State v. Angel A. (Dissent)

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 0
State v. Angel A.

MOLL, J., dissenting. The crux of this appeal involves
the right of the defendant, Angel A.—having just been
found guilty of, inter alia, attempt to commit murder
in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and
53a-54a (for which he subsequently received a consecu-
tive sentence of twenty years of incarceration)—to have
the jury polled pursuant to Practice Book § 42-31,1
which, ‘‘although not of constitutional dimension, is
nonetheless a corollary to the defendant’s right to a
unanimous verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Pare, 253 Conn. 611, 623, 755 A.2d 180
(2000). Our Supreme Court has held that, in a criminal
case, a trial court’s failure to conduct a jury poll follow-
ing a timely request constitutes structural error2 not
subject to harmless error review.3 See id., 635–39. In
the present case, one juror, C.A., purportedly told the
trial judge in the jury deliberation room—after the
return of the verdict but before the jury had been dis-
charged—that she ‘‘[felt] a little guilty about the
attempted murder charge.’’4 The court did not advise
1
Practice Book § 42-31 provides: ‘‘After a verdict has been returned and
before the jury has been discharged, the jury shall be polled at the request
of any party or upon the judicial authority’s own motion. The poll shall be
conducted by the clerk of the court by asking each juror individually
whether the verdict announced is such juror’s verdict. If upon the poll
there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for
further deliberations or it may be discharged.’’ (Emphasis added.)
2
A structural error is ‘‘a defect affecting the framework within which the
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself. . . .
Such errors infect the entire trial process . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724, 733, 859 A.2d 898 (2004).
3
In contrast, in a civil case, a violation of Practice Book § 16-32—the civil
counterpart of Practice Book § 42-31—is subject to harmless error review.
See Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 115, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).
4
It does not appear from the December 5, 2018 transcript (the date of
the verdict and the discharge of the jury) that the trial judge informed
counsel that she intended to speak with the jurors following their exit from
the courtroom. See Tessmann v. Tiger Lee Construction Co., 228 Conn. 42,
57, 634 A.2d 870 (1993) (‘‘[a]nswering jurors’ questions, to promote good
public relations, and soliciting feedback regarding the performance of mem-
bers of the bar are within the court’s administrative functions and are
permissible under [the rule of the Code of Judicial Conduct governing ex
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 0 ,0 3
State v. Angel A.

counsel of C.A.’s statement prior to the jury’s separation
and dispersal.
In my view, it is inconceivable that, had he immedi-
ately been informed of C.A.’s statement, defense coun-
sel would not have made a polling request prior to the
jury’s discharge (i.e., at a time when such request would
have been deemed timely as a matter of law pursuant
to State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 611, and when the
court would have been required to conduct a poll). See
id., 621 (‘‘We conclude that, pursuant to [Practice Book]
§ 42-31, a trial court’s obligation to poll the jury upon
a timely request from either party is mandatory. We
conclude further that a jury is not discharged for the
purpose of § 42-31 until its individual members separate
or disperse and, therefore, a request submitted prior
thereto is timely.’’). Because I see no meaningful differ-
ence between a trial court’s per se reversible denial of
a request to conduct a jury poll following a timely
request, as in Pare, and a trial court’s withholding of
information that otherwise would have prompted a
timely request for a jury poll, as in the present case, I
respectfully dissent from part I of the majority opinion
and would reverse the judgment of conviction of
attempt to commit murder and remand the case for a
new trial on that count.5
As a threshold matter, I disagree with the majority’s
analysis in part I concerning the issue of preservation
of the defendant’s first claim on appeal. Unlike the
majority, I would deem the defendant’s claim pre-
served.6
parte communications] as long as the judge fully discloses [her] intention
to speak with the jury and discloses the subject matter to be discussed’’
(emphasis added)). The defendant does not raise this issue on appeal.
5
As the majority correctly notes, on appeal, the defendant seeks a reversal
of the judgment of conviction only as to the count of attempt to commit mur-
der.
6
The majority concludes that the defendant did not preserve his Practice
Book § 42-31 claim because he did not raise it (1) during the posttrial hearing
or (2) in a motion for a new trial. With regard to the former (i.e., that the
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 0
State v. Angel A.

Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part that
this court ‘‘shall not be bound to consider a claim unless
it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent
to the trial. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) See Weiss v.
Smulders, 313 Conn. 227, 247–48, 96 A.3d 1175 (2014)
(because issue arose subsequent to trial, claim on
appeal was deemed preserved); Azia v. DiLascia, 64
Conn. App. 540, 558–59 n.13, 780 A.2d 992 (same), cert.
denied, 258 Conn. 914, 782 A.2d 1241 (2001); Hayward
v. Hayward, 53 Conn. App. 1, 5–6, 752 A.2d 1087 (1999)
(same).
Here, the issue of C.A.’s equivocation as to the verdict
arose—from the perspective of the parties’ knowl-
edge—subsequent to the trial (more specifically, after
defendant did not raise this claim during the posttrial hearing), by the time
of that hearing, a request for an individual poll under Practice Book § 42-
31 would have been too late as a matter of law, through no fault of the
defendant. See State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 632–33. With regard to the
latter (i.e., that the defendant did not raise the issue in a motion for a new
trial), the majority cites State v. Franklin, 162 Conn. App. 78, 93, 129 A.3d
770 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 905, 138 A.3d 281 (2016). I believe that
the majority’s reliance on Franklin is misplaced. In Franklin, this court
opined that, because the defendant had not moved for a new trial under
Practice Book § 42-53, he had not preserved his claim that he was entitled
to a new trial on the ground that the verdicts were against the weight of
the physical evidence. See id. In light of the nature of that particular claim,
such a preservation requirement makes sense. With regard to such a claim,
‘‘[i]t is well settled that only the judge who presided over the trial where
a challenged verdict was returned is legally competent to decide if that
verdict was against the weight of the evidence . . . . Consequently, a judge
in a later proceeding, such as a direct appeal or a habeas corpus proceeding,
is not legally competent to decide such a claim on the basis of the cold
printed record before it. . . . It necessarily follows that appellate review
of a weight of the evidence claim is greatly circumscribed. . . . [T]he proper
appellate standard of review when considering the action of a trial court
granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict and a motion for a new
trial is the abuse of discretion standard.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Capasso, 203 Conn.
App. 333, 346–47, 248 A.3d 58, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 939, 249 A.3d 352
(2021). However, to extend, as the majority does, the preservation require-
ment applicable to a weight of the evidence claim to a jury polling claim
that arises subsequent to the trial is a bridge too far.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 0 ,0 5
State v. Angel A.

the return of the verdict and after the discharge of the
jury). That is, by the time the court informed counsel
of C.A.’s statement (i.e., two days after the jury’s dis-
charge), it was too late, as a matter of law, for counsel
to make a polling request under Practice Book § 42-
31. In Pare, our Supreme Court stated: ‘‘For practical
reasons . . . a trial court should be [and is] required
to reassemble a jury and conduct a poll only prior to
the separation and dispersal of its members. ‘The reason
usually given why it is too late to poll jurors after they
have been dispersed is that they may have ‘‘come into
contact with outside influences.’’ 3 ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice at 15-148.’ State v. Coulthard, [171 Wis.
2d 573, 582, 492 N.W.2d 329 (1992), review denied, 497
N.W.2d 130 (1993)]; see also People v. McNeeley, 216
Ill. App. 3d 647, 652, 575 N.E.2d 926, appeal denied, 141
Ill. 2d 553, 580 N.E.2d 128 (1991) (‘protective shield’
removed upon discharge thereby ‘allowing the jurors
to be influenced by improper outside factors’). Even
‘[s]imple questions such as ‘‘[d]id we do alright?’’ or
‘‘[w]e did the right thing, didn’t we?’’—responded to
either positively or negatively would taint any subse-
quent poll.’ United States v. Marinari, [32 F.3d 1209],
1214 [(7th Cir. 1994)]. Until that time, however, it can
be assumed, in the absence of any indication to the
contrary, that the deliberative process had not been
tainted and, therefore, that the results of a jury poll will
provide adequate confirmation as to whether the verdict
was reached upon full consensus of the jurors.’’ State
v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 632–33. In light of the forego-
ing, and pursuant to Practice Book § 60-5, I would deem
the defendant’s claim preserved.
Having determined that the defendant’s Practice
Book § 42-31 claim is unpreserved, however, the major-
ity proceeds to conclude that the claim fails under the
third prong of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d
823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn.
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 0
State v. Angel A.

773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Respectfully, I disagree
with the majority’s application of Golding. It is well
settled that, in order for a defendant to prevail on a
claim pursuant to Golding, all of Golding’s conditions
must be satisfied. See, e.g., State v. Bolton, 352 Conn.
477, 494 n.14, 337 A.3d 1114 (2025). With respect to the
second Golding prong (i.e., ‘‘the claim is of constitu-
tional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental
right’’; State v. Golding, supra, 239), the majority effec-
tively assumes it is satisfied, notwithstanding the fact
that our Supreme Court has expressly held, however,
that the right to poll the jury under § 42-31 is ‘‘not of
constitutional dimension . . . .’’ State v. Pare, supra,
253 Conn. 623. Indeed, our Supreme Court recently held
that a claim of a § 42-31 violation ‘‘is not subject to
Golding review,’’ stating that, because a defendant’s
claim that the trial court violated § 42-31 ‘‘is not of
constitutional magnitude, it fails to satisfy the second
prong of Golding.’’ State v. Bolton, supra, 499. In addi-
tion, this court previously rejected the availability of
Golding review of a § 42-31 claim for that very reason.
See State v. Mazzeo, 74 Conn. App. 430, 438, 811 A.2d
775 (‘‘[T]he defendant’s claim fails because it is not
of constitutional magnitude alleging a violation of a
fundamental right. . . . As such, review under Golding
is denied.’’ (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied, 263 Conn.
910, 821 A.2d 767 (2003). Because this court follows
the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis (i.e., this court’s
commitment to follow its own precedent),7 and this
court previously has held that Golding is not available
on a claim under § 42-31, the majority opinion also
creates an inconsistency in our case law. In sum, the
7
See A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 192 Conn. App.
245, 260 n.10, 217 A.3d 996 (2019) (‘‘[T]his court’s policy dictates that one
panel should not, on its own, [overrule] the ruling of a previous panel. The
[overruling] may be accomplished only if the appeal is heard en banc.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)), aff’d, 338 Conn. 651, 258 A.3d 1244
(2021).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 0 ,0 7
State v. Angel A.

majority’s Golding analysis directly contravenes our
Supreme Court’s recent holding in Bolton, as well as
this court’s prior precedent.
The majority’s treatment of a Practice Book § 42-31
claim as a constitutional claim amenable to harmless
error review permeates the remainder of its analysis in
part I of its opinion. The majority begins its analysis of
the merits of the defendant’s claim by relying on Rushen
v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S. Ct. 453, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267
(1983), which did not involve a juror statement about
the verdict but rather a juror’s ex parte, midtrial commu-
nication with the trial judge concerning her recollection
of the murder of a childhood friend by a police infor-
mant who was identified during a witness’ testimony
at the defendant’s criminal trial and subsequently had
been convicted of that crime. Id., 115–16. After a subse-
quent habeas action, the defendant in Rushen v. Spain,
supra, 117, raised on appeal a constitutional claim to
which the United States Supreme Court applied harm-
less error review. Id., 121. As stated previously, how-
ever, a claim under § 42-31 is not of constitutional mag-
nitude, and a violation of § 42-31 results in structural
error that is not subject to harmless error review. See
State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 635–39.
Relying on Rushen, the majority adopts a rule
whereby a trial judge has no immediate obligation to
disclose a juror’s ex parte comment reflecting equivoca-
tion as to the verdict that is expressed after the return
of the verdict but prior to the jury’s discharge.
According to the majority, a trial judge can wait to make
the disclosure until after the jury’s discharge, and any
prejudicial effect can be determined in a posttrial hear-
ing (when the ability to conduct a jury poll no longer
exists). I find such a rule to be ill-advised and lacking
in the proper regard for the ‘‘weighty interest protected
by a jury poll’’; id., 639; either done ‘‘at the request of
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 0
State v. Angel A.

any party or upon the judicial authority’s own motion.’’
Practice Book § 42-31.
Further, I am unpersuaded by the majority’s reliance
on United States v. Jefferson, 258 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 967, 122 S. Ct. 379, 151 L. Ed. 2d 289
(2001). Although Jefferson involved a juror expressing
reservations about her verdict, the case is readily distin-
guishable because, among other things, the trial court
in that case had in fact individually polled the jury
members as to their guilty verdict and all twelve jurors
answered affirmatively.8 Id., 410. In the present case,
the defendant obviously did not have the benefit of an
individual poll.
Unpersuaded by the majority’s analysis, and for the
reasons that follow, I conclude that the trial court had
a duty, prior to the jury’s discharge, to notify counsel
of C.A.’s statement reflecting her equivocation as to the
verdict on the count of attempt to commit murder and
that the failure to do so deprived the defendant of his
right to request a jury poll under Practice Book § 42-
31, thereby resulting in structural error pursuant to
State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 635–39.
The defendant’s claim distills to the legal question of
whether the trial court had a duty to inform counsel
of C.A.’s statement prior to the jury’s discharge and
whether the failure to do so resulted in a violation of
Practice Book § 42-31. ‘‘ ‘The interpretive construction
of the rules of practice is to be governed by the same
principles as those regulating statutory interpretation.’
Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn.
723, 733–34, 830 A.2d 228 (2003); see also State v. Pare,
8
In Jefferson, the juror’s statement of equivocation was made after the
trial court had polled the jury, at which time the court asked the juror,
individually again, whether that was the juror’s verdict and the juror
responded affirmatively. United States v. Jefferson, supra, 258 F.3d 410.
The court’s handling of the juror’s equivocation following the jury poll was
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 0 ,0 9
State v. Angel A.

supra, 253 Conn. 622 (‘principles of statutory construc-
tion apply ‘‘with equal force to Practice Book rules’’ ’).
The interpretation and application of a statute, and thus
a Practice Book provision, involves a question of law
over which our review is plenary. Commissioner of
Social Services v. Smith, supra, 734.’’ Wiseman v. Arm-
strong, 295 Conn. 94, 99, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).
My analytical starting point is the guidance provided
in State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 611, in which our
Supreme Court considered whether the trial court’s
denial of a polling request in a criminal trial constituted
structural error. See id., 635–36. In Pare, the defendant
had been charged with murder. Id., 612. During delibera-
tions, the jury informed the court of its inability to reach
a unanimous verdict, whereupon the trial court gave a
‘‘Chip Smith’’ charge reminding the jury that it must act
unanimously.9 Id., 616 and n.4. Shortly thereafter, the
jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court denied
the defendant’s subsequent request to poll the jury,
made after the jury had retired to the jury room. Id.,
617, 619–20. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
denial of his request constituted per se reversible error.
Id., 613. Our Supreme Court concluded that the
‘‘weighty interest protected by a jury poll’’ and constitu-
tional concerns inherent in criminal trials required invo-
cation of per se reversible error. Id., 639. The court
explicitly stated that, ‘‘because the purpose of permit-
ting an individual poll is to protect the accused’s consti-
tutional right to an acquittal in the absence of the full
consensus of each juror, the denial of a timely request
to poll is of substantial and unique magnitude. . . .
[T]he action of the court [in denying a timely request
9
‘‘A Chip Smith [charge] reminds the jurors that they must act unani-
mously, while also encouraging a deadlocked jury to reach unanimity. . . .
A similar jury instruction, known as an Allen charge, is utilized in the federal
courts.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
O’Neil, 261 Conn. 49, 51 n.2, 801 A.2d 730 (2002); see Allen v. United States,
164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896).
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 0
State v. Angel A.

to poll the jury] work[s] a denial of a right of the accused
so fundamental as to require a retrial . . . . [I]t is bet-
ter that the case be tried again than that a precedent
impairing a defendant’s right to a poll of the jury be
engrafted on our criminal procedure.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 636. The court proceeded to
reject the state’s contention that a Practice Book § 42-
31 violation is subject to harmless error review; id., 637;
instead holding that ‘‘a defendant’s right to poll the jury,
if not waived, is absolute, and its denial requires reversal
even though the remainder of the trial may be error-
free.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 638–39.
The court reasoned: ‘‘Despite the jury’s collective assent
to the verdict, absent a poll, a defendant has no way of
ensuring that his or her right to a unanimous, uncoerced
verdict was honored. . . . [Although] the jury did not
behave in any manner to suggest that polling would
have produced a juror who did not support the verdict
and thus changed the outcome of the trial, the fact
remains that we cannot know the results of polling the
jury. . . . [I]n the absence of a valid poll upon a timely
request, we must regard the verdict as defective.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
637–38. The court also highlighted that ‘‘rarely does an
individual poll reveal that a juror assented to a verdict
despite reservation regarding the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Nonetheless, in light
of the weighty interest protected by a jury poll, and the
impracticality of gauging the results of a poll not taken,
[the court] conclude[d] that a violation of a party’s
timely polling request requires automatic reversal of
the judgment.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 639.
‘‘The purpose of a jury poll is to test the uncoerced
unanimity of the verdict by requiring each juror to
answer for himself, thus creating individual responsibil-
ity, eliminating any uncertainty as to the verdict
announced by the foreman. . . . [T]he right to poll the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 0 ,0 11
State v. Angel A.

jury, although not constitutional, is nonetheless a sub-
stantial right . . . that enables the court to ascertain
with certainty that a unanimous verdict has in fact been
recorded and that no juror has been coerced or induced
to agree to a verdict to which he [or she] has not fully
assented.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Bolton, supra, 352 Conn. 483–84; see
also State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 624 (Practice Book
§ 42-31 is ‘‘a mechanism for preserving an essential
characteristic of both the state and federal constitu-
tions; see Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138, 99 S.
Ct. 1623, 60 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1979) (right to unanimous
verdict rendered by six person jury protected under
right to jury trial guaranteed by due process clause of
fourteenth amendment to United States constitution);
State v. Jennings, 216 Conn. 647, 656, 583 A.2d 915
(1990) (acknowledging right to unanimous verdict pro-
tected by article first, § 8, of Connecticut constitu-
tion)’’).
The potential import of a jury poll is not mere fiction.
For example, a jury poll in State v. Bolton, supra, 352
Conn. 477, uncovered equivocation on the part of one
of the jurors. The polling was halted after six jurors
had been polled, and the jury ultimately was instructed
to continue deliberating. Id., 480–81. Indeed, Practice
Book § 42-31 expressly provides in relevant part that,
‘‘[i]f upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence,
the jury may be directed to retire for further delibera-
tions or it may be discharged.’’ Our Supreme Court in
Bolton gave this guidance: ‘‘Depending on the circum-
stances before it, the court may choose to canvass the
dissenting juror, to dismiss the jury and declare a mis-
trial, or to issue a Chip Smith charge or other instruction
before returning the jury to its deliberations; it may also
simply return the jury to deliberate without additional
instruction.’’ State v. Bolton, supra, 488. A trial court’s
handling of a juror’s equivocation uncovered during a
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 0
State v. Angel A.

jury poll is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id., 482–
94.
In the present case, the trial court deprived the defen-
dant of his right to request a jury poll with the knowl-
edge of C.A.’s expressed equivocation as to the verdict.
Indeed, had a jury poll occurred in real time and C.A.
individually responded to the clerk’s inquiry regarding
whether the verdict announced was her verdict by stat-
ing that she ‘‘[felt] a little guilty about the attempted
murder charge,’’ there can be little doubt that the trial
court would have been required to address C.A.’s equiv-
ocation during the poll and could not simply assume
that she had returned a verdict of guilty. Cf. State v.
Bolton, supra, 352 Conn. 482 n.3 (‘‘[b]ecause the jury
poll was not completed, it is unclear how the trial court
determined that eleven jurors had returned a verdict
of guilty’’). In effect, this is what the majority does.
That is, the majority states: ‘‘Because the trial court did
not inquire about C.A.’s comment at the time it was
made or during the posttrial hearing, any inferences
we may draw about what C.A. meant would be purely
speculative.’’ Yet, that is precisely the point. We simply
have no idea whether C.A. would have, in a jury poll,
individually affirmed a verdict of guilty on the count of
attempt to commit murder. See State v. Pare, supra,
253 Conn. 637 (rejecting state’s argument that, ‘‘in the
absence of any indication of dissent, the jury’s affirma-
tive responses as a body provides a sufficient guarantee
of unanimity to render the lack of individual interroga-
tion harmless’’).
As previously stated, it is inconceivable to me that
defense counsel would not have requested a jury poll
upon being timely informed of C.A.’s equivocation
regarding the verdict on the attempt to commit murder
count. See J.R. v. Commissioner of Correction, 105
Conn. App. 827, 843, 941 A.2d 348 (‘‘the petitioner does
not argue, nor do we conclude, that defense counsel is
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 0 ,0 13
State v. Angel A.

required in all circumstances to poll the jury, absent
some indication that the verdict was not unanimous’’
(emphasis added)), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 915, 945
A.2d 976 (2008). As stated in Pare, ‘‘[i]n the absence of
a valid poll upon a timely request, we must regard the
verdict as defective.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Pare, supra, 253 Conn. 638. Under these
circumstances, I conclude that the court’s withholding
of information that otherwise would have prompted a
timely request for a jury poll resulted in structural error
not subject to harmless error review. See State v. Lewis,
134 Conn. App. 262, 263, 37 A.3d 832 (2012) (reversing
judgment of conviction where trial court improperly
denied timely request to poll jury, made after recording
of verdict and prior to jury’s discharge); State v. James
P., 96 Conn. App. 93, 102, 899 A.2d 649 (‘‘[b]ecause the
jury was not discharged, defense counsel’s request to
poll the jury [made after the recording of the verdict
and prior to the jury’s discharge] was timely, and the
court’s improper denial of that request requires reversal
of the judgment’’), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 910, 908 A.2d
540 (2006); State v. Edelman, 64 Conn. App. 480, 482–84,
780 A.2d 980 (2001) (concluding that court’s denial of
defendant’s timely request for jury poll, made after jury
had returned verdict and prior to jury’s discharge,
required automatic reversal of judgment), appeal dis-
missed, 262 Conn. 392, 815 A.2d 104 (2003).
In light of the foregoing considerations, I respectfully
dissent from part I of the majority opinion.10

10
Because my conclusion with regard to the defendant’s first claim would
be dispositive of the resolution of his appeal, I do not address part II of the
majority opinion.