State v. Danielle P.

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State v. Danielle P.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANIELLE P.*
(AC 47104)
Seeley, Westbrook and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of harassment in the second degree and criminal
violation of a protective order, the defendant appealed. She claimed, inter
alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions because
the state failed to establish that the victim, V, had received harassing and
alarming phone calls, texts and mailings, and that she was responsible for
any such harassing communications. Held:
This court concluded that, although the defendant was prosecuted under the
wrong revision of the statute (§ 53a-183 (a)) proscribing harassment in the
second degree, that impropriety was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The revision of the statute ((Rev. to 2021) § 53a-183 (a), as amended by
Public Acts 2021, No. 21-56, § 5) under which the defendant was prosecuted
imposed a more onerous evidentiary burden on the state, in that it required
proof that the defendant’s conduct had caused terror or intimidation, whereas
the applicable revision of the statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 53a-183 (a)) required
communication with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm, and, as the trial
court’s jury instruction under the incorrect revision of the statute was con-
siderably more favorable to the defendant than the correct jury instruction
would have been, and because the defendant had full and fair notice of the
nature of the charges and her allegedly unlawful conduct, this court was
satisfied that the erroneous jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant.
The defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction of harassment in the second degree was without merit, as it was
reasonable and logical for the jury to find, given the sheer volume of her
unwelcome and incessant contacts, in which she threatened to “ruin” V’s
life and make it “a living hell,” that she repeatedly had contacted V for the
purpose of harassing and causing him alarm and that she made those contacts
in a manner likely to cause him such alarm.
The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of vio-
lating the criminal protective order the trial court had issued against the
defendant, as certain defects in the order did not render it invalid in light
of the defendant’s having engaged in conduct prohibited by the order before
*
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of
the victims of family violence, we decline to use the defendant’s full
name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s
identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d)
(3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be
protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining
order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that per-
son’s identity may be ascertained.
State v. Danielle P.

seeking to have it declared invalid, and the defendant provided no support
for her claims to the contrary.
The defendant was not entitled to review of her unpreserved claims that
the trial court and the prosecutor engaged in various improprieties and
misconduct during the trial, as those claims were set forth in conclusory
terms, unaccompanied by analysis, legal authority or reference to facts in
the record that identified any actions, statements or other conduct that
provided a basis for her assertions.

Argued March 10, 2025—officially released March 17, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the
defendant with two counts of the crime of harassment in
the second degree, and information, in the second case,
charging the defendant with the crime of criminal viola-
tion of a protective order, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area
number seven, where the cases were consolidated and
tried to the jury before Chaplin, J.; verdicts and judg-
ments of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Danielle P., self-represented, the appellant (defen-
dant).
Danielle Koch, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney,
Brian K. Sibley, Sr., senior assistant state’s attorney,
and Leah Schwartz, certified legal intern, for the appel-
lee (state).

Opinion

PALMER, J. The self-represented defendant, Danielle
P., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered
after a jury trial, of two counts of harassment in the
second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183
(a)1 and one count of criminal violation of a protective
1
As we explain more fully hereinafter, the defendant was improperly
charged and tried under General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-183 (a), as
amended by Public Acts 2021, No. 21-56, § 5, rather than the version of
the statute in effect at the time the defendant engaged in her unlawful
conduct, namely, General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-183 (a). For the
State v. Danielle P.

order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223 (a). On
appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support her convictions, and (2) her
constitutional and civil rights were violated as a result
of certain judicial and prosecutorial improprieties. We
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support
the defendant’s convictions and that her other claims
are inadequately briefed, unpreserved and otherwise
unsupported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. In 2017, the defendant and V became involved
romantically and moved in together. Not long thereafter,
however, they ended their romantic relationship and
began dating other people while continuing to reside
together platonically. Sometime later, V observed that
the defendant appeared to be jealous of the woman he was
dating and, as a result, in 2019, he and the defendant
separated. In 2020, however, when V needed a place to
stay while he was looking for an apartment, the defen-
dant allowed him to reside with her. Upon remembering
“how [the defendant] was,” V decided he did not want to
remain with the defendant, and he moved out after he
was able to find a residence of his own.
After V moved into his own apartment, the defendant
called him, wanting to be friends, but V declined. The
defendant told V that if they could not be friends, she
would make his life “a living hell . . . .” The next morning,
V discovered that all four of the tires on his car had been
slashed. The defendant began calling V repeatedly, and
when V answered one of the calls, the defendant admitted
to sending someone to vandalize his tires.
V contacted the police numerous times about the
defendant’s harassing conduct. On one such occasion,
on January 6, 2021, V reached Officer Marviline Carter
of the North Haven Police Department and informed
Carter about the ongoing issues he was having with the
reasons set forth in part I of this opinion, however, we conclude that
this impropriety was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Danielle P.

defendant. V explained that the defendant had been call-
ing and texting him incessantly from several different
phone numbers. V also told Carter that the defendant had
mailed him an envelope containing her electronic benefits
transfer (EBT) card and PIN number. In addition, V
played for Carter a recording of the defendant in which
she acknowledged that she had his tires vandalized and
had been calling him repeatedly. Using phone numbers
that V identified from his cell phone as belonging to the
defendant, Carter called the defendant and instructed
her to cease any further contact with V. Although the
defendant told Carter that she understood, the defendant
soon resumed contacting V. Upon learning this informa-
tion, Carter obtained an arrest warrant charging the
defendant with harassment in the second degree, and
the defendant was arrested pursuant to the warrant.
On March 19, 2021, the court issued a full no contact
protective order prohibiting the defendant from hav-
ing any contact with V or with others whom the contact
would likely cause annoyance or alarm to V. Following
the issuance of the protective order,2 the defendant con-
tinued to call V on multiple occasions, and the defendant
also repeatedly called V’s girlfriend, M, as well as M’s
son. After speaking with V and learning that the defen-
dant had been calling him constantly, Sergeant Santiago
Mateo of the North Haven Police Department obtained
an arrest warrant charging the defendant with violation
of the protective order. Subsequently, the defendant was
charged in an amended long form information with two
counts of harassment in the second degree in one case3
2
The trial court issued the protective order on the record and in the
defendant’s presence during her arraignment on the harassment charges
and provided the defendant with a copy of the order at that time. The
court also read the order to the defendant and explained that a violation
of its terms constitutes a felony. The court asked the defendant if she
understood the terms of the order, and she responded in the affirmative.
3
The first count alleged that between November 14, 2020, and January
6, 2021, the defendant intentionally harassed V by repeatedly telephon-
ing him despite being advised that V did not want any contact with the
defendant. The second count alleged that between those same dates,
the defendant intentionally harassed V by repeatedly texting him and
State v. Danielle P.

and with one count of violation of a criminal protec-
tive order in another case. The state filed a motion to
consolidate the two cases for purposes of trial, and the
court granted the motion.
Following a trial,4 the jury found the defendant guilty
as charged. The court rendered judgments in accordance
with the jury verdicts and imposed a total effective sen-
tence of eighteen months of incarceration, execution
suspended, followed by eighteen months of conditional
discharge. This appeal followed. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
Before considering the defendant’s claims of eviden-
tiary insufficiency and judicial and prosecutorial impro-
priety, we address an issue that neither party raised in
the trial court or on appeal, namely, whether the defen-
dant was properly charged and tried under the version
of § 53a-183 (a) that was in effect when the defendant
engaged in harassing conduct toward V. Although we
conclude that the defendant was prosecuted under the
wrong version of § 53a-183 (a), we also conclude that the
impropriety did not prejudice the defendant.
As alleged in the amended long form information, the
conduct of the defendant that provided the basis for the
two counts of harassment in the second degree occurred
between November 14, 2020, and January 6, 2021. See
footnote 3 of this opinion. Both of those counts used lan-
guage identical to the wording of the 2021 revision of §
53a-183 (a), as amended by Public Acts 2021, No. 21-56,
§ 5 (P.A. 21-56);5 the current version of that statutory
communicating with him by mail after being advised that V did not
want any contact with the defendant.
4
The defendant represented herself at trial as well as on appeal.
5
General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-183 (a), as amended by P.A.
No. 21-56, § 5, provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of harass-
ment in the second degree when with intent to harass, terrorize or
alarm another person, and for no legitimate purpose, such person . . .
(2) makes a telephone call or engages in any other form of communica-
tion, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause
terror, intimidation or alarm . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
State v. Danielle P.

provision, which did not become effective until October
1, 2021,6 well after the defendant was alleged to have
engaged in her harassing conduct toward V. Consistent
with the language of the information, the trial court,
without objection, instructed the jury under General
Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-183 (a), as amended by
P.A. No. 21-56, § 5, rather than under General Statutes
(Rev. to 2019) § 53a-183 (a),7 the version of the statute
in effect when the defendant engaged in the harassing
conduct alleged in the amended long form information.
Although the parties never raised the issue, in the inter-
est of justice, we afforded them the opportunity to sub-
mit supplemental briefs to address, first, the propriety
of the trial court’s jury instructions on harassment in
the second degree, and second, the appropriate remedy,
if any, in the event the instruction was improper. See,
e.g., Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown &
Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 161–62, 84
A.3d 840 (2014) (reviewing court was not precluded from
raising issues involving constitutional error sua sponte,
as long as record is adequate for review of unpreserved
claim and court provides parties opportunity to be heard
by way of supplemental briefs); see also State v. Adam
P., 351 Conn. 213, 231, 330 A.3d 73 (2025) (“[i]nstruc-
6
The first count of the amended long form information alleged in
relevant part that the defendant intentionally harassed V, “and for no
legitimate purpose, [the defendant], made telephone calls, in a manner
likely to cause terror, intimidation, or alarm . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The second count of the amended long form information alleged in
relevant part that the defendant intentionally harassed V “for no legiti-
mate purpose [and] in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, or
alarm . . . repeatedly texted and communicated by mail with [V] . . . .”
(Emphasis added.) Both counts charged a violation of § 53a-183 (a) (2).
See footnote 3 of this opinion.
7
General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-183 (a) provides in relevant
part: “A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when . . .
(2) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communi-
cates with a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting
a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer
network, as defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written
communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or harm; or (3)
with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he makes a tele-
phone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to
cause annoyance or alarm.” (Emphasis added.)
State v. Danielle P.

tional errors violate due process—and, therefore, are of
constitutional dimension—when they confuse . . . one
of the essential elements of the crime”). The state filed a
supplemental brief on the issue; the defendant did not.
Although the instruction was improper because it tracked
the language of the wrong version of the statute,8 we
agree with the state that the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.9
The version of the statute in effect at the time of the
defendant’s conduct; see General Statutes (Rev. to 2019)
8
In its supplemental brief, the state asserts that, at the time of her
arrest, the defendant was charged with harassment in the second degree
under the correct version of the statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 2019)
§ 53a-183 (a), because the 2021 revision of the statute, as amended by
P.A. 21-56, § 5, had not yet taken effect. Although the arrest warrant
itself does not distinguish between the two versions of the statute, we
have no reason to dispute the state’s representation. The state also main-
tains, however, that “[t]he state’s [amended] long form information,
filed July 11, 2023, and the rest of the court record, do not indicate any
departure from [the] 2019 edition of the statutes,” asserting, further,
that the defendant was “properly prosecuted . . . even assuming for
the sake of argument that the defendant was charged in the state’s
[amended] long form information with the incorrect version of the
harassment statute . . . .”
Although we ultimately agree with the state that the defendant cannot
prevail on appeal, we have difficulty understanding the state’s asser-
tion that the record reflects no departure from the correct version of
the statute. For example, the information charges the defendant in the
precise language of the 2021 statutory revision, as amended by P.A.
21-56, § 5, asserting in each of the two counts of harassment in the
second degree that the defendant, “for no legitimate purpose,” engaged
in the prohibited conduct “in a manner likely to cause terror, intimida-
tion, or alarm . . . .” See footnote 6 of this opinion. Moreover, the trial
court instructed the jury in the precise language of the 2021 revision
of § 53a-183, as amended by P.A. 21-56, § 5. Further, in its original
brief to this court, the state cited to and relied on the 2021 revision
of § 53a-183, as amended by P.A. 21-56, § 5, clearly treating it as the
operative statutory provision for purposes of the case. Consequently,
contrary to the state’s contention, it is clear that the defendant was not
prosecuted under General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-183 (a), as she
should have been but, rather, under the 2021 revision of the statute,
as amended by P.A. 21-56, § 5, which was not yet in effect when the
defendant engaged in the harassing conduct at issue here.
9
In light of our determination that the improper jury instruction was
harmless, we need not address other arguments raised by the state to
State v. Danielle P.

§ 53a-183 (a); provided in relevant part that a person is
guilty of harassment in the second degree when, “with
intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person,” she
communicates with a person “in a manner likely to cause
annoyance or alarm,” either by mail or text; see General
Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-183 (a) (2); or by making
a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues.
See General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-183 (a) (3). By
contrast, General Statutes (Rev. to 2021), as amended by
P.A. 21-56, § 5, pursuant to which the court instructed
the jury, provides that a person is guilty of harassment in
the second degree when, “with intent to harass, terrorize
or alarm another person, and for no legitimate purpose,”
she makes a telephone call or engages in any other form
of communication “in a manner likely to cause terror,
intimidation or alarm . . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to
2021) § 53a-183 (a) (2), as amended by P.A. 21-56, § 5.
There is some overlap in the language of the two ver-
sions of the statute: under both, a defendant is prohib-
ited from communicating with the intent to harass or
to alarm another person and doing so in such a manner
likely to cause “alarm . . . .” However, whereas the 2019
revision of the statute, which is applicable to the pres-
ent case, requires that the communication be made with
the intent to “harass, annoy or alarm” and in a manner
likely to cause “annoyance or alarm,” the 2021 statutory
revision, as amended by P.A. 21-56, § 5, requires that
the communication be made with the intent to “harass,
terrorize or alarm . . . and for no legitimate purpose,”
and in a manner likely to cause “terror, intimidation or
alarm . . . .”
On the basis of this language, it is clear that the trial
court’s erroneous jury instruction imposed a more oner-
ous or demanding evidentiary burden on the state than
was required under the correct version of the statute
because harassing conduct aimed at causing “terror” or
“intimidation” is qualitatively more serious and extreme
support its contention that the defendant’s conviction of harassment
in the second degree should stand despite the erroneous instruction.
State v. Danielle P.

than conduct intended to cause “annoyance” or “alarm.”10
For this reason, any harassing conduct falling within the
terms of the predecessor version of the statute necessar-
ily would fall within the terms of the 2021 revision, as
amended. Because the instruction as given was consid-
erably more favorable to the defendant than the correct
instruction would have been, and because the defendant
otherwise had full and fair notice both of the nature
of the charges and the unlawful conduct in which she
allegedly engaged, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the trial court’s erroneous instruction did not
prejudice the defendant.11 See, e.g., State v. Johnson,
345 Conn. 174, 196, 283 A.3d 477 (2022) (“the test for
determining whether a constitutional [error] is harm-
less . . . is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt
that the [error] complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to any relief
due to the erroneous instruction.
Finally, the state’s improper reliance on the 2021 revi-
sion of § 53a-183, as amended by P.A. 21-56, § 5, gives
rise to a second, albeit related, issue pertaining to the
defendant’s conviction of making harassing telephone
10
We note that, in his March 10, 2021 testimony before the Judiciary
Committee regarding the proposed 2021 amendment to § 53a-183 (a),
Chief State’s Attorney Richard J. Colangelo, Jr., expressly acknowl-
edged this enhanced burden on the state, explaining that “terrorizing
is going to be harder to reach [than annoyance].” Conn. Joint Standing
Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 4, 2021 Sess., p. 2719.
11
The court’s jury instruction on the wrong version of the statute did
not constitute structural error and, therefore, is subject to a harmless-
ness analysis. “Structural [error] cases defy analysis by harmless error
standards because the entire conduct of the trial, from beginning to
end, is obviously affected . . . . These cases contain a defect affecting
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an
error in the trial process itself.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Alexander, 343 Conn. 495, 511 n.13, 275 A.3d 199 (2022).
Thus, “[o]nly a small share of constitutional errors are structural, that
is, so presumptively harmful that they require automatic reversal. . . .
Most, rather, are subject to harmless error review. . . . This includes
errors in instructing the jury as to the elements of a crime.” (Citations
omitted.) Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 339 Conn. 1, 29, 259
A.3d 1082 (2021).
State v. Danielle P.

calls as charged in count one of the amended long form
information. The defendant was charged with violating
subsection (a) (2) of § 53a-183 in each of the two counts
alleging harassment in the second degree; see footnote 6
of this opinion; and she was found guilty of both counts
as charged. However, although harassing telephone calls
are prohibited under subsection (a) (2) of the 2021 revi-
sion of § 53a-183, as amended by P.A. 21-56, § 5, under
the correct version of the statute, General Statutes (Rev.
to 2019) § 53a-183 (a), such telephone calls are barred
under subsection (a) (3). Consequently, with respect to
the first count alleging harassing telephone calls, the
defendant was convicted under the wrong statutory
subsection. However, for the same reasons that we have
determined that the defendant was not prejudiced by
virtue of having been charged and tried under the wrong
version of the statute—including the fact that she had
due notice of the charges and the state’s case against
her—we conclude that the defendant’s conviction of
placing harassing telephone calls under the incorrect
statutory subsection does not constitute reversible error.
We reach this determination because, in the particular
circumstances of the present case, this error is properly
viewed as technical, rather than fundamental or substan-
tive, in nature. Cf. State v. Hilton, 45 Conn. App. 207,
208 n.2, 694 A.2d 830 (although information charged
defendant with capital felony in violation of General
Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-54b, defendant was con-
victed under § 53a-54b, and state’s brief cited § 53a-54b,
because case was otherwise tried and presented to jury
under murder statute, General Statutes § 53a-54a, on
appeal, defendant’s conviction under § 53a-54b instead
of under § 53a-54a was treated as scrivener’s error),
cert. denied, 243 Conn. 925, 701 A.2d 659 (1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1134, 118 S. Ct. 1091, 140 L. Ed. 2d
147 (1998). In view of the fact that the fairness of the
defendant’s trial was not implicated by her conviction
State v. Danielle P.

under the wrong subsection of § 53a-183 (a), that impro-
priety does not require a new trial. We therefore turn to
the defendant’s claims on appeal.
II
The defendant first contends that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty findings on
all three counts. We disagree.
We begin our analysis with the familiar principles that
govern our consideration of a claim of evidentiary insuf-
ficiency. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test.
First, we construe the evidence in the light most favor-
able to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine
whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could
have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“In particular, before this court may overturn a jury
verdict for insufficient evidence, it must conclude that
no reasonable jury could arrive at the conclusion the
jury did. . . . Although the jury must find every element
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the
defendant guilty of the charged offense . . . each of the
basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“If it is reasonable and logical for the [jury] to conclude
that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the [jury] is
permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider
it in combination with other proven facts in determining
whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves
the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Waters, 214
Conn. App. 294, 301–302, 280 A.3d 601, cert. denied,
345 Conn. 914, 284 A.3d 25 (2022).
In addition, “[t]he law is clear that it is within the
jury’s exclusive province to determine what weight, if
State v. Danielle P.

any, to afford evidence and to determine the credibility
of witnesses. . . . [W]e must defer to the jury’s assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand
observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude. . .
. This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that
of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdict.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Makins, 232 Conn. App. 199,
220, 335 A.3d 67, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 908, 344 A.3d
150 (2025).
Furthermore, “[i]n evaluating evidence, the [jury] is
not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that
are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The
[jury] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence
or facts established by the evidence [that] it deems to be
reasonable and logical. . . . Finally, on appeal, we do not
ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence
that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of
the evidence that supports the jury’s verdict of guilty.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Luciano, 204 Conn. App. 388, 397–98, 253 A.3d
1005, cert. denied, 337 Conn. 903, 252 A.3d 362 (2021).
A
The defendant first claims that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support the jury’s guilty findings with respect
to the two counts of harassment in the second degree. In
support of her contention, the defendant argues that the
state’s evidence failed to establish that V had received
harassing and alarming phone calls, texts and mailings,
and that, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to
prove that she was the individual responsible for any
such harassing communications.12 We reject the defen-
dant’s claim.
V testified at trial that, after he moved into his apart-
ment and declined the defendant’s invitation to remain
12
On appeal, the defendant’s argument with respect to her evidentiary
insufficiency claim does not distinguish between the two counts of
State v. Danielle P.

friends, the defendant called him and said that she was
“going to ruin my life, make my life a living hell if we
can’t be friends. If I can’t come over and we can’t—I
can’t come over and have dinner with you or whatever,
whatever, we going to be enemies.” V further testified
that after he discovered that all four tires on his car had
been slashed, the defendant called him “multiple times,
about a million times. Kept calling, calling. I couldn’t—
I couldn’t even turn my phone off. She was calling and
calling. So, I finally answered the phone, and I wanted to
know what happened to my tires. She told me she popped
my tires. I don’t know if she—she actually said—she
was going back and forth. She actually said she probably
sent somebody over to pop my tires or whatever.” V also
explained that he had repeatedly complained to the police
about the defendant’s numerous harassing and threaten-
ing phone calls and texts because the defendant contin-
ued to contact him on multiple occasions.13 The arrest
warrant application for the defendant, which outlined
V’s multiple complaints to the police about her repeated
phone calls and texts to him from various numbers, and
a police report dated January 6, 2021, explaining the
defendant’s history of harassing V by phone and mail,
harassment in the second degree. Consequently, we, too, address both
counts together.
13
We note that, on cross-examination, V testified that the defendant
had threatened him over the phone and not by way of texts. V further
stated that he did not recall receiving any harassing texts and was con-
cerned about the defendant “calling [him] over and over and over and
over again,” on some occasions, “all through the night.” With respect
to V’s testimony about the texts, “[i]t is well-settled . . . that [e]vidence
is not insufficient . . . because it is conflicting or inconsistent. . . .
Rather, the [finder of fact] [weighs] the conflicting evidence and . . .
can decide what—all, none, or some—of a witness’ testimony to accept
or reject.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 200
Conn. App. 427, 449, 238 A.3d 797, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 974, 240
A.3d 676 (2020); see also Parker v. Slosberg, 73 Conn. App. 254, 265,
808 A.2d 351 (2002) (“jury [is] free to credit one version of events
over the other, even from the same witnesses”). Accordingly, the jury
reasonably could have credited the substance of the complaints that V
made about harassing texts “closer in time to the events at issue, when
[his] recollection would have been fresher.” State v. Stephen J. R., 309
Conn. 586, 600, 72 A.3d 379 (2013).
State v. Danielle P.

both of which were introduced into evidence, buttressed
V’s testimony.14
Carter testified that while meeting with V following
one of his numerous complaints to the police about the
defendant’s constant and unwanted phone calls and
texts, V showed Carter the call log on his cell phone.
The log contained two different phone numbers from
which he had been called repeatedly, and V identified the
calls from those numbers as coming from the defendant.
Carter then called one of the numbers and was sent to
voicemail, and the outgoing voicemail message indicated
that it was the defendant’s phone number. Carter dialed
the second number in V’s call log from which he also had
received numerous calls, and the person who answered
identified herself as the defendant. Carter informed the
defendant of V’s complaint and told the defendant to
cease all contact with V. The defendant responded that
she did not realize that V had an issue with her, that she
had sent her EBT card to V because he needed money for
groceries, and that she would not have any contact with
him in the future. However, V subsequently reported
that the defendant continued to contact him and, on
one occasion, graphically threatening to cause him harm
if he did not use the EBT card. The defendant also left
multiple messages from various phone numbers admit-
ting to showing up unannounced at his home and at the
homes of V’s former girlfriends. In addition, according
to V, soon after Carter informed the defendant to cease
contact with him, the defendant “was getting apps to call
me on that wasn’t really nobody’s number. It was—she
was changing numbers, calling from different numbers
all the time.”
In view of the evidence adduced at trial, it was reason-
able and logical for the jury to conclude that the defen-
dant had repeatedly called V and texted and mailed him
for the purpose of harassing him and causing him alarm.
Moreover, given the sheer volume of the defendant’s
14
The defendant herself introduced those two documents into evidence
during her cross-examination of V.
State v. Danielle P.

unwelcome contacts with V, her unwillingness to cease
communication with V, and the content of at least some
of those communications—for example, the defendant
threatened to “ruin [V’s] life” by making it a “living
hell”—it was reasonable for the jury to find that the
incessant calls, texts and mailings from the defendant
were done with the intent to harass or to alarm V and
were done in a manner likely to cause alarm to V.
With respect to the defendant’s contention that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant
was responsible for the harassing communications, the
jury was entitled to find that V, who had known the
defendant for at least several years and had lived with
and been romantically involved with her, was sufficiently
familiar with the defendant to recognize both her voice
over the phone and her phone numbers. The jury also
was free to credit V’s testimony, substantiated by his
call logs and consistent complaints to the police, that the
defendant had initiated the unceasing calls, texts and
mailings. As stated previously, it is the jury’s unique
role to evaluate and ascertain the veracity of witnesses
and to decide whether to accept or reject, in whole or in
part, a witness’ testimony. Consequently, “[q]uestions of
whether to believe or disbelieve a competent witness are
beyond our review”; (internal quotation marks omitted)
State v. Margaraci, 198 Conn. App. 305, 315, 232 A.3d
1220 (2020), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 916, 284 A.3d 299
(2022); and we therefore will not second-guess the jury’s
credibility determinations with respect to V or Carter.
See, e.g., Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306, 333,
285 A.3d 59 (2022) (“[b]ecause it is the sole province of
the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, it is
not our role to second-guess such credibility determina-
tions” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied,
346 Conn. 903, 287 A.3d 601 (2023).
The defendant also asserts that the state’s case was
insufficient because the state failed to adduce certain
evidence at trial, such as the actual call logs on V’s phone
and a letter that the defendant had sent to V along with
State v. Danielle P.

her EBT card. The defendant cross-examined the state’s
witnesses, V and Carter, on these matters, and, during
closing argument, she urged the jury to conclude that
the state had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt because of the evidence that was not introduced.
It was for the jury to decide whether the absence of that
or any other evidence had a bearing on the strength of
the state’s case and, ultimately, to determine, in light
of all the evidence, whether the state proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty under
the two counts of harassment in the second degree with
which she was charged. Moreover, when considering the
defendant’s claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we are
bound to review that claim based only on the evidence
presented at trial; see, e.g., State v. Luciano, supra, 204
Conn. App. 396 (insufficiency of evidence claim is tested
by reviewing no less than, and no more than, evidence
introduced at trial); and that evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s findings with respect to the two counts
of harassment in the second degree. Accordingly, the
defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient as
to those two counts is without merit.
B
The defendant further maintains that the state failed
to prove that she violated the protective order. The defen-
dant also appears to contend that the protective order
was invalid and, therefore, unenforceable. We reject the
defendant’s contentions.
Due to the defendant’s harassing conduct, as discussed
previously, the trial court issued a full no contact pro-
tective order on March 19, 2021, when the defendant
was arraigned on the harassment charges. In relevant
part, the protective order prohibited the defendant from
“contact[ing] [V] in any manner, including by written,
electronic or telephone contact, [and from] contact[ing]
[V’s] home, workplace or others with whom the contact
would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to [V].” Under
§ 53a-223 (a), “[a] person is guilty of criminal violation
of a protective order when an order [of protection] issued
State v. Danielle P.

pursuant to subsection (e) of section 46b-38c . . . has been
issued against such person, and such person violates such
order.” “It is well settled that in order to prove a charge
of criminal violation of a protective order, the state must
demonstrate that a protective order was issued against
the defendant . . . and it must demonstrate the terms of
the order and the manner in which it was violated by the
defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Wiggins, 159 Conn. App. 598, 604, 124 A.3d 902
(2015), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 908, 170 A.3d 4 (2017).
The defendant asserts, in largely conclusory terms,
that the state relied only on allegations and produced
no persuasive evidence at trial that she violated the
protective order. Instead of addressing the evidence,
however, the defendant focuses primarily on the fact
that V’s date of birth and race were listed incorrectly
on the protective order. It is not entirely clear, though,
why, in the defendant’s view, these errors are mate-
rial to her case because she does not appear to dispute
either the existence of the protective order or that it
prohibited her from contacting V or others with whom
such contact would likely cause annoyance or alarm to
V.15 In any event, we treat her claim with respect to the
protective order as twofold: first, that the protective
order was invalid because of those errors, and second,
that the evidence was insufficient to prove a violation
of § 53a-223 (a).
The defendant cannot prevail on her claim challenging
the validity of the protective order because, as this court
previously has explained, “the validity of the [protective]
order is not an element of the crime of criminal viola-
tion of a protective order under § 53a-223. . . . In State
v. Wright, 273 Conn. [418, 870 A.2d 1039 (2005)], our
Supreme Court held that the invalidity of the protec-
tive order does not constitute a legitimate defense to
the charged crime. Id., 424. The Wright court began its
15
See footnote 2 of this opinion. Moreover, at the hearing at which the
protective order was issued, the court expressly asked the defendant if
she knew the identity of the “protected person” with “[t]he [initial V],”
and the defendant said that she did.
State v. Danielle P.

analysis by reiterating its holding in Cologne v. West-
farms Associates, 197 Conn. [141, 147–48, 496 A.2d 476
(1985)], that in the context of a contempt proceeding, an
order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction must
be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly
and proper proceedings. . . . In extending the application
of this rule from a contempt proceeding to a protective
order, the court concluded: If the defendant believed that
the [protective] order did not comport with the statutory
requirements of [General Statutes] § 46b-38c (e), he had
two lawful remedies available to him. He could have: (1)
sought to have the order modified or vacated by a judge
of the Superior Court pursuant to Practice Book § 38-13;
or (2) appealed the terms of the order to the Appellate
Court in accordance with General Statutes § 54-63g.
Having failed to pursue either remedy, the defendant
may not seek to avoid his conviction for violating that
order by challenging the factual basis of its issuance.
State v. Wright, supra, 426–27 . . . .” (Citations omitted;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Winter, 117 Conn. App. 493, 502, 979 A.2d
608 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 569
(2010). In light of the foregoing, the defendant cannot
challenge the validity of the protective order because
she engaged in conduct prohibited by the order before
seeking to have it declared invalid.16
We also conclude that there was sufficient evidence
from which the jury reasonably could have found that the
16
Significantly, however, the defendant, without objection, elicited
testimony from V that his date of birth and race were listed inac-
curately in the protective order, and the defendant questioned him
extensively about those inaccuracies. It also bears noting that, during
its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court, asking, “does the
fact that the person listed as the protected party is different, based
on the incorrect date of birth, invalidate a protective order? Meaning,
even if the defendant contacted [V], sitting in the courtroom testifying,
she, technically, did not contact an individual named on the protective
order, as the protected person?”
In response to the question, the court instructed the jury as follows.
“First, a protective order is issued, primarily, to give notice to a defen-
dant that they are to not engage in certain conduct with regard to another
person. Secondarily, it is to give that second person notice that they are
State v. Danielle P.

protective order issued against the defendant on March
19, 2021, and that she violated the order by placing
multiple phone calls to V and to M and her son, as well,
after that date. Jennifer Rollberg, deputy chief clerk of
the Superior Court, geographical area number seven, in
Meriden, testified that, on March 19, 2021, a protective
order was issued against the defendant listing V as the
protected party. The protective order was admitted as a
full exhibit at trial and, as previously noted, prohibited
the defendant from having any contact with V or any
other person with whom such contact would likely cause
annoyance or alarm to V.
V testified that, following the issuance of the protec-
tive order, the defendant continued to call him multiple
times and that she “started calling [M] and threatening
[M and her son] because [the defendant] was mad at them
for some reason. And that’s when I had to call the police
again. And that’s when I did have the protective order.
I showed the police the protective order that night.” V
further testified that he called the police regarding the
violations of the protective order sometime in October,
2021, but that he could not remember the exact date.
Mateo testified that, in the late evening of October 10,
2021, or the early morning hours of October 11, 2021,
he responded to a complaint from V that he had received
repeated calls from the defendant. V showed Mateo the
call logs on his phone, which revealed many calls from
private numbers and from a number that the caller ID
identified as belonging to the defendant. The state intro-
duced as a full exhibit a paper copy of the screenshot
that Mateo took of the call log on V’s phone.17 Mateo also
protected from the first person. As to whether the date of birth, which
you heard significant testimony about, today, is a material difference,
or merely a scrivener’s error, that is something for you to consider.
But to understand that the intention behind the protective order is to
give one person notice that they are not to do XY and Z, to the second
person. And it’s for protection.” The court’s instruction in response to
the jury’s inquiry has not been challenged in the defendant’s appeal.
17
There were no dates on the call log identifying the phone as belonging
to V, and the defendant cross-examined Mateo on this point.
State v. Danielle P.

interviewed M, who reported multiple harassing phone
calls similar to those received by V.
M also testified at trial and confirmed that she had
been receiving numerous unwanted and harassing calls,
some from numbers that she knew were associated with
the defendant and others from numbers that she did not
recognize. However, given the nature of those calls and
their similarity to calls that V had been receiving from
the defendant—the caller did not speak but instead left
messages requesting a return call—it was apparent that
the calls were coming from the defendant.
The foregoing evidence fully supports the jury’s find-
ing that the defendant violated the protective order as
charged, and the defendant has provided no support,
factual or otherwise, for her contrary contention. Con-
sequently, we reject the defendant’s claim of evidentiary
insufficiency with respect to her conviction of criminal
violation of a protective order.
III
The defendant also raises several claims concerning
alleged improprieties and misconduct by the trial court
and the prosecutor. The defendant cannot prevail on her
claims because they are either not properly preserved,
adequately briefed or supported by the record.
The defendant asserts that the trial court “committed
perjury all during the trial” and otherwise engaged in
“egregious” misconduct, “did not allow [her] to have a
pretrial [conference] to determine if [there] was enough
evidence to go to trial,” and “denied [her] the opportu-
nity to submit supporting evidence [of] her innocence,”
including “evidence from the [state] Commission [on]
Human Rights [and] Opportunities . . . .” The defen-
dant also asserts that the prosecutor had an “[a]ctual
conflict of interest,” improperly failed to provide her
with a witness list until shortly before trial commenced,
withheld evidence, including a police report from the
North Haven Police Department, did not provide her
with certain “video and audio recordings” pertaining to
State v. Danielle P.

her case, denied her the “opportunity to speak with any
witnesses,” and presented “misleading information” and
“falsif[ied]” documents.
The defendant’s claims, all of which are set forth in
wholly conclusory terms, are unaccompanied by any anal-
ysis, legal authority or reference to facts in the record.
In addition, the defendant did not properly preserve her
claims by raising them at trial or otherwise providing the
trial court or this court with a factual or legal basis for
the claims. Furthermore, we have identified nothing in
the record that supports the defendant’s claims. Indeed,
with respect to her allegations of intentional misconduct
by both the trial court and the prosecutor, the defendant
has not identified any actions, statements or other con-
duct, either by the court or the prosecutor, that provide
any basis for her bald assertions of such misconduct.
“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented to
this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis,
rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order
to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue
properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement
of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention
in the brief without substantive discussion or citation
of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a
reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . con-
sider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must
clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.
. . . In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only
short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Godbout,
229 Conn. App. 231, 235–36, 326 A.3d 1142 (2024).
Furthermore, it is a “fundamental precept, deeply
ingrained in our decisional law and our rules of practice,
that the appellate courts of this state shall not be bound
to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the
trial. . . . Requiring a party to distinctly raise a claim of
error before the trial court is no mere formality; rather,
it ensures that the trial court is specifically apprised of
State v. Danielle P.

the alleged error and, thus, has an opportunity to respond
accordingly. As [our Supreme Court] repeatedly has
observed, the essence of the preservation requirement is
that fair notice be given to the trial court of the party’s
view of the governing law . . . .” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramon A.
G., 190 Conn. App. 483, 492–93, 211 A.3d 82 (2019),
aff’d, 336 Conn. 386, 246 A.3d 481 (2020). Relatedly,
“[a]s an appellant, the self-represented defendant bore
the burden of providing this court with an adequate
record. . . . In the absence of an adequate record, we can
engage only in speculation and conjecture, which have no
place in appellate review.” (Citations omitted; footnote
omitted.) State v. Raffone, 163 Conn. App. 410, 414–15,
136 A.3d 647 (2016).
Of course, “[w]e are mindful that [i]t is the established
policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-
represented] litigants and when it does not interfere
with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of
practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Godbout,
supra, 229 Conn. App. 236. “The courts adhere to this
rule to ensure that [self-represented] litigants receive a
full and fair opportunity to be heard, regardless of their
lack of a legal education and experience . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Traylor v. State, 332 Conn.
789, 806, 213 A.3d 467 (2019). Thus, we “always [have]
been solicitous of the rights of [self-represented] litigants
and, like the trial court, will endeavor to see that such
a litigant shall have the opportunity to have [her] case
fully and fairly heard so far as such latitude is consistent
with the just rights of any adverse party.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Costello v. Goldstein & Peck,
P.C., 321 Conn. 244, 257, 137 A.3d 748 (2016). “None-
theless, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants
some latitude, the right of self-representation provides
no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules
State v. Danielle P.

of procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Godbout, supra, 236.
Despite our long-standing “policy to give leeway to
[self-represented] litigants regarding their adherence to
the rules of this court”; (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) State v. Bethea, 187 Conn. App. 263, 267 n.3, 202
A.3d 429, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 904, 208 A.3d 1239
(2019); because the defendant’s claims are unpreserved,
unsupported by the record and devoid of any analysis or
authority, the defendant is not entitled to review of her
claims.18 Accordingly, we reject those claims.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

18
Even if we were to review the defendant’s claims, they lack merit.
The record contains no suggestion that either the trial court or the
prosecutor engaged in any misconduct of any kind. The defendant never
requested a pretrial ruling or hearing in accordance with Practice Book
§ 41-8 to determine whether the information should be dismissed for
lack of evidence. The record also provides no support for the defendant’s
contention that she was barred from introducing evidence in her own
defense, and she never sought to introduce the only evidence that she
has identified in support of her claim, namely, “evidence from the . . .
Commission [on] Human Rights [and] Opportunities . . . .” Indeed, the
defendant has not explained the substance of this evidence or why it
would be relevant to any issue in her trial. Contrary to her claim, the
state provided the defendant with a witness list, and the defendant
indicated that the list included all the witnesses who she herself might
elect to call on her own behalf. The record also provides no support for
the defendant’s claim that she was barred from interviewing witnesses
or that the state withheld from the defendant relevant evidence in its
possession. Finally, the defendant has provided no explanation of the
nature of the prosecutor’s alleged conflict of interest, let alone has she
offered proof of any such conflict. For those reasons, the defendant
could not prevail on her claims even if they were reviewable.