding that the plaintiffs concede is quasi-judicial
in nature. The trial court explained, and the plaintiffs
do not contest, that “[t]he [defendants’] alleged filing of
Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

complaints with the [department] were part of the initial
steps in the ‘distinct possibility’ that the [department]
would commence proceedings against the plaintiffs.” A
complaint filed with the department pursuant to § 14-63-
45b of the regulations is, therefore, a complaint trig-
gering a quasi-judicial proceeding like the complaint
initiating the internal affairs investigation at issue in
Craig, and distinguishable from the informal statements
at issue in Gallo. See Gallo v. Barile, supra, 284 Conn.
474. Moreover, we conclude that, in the present case,
the strong public policy interests in encouraging indi-
viduals to file complaints with the department concern-
ing improper nonconsensual towing, transporting, and
storage transactions without the threat of suit weighs
in favor of the application of the litigation privilege. We
acknowledge that defending allegedly false and malicious
complaints filed with the department poses a burden for
the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, unlike statements made to
the police in connection with a criminal investigation,
we are persuaded that the public interest in encouraging
the filing of complaints with the department outweighs
the harm resulting from occasional false and malicious
complaints.16 Accordingly, we agree with the court that
public policy supports the application of the litigation
privilege to complaints filed with the department pur-
suant to § 14-63-45b of the regulations and, therefore,
conclude that the court properly granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
16
The plaintiffs also contend that the litigation privilege is inappli-
cable because a hearing before the department might result in criminal
sanctions, but the mere possibility of criminal sanctions alone does not
mean that a statement would not be protected by absolute immunity.
Such a blanket rule would be inapposite to our case law because it is
well settled that the litigation privilege applies to certain statements
made in the course of a criminal proceeding despite possible criminal
sanctions resulting from those statements. See, e.g., Harvin v. Yale
New Haven Health Services Corp., 225 Conn. App. 171, 188–89, 315
A.3d 365 (2024) (recognizing that witness testimony in criminal trial
is protected by litigation privilege).