State v. Valle

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State v. Valle

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID VALLE
(AC 46735)
Alvord, Clark and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crimes of cruelty to animals, interfering with an officer,
and threatening in the second degree, the defendant appealed. After the
state had rested its case, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for
a judgment of acquittal with respect to various other criminal charges. He
claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in submitting to the jury exhibits
that were relevant only to charges that had been dismissed after the court
granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Held:

This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the
trial court erred by permitting the jury to review exhibits during its delibera-
tions that related only to charges of which he had been acquitted, as, although
the defendant generally objected to the court’s order that all full exhibits
would go to the jury for deliberation, he did not identify the exhibits he
claimed should have been excluded and did not articulate the factual or
legal basis for excluding those exhibits, and nothing in the record supported
the defendant’s claim that he was not afforded an opportunity to properly
preserve his objection for appellate review.

This court rejected the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the statute (§ 53-
247 (a)) prohibiting conduct constituting cruelty to animals was unconstitu-
tionally vague as applied to his conduct, the defendant’s claim having failed
under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because no
constitutional violation existed, as the defendant’s conduct, specifically, his
conduct in confining one dog to a dirty, unsanitary, outdoor cage and in
failing to provide that dog and another dog with sufficient food or water
for several weeks or months at a time, fell within the unmistakable core of
conduct prohibited by § 53-247 (a).
Argued October 7—officially released December 23, 2025

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
five counts of the crime of cruelty to animals, and with
one count each of the crimes of interfering with an
officer, reckless burning, threatening in the second
degree, and tampering with physical evidence, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield,
geographical area number two, and tried to the jury
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State v. Valle

before Reid, J.; thereafter, the court granted the defen-
dant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to three
counts of the charge of cruelty to animals and as to
the charges of reckless burning and tampering with
physical evidence; verdict and judgment of guilty of
two counts of the crime of cruelty to animals, and of
the crimes of threatening in the second degree and
interfering with an officer, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Stephan E. Seeger, with whom was Igor G. Kuper-
man, for the appellant (defendant).
Danielle Koch, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Joseph Corradino, state’s attorney,
and Justina L. Moore, senior assistant state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The defendant, David Valle, appeals from
the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury
trial, of two counts of cruelty to animals in violation
of General Statutes § 53-247 (a),1 one count of threaten-
ing in the second degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-62 (a),2 and one count of interfering with an officer
in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-
167a.3 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial
1
General Statutes § 53-247 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who
. . . having impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such animal
proper care or . . . fails to supply any such animal with wholesome air,
food and water, or . . . having charge or custody of any animal . . . fails
to provide it with proper food, drink or protection from the weather . . .
shall, for a first offense, be fined not more than one thousand dollars or
imprisoned not more than one year or both, and for each subsequent offense,
shall be guilty of a class D felony.’’
2
General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is
guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such
person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of
imminent serious physical injury, (2) (A) such person threatens to commit
any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person . . . .’’
3
General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-167a provides in relevant part: ‘‘A
person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs,
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State v. Valle

court erred in submitting to the jury exhibits that were
relevant only to counts that had been dismissed after
the court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal
and (2) § 53-247 (a) is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to the facts of this case. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On the evening of December 1, 2020, the Bridge-
port Fire Department (fire department) was dispatched
to the vicinity of Wayne Street following a report of
smoke in the area. The responding firefighters noticed
smoke coming from behind a stockade fence at 675
Wayne Street. Scott Boris, then a captain with the fire
department, entered the property to investigate and
saw a three-sided shedlike structure aflame with smoke
billowing from the top. When Boris opened the gate to
the fence, a ‘‘tiny and frail,’’ ‘‘unhealthy looking’’ dog,
later identified as Sheeba, ran toward him. Boris also
noticed a kennel behind the shed with another
unhealthy looking dog, later identified as Honey,
locked inside.
As the fire department was attempting to extinguish
the fire, a man exited the residence and told Boris
that he was burning wood and did not want the fire
extinguished.4 Boris explained to the man that a Bridge-
port city ordinance prohibited such fires and that the
fire department was required to extinguish it. The man
went back inside the house and Boris called the Bridge-
port Police Department (police department) for assis-
tance. A short time later, the same man came back
outside and, now agitated and yelling, told Boris that
the homeowner was on his way and wanted the fire
department off the property.
resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer . . . or firefighter in the
performance of such peace officer’s . . . or firefighter’s duties.’’
4
The man who first approached the fire department and asked them to
leave the premises was not identified during trial.
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State v. Valle

Shortly thereafter, the defendant drove at a high rate
of speed toward the residence, slammed on his brakes,
jumped out of the vehicle, and charged toward the fire-
fighters. The defendant ‘‘got right into [Boris’] face’’ and
said that the shed was his smokehouse, that he was
smoking a deer inside of it, and that he would ‘‘put a
bullet in every one of [the firefighters’] heads if [they]
didn’t get off his property.’’ The defendant also
attempted to pull the hose away from the firefighters
as they attempted to extinguish the fire. While the con-
frontation between the defendant and the firefighters
was ongoing, the police arrived and detained the defen-
dant. During the ensuing investigation, Hiram Velez, a
fire inspector for the city of Bridgeport, found three
deceased dogs inside the shed amidst a pile of burned
trash and other debris.
The defendant was arrested and, by way of an
amended long form information, charged with one
count of interfering with an officer in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-167a and five counts
of cruelty to animals in violation of § 53-247 (a)—two
related to his treatment of Honey and Sheeba, and three
related to the deceased dogs found in the shed. The
defendant was also charged with one count of reckless
burning in violation of General Statutes § 53a-114,5 one
count of threatening in violation of § 53a-62 (a) (3),
and one count of tampering with physical evidence in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-155 (a) (1).6 On May
5
General Statutes § 53a-114 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of reckless burning when he intentionally starts a fire or causes an
explosion, whether on his own property or another’s, and thereby recklessly
places a building . . . of another in danger of destruction or damage.’’
6
General Statutes § 53a-155 (a) (1) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of tamper-
ing with or fabricating physical evidence if, believing that a criminal investi-
gation conducted by a law enforcement agency or an official proceeding is
pending, or about to be instituted, such person . . . [a]lters, destroys, con-
ceals or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its
verity or availability in such criminal investigation or official proceeding
. . . .’’
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State v. Valle

10, 2023, after the state rested, the defendant made an
oral motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to
the three counts of animal cruelty related to the
deceased dogs, as well as the counts charging him with
reckless burning and tampering with physical evidence.
The defendant argued that it was undisputed that he
was not on the property when the fire was discovered
and that there was not sufficient evidence to support
a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he started the
fire or that he had any connection to the three deceased
dogs that were found in the shed. The court, Reid, J.,
granted the defendant’s motion the following morning.
On May 12, 2023, the jury found the defendant guilty
of the remaining counts of the amended long form infor-
mation. On July 14, 2023, the court imposed a total
effective sentence of 1456 days of incarceration, execu-
tion suspended after fourteen months, followed by
three years of probation. This appeal followed. Addi-
tional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court erred in
submitting to the jury exhibits that were relevant only
to counts that had been dismissed after the court
granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The
defendant contends that certain exhibits that had been
admitted during the state’s case-in-chief related only to
the charges of which he had been acquitted and that
the court erred by permitting the jury to review those
exhibits during its deliberations. The state contends
that the defendant failed to preserve his claim and, in
the alternative, that the court did not err by submitting
to the jury all exhibits that had been admitted into
evidence. We conclude that the defendant failed to pre-
serve his claim.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. During trial, twenty-five state
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exhibits and three defense exhibits were admitted into
evidence. Among the exhibits submitted by the state
were photographs of the charred contents of the shed,
including the three deceased dogs found therein, and
body worn camera footage which depicts, among other
things, the investigating officers discussing whether the
defendant had ‘‘burned a dog in [the shed].’’ The defen-
dant’s exhibits included Velez’ fire investigation report
documenting his findings, which contains a paragraph
describing his discovery of the deceased dogs in the
shed. The defendant’s exhibits also included a police
incident report completed by an animal control officer,
Jennifer Wallace, which contains detailed descriptions
of the condition of the three deceased dogs, as well as
Sheeba, Honey, and the inside of the kennel in which
Honey was found. At the time the court granted the
defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, the
defendant did not move to strike or otherwise limit the
jury’s consideration of any of the exhibits. Additionally,
on May 11 and 12, 2023, the court held a charging confer-
ence to discuss proposed jury instructions, and the
defendant did not request that the court give any
instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the
exhibits.
On the morning of May 12, 2023, the parties presented
closing argument and, thereafter, the court instructed
the jury in accordance with the proposed charges that
were discussed during the charging conference. After
the jury retired to the deliberation room but before it
began deliberating, the following colloquy between the
court and defense counsel ensued:
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I have a question.
. . . What I’m wondering is, the exhibits, do they
include only the exhibits with relation to these charges
or are they all of the exhibits including those (inaudi-
ble). . . .
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State v. Valle

‘‘The Court: All the full exhibits will . . . go to the
jury.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Is that the usual way to handle it?
‘‘The Court: Well . . . one, there’s been no . . .
motions, or anything presented to the court. Two,
there’s not been any specific delineation as to what
specific exhibits were provided for what specific
charges and, therefore, the ruling is that all exhibits
that were admitted rightfully as full exhibits at trial
either with or without objection will be exhibits that
go to the jury room.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay. I’m going to object to that
because I don’t know what (inaudible) is or . . . what
law there may be or any—
‘‘The Court: I didn’t hear you, sir.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I’m just taking an objection to it.
‘‘The Court: I’ll note your objection.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay.
‘‘The Court: All the full exhibits will go to the jury
room.’’
Thereafter, the court gave counsel for both parties
the opportunity to review the exhibits before they were
submitted to the jury. The court then asked if the parties
had reviewed the exhibits and were ‘‘satisfied that all
of the full exhibits [were] there.’’ Defense counsel did
not identify which exhibits he claimed should not be
submitted to the jury or otherwise raise any further
objection. Later that day, the jury returned its verdict
finding the defendant guilty of two counts of cruelty to
animals, one count of threatening in the second degree,
and one count of interfering with an officer.
On appeal, the defendant acknowledges that Practice
Book § 42-23 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he
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judicial authority shall submit to the jury . . . (2) [a]ll
exhibits received in evidence.’’ The defendant also does
not dispute that the court complied with the express
terms of § 42-23 (a) by submitting to the jury all exhibits
that had been admitted as full. He argues, however, that
‘‘our Supreme Court has long ago recognized that jurors
should not be allowed to consider in deliberation mate-
rials not pertaining to the charges at hand.’’
In support of his claim, the defendant relies on State
v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 164 A.2d 399 (1960). In that
case, after the trial court directed a verdict of not guilty
of twenty-two counts of embezzlement; id., 598; the
defendant was convicted of twenty-eight counts of
embezzlement and one count of theft. Id., 591. On
appeal, the defendant claimed, for the first time, that
the court should not have submitted to the jury exhibits
that related only to the counts of which he had been
acquitted. Id., 598. Our Supreme Court rejected that
claim, noting that the defendant had ‘‘made no objection
at the time, although his counsel were given full oppor-
tunity to check the exhibits before they were sent to
the jury . . . . In any event, there was no error by
reason of the failure of the court itself to sort the exhib-
its and, in the absence of any request from the defen-
dant, to withhold from the jury those concerned only
with the counts as to which a verdict in his favor had
been directed.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id. The defendant
argues that, ‘‘[u]nlike Harris, defense counsel in this
case did object to and raise the issue of exhibits that
no longer related to the remaining charges,’’ and that
‘‘the graphic nature of some of these exhibits, combined
with the allegations of animal cruelty, would have mis-
led the jury into using evidence of one type of miscon-
duct (three burned dogs) . . . as evidence of his cru-
elty [to] the two live dogs.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
In response, the state argues that the defendant failed
to preserve his claim for appeal because he did not
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State v. Valle

identify either the factual or legal basis for his objection
before the trial court. Specifically, the state contends
that, ‘‘although generally objecting to the order that ‘all’
full exhibits would go to the jury room for deliberation,
the defendant never specified to the trial court which
exhibits his objection pertained to, nor did he explain
the basis upon which his appeal relies . . . even after
having the opportunity to examine all of the full exhibits
before their submission to the jury room.’’ The state
argues, therefore, that ‘‘the record is inadequate insofar
as it was unknown to the trial court which exhibits the
defendant claimed should not go to the jury and what
the legal basis for that objection was.’’ We agree with
the state.

‘‘It is axiomatic that the appellate tribunals of this
state are not bound to consider claims of law that are
not distinctly raised at trial.’’ State v. Ramon A. G., 336
Conn. 386, 395, 246 A.3d 481 (2020); see Practice Book
§ 60-5. ‘‘The requirement that [a] claim be raised dis-
tinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to
the attention of the court the precise matter on which
its decision is being asked. . . . [It must] alert the trial
court to the specific deficiency now claimed on appeal.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Lueders, 225 Conn. App. 612, 639, 317
A.3d 69, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 920, 321 A.3d 402 (2024).
‘‘In objecting to evidence, counsel must properly articu-
late the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial
court of the precise nature of the objection and its
real purpose, in order to form an adequate basis for a
reviewable ruling. . . . Once counsel states the author-
ity and ground of his objection, any appeal will be
limited to the ground asserted.’’ (Emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 229
Conn. App. 435, 449, 327 A.3d 448 (2024), cert. denied,
351 Conn. 909, 330 A.3d 880 (2025).
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State v. Valle

‘‘[B]ecause the sine qua non of preservation is fair
notice . . . the determination of whether a claim has
been properly preserved will depend on a careful review
of the record to ascertain whether the claim on appeal
was articulated below with sufficient clarity to place
the trial court on reasonable notice of that very same
claim. . . . These requirements are not simply formali-
ties. They serve to alert the trial court to potential error
while there is still time for the court to act. . . .
Assigning error to [the trial court’s] rulings on the basis
of objections never raised at trial unfairly subjects the
court and the opposing party to trial by ambush.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Ramon A. G., supra, 336 Conn. 395.
In the present case, our review of the record leads
us to conclude that the defendant did not adequately
raise his claim at trial because he did not identify the
exhibits he now claims should have been excluded from
the jury during deliberations and did not articulate the
legal or factual basis for excluding those exhibits. As
explained previously, Practice Book § 42-23 expressly
provides that, ‘‘(a) [t]he judicial authority shall submit
to the jury . . . (2) [a]ll exhibits received in evidence.’’
Although the defendant indicated that he objected to
the court submitting all of the exhibits that had been
admitted into evidence to the jury, he did not articulate
the legal basis for his objection or identify which spe-
cific exhibits he believed should be withheld from the
jury. In fact, after the court stated that, in accordance
with § 42-23 (a) (2), all exhibits admitted into evidence
would be submitted to the jury, the defendant
responded that he objected simply because he ‘‘[did
not] know . . . what law there may be’’ that pertained
to that issue.
As we repeatedly have recognized, ‘‘[t]he purpose of
our preservation requirements is to ensure fair notice
of a party’s claims to both the trial court and opposing
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State v. Valle

parties,’’ so as ‘‘to alert the trial court to potential error
while there is still time for the court to act.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Guddo v. Guddo, 185 Conn.
App. 283, 287, 196 A.3d 1246 (2018). For that reason,
‘‘[w]e have consistently declined to review claims based
on a ground different from that raised in the trial court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co. v. Munsill-Borden Mansion, LLC,
147 Conn. App. 30, 38, 81 A.3d 266 (2013). See, e.g.,
State v. Roberts, 224 Conn. App. 471, 490, 312 A.3d 1086
(defendant’s general objection that General Statutes
§ 29-35, which prohibits carrying pistol or revolver with-
out permit outside of home, violated second amend-
ment to United States constitution was insufficient to
preserve specific claim that statute was unconstitu-
tional as applied to him because, as Ohio resident with-
out permit from home state, he had no way to obtain
permit under Connecticut law), cert. denied, 349 Conn.
912, 314 A.3d 602 (2024); Connecticut Bank & Trust
Co. v. Munsill-Borden Mansion, LLC, supra, 38 (‘‘[t]he
defendants cannot challenge the court’s evidentiary rul-
ings by arguing that evidence was admissible [on
grounds] that were never asserted during trial’’).
Because ‘‘any appeal will be limited to the ground
asserted’’ at trial; (internal quotation marks omitted)
State v. Miller, supra, 229 Conn. App. 449; it is axiomatic
that a party cannot preserve a claim for appeal simply
by asserting a general objection without identifying any
legal ground therefor. Allowing the defendant to raise
a claim on appeal after he failed to articulate any legal
basis for his objection at trial ‘‘would encourage trial
by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court
and the opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Guddo v. Guddo, supra, 287.
We disagree with the defendant’s contention that the
court overruled his objection ‘‘[b]efore counsel could
even begin to specify the exhibits by number,’’ thereby
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rendering futile any attempt to identify the specific fac-
tual and legal basis for his claim. To the contrary, our
review of the record reveals that the court provided
the defendant with ample opportunity to articulate a
factual and legal basis for his objection. Defense coun-
sel first raised the issue by inquiring whether submitting
all full exhibits to the jury was ‘‘the usual way to handle
it,’’ to which the court responded by noting that the
defendant had not filed any motion to limit the jury’s
consideration of any of the exhibits or provided ‘‘any
specific delineation as to what specific exhibits were
provided for what specific charges . . . .’’ In response,
defense counsel did not identify any legal basis for
deviating from that practice or specify which exhibits
he claimed should be withheld from the jury, but merely
stated that he objected because he ‘‘[did not] know
. . . what law there may be’’ about the issue. Immedi-
ately after the court overruled that objection, it pro-
vided the parties with an opportunity to review all of
the exhibits before they were submitted to the jury.
Even after he had the opportunity to review the exhibits,
the defendant did not move to strike any of the exhibits
or otherwise identify which exhibits he claimed were
relevant only to the charges of which he had been
acquitted. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous (83-FG), 190
Conn. 715, 726–27, 463 A.2d 533 (1983) (concluding that
trial court did not err by admitting exhibit that was
relevant to dismissed charges where ‘‘defendant . . .
never requested any restriction against the use of the
exhibit as evidence upon the other two charges’’ and
‘‘made no motion to strike the exhibit’’); State v. Cain,
25 Conn. App. 503, 525–26, 596 A.2d 449 (1991) (recog-
nizing trial court’s authority to strike exhibits from the
record after granting motion for judgment of acquittal
with respect to certain counts, but concluding that court
did not err in refusing to strike exhibit that was relevant
to remaining counts), aff’d, 223 Conn. 731, 613 A.2d 804
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State v. Valle

(1992). Moreover, our review of the record indicates
that at least some of the exhibits that were admitted
at trial—namely, Velez’ fire investigation report and
Wallace’s police report—were relevant to the counts
on which the court granted the defendant’s motion for
a judgment of acquittal and to the counts that remained.
As the court recognized in Harris, it was the defendant’s
burden to adequately articulate his objection and iden-
tify the exhibits that he claimed were not relevant to
the remaining counts, and ‘‘there was no error by reason
of the failure of the court itself to sort the exhibits
. . . .’’ State v. Harris, supra, 147 Conn. 598. Nothing
in the record supports the defendant’s argument that
he was not afforded an opportunity to properly preserve
his objection for appellate review. Accordingly, we
decline to review the defendant’s claim.
II
The defendant also claims that § 53-247 (a) is uncon-
stitutionally vague as applied to his conduct. Specifi-
cally, he contends that the statute does not provide
sufficient notice of what conduct it prohibits because
it ‘‘does not define ‘proper care’ or ‘proper’ food/drink/
protection from the weather.’’ In addition, noting that
the state relied on the testimony of two witnesses with
specialized knowledge in the care of animals—namely,
Wallace and Kelley Harpin, an emergency veterinar-
ian—the defendant argues that ‘‘if it takes an [animal
control officer] and/or a veterinarian to decipher that
the dogs were not properly cared for or provided
‘proper’ food/drink/protection from the weather, any-
one without specialized knowledge would be at risk of
violating [§ 53-247 (a)].’’ We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the defendant’s claim. The state pre-
sented evidence that the kennel in which Honey was
found was made of plywood walls and a chain link gate
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State v. Valle

that did not provide protection from the elements. The
gate was secured by a padlock that was either frozen
or corroded shut and could not be opened with the
keys provided by the defendant, so the police officers
had to break the gate open. The floor of the kennel was
made of concrete, which ‘‘was covered in urine and
fecal staining that layered over itself,’’ with ‘‘several
piles of both fresh and old feces.’’ Inside the kennel
were two five gallon buckets, one of which was over-
turned and empty, and the other of which was upright
with a small amount of water at the bottom that was
beyond Honey’s reach. Toward the back of the kennel
there was ‘‘a little bit of bedding that . . . appeared
damp and stained.’’ Wallace testified that it was approxi-
mately 40 degrees that evening, and that Honey was so
thin that ‘‘[y]ou could easily see her ribs from . . .
standing outside of the kennel’’ and she ‘‘[did not] have
long fur . . . [or] a lot of fat to be able to combat that
sort of weather . . . .’’ She also testified that Sheeba
‘‘was notably skinny’’ with ‘‘protruding ribs [and a] very
visible spine.’’ Both dogs were shivering when they
were found.
Harpin, who examined Honey and Sheeba after they
were removed from the defendant’s care, testified that
Sheeba was emaciated and dehydrated and looked and
smelled like she had never been bathed. Harpin also
determined that Sheeba had recently given birth and
was actively lactating, and it did not appear that she
was receiving proper nutrition to support lactation.
Honey was likewise emaciated and dehydrated and had
dried feces stuck to her fur. Harpin testified that an
ideal weight for Sheeba and Honey was approximately
sixty pounds and that they weighed thirty and forty
pounds, respectively, at the time they were examined.
She further testified that it would take at least several
weeks, if not months, of malnourishment for them to
end up in the physical condition in which they were
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State v. Valle

found. Harpin also testified that both dogs exhibited
symptoms of intestinal parasite infection, which sug-
gests that they were not receiving regular veterinary
care.
The defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve
his vagueness claim before the trial court, but seeks
review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233,
239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel
R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). ‘‘Under
Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitu-
tional error not preserved at trial only if all of the
following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate
to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is
of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a
fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional viola-
tion . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a
fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis,
the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the
alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions,
the defendant’s claim will fail.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hearl, 182
Conn. App. 237, 265, 190 A.3d 42, cert. denied, 330 Conn.
903, 192 A.3d 425 (2018). The defendant’s claim meets
the first two prongs of Golding because the record is
adequate for review and his claim that § 53-247 (a) is
unconstitutionally vague implicates his right to due pro-
cess. See id., 265–66; see also State v. Josephs, 328 Conn.
21, 30, 176 A.3d 542 (2018). We conclude, however, that
the defendant’s claim fails under the third prong of
Golding because he has not demonstrated that the
alleged constitutional violation exists.
‘‘The determination of whether a statutory provision
is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over
which we exercise de novo review. . . . The void for
vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept
that originally was derived from the guarantees of due
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State v. Valle

process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States constitution. . . . The con-
stitutional injunction that is commonly referred to as
the void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central
precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a
governing statute or regulation and the guarantee
against standardless law enforcement.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hearl,
supra, 182 Conn. App. 266. ‘‘A statute . . . [that] for-
bids or requires conduct in terms so vague that persons
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process. . . . Laws must give a person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited so that he may act accord-
ingly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Middletown
v. Wagner, 228 Conn. App. 265, 281, 325 A.3d 253 (2024).

‘‘If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained
[it] will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes
will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English
words and phrases there lurk uncertainties. . . . For
statutes that do not implicate the especially sensitive
concerns embodied in the first amendment, we deter-
mine the constitutionality of a statute under attack for
vagueness by considering its applicability to the particu-
lar facts at issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Hearl, supra, 182 Conn. App. 266.

‘‘A statute is not void for vagueness unless it clearly
and unequivocally is unconstitutional, making every
presumption in favor of its validity. . . . To demon-
strate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to [him], the [defendant] therefore must . . .
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had
inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [he
was] the [victim] of arbitrary and discriminatory
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State v. Valle

enforcement. . . . Unless a vagueness claim impli-
cates the first amendment right to free speech, [a] defen-
dant whose conduct clearly comes within a statute’s
unmistakable core of prohibited conduct may not chal-
lenge the statute because it is vague as applied to some
hypothetical situation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Middletown v. Wagner, supra, 228
Conn. App. 281–82.
On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude
that the defendant cannot prevail on his vagueness
claim because his conduct fell within the ‘‘unmistakable
core’’ of conduct prohibited by § 53-247 (a). (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 282. As stated previously,
§ 53-247 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who
. . . having impounded or confined any animal, fails
to give such animal proper care or . . . fails to supply
any such animal with wholesome air, food and water,
or . . . having charge or custody of any animal . . .
fails to provide it with proper food, drink or protection
from the weather . . . shall, for a first offense, be fined
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not
more than one year or both, and for each subsequent
offense, shall be guilty of a class D felony.’’ This court
has recognized that ‘‘[t]he manifest purpose of [§ 53-
247 (a)] is to ensure that no impounded or confined
animal, including any dog, is exposed by its caretaker
to conditions harmful to its health or well-being.’’ State
v. Acker, 160 Conn. App. 734, 746, 125 A.3d 1057 (2015),
cert. denied, 320 Conn. 915, 131 A.3d 750 (2016).
Although the term ‘‘proper care’’ may be ‘‘susceptible
to a wide range of interpretations and could be vague as
applied to some situations’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145,
157, 947 A.2d 282 (2008); conduct that ‘‘places an animal
. . . at such a risk of illness or physical harm that it
begins to exhibit the visible signs of such illness or
harm clearly lies at the statute’s unmistakable core of
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prohibited conduct . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Acker, supra, 747.
Here, the record contains ample evidence that a rea-
sonable person in the defendant’s position would have
known that the condition in which the defendant kept
Sheeba and Honey was harmful to their health and well-
being. Honey was found in an outdoor kennel unpro-
tected from the elements with a cold, urine and fecal
stained concrete floor and damp bedding with no place
that would provide a warm or clean sleeping area. Both
dogs were described by multiple witnesses as emaci-
ated, dehydrated, and unhealthy looking, with their ribs
and spines visible. Harpin testified that the condition
of Sheeba and Honey indicated that they had not been
provided with proper nutrition for at least several
weeks, if not months. A person of ordinary intelligence
would know that confining dogs to a dirty, unsanitary,
outdoor cage and failing to provide them with sufficient
food or water for weeks or months at a time does not
constitute proper care.
Moreover, and contrary to the defendant’s con-
tention, § 53-247 (a) is not unconstitutionally vague
merely because the state relied in part on testimony
from witnesses with specialized knowledge in the care
of animals to establish that the defendant failed to pro-
vide Sheeba and Honey with proper care. As the state
argues, there was ample photographic evidence and lay
witness testimony regarding the condition of Sheeba
and Honey to demonstrate that a reasonable person
would know that the defendant did not provide the dogs
with proper care. The state introduced photographs of
both Sheeba and Honey to show their sickly condition,
as well as photographs showing the unsanitary condi-
tions of the kennel. In addition, multiple police officers
and firefighters who responded to the scene testified
that the dogs were visibly unhealthy. Boris testified that
Sheeba was ‘‘tiny and frail’’ and that both dogs were
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State v. Valle

‘‘very unhealthy looking.’’ Velez testified that he saw
one of the dogs and ‘‘it looked malnourished.’’ Ronald
Jersey, a sergeant with the police department, testified
that one of the dogs was limping and that both dogs
looked like ‘‘they needed to be fed’’ and ‘‘needed water.’’
Another police officer, Natalia Luty, testified that
Sheeba and Honey were ‘‘very skinny, malnourished
. . . [and] shivering,’’ that there were ‘‘feces all over
the place,’’ and that it ‘‘didn’t look [like] a suitable
[place] for a dog to be living in.’’ The fact that these
witnesses, none of whom testified to having any special
skill or training in the care of animals, recognized the
severity of the condition that Sheeba and Honey were
in demonstrates that a person of ordinary intelligence
would have known that the dogs were not properly
cared for. Accordingly, we conclude that § 53-247 (a)
is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts
of this case.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.