State v. Chalupka

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State v. Chalupka

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
JAROSLAW CHALUPKA
(AC 47556)
Elgo, Suarez and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of, inter alia, operating a motor vehicle while
having an elevated blood alcohol content and evasion of responsibility in the
operation of a motor vehicle, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia,
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that he operated a motor vehicle to support his conviction
of those charges. Held:

This court reversed the defendant’s conviction with respect to the charges
of operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content
and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, as the
cumulative force of the state’s evidence, viewed in the light most favor-
able to sustaining the jury’s verdict, was insufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle, which was a
required element of both charges.

Argued November 12, 2025—officially released March 3, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of operating a motor vehicle while having
an elevated blood alcohol content, interfering with an
officer, and evasion of responsibility in the operation
of a motor vehicle, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of New Britain, geographical area
number fifteen, and tried to the jury before Taylor, J.;
verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defen-
dant appealed to this court. Reversed in part; judgment
directed; further proceedings.
Alice Osedach Powers, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (defendant).
Olivia M. Hally, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Christian Watson, state’s
attorney, and Devant Joiner, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
State v. Chalupka

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Jaroslaw Chalupka,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered fol-
lowing a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while
having an elevated blood alcohol content in violation of
General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (2),1 interfering with an
officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a),2
and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor
vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (3).3
1
General Statutes § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: “No person
shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any
drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle . . . (2) while such
person has an elevated blood alcohol content. For the purposes of this
section, ‘elevated blood alcohol content’ means a ratio of alcohol in the
blood of such person that is eight-hundredths of one per cent or more
of alcohol, by weight . . . .”
Although § 14-227a (a) was the subject of an amendment in 2021; see
Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2021, No. 21-1, § 116; that amendment
has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity,
we refer to the current revision of the statute.
2
General Statutes § 53a-167a (a) provides: “A person is guilty of
interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders
or endangers any peace officer or firefighter in the performance of such
peace officer’s or firefighter’s duties.”
Although § 53a-167a was amended in 2022; see Public Acts 2022,
No. 22-117, § 12; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this
appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision
of the statute.
3
General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (3) provides: “Each operator of a motor
vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident that causes injury or
damage to property shall at once stop and render such assistance as may
be needed and shall give such operator’s name, address and operator’s
license number and registration number to the owner of the injured or
damaged property, or to any officer or witness to the injury or damage to
property, and if such operator of the motor vehicle causing the injury or
damage to any property is unable to give such operator’s name, address
and operator’s license number and registration number to the owner of
the property injured or damaged, or to any witness or officer, for any
reason or cause, such operator shall immediately report such injury or
damage to property to a police officer, a constable, a state police officer
or an inspector of motor vehicles or at the nearest police precinct or sta-
tion, and shall state in such report the location and circumstances of the
accident causing the injury or damage to property and such operator’s
name, address, operator’s license number and registration number.”
State v. Chalupka

On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a motor
vehicle to support his conviction of operating a motor
vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content
and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor
vehicle.4 We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the
judgment of the court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to the
resolution of this appeal. On April 16, 2021, at approxi-
mately 10:05 p.m., the Berlin Police Department received
an anonymous call reporting a single motor vehicle crash
near the intersection of Old Brickyard Lane and Porters
Pass.5 The caller did not mention seeing anyone driv-
ing the vehicle or how many people were in it. Officers
Aimee Krzykowski and Brendan Clark of the Berlin Police
Department were dispatched to the scene of the accident
in their police cruiser. They discovered the defendant
wearing an illuminated headlamp and holding his cell
phone in one hand and a pair of wire cutters in the other.
Krzykowski observed the defendant “standing by a utility
box attached to a light pole . . . .” A dark colored Dodge
Caravan (Caravan), which had disabling damage to the
front left tire, was “perpendicular in the roadway, fac-
ing the wrong direction . . . .” The officers did not see
anyone other than the defendant in the area. They also
did not receive a report of how long the Caravan had been
there and, thus, did not know how long the vehicle had
been there. Additionally, Krzykowski did not touch the
engine compartment of the vehicle to see if it was warm
to determine whether it had been operated recently. Video
footage from a body camera on Clark, which was admitted
4
In this appeal, the defendant has not challenged his conviction of
interfering with an officer. See footnote 17 of this opinion.
5
This section of Old Brickyard Lane and Porters Pass is a mix of resi-
dential buildings and businesses. Moreover, Old Brickyard Lane ends in a
cul-de-sac. As a result, the area does not have heavy foot traffic at night.
State v. Chalupka

into evidence at trial, shows that the rear sliding pas-
senger door on the driver’s side of the vehicle was open.
Krzykowski called out to the defendant to inquire about
what he was doing, but the defendant did not answer in
a coherent manner. The defendant appeared to be speak-
ing with someone in another language on his cell phone.
Krzykowski repeated her inquiry, and the defendant held
up his cell phone and said something to the effect that he
“was looking for this.” The defendant’s speech was “low
and slurring,” and, based on his demeanor, he appeared
to be intoxicated. Krzykowski then asked the defendant
to come toward her, but the defendant moved to the far
side of the vehicle where the officers could not see him.
Suddenly, the defendant turned and ran from the
officers, heading westbound down Old Brickyard Lane.
Krzykowski and Clark pursued the defendant and com-
manded the defendant to stop running several times. The
defendant did not comply with the officers’ commands
and, instead, ran into a nearby wooded area. Krzykowski
and Clark followed the defendant and, again, ordered
the defendant to stop running and to come out of the
woods. The defendant ignored the officers’ commands
and entered the water of Brickyard Pond. He walked out
about twenty to thirty feet and waded through the water
at “chest to shoulder height.” Sergeant Scott Schreiner of
the Berlin Police Department, along with another officer,
arrived at the scene to provide assistance. Eventually,
Schreiner and Krzykowski located the defendant in the
woods, “crouched over.” Because the defendant’s hands
were not visible, Krzykowski commanded the defendant
to show his hands, but he did not comply. Krzykowski
drew her Taser and repeatedly commanded the defendant
to show his hands. The defendant ignored the commands
and, instead, stood up, prompting Krzykowski to deploy
her Taser. Nevertheless, the defendant fled from the
officers and ran from the woods into a parking lot, where
he tripped and fell. Schreiner ordered him to remain on
the ground, but the defendant ignored this command
and began to stand up, at which point Schreiner deployed
State v. Chalupka

his Taser to prevent the defendant from fleeing. The
defendant was taken into custody, and officers called
an ambulance to provide the defendant with medical
care. Officers observed the defendant exhibit signs of
intoxication, including difficulty balancing and walk-
ing; slow, slurred speech; the odor of alcoholic bever-
ages on his breath and person; and glassy, red eyes. The
defendant continued to act in an erratic and incoherent
manner, as he screamed and cried “hysterically” while
saying “I’m kidding. I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I’m scared.”
Officers located the defendant’s Class A Connecticut
commercial driver’s license6 in his wallet and identified
him as Jaroslaw Chalupka.
The defendant was transported by ambulance to the
Hospital of Central Connecticut in New Britain. Theo-
dore Sherry, the attending physician for the emergency
department, treated the defendant and testified at trial
as to the medical treatment that the defendant received
while at the hospital. Specifically, the defendant’s blood
was drawn and sent to the hospital laboratory for analy-
sis. That analysis showed that the ethanol level7 in the
defendant’s blood was 193 milligrams per deciliter, which
indicated that it was “elevated” and “high.” Thereafter,
Schreiner applied for and obtained a search warrant
to seize the defendant’s medical records to determine
whether the defendant’s blood alcohol content exceeded
the legal limit to operate a motor vehicle. Once Schreiner
received a copy of the results of the defendant’s blood
test, he sent the results to the state forensic laboratory
in Meriden. Thereafter, Mark Anderson, a forensic sci-
ence examiner, performed “a mathematical conversion
of the serum to whole blood and also from . . . milligrams
to grams” and calculated the defendant’s blood alcohol
6
General Statutes § 14-44d (b) (1) provides that a Class A commercial
driver’s license authorizes holders to drive “[a]ny combination of vehicles
with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of twenty-six thousand one
pounds or more, provided the GVWR of the vehicle being towed is in
excess of ten thousand pounds.”
7
Sherry testified that “[e]thanol is the chemical [that is] measure[d]
in alcohol.”
State v. Chalupka

content to be 0.16 percent, or twice the legal limit of
0.08 percent to operate a motor vehicle.
On April 18, 2021, the defendant went to the Ber-
lin Police Department. He met with Krzykowski and
inquired about what had happened two days prior and
the location of the Caravan. The defendant said that he
did not remember the night in question and only knew
he had woken up in the hospital. Krzykowski informed
the defendant that the Caravan had been towed and that
only the registered owner could retrieve the vehicle from
the tow company. The defendant told Krzykowski that
the Caravan belonged to his friend; however, he did not
supply Krzykowski with his friend’s name.8
The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged
with operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated
blood alcohol content in violation of § 14-227a (a) (2),
interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a (a),
and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor
vehicle in violation of § 14-224 (b) (3). The defendant
elected a trial by jury. In his case-in-chief, the prosecutor
presented testimony from three law enforcement person-
nel, Schreiner, Krzykowski, and Clark; the emergency
room physician, Sherry; and the forensic examiner,
Anderson.
After the prosecutor rested the state’s case-in-chief,
defense counsel filed a written motion for a judgment
of acquittal. Specifically, as to the charges of operating
a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol
content and evasion of responsibility in the operation of
a motor vehicle, defense counsel argued that the prosecu-
tor failed to prove a required element of both charges,
namely, that the defendant operated a motor vehicle.9 In
8
Officers determined that the Caravan was registered to Andrzej Gasz-
told, who did not testify at trial. When officers searched the Caravan,
they did not find any identifying information related to the defendant
in the vehicle.
9
Defense counsel argued further that “there is no evidence any wit-
nesses put [the defendant] behind the wheel of that vehicle. Not only
is there no direct evidence of that, there’s no circumstantial evidence
of that,” and, therefore, “for a jury to find [the defendant] guilty . . .
State v. Chalupka

response, the prosecutor argued, inter alia, that he had
established the element of operation because the police
witnesses testified that no other individuals were in the
immediate area, the defendant was connected to the
Caravan because it belonged to a friend, and the defen-
dant asked about the Caravan two days after his arrest.
The court denied the motion, and, thereafter, the
defense presented testimony from Mitchell Pawlina, who
had been disclosed as an alibi witness for the defendant
prior to trial. Pawlina testified that he met the defen-
dant for the first time that evening at a restaurant in
Berlin, observed that the defendant was intoxicated and
convinced the defendant that he should allow Pawlina to
drive the defendant to his home, which was located on
the same street on which Pawlina lived. Pawlina further
testified that, after he had helped the defendant into
the passenger seat of the Caravan, he drove the vehicle.
Pawlina testified that, while he was driving the Caravan,
its steering malfunctioned, causing the Caravan to go
over a curb, which damaged the front tire and rendered
the vehicle inoperable. According to Pawlina, the defen-
dant, who had fallen asleep but was awakened when the
Caravan ran over the curb, became “really upset about
what happened” and “very aggressive” and threatened
to hit Pawlina. After the defendant threatened him,
Pawlina told the defendant that he was on his own and
left, walking to his home, which was located nearby.
After defense counsel rested, he renewed the motion
for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. The
jury found the defendant guilty of the three charges.
The court discharged the jury, after which defense
counsel orally moved for a judgment of acquittal not-
withstanding the verdict, which the court denied. On
December 22, 2023, the court sentenced the defendant
to a total effective term of 908 days of incarceration,
execution suspended after 370 days, of which two days
[it] would have to find that the operation element was satisfied solely
by consciousness of guilt evidence from [the defendant’s] flight from
the scene.”
State v. Chalupka

were mandatory, and three years of probation.10 This
appeal followed.
The defendant claims that the evidence presented by
the state at trial was insufficient to support his conviction
of operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated
blood alcohol content and evasion of responsibility in the
operation of a motor vehicle because it failed to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had operated the
Caravan, which the state was required to establish with
respect to both of the charges. The state contends that it
provided ample circumstantial evidence from which the
jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant
was driving the Caravan when it crashed. We agree with
the defendant that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence establishing that the defendant operated the
Caravan, an element of both crimes that the state was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
convict the defendant. Therefore, we reverse the judg-
ment of conviction as to these two crimes.
We first set forth our well settled standard of review
applicable to sufficiency of the evidence claims. As our
Supreme Court has stated: “In reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply
a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second,
we determine whether [on] the facts so construed and
the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury]
reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative
force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. . . .
10
Specifically, the court sentenced the defendant to six months of
incarceration, execution suspended after fifty days, with forty-eight
hours as a mandatory minimum period of incarceration and two years of
probation as to the charge of operating a motor vehicle while having an
elevated blood alcohol content. The court sentenced the defendant to 364
days of incarceration, execution suspended after fifty days, and three
years of probation with respect to the charge of evasion of responsibil-
ity in the operation of a motor vehicle. Finally, the court sentenced the
defendant to 364 days of incarceration, execution suspended after nine
months, and three years of probation as to the charge of interfering with
an officer. The sentences were imposed consecutively.
State v. Chalupka

“We note that the jury must find every element proven
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant
guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and
inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable
and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or
an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider
the fact proven and may consider it in combination with
other proven facts in determining whether the cumu-
lative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant
guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. . . .
“Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force
of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of
evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . .
It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multi-
tude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving
substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating
evidence, the [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive
those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s
innocence. . . . The [jury] may draw whatever inferences
from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it
deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .
“Finally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all pos-
sible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt
require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed
by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the
[jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal,
we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the
evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable
view of the evidence that supports the [jury’s] verdict
of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Dixon, 353 Conn. 382, 417–18, 342 A.3d 161 (2025).
This court’s inquiry necessarily begins with an exami-
nation of the element of operation under the charged
offenses. With respect to the defendant’s conviction of
operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood
State v. Chalupka

alcohol content, § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part:
“No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A
person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any
drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle
. . . (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol
content. For the purposes of this section, ‘elevated blood
alcohol content’ means a ratio of alcohol in the blood of
such person that is eight-hundredths of one per cent or
more of alcohol, by weight . . . .” With respect to the
defendant’s conviction of evasion of responsibility in the
operation of a motor vehicle, § 14-224 (b) (3)11 provides
in relevant part: “Each operator of a motor vehicle who
is knowingly involved in an accident that causes injury
or damage to property shall at once stop and render such
assistance as may be needed and shall give such opera-
tor’s name, address and operator’s license number and
registration number to the owner of the injured or dam-
aged property, or to any officer or witness to the injury
or damage to property . . . .” The operation of a motor
vehicle, therefore, is an essential element of both crimes,
which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
State v. King, 346 Conn. 238, 251, 288 A.3d 995 (2023);
State v. Ragalis, 235 Conn. App. 538, 549, 345 A.3d
844, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 934, 347 A.3d 877 (2025).
In examining the element of operation for purposes of
§ 14-224 (b), we look for guidance to case law establishing
what constitutes “operation” under § 14-227a (a). See,
e.g., State v. Ragalis, supra, 549 (interpreting meaning
of term “operating” in General Statutes § 53a-60d simi-
larly to interpretation of “operating” in § 14-227a (a) (2)).
The element of operation is not defined under the statu-
tory scheme. Our Supreme Court, however, recently
11
Pursuant to General Statutes § 14-107 (b), “[w]henever there occurs
a violation of section . . . 14-224 . . . proof of the registration number
of any motor vehicle therein concerned shall be prima facie evidence
in any criminal action or in any action based on an infraction that the
owner was the operator thereof, except in the case of a leased or rented
motor vehicle, such proof shall be prima facie evidence in any criminal
action that the lessee was the operator thereof.”
State v. Chalupka

addressed what constitutes “operation” for purposes
of § 14-227a (a) in State v. King, supra, 346 Conn. 238.
Specifically, the court stated that it “consistently has
defined ‘operation’ as occurring ‘when in the vehicle [a
person] intentionally does any act or makes use of any
mechanical or electrical agency [that] alone or in sequence
will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.’ . . .
[S]ee . . . State v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 403, 6 A.2d 359
(1939) (‘[s]o if you find that the accused . . . manipulated
the machinery of the motor for the purpose of putting
the automobile into motion, the accused being in the car
and in a position to control its movements, the accused
would be guilty of operating a car under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, whether the automobile moved or
not’ . . .). In applying this definition, we have explained
that ‘the term operating encompasses a broader range of
conduct than does [the term] driving.’ . . . State v. Cyr,
[291 Conn. 49, 57, 967 A.2d 32 (2009)]. For example, in
State v. Haight, 279 Conn. 546, 903 A.2d 217 (2006),
we held that the element of operation could be satisfied
even ‘when a defendant had been seated in a vehicle that
neither was in motion nor had its motor running.’ . . .
Although inserting the key into the ignition does not
turn the motor on, ‘[n]othing in our definition of “opera-
tion” requires the vehicle to be in motion or its motor to
be running.’ Id., 552. Thus, our case law clearly holds
that a defendant’s conduct constitutes operation if he
or she places the key in the ignition.
“We have never held, however, that inserting a key
into the ignition is a prerequisite for a conviction under
§ 14-227a (a). . . . Rather, the court must look to all the
facts from which the fact finder reasonably could infer
that the defendant undertook any act or made use of any
mechanical or electrical agency that, alone or in sequence
with other steps, would have set in motion the motive
power of the vehicle.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omit-
ted.) State v. King, supra, 346 Conn. 267–70.
The present case differs from King and similar cases
in that the defendant in the present case was not found
State v. Chalupka

in the driver’s seat of the Caravan when the officers
arrived at the scene, nor was there any evidence con-
cerning the location of the key to the Caravan, namely,
whether the key was in the ignition, in the Caravan or
on the defendant’s person; rather, the defendant was
standing nearby, outside of the vehicle. See, e.g., State
v. Sienkiewicz, 162 Conn. App. 407, 411, 131 A.3d 1222
(evidence was sufficient to establish element of opera-
tion of motor vehicle when defendant was in driver’s
seat attempting to start vehicle, hood of vehicle was
warm to touch and no one else was observed in vicinity
of vehicle), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 924, 134 A.3d 621
(2016). That, however, does not necessarily preclude a
finding of operation. Indeed, our Supreme Court has
stated that “[t]he absence of witnesses to the plaintiff’s
operation of the vehicle is not dispositive on the issue
of operation. To be sure, it is often the case that police
officers investigate § 14-227a violations after the intoxi-
cated driver has ceased operating the vehicle.” Murphy
v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 254 Conn. 333, 347,
757 A.2d 561 (2000).12 In the present case, therefore, we
must determine whether “the cumulative force of [the]
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to satisfy the
element of operation”; State v. Sienkiewicz, supra, 411;
as “[t]here is no requirement that the fact of operation
be established by direct evidence.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 410.
In State v. Teti, 50 Conn. App. 34, 716 A.2d 931, cert.
denied, 247 Conn. 921, 722 A.2d 812 (1998), the defen-
dant claimed on appeal that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs
in violation of § 14-227a (a) because it did not establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a motor
12
We note that, although the issue in Murphy concerned the sufficiency
of the evidence in the administrative record to establish probable cause
that the plaintiff in that case violated § 14-227a, which requires a lower
standard of proof than in a criminal matter such as the present case,
the court’s statements regarding operation for purposes of § 14-227a
nevertheless inform our analysis of this issue. See Murphy v. Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 254 Conn. 334, 347.
State v. Chalupka

vehicle. Id., 37. In Teti, this court concluded that the
jury reasonably could have found that, at approximately
1:30 a.m., a witness awoke to the sound of spinning tires,
looked out his window, and saw someone inside a vehicle
that was stuck in a snowbank. Id., 36. The witness, who
could not identify the person inside the vehicle but saw
no one else in the area, called the police. Id. Five or ten
minutes later, the witness looked outside again and saw
someone standing near the driver’s door of the vehicle.
Id. The first police officer to arrive at the scene “did not
see anyone in or near the vehicle” but “did see footprints
that went from the driver’s door to the back of the vehicle
and then away from the vehicle. [The officer] saw no
footprints other than those and his own.” Id. While that
officer went to speak with the witness, a second police
officer arrived at the scene, followed by the defendant,
who was asked if he knew what had happened. Id. The
defendant, who admitted that the vehicle was his, denied
drinking alcohol that evening and stated that a friend
had driven the vehicle. Id., 36–37. Because the defen-
dant was staggering and slurring his speech, the officers
administered field sobriety tests, which the defendant
failed, and he was subsequently arrested. Id., 37. The
defendant and his neighbor, Tina Espinosa, testified at
trial that Espinosa had borrowed the defendant’s car
and was driving it when it slid into the snowbank. Id.
On appeal in Teti, this court concluded that “the cir-
cumstantial evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to sustaining the verdict, was sufficient for a
jury to find that the defendant was the operator of the
vehicle. First, [the second officer] testified that there
was only one set of footprints coming from the vehicle
and that the footprints matched the defendant’s. More-
over, the only footprints in the area were those of the
defendant and the police officers. Therefore, the jury
reasonably could have concluded that the defendant
operated the vehicle and reasonably could have rejected
the defendant’s claim that either a snowplow destroyed
Espinosa’s footprints or snow covered them. Footprints,
State v. Chalupka

together with other circumstantial evidence of guilt, are
sufficient to sustain a conviction. . . .
“Second, both times within a ten minute period when
[the witness] looked out his window, he saw someone
standing by the vehicle. The defendant conceded that he
was the person whom [the witness] saw the second time.
The jury reasonably could have found that the defendant
did not have time between sightings to go home and
return to the accident scene. Therefore, the jury rea-
sonably could have concluded that [the witness] saw the
defendant each time that he looked out of his window.
“Third, there was evidence of the defendant’s con-
sciousness of guilt. A jury can properly draw an inference
from consciousness of guilt evidence. . . . In this case,
evidence of guilt consisted of the defendant’s (1) ignoring
[the second officer’s] initial question of what happened,
(2) claiming that he had been riding in the vehicle with
his friends and (3) denying to the officers that he had
been drinking. From that evidence, the jury reasonably
could have concluded that the defendant was trying
to hide from the officers that he had operated a motor
vehicle while intoxicated.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 40.
In the present case, the state relies on Teti in support
of its contention that it presented ample circumstantial
evidence to prove the element of operation. We conclude
that the state’s reliance on Teti is misplaced, as Teti is
factually distinguishable from the present case. In Teti,
this court concluded that the jury reasonably could have
found that the defendant operated the vehicle on the
basis of the circumstantial evidence presented, which
included evidence showing that (1) there was only one
set of footprints in the snow coming from the vehicle
and that those footprints matched those of the defen-
dant, (2) the only footprints in the snow were those of
the defendant and the responding police officers, (3)
the defendant conceded that he was the person whom
the witness saw the second time the witness looked out
his window, and (4) the defendant ignored the second
officer’s initial question of what happened, claimed that
State v. Chalupka

he had been riding in the vehicle with his friends, and
denied to the officers that he had been drinking, which
demonstrated consciousness of guilt. Id.
The present case, by contrast, lacks the type of distin-
guishing evidence in Teti that supported a reasonable
inference of operation, namely, the footprint evidence
and the defendant’s concession that he was the sole person
seen by the witness standing near the vehicle before the
police arrived. In the present case, there is no eyewitness
testimony concerning the accident or when or how it
happened. Although the absence of such testimony is not
necessarily fatal to the state’s case, there must be some
evidence in the record from which the jury could have
made a reasonable inference of operation. The defendant
was not the registered owner of the vehicle; see General
Statutes § 14-107 (b); and the police did not locate any
documents or other items in the Caravan connecting
the defendant to the vehicle. Moreover, the responding
officers did not touch the hood of the Caravan or inves-
tigate whether the Caravan recently had been operated.
See State v. Sienkiewicz, supra, 162 Conn. App. 411
(evidence supporting element of operation included that
defendant was in driver’s seat of Camaro attempting to
start vehicle when officer arrived, officer did not observe
anyone else in vicinity, and hood of vehicle was warm to
touch, which indicated to officer that vehicle recently
had been running).
The state points to the following evidence in the record,
which it claims was sufficient to demonstrate operation:
(1) the defendant was the only individual in the area
when the police arrived and he was standing near the
disabled Caravan, (2) the body camera footage shows
that “the driver side door of the [Caravan] was open and
not the passenger side, where the defendant claimed to
be when the vehicle crashed,” (3) the defendant had a
“connection” with the Caravan because he went to the
police department and inquired about it two days after
the incident, and (4) the defendant fled from the scene,
which demonstrated consciousness of guilt. According
State v. Chalupka

to the state, this circumstantial evidence, like the cir-
cumstantial evidence in Teti, was sufficient to support
a reasonable inference that the defendant was operating
the Caravan when it hit the curb and became disabled.
We do not agree.
The evidence does show that the defendant was stand-
ing near the disabled Caravan and was the only person in
the area of the Caravan when the officers arrived at the
scene. “[M]ere presence is not enough to support an infer-
ence of dominion or control, [but when] there are other
pieces of evidence tying the defendant to dominion [or]
control, the [finder of fact is] entitled to consider the fact
of [the defendant’s] presence and to draw inferences from
that presence and the other circumstances linking [the
defendant] to the crime. . . . [S]ee also State v. Rhodes,
[335 Conn. 226, 241, 249 A.3d 683 (2020)] (some connec-
tion or nexus individually linking the defendant to the
contraband is required . . .); State v. Delossantos, 211
Conn. 258, 278, 559 A.2d 164 ([p]resence alone, unillu-
minated by other facts is insufficient proof of possession
. . .), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866, 110 S. Ct. 188, 107 L.
Ed. 2d 142 (1989).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Jordan, 236 Conn. App. 168, 186–87, 347 A.3d
912 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 903, 349 A.3d 18
(2026); see State v. Dawson, 340 Conn. 136, 147–49,
263 A.3d 779 (2021) (discussing two kinds of posses-
sion, actual and constructive); see also United States v.
Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 823–24 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[a]bsent
evidence of . . . purposeful behavior, mere presence at
the scene of a crime, even when coupled with knowledge
that at that moment a crime is being committed, is insuf-
ficient to prove aiding and abetting or membership in
a conspiracy”). Thus, the defendant’s presence at the
scene is not sufficient by itself to establish the element
of operation and must be considered in combination with
other evidence.
Second, the record shows that the rear passenger slid-
ing door to the Caravan, which is located on the driver’s
side of the vehicle, was open when the officers arrived,
State v. Chalupka

not the driver’s door to the vehicle. The fact that the
rear passenger door on the driver’s side of the Caravan
was open, as opposed to the driver’s door, does not sup-
port an inference that the defendant was operating the
Caravan. In other words, it does not add to an inference
of operation or dispel the contention that the defendant
was a passenger in the vehicle. As a result, we conclude
that this evidence does not provide a basis from which the
jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant
had operated the Caravan. Moreover, the same is true
with respect to the fact that the defendant, who was not
the registered owner of the Caravan,13 inquired about
it subsequent to the accident. We do not agree that the
defendant’s inquiry subsequent to the accident lends
itself to a reasonable inference that he was operating
the Caravan at the time of the accident.
The state’s evidence concerning operation, thus, pri-
marily consisted of the consciousness of guilt evidence.14
Our analysis of this evidence is guided by the following
legal principles. “In a criminal trial, it is relevant to show
the conduct of an accused, as well as any statement made
by him subsequent to the alleged criminal act, which
may fairly be inferred to have been influenced by the
criminal act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Cooper, 353 Conn. 510, 561, 343 A.3d 465 (2025).
Such evidence is referred to as consciousness of guilt
evidence. Our Supreme Court “repeatedly [has] held that
13
See footnote 11 of this opinion.
14
We note that currently pending before our Supreme Court is a
case concerning jury instructions pertaining to consciousness of guilt
evidence. See State v. Kim (Docket No. SC 21086). In that appeal, our
Supreme Court invited amici curiae to file briefs addressing the follow-
ing questions: (1) “Should the Supreme Court exercise its supervisory
authority either to abandon or to limit the trial court’s use of the con-
sciousness of guilt jury instruction, for which § 2.6-3 of the Connecticut
Criminal Jury Instructions provides that, ‘[i]n any criminal trial it is
permissible for the state to show that conduct or statements made by a
defendant after the time of the alleged offense may have been influenced
by the criminal act; that is, the conduct or statements show a conscious-
ness of guilt?’ ” and (2) “If the Supreme Court exercises its supervisory
authority to limit the trial court’s use of the consciousness of guilt jury
instruction, under what circumstances should its use be permitted?”
State v. Chalupka

a jury may infer guilt based on consciousness of guilt
evidence in conjunction with other evidence . . . . State
v. Davis, 324 Conn. 782, 797 n.8, 155 A.3d 221 (2017);
see also State v. Morelli, 293 Conn. 147, 154, 976 A.2d
678 (2009) (evidence of consciousness of guilt, along with
other evidence, provided sufficient evidence to prove that
defendant was under influence of intoxicating liquor,
which is essential element of offense of operating motor
vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor) . . . .”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez,
337 Conn. 175, 201, 252 A.3d 811 (2020). In particular,
“[f]light, when unexplained, tends to prove a conscious-
ness of guilt. . . . The flight of the person accused of a
crime is a circumstance [that], when considered together
with all the facts of the case, may justify an inference of
the accused’s guilt.” (Emphasis added; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., 344 Conn. 565,
577, 280 A.3d 461 (2022).15
Thus, similar to the evidence of the defendant’s pres-
ence at the scene of the accident, consciousness of guilt
evidence, by itself, is not sufficient to support an infer-
ence of guilt; rather, such an inference can be made only
when consciousness of guilt evidence is considered in
combination with other evidence. Moreover, it is also
important to note that “[t]he flight of the person accused
of crime is a circumstance which, when considered
15
We recognize that “[e]vidence that an accused has taken some kind
of evasive action to avoid detection or prosecution for a crime, such
as flight, is quintessential consciousness of guilt evidence. See State
v. Oliveras, 210 Conn. 751, 759, 557 A.2d 534 (1989); see also, e.g.,
State v. Rhodes, [supra, 335 Conn. 243]. [T]he fact that ambiguities or
explanations may exist [that] tend to rebut an inference of guilt does
not render [such] evidence . . . inadmissible but simply constitutes a
factor for the jury’s consideration. . . . State v. Coccomo, 302 Conn.
664, 670, 31 A.3d 1012 (2011). [I]t is the province of the jury to sort
through any ambiguity in the evidence in order to determine whether
[such evidence] warrants the inference that [the defendant] possessed a
guilty conscience.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones,
351 Conn. 324, 341, 330 A.3d 118 (2025); see also State v. Grajales,
181 Conn. App. 440, 449, 186 A.3d 1189 (“[e]vidence of flight from the
scene of a crime [is] inherently ambiguous” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 329 Conn. 910, 186 A.3d 707 (2018).
State v. Chalupka

together with all the facts of the case, may justify [only]
an inference of the accused’s guilt. It does not raise a
presumption of guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Rosa, 170 Conn. 417, 433, 365 A.2d 1135,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S. Ct. 126, 50 L. Ed. 2d
116 (1976). The question before this court, therefore,
is whether the consciousness of guilt evidence—the
defendant’s flight—when considered with the evidence
of the defendant’s presence at the scene of the accident
and the fact that no other individuals were seen in the
area, was enough to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant operated the Caravan. See generally
State v. Dixon, supra, 353 Conn. 421–22. We conclude
that it was not sufficient to meet that “weighty burden
imposed on the state . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Ervin B., 202 Conn. App. 1, 7, 243
A.3d 799 (2020).
“Under bedrock principles of our criminal justice sys-
tem, it is obviously not sufficient for the state to prove
simply that it is more likely than not that the defendant
[committed the offense], or even that the evidence is clear
and convincing that he [committed the offense]. . . . Our
Supreme Court has described the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard as a subjective state of near certitude
. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also
State v. Dawson, supra, 340 Conn. 147 (“[I]t does not
‘satisfy the [c]onstitution to have a jury determine that
the defendant is probably guilty.’ . . . ‘[When] the evi-
dence is in equipoise or equal, the [s]tate has not sustained
its burden [of proof] . . . .’ ” (Citation omitted; emphasis
omitted.)).
As we have stated, there were no eyewitnesses to the
accident, the anonymous caller who reported the accident
to the police did not mention seeing anyone driving the
vehicle or how many people were in it, and there was no
evidence found in the vehicle suggesting that the defen-
dant was the driver or owner of the vehicle. The location
where the Caravan became disabled is a low traffic area,
Clark testified that the police could not “tell exactly what
State v. Chalupka

time the vehicle got there,” and Krzykowski similarly
testified that she did not know how long the Caravan
was there and that there were no reports of how long the
vehicle was there. The state’s case rested on the evidence
concerning the defendant’s presence at the scene, and
the facts that no one else was seen in the vicinity and
that the defendant fled from the police, which the state
contends provided a sufficient basis for the jury reason-
ably to infer that the defendant operated the Caravan.
Our review of the record in this case leads us to conclude
that any such inference would have “depart[ed] from the
realm of reasonable inferences that a jury permissibly
may draw into pure speculation that cannot be a permis-
sible basis for a criminal conviction.” State v. Ervin B.,
supra, 202 Conn. App. 9.
“As demonstrated by our Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion in State v. Rhodes, [supra, 335 Conn. 226], the
‘line between permissible inference and impermissible
speculation is not always easy to discern.’ . . . Id., 238.
‘When we infer, we derive a conclusion from proven facts
because such considerations as experience, or history, or
science have demonstrated that there is a likely correla-
tion between those facts and the conclusion. . . . [I]f the
correlation between the facts and the conclusion is slight,
or if a different conclusion is more closely correlated
with the facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference
is less reasonable. At some point, the link between the
facts and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call
it speculation.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Ervin
B., supra, 202 Conn. App. 11.
In the present case, we are not convinced, on the basis
of our review of the cumulative force of the evidence pre-
sented by the state, considered in the light most favorable
to sustaining the verdict, that “it establishes anything
more than a temporal and spatial nexus” between the
defendant and the Caravan; State v. Dawson, supra, 340
Conn. 163; and it, thus, does not support a reasonable
inference that the defendant had operated the Cara-
van. See State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 97, 836 A.2d
State v. Chalupka

224 (2003) (“An inference is not legally supportable
. . . merely because the scenario that it contemplates
is remotely possible under the facts. To permit such a
standard would be to sanction fact-finding predicated
on mere conjecture or guesswork. Proof by inference is
sufficient, rather, only ‘if the evidence produces in the
mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability
of the existence of the material fact.’ ” (Emphasis in
original.)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614,
158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004); State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115,
131, 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (“[I]nferences which do not
have a basis in facts established by the evidence cannot
be drawn or relied upon to sustain a verdict. . . . The jury
may not resort to speculation and conjecture.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). In deciding
whether the state had met its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the element of operation, “the jury was
not permitted to guess at possibilities or speculate” that
the defendant had operated the Caravan simply because
he was standing in the vicinity of the vehicle when the
officers arrived with no one else around and subsequently
fled. State v. Ervin B., supra, 202 Conn. App. 11–12.
In the present case, the state did not present any evi-
dence akin to the footprints in the snow in Teti. Without
something more than the defendant’s sole presence at
the scene and his flight,16 the jury would have had to
16
We note that, even in administrative appeals from license sus-
pensions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drugs, which involve a much lower burden of
proof of probable cause; see footnote 12 of this opinion; this court and
our Supreme Court consistently have concluded that an inference of
operation was reasonable with more than presence and consciousness of
guilt evidence. See, e.g., Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
supra, 254 Conn. 347–48 (record contained sufficient circumstantial
evidence demonstrating that plaintiff drove vehicle to location from
which vehicle rolled into river given evidence that plaintiff owned
vehicle, her breath smelled of alcohol and she failed field sobriety tests,
plaintiff testified that she was driving past scenic area when she decided
to pull over and take photographs, and police arrived shortly after time
at which plaintiff testified that occurred); Mata v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, 221 Conn. App. 25, 38, 299 A.3d 1262 (2023) (reason-
able inference that plaintiff was operator of vehicle could be made
State v. Chalupka

invade “the realm of speculation and conjecture” to con-
clude that the defendant operated the Caravan. State v.
DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 505, 162 A.2d 704 (1960); see,
e.g., State v. Comollo, 21 Conn. App. 210, 216–17, 572
A.2d 1037 (“[W]e . . . conclude that sufficient evidence
existed to satisfy the element of operation [in addition to
the defendant’s admission]. In reaching this conclusion
we have considered the following: The motor of the car
had recently been turned off, as evidenced by the warmth
of the car’s hood; there were no other individuals within
view either walking for assistance or leaving the scene of
the accident on foot; the defendant had just been inside
the car as evidenced by the dry condition of his cloth-
ing on a rainy day; this car was the only one in sight;
the defendant knew where to find the car’s registration
and insurance information and he did not question the
on basis of evidence that plaintiff was in Jeep when officer arrived,
plaintiff was only individual apart from responding officers at scene
of accident, plaintiff was registered owner of Jeep, and photograph of
accident scene showed driver’s side door of Jeep open, headlights on,
and dashboard and center console screen lit, all of which supported
inference that Jeep was being operated by someone when it hit stone
wall); Adams v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 182 Conn. App. 165,
175, 189 A.3d 629 (even though there were no witnesses to plaintiff’s
operation of vehicle, operation could be inferred from evidence that
plaintiff was standing beside vehicle with substantial front end damage
and, when asked what had happened by police officer, plaintiff stated
that he had been driving vehicle when brakes malfunctioned and he
struck traffic cone in roadway, as plaintiff’s statements constituted
substantial evidence that he had operated vehicle), cert. denied, 330
Conn. 940, 195 A.3d 1134 (2018); Kirei v. Hadley, 47 Conn. App. 451,
453, 705 A.2d 205 (1998) (sufficient evidence was presented at trial
showing that plaintiff operated vehicle in question, even though plain-
tiff was found two tenths of mile away from accident scene and there
were no eyewitnesses to his operation of vehicle, as operation could be
inferred on basis of facts that plaintiff claimed ownership of vehicle,
car was warm, and plaintiff admitted to driving recently); O’Rourke
v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 33 Conn. App. 501, 508–509, 636
A.2d 409 (plaintiff’s operation of vehicle could be inferred from fact
that he was found strapped into driver’s seat by his seat belt, plaintiff
admitted to police that he had been arrested one year prior for operat-
ing motor vehicle while intoxicated, plaintiff had nervous demeanor,
which demonstrated consciousness of guilt, and plaintiff’s attorney
stated that plaintiff lost his eyeglasses during accident), cert. denied,
229 Conn. 909, 642 A.2d 1205 (1994).
State v. Chalupka

officer’s interest in his driver’s license.”), cert. denied,
215 Conn. 811, 576 A.2d 542 (1990).
Furthermore, “[i]t is axiomatic under Connecticut
law that, while a [trier of fact] may reject a defendant’s
testimony, a [trier of fact] in rejecting such testimony
cannot conclude that the opposite is true. . . . Thus, under
Connecticut law, the [trier of fact] is not permitted to
infer, from its disbelief of the defendant’s testimony,
that any of the facts which he denied were true.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCarthy, 105 Conn.
App. 596, 619, 939 A.2d 1195, cert. denied, 286 Conn.
913, 944 A.2d 983 (2008); see also State v. Stovall, 316
Conn. 514, 524, 115 A.3d 1071 (2015) (“[t]he jury was
free to disbelieve [witness’] testimony [that she had never
seen the defendant sell drugs in the witness’ apartment],
but such disbelief could not provide an adequate eviden-
tiary basis for the opposite finding that the defendant
intended to sell narcotics in [the witness’] apartment”).
As a result, even though the jury was free to disbelieve
Pawlina’s testimony that he was operating the Caravan
with the defendant as a passenger when the steering of
the Caravan malfunctioned and the vehicle hit the curb,
in rejecting that testimony it could not infer that the
opposite was true.
“[A]lthough we do not sit as the seventh juror when we
review the sufficiency of the evidence . . . we also must be
faithful to the constitutional requirement that no person
be convicted unless the [g]overnment has proven guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt [and] take seriously our obliga-
tion to assess the record to determine . . . whether a jury
could reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Dawson, supra, 340 Conn. 150;
see also State v. Glass, 214 Conn. App. 132, 164, 279
A.3d 203 (2022) (“[a]lthough we must not substitute
our judgment for that of the jury, a reviewing court
must determine whether the jury reasonably could have
concluded as it did” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In the present case, the cumulative force of the state’s
State v. Chalupka

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict, was insufficient to establish beyond a reason-
able doubt the defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle.
Consequently, the defendant’s conviction of operating
a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol
content and evasion of responsibility in the operation of
a motor vehicle cannot stand.17
The judgment is reversed only as to the defendant’s
conviction of operating a motor vehicle while having an
elevated blood alcohol content and evasion of responsi-
bility in the operation of a motor vehicle and the case is
remanded with direction to render a judgment of acquit-
tal as to those charges and for resentencing; the judgment
is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

17
On appeal, the defendant also claims that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to establish that (1) he had an elevated blood alcohol content at
the time of his alleged operation of the Caravan, which is an element
of the crime of operation of a motor vehicle while having an elevated
blood alcohol content, and (2) he was involved in an accident that caused
damage to property; see General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (3); which is an
element of the crime of evasion of responsibility in the operation of a
motor vehicle. In light of our conclusion that the evidence presented
by the state was insufficient to prove that the defendant operated a
motor vehicle—an essential element of both operating a motor vehicle
while having an elevated blood alcohol content and evasion of respon-
sibility in the operation of a motor vehicle—we need not address the
defendant’s other claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction of those crimes. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 303
Conn. 760, 763 n.1, 36 A.3d 670 (2012) (because court determined that
state failed to provide sufficient evidence of defendant’s intent to sell
narcotics in prosecution of charge of possession of narcotics with intent
to sell within 1500 feet of school, it was unnecessary to address whether
record contained sufficient evidence of additional element that school
was elementary or secondary school).
We also need not address the defendant’s claim that the court abused
its discretion in permitting the state to elicit evidence from Krzykowski
concerning her familiarity with the possible negative consequences
that could occur if a holder of a commercial driver’s license is arrested
for operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol
content. In his principal appellate brief, the defendant contends that
this testimonial evidence is not relevant, as it “did not have a tendency
State v. Chalupka

to prove that [he] operated a motor vehicle while under the influence
or that he operated a motor vehicle and knowing[ly] was involved in
an accident that caused injury or property damage to another and
failed to report it.” He raises this claim, therefore, only with respect
to his conviction of operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated
blood alcohol content and evasion of responsibility in the operation
of a motor vehicle, and not as to his conviction of interfering with an
officer. Accordingly, in light of our determination that the element of
operation has not been proven, which is dispositive of the defendant’s
conviction of operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood
alcohol content and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor
vehicle, we need not address this claim.