In re Loyal H.

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In re Loyal H.

IN RE LOYAL H. ET AL.*
(AC 48934)
Cradle, C. J., and Moll and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgments adjudicating
his four minor children neglected. The father claimed that the evidence was
insufficient to support the court’s findings of neglect. Held:

The trial court did not improperly deny the respondent father’s motions
to strike the neglect petitions filed by the petitioner, the Commissioner of
Children and Families, as to two of his children, as his claim that those peti-
tions did not allege any abuse was belied by the amended neglect petitions
the petitioner had filed, which alleged that those two children were being
permitted to live under circumstances that were injurious to their well-
being, and, even if those two children had not been abused themselves, the
allegations of physical abuse and violence on the part of the father and the
paternal grandmother as to the other two children were sufficient to find
that all of the children were living under circumstances that were injurious
to their well-being.

The respondent father’s challenge to the trial court’s determination that the
children were neglected was unavailing, as the evidence showed that three of
the children had scars that were indicative of abuse, and the court credited
one of the children’s statements to the police that she had been abused and
gave weight to the paternal grandmother’s concession that “kids should be
beaten; that’s the way we do it.”

Moreover, even if the respondent father’s assertions that he had engaged
in and benefited from services were true, along with his claims that one
of the children bore no bruises and that all of the children were visible in
the community, that did not negate the court’s findings of physical abuse.

Argued January 14—officially released March 16, 2026**

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families
to adjudicate the respondent father’s four minor children
neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
*
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-
142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in
this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall
be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein
and upon order of the court.
**
March 16, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opin-
ion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
In re Loyal H.

district of Waterbury, Juvenile Matters, where the court,
Nadim, J., granted in part the petitioner’s motion to
consolidate the cases; thereafter, the court denied the
respondent’s motions to strike the petitions as to two of
the minor children and granted the petitioner’s motions
to amend the petitions; subsequently, the cases were
tried to the court; judgments adjudicating the minor
children neglected and committing them to the custody
of the petitioner, from which the respondent appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
David E. Schneider, Jr., assigned counsel, for the
appellant (respondent father).
Nisa J. Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom
were Matthew J. Parenti, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The respondent father appeals from
the judgments of the trial court adjudicating his four
minor children, J, S, A and L, neglected.1 On appeal, the
respondent claims that (1) the court erred by denying
his motions to strike the neglect petitions as to S and L,
and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the
court’s findings of neglect as to his four children.2 We
affirm the judgments of the trial court.
On January 4, 2025, the Department of Children and
Families (department) invoked a ninety-six hour hold as
1
The mother of L is deceased. The mother of J and S—O—appeared in
the trial court, did not respond to the neglect petitions and did not file
an appeal. The mother of A did not appear in the trial court. We there-
fore refer in this opinion to the respondent father as the respondent.
2
The respondent initially also challenged on appeal the trial court’s
orders granting temporary custody of his four children to the petitioner.
Since the date of the filing of this appeal, the court has, by way of the
dispositional phase of the proceedings following the adjudications of
neglect, committed A and L to the custody of the petitioner and J and
S to the custody of their mother. This court therefore granted the
petitioner’s postjudgment motions to dismiss as moot the respondent’s
challenges to the orders of temporary custody. See, e.g., In re Forrest
In re Loyal H.

to the respondent’s four children. See General Statutes
§ 17a-101g. On January 7, 2025, the petitioner, the
Commissioner of Children and Families, filed motions
for ex parte orders of temporary custody as to each of the
children, alleging that they were in immediate physical
danger. The ex parte orders were issued on that same
day, and hearings on them were scheduled for January
15, 2025.
Also on January 7, 2025, the petitioner filed neglect
petitions as to each of the four children, alleging that
the children had physical injury or injuries inflicted by
other than accidental means. The neglect petitions were
scheduled for hearings on February 18, 2025.3
On January 22, 2025, the respondent filed motions
to strike, inter alia, the neglect petitions as to S and L
on the grounds that the underlying allegations did not
concern them.
On January 23, 2025, the petitioner moved to amend
the neglect petitions to add the ground that the four
children were being denied proper care and attention
and were being permitted to live under conditions that
were injurious to their well-being as alleged in the depart-
ment’s summary of facts dated January 8, 2025. The
petitioner objected to the motions to strike the neglect
petitions on the ground, inter alia, that they were moot
due to the amendment to the neglect petitions.
On January 24, 2025, the first day of the neglect trial,
the court granted the petitioner’s motions to amend the
neglect petitions. The court also denied the respondent’s
motions to strike. The court reasoned that, “[i]n light of
the [petitioner’s] amendments to the neglect petition[s]
B., 109 Conn. App. 772, 776, 953 A.2d 887 (2008) (“[o]ur case law
specifically conceives of appeals from temporary custody as moot when
the children involved are adjudicated neglected”).
3
The petitioner moved to consolidate the temporary custody orders
and neglect petitions as to each child for a single hearing. Over the
respondent’s objection, the trial court granted the motion as to the
hearings on the temporary custody orders and the adjudicatory phase
of the neglect proceedings. The consolidation is not at issue on appeal.
In re Loyal H.

and the withdrawal of the abuse allegations, the court
rules as follows: The purpose of a motion to strike is to
challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a
complaint for a failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted. The [petitioner’s] pleadings must be read
in the most broad manner, and the court is to look at the
allegations in the light most favorable to the moving
party. Subsequently, because the [petitioner’s] plead-
ings are inarticulate does not mean they are insufficient
and unable to survive a motion to strike. The allegations
here are that there is a presence of violence in the home.
This is a basis, if proven, to establish a finding of neglect.
Therefore, [the respondent’s] motion[s] to strike the
neglect petition[s] [are] denied.”
The court then proceeded with the trial, which spanned
several days. On June 4, 2025, the court orally issued its
decision, adjudicating the respondent’s four children
neglected. The court stated: “[J] is twelve years old, [S]
is nine years old, [A] is seven years old, and [L] is one
and a half years old.
“On January 3, 2025, the mother of [J] and [S]—[O],
who resides in California—made a report to [the depart-
ment] of suspected abuse by the respondent . . . and the
paternal grandmother . . . .
“[O] reported that she had been with the children at
Thanksgiving in Ohio along with a paternal aunt, and
that the children had shared being physically abused by
the respondent . . . .
“As a result of the report, Waterbury Police [Officer
Flori Martinaj] responded to the respondent’s . . . home
on January 3, 2025. At the time when the police first
responded to the home, none of the children nor the
respondent . . . or the paternal grandmother reported
any physical abuse. The children did not disclose any
information to the police, as the respondent father was
present the entire time.
“After the police left, [J] spoke with her paternal aunt
via phone, who told her that she could remain in the
In re Loyal H.

home until a future court date hearing in family court
between . . . [O and] . . . the respondent . . . or leave the
home with her siblings. That same night, [J] left with
[A], unbeknownst to the respondent . . . and went to
the [store] around the corner. . . . There, [J] called the
paternal aunt, who, in turn, called the Waterbury Police
Department. . . .
“Martinaj responded to the [store] where he met with
[J] and [A]. [J] apologized to the officer for not telling
him previously about the abuse because [the respondent]
was watching the entire time. . . . She stated that, if [the
respondent] wasn’t there, she would have told him that
she gets beaten frequently, along with her siblings, in
the form of being hit with hands, belts, shoes, or metal
pipes. A said the same thing. . . .
“Martinaj observed dark scars and bruising to the
lower back and legs of both [A] and [J]. He called an
ambulance, which brought the children to St. Mary’s
Hospital [in Waterbury]. . . . [Martinaj] then returned
to the respondent’s . . . home where [the respondent] was
arrested for three counts of assault in the third degree
and three counts of risk of injury to a child. . . .
“[U]pon transport to the hospital, [emergency medi-
cal services personnel] noted bruising on both [of A’s]
arms with scratches, which [A] reported were done by
the respondent . . . . [A] reported to the emergency room
at [the hospital] that she was hit that night with a metal
pole by the respondent . . . . She reported that she has
been beaten with a belt in the past. She stated that both
the respondent . . . and the paternal grandmother hit
her and her siblings. Her skin was noted to be positive
for a wound and indicated on the hospital records to
see photos. The photos presented to the court displayed
that she had a large bruise above her knee as well as two
smaller bruises to her buttocks and two fresh cuts on
her forearms. A full [examination] was conducted, in
which there was noted to be bruising to the left knee
and left lower anterior leg. She also had healing linear
abrasions to her forearms, which she reported were due
In re Loyal H.

to being struck with a belt. The hospital records indicate
diagnosis, in quotations, ‘child abuse initial encounter,’
end quote.
“[S] was also evaluated at St. Mary’s Hospital on Janu-
ary 3, 2025. During his physical [examination], it was
noted for a healing linear mark to his lower back. The
hospital records reflect diagnosis, in quotes, ‘suspected
physical abuse of child initial encounter’ . . . .
“On January 3, 2025, [the department] received a
call from [advanced practice registered nurse] Meecha
Calle from St. Mary’s Hospital to the [the department’s]
Careline to report that the children were reporting being
abused by the respondent . . . . She reported that [J] had
bruising and scratches, and that [J] reported being hit
by the respondent . . . with a belt and pipe.
“Social worker Tameka Plunkett spoke with the chil-
dren once they came into care. She spoke with [J], who
shared that the reason she came into care is that she is
being beaten by [the respondent]. She stated that he
would hit her with a belt, shoe, hanger, or part of a pipe
when she doesn’t do chores or takes too long to do dishes;
that it’s common; and that it happens when she doesn’t
do what she’s told by the respondent . . . or the paternal
grandmother. She reported that the last time she was
hit was by [the respondent] on January 3, 2025. She said
that the paternal grandmother does not intervene and
also beats her with a hanger or punches her in the face
when she gets angry. . . .
“Plunkett spoke with [A], who stated that she has
witnessed [the respondent] beat [J] and has asked him to
stop but he continues. She said she witnessed him beating
her with a belt. She did not say how often it happens but
that it does happen if she takes too long to do chores or
dishes. She also report[ed] being slapped on the hand by
the respondent . . . .
“Plunkett also spoke with [S] . . . . She stated that he
presented as nervous, fearful, and hesitant to share his
feelings.
In re Loyal H.

“[Plunkett] spoke with the paternal grandmother
regarding the allegations during a considered removal
meeting on January 7, 2025, where the paternal grand-
mother admitted to the use of physical discipline. She
stated that . . .‘[k]ids should be beaten; that’s the way
we do it’ . . . and acknowledged using a slipper and belt.
“The respondent . . . testified that under no circum-
stances does he use physical discipline and that he has
conveyed this to the paternal grandmother. He stated he
is aware of the paternal grandmother’s statement that
‘kids should be beaten; that’s the way we do it,’ but that
it was taken out of context. He testified that his mother
has never physically disciplined the children, nor has
he. When shown hospital photos of [A] and [S], which
displayed bruising and cuts, he stated [that] he did not
see any injuries in the photos and acknowledged only
superficial scratches.
“The court credits the initial disclosures made by [J]
and [A] regarding physical abuse inflicted by the respon-
dent . . . and the paternal grandmother. The court recog-
nizes that . . . at a subsequent date, [A] denied witnessing
physical abuse; however, no plausible alternative explana-
tion has been given as to how she received a large bruise
on her leg or small bruises to her buttocks.
“The paternal grandmother, on her own volition, con-
ceded that she physically disciplines the children, and
has previously stated that ‘kids should be beaten’ and
admitted to using a slipper and belt. These statements
were made at the considered removal meeting. . . . The
[respondent’s] testimony directly contradicts the pater-
nal grandmother’s own admissions, and the court can find
no reasonable explanation why the paternal grandmother
would have made those concessions at the considered
removal meeting other than that they are true.
“The court does not find the [respondent’s] testimony
to be credible. When presented with the hospital photos
of [A] and [S], he stated [that] he did not see any bruising
or cuts and only acknowledged what he called superficial
In re Loyal H.

scratches. This testimony by [the respondent] reduces
his credibility for his lack of candor to the court and is
indicative of his refusal to acknowledge injuries sus-
tained by his children.
“The respondent . . . has a troubling [department]
history, both in Connecticut and Michigan, relating to
concerns of [intimate partner violence], anger issues,
and questionable parental judgment.
“To date, no viable alternative explanation has been
given to explain the injuries sustained by [A], [S] and
[J], other than the reports by [A] and [J] that they were
inflicted by the respondent . . . and the paternal grand-
mother.
“Based on the factual findings set forth, the court finds
by a fair preponderance of the evidence presented at trial
that the children would be in immediate physical danger
from their surroundings if they were returned home,
that removal from the home is necessary to ensure their
safety, and return to their home at this time is contrary
to their welfare. The court further finds that reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of
the children were made by the [department]. The orders
of temporary custody are sustained and custody is vested
[in the petitioner].
“The court also finds by a fair preponderance of the
evidence presented at trial that, as of the date of the fil-
ing of the last amendment to the neglect petitions, the
children were neglected and that they were permitted
to live under conditions injurious to their well-being.
Accordingly, the court enters an adjudication of neglect
as to all four children.” This appeal followed.
The following legal principles are relevant to the
respondent’s claims on appeal. “Neglect proceedings,
under . . . [General Statutes] § 46b-129, are comprised of
two parts, adjudication and disposition. . . . The standard
of proof applicable to nonpermanent custody proceedings,
such as neglect proceedings, is a fair preponderance of
the evidence. . . .
In re Loyal H.

“During the adjudicatory phase, the court determines
if the child was neglected. Practice Book § 35a-7 (a)
provides in relevant part: In the adjudicatory phase,
the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events
preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amend-
ment . . . . [General Statutes § 46b-120 (4)] provides
that a child may be found neglected if the child is being
denied proper care and attention, physically, education-
ally, emotionally or morally, or is being permitted to live
under conditions, circumstances, or associations injuri-
ous to the well-being of the child or youth . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re P. M., 226 Conn. App.
378, 389–90, 318 A.3d 1085, cert. denied, 349 Conn.
919, 320 A.3d 978 (2024). This court has held that a
respondent parent fails to provide for the emotional
well-being of a child by abusing another child in his or
her presence. See, e.g., In re Nelmarie O., 97 Conn. App.
624, 629, 905 A.2d 706 (2006); see also In re Payton V.,
158 Conn. App. 154, 162, 118 A.3d 166 (abusing sibling
in child’s presence or earshot constitutes act of parental
commission that fails to provide for child’s emotional
well-being), cert. denied, 317 Conn. 924, 118 A.3d 549
(2015).4 With these principles in mind, we address the
respondent’s claims in turn.
I
The respondent first claims that the trial court erred
by denying his motions to strike the neglect petitions as
to S and L. We disagree.
Practice Book § 34a-15 (a) provides in relevant part
that, “[w]henever any party wishes to contest . . . the
legal sufficiency of the allegations of any petition, or
of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted . . . that party may do so by
filing a motion to strike the contested petition or part
thereof.” It is well settled that “[b]ecause a motion to
4
Although In re Nelmarie O. and In re Payton V. involved petitions
to terminate the respective respondents’ parental rights, the impact
of a child’s exposure to the physical abuse of his or her siblings would
similarly impact a child’s well-being in a neglect proceeding.
In re Loyal H.

strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and,
consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial
court, our review of the court’s ruling on the [motion to
strike] is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged
in the [petition] . . . and we construe the [petition] in the
manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.
. . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the [petition] would support
a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. .
. . Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied
[in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. . . . It is
fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a
[petition] challenged by a [respondent’s] motion to strike,
all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied
from the allegations are taken as admitted. . . . Indeed,
pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically,
rather than narrowly and technically.” (Emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spiotti v.
Clarke, 235 Conn. App. 715, 721, 346 A.3d 562 (2025).
The respondent contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motions to strike the neglect petitions as to
S and L because those petitions did not allege any abuse
as to those two children. As noted herein, however, the
petitioner filed amended neglect petitions alleging that
the children were being permitted to live under circum-
stances that were injurious to their well-being. As the
court aptly noted, even if S and L were not abused them-
selves, the allegations of physical abuse and violence on
the part of the respondent and the paternal grandmother
as to the other children were legally sufficient to find that
all of the children were living under circumstances that
were injurious to their well-being. We therefore reject
the respondent’s claim that the court improperly denied
his motions to strike the neglect petitions as to S and L.
II
The respondent also claims that the trial court erred
when it adjudicated the children neglected on the ground
that they were being permitted to live under conditions
that were injurious to their well-being. We disagree.
In re Loyal H.

“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, the function of an appellate court is to review
the findings of the trial court, not to retry the case. . .
. [W]e must determine whether the facts set out in the
memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence
or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in
the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous. . . .
We also must determine whether those facts correctly
found are, as a matter of law, sufficient to support the
judgment. . . . [W]e give great deference to the findings
of the trial court because of its function to weigh and
interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the
credibility of witnesses . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re P. M., supra, 226 Conn. App. 390.
In challenging the trial court’s neglect adjudication,
the respondent argues that the department noted that L
was nourished and healthy and bore no marks or bruises.
He also argues that S did not report that he or any of the
siblings had been abused or neglected and that A had
recanted her statement to the police that she had been
abused or neglected by the respondent. In so arguing,
the respondent ignores the court’s findings that J, S and
A had presented with scars indicative of abuse, that the
court credited A’s initial statement to the police that she
had been abused and that the respondent’s testimony
that neither he nor the children’s paternal grandmother
had physically abused the children was not credible. In
addition to the evidence of physical abuse, the court
gave weight to the paternal grandmother’s concession
that “kids should be beaten; that’s the way we do it,” and
that she had done so using a slipper or a belt. Moreover,
notably absent from the respondent’s argument is any
mention of the abuse of J or an assertion that either he
or the paternal grandmother hid the abuse from the
other children. As noted herein, the abuse of one of the
children, in the presence of the others, in itself, would
support a determination that all four children were living
under conditions that were injurious to their well-being.
The respondent also argues that the neglect adjudica-
tions were erroneous because he had “engaged in services
In re Loyal H.

and had benefited from those services.” He also contends
that there was no evidence that the children lived in inad-
equate housing and the children were visible in the com-
munity in that they attended school and were involved
in their church. Even if the respondent’s assertions
were true, they do not negate the trial court’s findings
of physical abuse, which were supported by the evidence.
Accordingly, the respondent’s challenges to the neglect
adjudications fail.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.