Ferrua v. Napoli Foods, Inc.

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Ferrua v. Napoli Foods, Inc.

ELTON FERRUA ET AL. v. NAPOLI
FOODS, INC., ET AL.
(AC 47975)
Moll, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing their
complaint alleging, inter alia, abuse of process, after granting a motion to
strike filed by two of the defendants, an attorney and his law firm, who had
represented the named defendant in workers’ compensation proceedings
involving the named plaintiff. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the court
improperly concluded that they had failed to sufficiently plead an actionable
abuse of process claim. Held:

This court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal as moot because they did not
challenge on appeal the trial court’s conclusion that their action was barred
by the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision in the statute (§ 31-284
(a)), an independent ground expressly relied on by the trial court to support
the granting of the defendants’ motion to strike, and, accordingly, this court
was unable to afford the plaintiffs practical relief in connection with their
properly briefed claims on appeal.

Argued October 15—officially released December 30, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, abuse of
process, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the
court, D’Andrea, J., granted a motion to strike filed by
the defendant Dominick C. Statile et al. and rendered
a judgment of dismissal thereon; thereafter, the action
was withdrawn as to the remaining defendants, and the
plaintiffs appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.

Eddi Z. Zyko, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Jonathan C. Zellner, for the appellees (defendant
Dominick C. Statile et al.).
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Ferrua v. Napoli Foods, Inc.

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The plaintiffs, Elton Ferrua (Elton) and
Milika Ferrua (Milika),1 brought the civil action underly-
ing this appeal, which alleges claims of abuse of process
and loss of consortium, respectively, against the defen-
dants Dominick C. Statile, a Connecticut attorney, and
Montstream Law Group, LLP (Montstream).2 The trial
court granted the defendants’ motion to strike and
thereafter rendered judgment dismissing the complaint,
from which the plaintiffs now appeal, claiming that the
court improperly (1) converted the defendants’ motion
to strike into a motion to dismiss, (2) concluded that
Elton failed to sufficiently plead an actionable abuse of
process claim, and (3) determined that the defendants’
conduct was absolutely privileged and that the court
therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The defen-
dants respond, inter alia, that the appeal is moot
because the plaintiffs have not challenged on appeal
the court’s conclusion that their action was barred by
the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision in
General Statutes § 31-284 (a),3 even though this was
1
In this opinion, we refer to the plaintiffs individually by name when
necessary and collectively as the plaintiffs.
2
The plaintiffs also named Napoli Foods, Inc., Praetorian Insurance Com-
pany, Gallagher Bassett Services, and Steven E. Selden, a physician, as
defendants but later withdrew the claims brought against them. For clarity,
we refer to Dominick C. Statile and Montstream Law Group, LLP, collectively
as the defendants and individually by name when appropriate.
3
General Statutes § 31-284 (a) provides: ‘‘An employer who complies with
the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any
action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee
arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death
resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure
compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that
compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused
by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his
intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with
the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any
representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal
injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other
than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section
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Ferrua v. Napoli Foods, Inc.

an independent ground to support the granting of the
defendants’ motion to strike. We agree with the defen-
dants that the appeal is moot because the plaintiffs
have failed to challenge an independent ground that
supports the judgment of the trial court striking counts
one, two, three, and four of the operative complaint.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.4
The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiffs’ opera-
tive amended complaint,5 and procedural history are
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. At all relevant
times, Elton was employed by the defendant Napoli
Foods, Inc. (Napoli Foods). Statile, the managing part-
ner of Montstream, was assigned to defend Napoli
Foods and Gallagher Bassett Services in connection
with two workers’ compensation claims that Elton had
brought against them for personal injuries he allegedly
sustained in March and April, 2011.
Statile noticed a respondent’s medical examination
in Elton’s workers’ compensation matters, to be per-
formed by Steven E. Selden, a physician. Selden alleg-
edly prepared a report thereafter that referenced certain
video surveillance footage of Elton, which had been
provided to him by the defendants. Statile also allegedly
showed the video surveillance footage to Judith L. Gore-
lick, Elton’s treating physician, during her deposition,
without indicating that the footage was authenticated,
consented to by Elton, or previously presented to Elton.
In November, 2023, the plaintiffs commenced the
present action against the defendants. On April 4, 2024,
shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer,
additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing
any agreement for additional compensation.’’
4
Because we dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims as moot, we do not reach the
merits of their claims.
5
For purposes of reviewing a motion to strike, ‘‘we take the facts alleged
in the complaint as true.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Michel v.
Hartford, 226 Conn. App. 98, 101 n.2, 317 A.3d 49 (2024).
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the plaintiffs filed the operative complaint consisting of
twelve counts.6 Only counts one through four, alleging
abuse of process and loss of consortium as to the defen-
dants, are relevant to the present appeal. Specifically,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ conduct in
Elton’s workers’ compensation matters constituted an
abuse of process because the defendants used a legal
process against them ‘‘in an improper manner or to
accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)The plain-
tiffs further alleged that Milika, Elton’s wife, suffered
a loss of consortium and emotional distress as a result
of the defendants’ alleged tortious conduct.7

On April 26, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to
strike and a memorandum of law in support of their
motion on the grounds that (1) the workers’ compensa-
tion exclusivity provision barred the plaintiffs’ action,
(2) Elton failed to plead actionable claims of abuse of
process, and (3) because Milika’s loss of consortium
claims were derivative of Elton’s claims, they also failed
as a matter of law.8 The plaintiffs filed a reply memoran-
dum in opposition to the defendants’ motion to strike
on May 10, 2024.
6
The remaining counts were brought against Napoli Foods, Praetorian
Insurance Company, Gallagher Bassett Services, and Selden, who are not
participating in the present appeal. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
7
The plaintiffs’ original complaint, filed on November 29, 2023, also alleged
claims of so-called ‘‘unintentional infliction of emotional distress,’’ as well
as violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes
§ 42-110a et seq. The plaintiffs, however, withdrew those counts of the
complaint on March 27, 2024, and subsequently filed the operative amended
complaint on April 4, 2024, which omitted those allegations.
8
The defendants did not raise the issue of whether the litigation privilege
barred the plaintiffs’ action in their motion to strike. The issue, however,
was discussed before the court, D’Andrea, J., at oral argument on the
defendants’ motion to strike. Moreover, it is well established that the litiga-
tion privilege, which implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, may
be raised at any time. See, e.g., Brady v. Bickford, 179 Conn. App. 776,
790–91, 183 A.3d 27 (2018).
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Ferrua v. Napoli Foods, Inc.

After a hearing, the court issued a memorandum of
decision on July 10, 2024, in which it granted the defen-
dants’ motion to strike counts one, two, three, and four
of the operative complaint. The court granted the
motion to strike on the grounds that the workers’ com-
pensation exclusivity provision barred the action and
that Elton failed to sufficiently plead an abuse of pro-
cess claim. The court also concluded that the defen-
dants’ conduct was protected by absolute privilege and,
therefore, determined that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction and dismissed the complaint. The court further
ordered that the plaintiffs were precluded from filing
a substitute complaint.9
With respect to the workers’ compensation exclusiv-
ity provision, the court stated: ‘‘The plaintiffs’ claims
distill to the contention that the defendants provided
surveillance video footage of Elton to Selden, without
any indication that Elton had consented to the surveil-
lance or that the footage was provided to him; and that
Statile did not inform Elton’s counsel of the existence
of the footage or provide it to counsel before showing
it to Gorelick at her deposition. This conduct occurred
in the context of a deposition in Elton’s workers’ com-
pensation matters. Such conduct implicated strategy in
the defense of Napoli Foods in the workers’ compensa-
tion matters. Because the plaintiffs’ claims implicate
issues arising out of and in the course of the workers’
compensation claims process, redress for any claimed
injuries arising therefrom falls within the purview of
the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation
statute. To permit the claims to continue would invite
indefinite prolonged litigation and create a risk of dou-
ble recovery by the plaintiffs. It also would usurp the
9
On that same date, the court issued memoranda of decision dismissing
the plaintiffs’ claims against Napoli Foods, Praetorian Insurance Company,
Gallagher Bassett Services, and Selden. The plaintiffs have not appealed
from the court’s rulings with respect to those defendants. See footnote 2
of this opinion.
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Ferrua v. Napoli Foods, Inc.

purpose of the exclusivity provision. DeOliveira [v. Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 503–504, 870 A.2d
1066 (2005)]. Because the exclusivity provision bars the
plaintiffs’ claims, the defendant[s] accurately [contend]
that the court should strike the plaintiffs’ amended com-
plaint and dismiss the action.’’
The court also concluded that Elton’s abuse of pro-
cess claims were legally insufficient. The court rea-
soned that ‘‘Elton complains of conduct occurring in
the context of an administrative proceeding, which is
clearly not a judicial action. That alone renders the
claims legally insufficient. Furthermore, even if the
workers’ compensation proceeding is quasi-judicial in
nature and sufficient to render it a judicial process for
purposes of an abuse of process claim, Elton’s claims
are still legally insufficient because the defendants did
not commence the proceeding. . . . Their alleged con-
duct occurred in the context of a deposition taken as
part of the workers’ compensation proceeding filed by
Elton, and being defended by the defendants.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Because the court deter-
mined that Elton’s abuse of process claims in counts
one and three should be stricken, it concluded that
Milika’s loss of consortium claims in counts two and
four must also fail.
Finally, the court determined that the defendants
were entitled to absolute immunity with respect to their
conduct, and that, as a result, it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Specifically, the court stated that an ‘‘abso-
lute privilege . . . attaches to relevant statements
made during administrative proceedings [that] are
quasi-judicial in nature.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) The court therefore dismissed the plaintiffs’
action and ordered that they were precluded from filing
a substitute complaint. On July 29, 2024, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to reargue, to which the defendants
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Ferrua v. Napoli Foods, Inc.

objected. On August 26, 2024, the court denied the plain-
tiffs’ motion to reargue. This appeal followed.
The plaintiffs set forth five distinct issues in the state-
ment of issues section of their principal appellate brief.
First, ‘‘[w]hether the trial court erred in converting a
motion to strike into a motion to dismiss without provid-
ing the [plaintiffs] timely notice and a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard . . . .’’ Second, ‘‘[w]hether an action
for abuse of process lies where the underlying litigation
takes place in an administrative, as opposed to a judi-
cial, forum.’’ Third, ‘‘[w]hether an abuse of process
action may be maintained where the administrative
action was not commenced by the defendants.’’ Fourth,
‘‘[w]hether process can be a manipulated deposition.’’
And, fifth, ‘‘[w]hether attorneys are immune from an
abuse of process claim.’’
The plaintiffs have not stated any claim in their state-
ment of issues that the trial court incorrectly concluded
that their action was barred by the workers’ compensa-
tion exclusivity provision. Moreover, our careful review
of the body of the plaintiffs’ principal appellate brief
reveals that they did not brief any such claim.10 Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs have abandoned
any claim relating to the exclusivity provision, which
constituted an independent ground on which the court
granted the defendants’ motion to strike. See, e.g.,
Traylor v. State, 332 Conn. 789, 804–805, 213 A.3d 467
(2019) (plaintiff’s failure to brief challenge to trial
The plaintiffs, in responding to the defendants’ argument that the appeal
10

should be dismissed as moot because they failed to challenge the court’s
determination regarding the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision,
challenge the court’s conclusion as to that issue in their reply brief. This
analysis, however, is of ‘‘no consequence to our determination that [the
plaintiffs] have abandoned’’ any claim regarding the exclusivity provision.
Gorbecki v. Shehu, 234 Conn. App. 355, 360 n.4, 342 A.3d 1052, cert. denied,
353 Conn. 930, A.3d (2025). ’’An appellant may not raise arguments
for the first time in a reply brief.’’ Id.
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court’s conclusions in its memoranda of decision consti-
tuted abandonment of any such challenge to those con-
clusions, rendering plaintiff’s claim on appeal moot);
cf., e.g., Gorbecki v. Shehu, 234 Conn. App. 355, 359,
342 A.3d 1052 (concluding that plaintiffs abandoned
claim that appeared solely in statement of issues portion
of brief), cert. denied, 353 Conn. 930, A.3d
(2025).
In this appeal, the plaintiffs have left unchallenged
one of the grounds on which the court expressly relied
as being sufficient to grant the defendants’ motion to
strike.11 Faced with this deficiency, ‘‘we must determine
whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over this
appeal or whether it should be dismissed as moot. Moot-
ness is a question of justiciability that must be deter-
mined as a threshold matter because it implicates [this]
court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . A determina-
tion regarding . . . [this court’s] subject matter juris-
diction is a question of law . . . [and, therefore] our
review is plenary. . . . [I]t is not the province of appel-
late courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from
11
The fact that the court dismissed the action in light of its determination
that the defendants’ conduct was absolutely privileged does not alter our
conclusion that the present appeal is moot. Although the workers’ compensa-
tion exclusivity provision does not implicate the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction; see, e.g., Feliciano v. State, 336 Conn. 669, 684, 249 A.3d 340
(2020) (holding that trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff’s action
was barred by § 31-284 (a), but concluding that form of judgment was
improper because trial court had jurisdiction over complaint); as we
explained previously, in addition to the trial court’s conclusion that the
plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead an abuse of process claim, the exclusivity
provision was an independent ground on which the court relied in granting
the motion to strike, and the plaintiffs have not challenged the court’s ruling
as to that ground on appeal.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the litigation privilege is inade-
quately briefed, as it occupies less than one page of the plaintiffs’ principal
appellate brief and contains minimal citations to relevant authorities or
analysis. Therefore, even if that claim was properly before us, we would
decline to address it. See, e.g., OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Ceslik, 202 Conn.
App. 445, 466–67, 246 A.3d 18, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 936, 249 A.3d 39 (2021).
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the granting of actual relief or from the determination
of which no practical relief can follow. . . . In
determining mootness, the dispositive question is
whether a successful appeal would benefit the plain-
tiff[s] or defendant[s] in any way. . . .
‘‘Whe[n] an appellant fails to challenge all bases for
a trial court’s adverse ruling on [their] claim[s], even if
this court were to agree with the appellant[s] on the
issues that [are] raise[d], we still would not be able to
provide [them] any relief in light of the binding adverse
finding[s] [not raised] with respect to those claims. . . .
Therefore, when an appellant challenges a trial court’s
adverse ruling, but does not challenge all independent
bases for that ruling, the appeal is moot.’’ (Footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gorbecki
v. Shehu, supra, 234 Conn. App. 360–61.
In the present case, even if we were to agree with
the plaintiffs’ claims, the trial court’s decision to grant
the defendants’ motion to strike would still stand in
light of its independent, unchallenged determination
that the plaintiffs’ action was barred by the workers’
compensation exclusivity provision.12 Thus, we are
12
The plaintiffs have not disputed that the issues of whether (1) Elton
sufficiently pleaded an abuse of process claim, and (2) the litigation privilege
applies are independent of whether the workers’ compensation exclusivity
provision in § 31-284 (a) bars the present action. An analysis of the exclusivity
provision would involve a determination of whether the legislature intended
that the Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., would
be ‘‘applicable to the injury at issue.’’ DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., supra, 273 Conn. 498. As to whether Elton sufficiently pleaded an abuse
of process claim, the plaintiffs argue that (1) an action for abuse of process
lies when the underlying litigation takes place in an administrative forum,
(2) an action for abuse of process may be maintained when the administrative
action was not commenced by the defendants, and (3) process can be a
manipulated deposition. As to the litigation privilege, it is a ‘‘long-standing
[common-law] rule that communications uttered or published in the course
of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some
way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 351 Conn. 656, 665,
332 A.3d 180 (2025). These issues are wholly distinct from the issue of
whether the action was barred by § 31-284 (a).
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unable to afford the plaintiffs practical relief in connec-
tion with their other claims that are properly briefed
in this appeal. See, e.g., id., 361 (dismissing appeal as
moot because, even if plaintiffs were to succeed on
appeal vis--vis properly briefed claims, judgment would
still stand in light of trial court’s unchallenged determi-
nation that plaintiffs failed to prove damages with
respect to all causes of action). Accordingly, the appeal
is dismissed as moot.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Therefore, the present case is distinguishable from cases in which
reviewing courts have declined to dismiss an appeal as moot because the
challenged ground that formed the basis of the appeal was not independent of
an unchallenged ground. Cf., e.g., Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 379 n.23, 119 A.3d 462 (2015) (declining to dismiss claim
as moot when claim encompassed two ‘‘conceptually related’’ factual bases).