Metroplitan District v. Mott

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Metropolitan District v. Mott

THE METROPOLITAN DISTRICT v.
DAVID B. MOTT ET AL.
(AC 46665)
Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The defendants appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered on their
counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment and to quiet title with respect to
the plaintiff’s express easement encumbering their property. The defendants
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rendered judgment for the
plaintiff on their quiet title claim. Held:

This court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review portions of the defen-
dants’ claim that the declarations issued by the trial court in adjudicating
the counterclaim were improper, as the defendants failed to demonstrate
that they were aggrieved by two of the declarations at issue, which mirrored
or substantively tracked the language of the defendants’ requested declara-
tions.

The trial court’s final declaration at issue was not improper, as the defendants
misconstrued the scope of the court’s declaration regarding the plaintiff’s
acquiescence to the defendants’ encroachment in the easement area by their
installation of a driveway and utilities.

The trial court did not improperly fail to address certain issues in adjudicat-
ing the counterclaim, as the court resolved one issue, there was no reason
for the court to address a second issue, and the defendants abandoned their
claim regarding a third issue by failing to brief it adequately.

The trial court improperly rendered judgment for the plaintiff on count two
of the defendants’ counterclaim seeking to quiet title, as, although the court
deemed the lack of a dispute between the parties regarding ownership of
the property, subject to the easement, to be dispositive, disputes arising as
to an express easement when title to the encumbered property is not in
question may be resolved pursuant to statute (§ 47-31), and, therefore, the
court should have rendered judgment for the defendants to the extent that
the court granted the defendants’ requested relief.

This court declined to review the defendants’ claim that the trial court
improperly admitted irrelevant evidence at trial, as the defendants failed to
identify, with any specificity, the evidence that the court purportedly erred
in admitting.

The trial court did not improperly admit evidence at trial generally, as the
defendants failed to establish that the court committed error in hearing
evidence in order to resolve the counterclaim.
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Metropolitan District v. Mott
This court declined to review the defendants’ claim that the trial court
improperly declined to award them attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to
the rule of practice (§ 1-25), as the defendants failed to adequately brief
their claim.

The trial court properly determined that the defendants were not entitled
to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to statute (§ 48-17b), as the defendants
neither alleged an inverse condemnation claim in the counterclaim nor
successfully prosecuted such a claim, and, accordingly, § 48-17b was inappli-
cable to this case.
Argued May 27—officially released September 30, 2025

Procedural History

Action to quiet title to certain real property owned
by the named defendant et al. over which the plaintiff
held an easement, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where
the named defendant et al. filed a counterclaim; there-
after, the plaintiff withdrew its claims against the defen-
dant R & R Construction, Inc., et al.; subsequently, the
plaintiff withdrew its action and the counterclaim was
tried to the court, Rosen, J.; judgment in part for the
named defendant et al. on the counterclaim, from which
the named defendant et al. appealed to this court.
Reversed in part; judgment directed.
Joseph M. Mott, pro hac vice, with whom, on the
brief, was Proloy K. Das, for the appellants (named
defendant et al.).
Elizabeth M. Cristofaro, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs
David B. Mott and Jacqueline L. Mott (defendants)1
appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered
1
The plaintiff’s verified complaint named R&R Construction, Inc., James
Trzcinski, and the town of Canton as additional defendants; however, the
plaintiff subsequently withdrew its claims as to those parties. In the interest
of simplicity, we refer to David B. Mott and Jacqueline L. Mott collectively
as the defendants.
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Metropolitan District v. Mott

on their counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment
and to quiet title with respect to an express easement
encumbering their property, which easement inures to
the benefit of the plaintiff and counterclaim defendant,
the Metropolitan District (plaintiff).2 On appeal, the
defendants’ claims distill to whether the court (1) com-
mitted error in issuing relief, (2) improperly failed to
address certain issues, (3) improperly rendered judg-
ment on their quiet title claim in the plaintiff’s favor,
(4) abused its discretion in admitting evidence during
trial, and (5) improperly declined to award them attor-
ney’s fees and costs. We reverse the judgment of the
trial court only insofar as the court rendered judgment
for the plaintiff on the entirety of the defendants’ quiet
title claim.
The following undisputed facts, as found by the trial
court or as gleaned from the record, and procedural
history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On
May 29, 2015, the defendants purchased real property
located at 594 Albany Turnpike in Canton (property),
with the intent to build a house thereon. The property
is subject to an easement granted in favor of the plaintiff
in 1939, and the defendants were aware of the easement
before they purchased the property. The easement area
comprises a seventy-five foot wide section that runs
across the property, as well as a twenty-five foot wide
section that extends from the main section. Located
four to six feet below the ground within the easement
area is a forty-eight inch diameter water main pipeline
(pipeline), accompanied by pipe collars located three
to five feet below the ground, which the plaintiff
2
‘‘We note that the plaintiff has been identified alternatively as the Metro-
politan District and the Metropolitan District Commission in our case law.’’
Metropolitan District v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities,
180 Conn. App. 478, 480 n.1, 184 A.3d 287, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 937, 184
A.3d 267 (2018). We refer to the plaintiff as the Metropolitan District, the
moniker used by the plaintiff in its verified complaint and on appeal.
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Metropolitan District v. Mott

installed and which supplies water to approximately
400,000 people in the greater Hartford area.
The easement provides in relevant part that the plain-
tiff is granted ‘‘an easement for a [right-of-way] for the
construction and maintenance of [pipelines] for the car-
riage of water over [the easement area] . . . . The
[plaintiff] shall have the right to install and maintain
one or more [pipelines] through said [right-of-way] and
shall have the right at all times to enter upon said [right-
of-way] for the purpose of inspecting, operating and
repairing said [pipelines]. . . .’’ The easement further
provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he grantor agrees not
to erect any permanent buildings or other structures
within the limits of said [right-of-way] and to maintain
the surface of the ground at approximately the same
grade not exceeding 12 inches up or down from the
present surface over all parts of said [right-of-way]. The
grantor shall have the right to use the surface of said
[right-of-way] for any purpose connected with usual
agricultural operations but not for orchard or timber
raising or for any similar purpose which would interfere
with the work of installing, maintaining or repairing
said [pipelines]. The grantor shall have the right to build
a road over said [right-of-way], provided the center line
of said road shall be coincident with the center line of
said [right-of-way] and built in such a manner as not to
prevent or interfere with the layout of future [pipelines],
and provided the [plaintiff] shall have free use of said
road for the purpose of constructing, maintaining,
operating and repairing said [pipelines] without respon-
sibility for the maintenance or upkeep of said road.
Nothing herein shall prevent the use of said [right-of-
way] by the [plaintiff] herein for such [pipeline] uses
as it may require nor shall the [plaintiff] be responsible
for any damage which may be done to any road built
by the grantor as a result of its use by the [plaintiff] or
its agents. . . .’’
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Metropolitan District v. Mott

In May, 2015, the defendants contacted the plaintiff
to inquire about its permit process in connection with
their intent to install a driveway over and underground
utilities within the easement area. In response, the plain-
tiff provided the defendants with information regarding
what it called its ‘‘encroachment permit process,’’ which
the court found to be a ‘‘voluntary encroachment pro-
cess.’’ Attached to the plaintiff’s correspondence was
a ‘‘sample encroachment agreement,’’ with the plaintiff
advising the defendants that ‘‘[a]n encroachment agree-
ment will be needed if any development occurs within
the limits of the right-of-way . . . .’’3 Among other pro-
visions, the sample encroachment agreement deline-
ated insurance requirements and set forth six ‘‘specific
conditions’’ that the defendants would need to satisfy.
On February 11, 2016, the defendants sent a letter
to the plaintiff ‘‘to request permission to permanently
encroach upon the [plaintiff’s] . . . right-of-way on
[the] property as shown on [an] enclosed site plan.’’
The defendants’ correspondence also confirmed their
understanding that six restrictions applied to their pro-
posed construction project.4
On March 7, 2016, upon the recommendation of the
plaintiff’s Water Bureau (water bureau), the plaintiff
passed a resolution5 (March 7, 2016 resolution) author-
izing the execution of an agreement, subject to approval
by the plaintiff’s district counsel, granting the defen-
dants permission to proceed with their construction
project and ‘‘to permanently encroach upon the [plain-
tiff’s] [r]ight-of-[w]ay,’’ provided that the plaintiff would
3
During trial, David B. Mott testified that he had received the plaintiff’s
correspondence and the sample encroachment agreement, copies of which
were admitted in full into the record.
4
The six restrictions identified by the defendants substantively tracked
the six ‘‘specific conditions’’ detailed in the sample encroachment agreement.
5
The resolution was passed by the plaintiff’s District Board. In the interest
of simplicity, we treat the plaintiff and its District Board as one and the same.
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Metropolitan District v. Mott

not be held liable for any costs or damages in relation
to the proposed construction project or any future con-
struction, maintenance, or repair stemming from the
encroachment. On April 18, 2016, the plaintiff sent the
defendants a proposed encroachment agreement
(encroachment agreement), which included the six
restrictions previously acknowledged by the defendants
and insurance requirements, among other terms. The
defendants declined to execute the proposed encroach-
ment agreement.6

Between September, 2016, and January, 2017, unbe-
knownst to the plaintiff, the defendants proceeded with
their construction project. In January, 2017, after having
discovered the defendants’ construction activities, the
plaintiff filed an application seeking an ex parte tempo-
rary restraining order and a temporary injunction,
accompanied by an order to show cause and a verified
complaint. In its one count verified complaint, the plain-
tiff asserted that it was ‘‘bring[ing] this action [to quiet
title] pursuant to General Statutes § 47-317 seeking to
enforce its long-standing . . . easement rights, protect
its [pipeline], and otherwise settle the status of title with
respect to the [property] owned by the [defendants]
6
In an email sent by the defendants to the plaintiff on July 13, 2016, which
email was admitted in full into the record, the defendants objected to the
proposed encroachment agreement, stating that they could not ‘‘agree to
amending the easement and placing additional burdens on [their] land title.’’
7
General Statutes § 47-31 (a) provides: ‘‘An action may be brought by any
person claiming title to, or any interest in, real or personal property, or
both, against any person who may claim to own the property, or any part
of it, or to have any estate in it, either in fee, for years, for life or in
reversion or remainder, or to have any interest in the property, or any lien
or encumbrance on it, adverse to the plaintiff, or against any person in
whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim or title conflicting
with the plaintiff’s claim, title or interest, for the purpose of determining
such adverse estate, interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes
and to quiet and settle the title to the property. Such action may be brought
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the immediate or exclusive posses-
sion of the property.’’
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and impacted by the plaintiff’s . . . easement.’’ (Foot-
note added.) As relief, the plaintiff requested, inter alia,
that the court (1) enjoin the defendants from proceeding
with their construction project and (2) order the defen-
dants to execute the encroachment agreement with the
plaintiff before proceeding with any additional con-
struction activities in, on, or near the easement area.
On February 14, 2017, the defendants filed an objection
to the plaintiff’s application.
On February 16, 2017, the parties executed a settle-
ment agreement (interim settlement agreement) resolv-
ing the plaintiff’s application for a temporary injunction,
which agreement the trial court, Berger, J., approved
that same day. The interim settlement agreement pro-
vided in relevant part that (1) the plaintiff would with-
draw its application for a temporary injunction without
prejudice, (2) the defendants were permitted to resume
their construction activities, provided that, inter alia,
they adhered to the conditions specified in the March
7, 2016 resolution, except for certain insurance require-
ments as detailed in the interim settlement agreement,
and (3) ‘‘[n]o [e]ncroachment [a]greement will be signed
or required at this time and no recording will be made
[on] the [Canton] land records regarding any of the
improvements/utilities located in the right-of-way, but
the [p]laintiff reserves its right to seek that relief in the
future. . . .’’ There is no dispute that the defendants
completed the installation of the driveway and the utili-
ties in March, 2017.
On April 3, 2017, upon the recommendation of the
water bureau, the plaintiff passed a resolution authoriz-
ing the execution of an encroachment agreement con-
sistent with the terms of the March 7, 2016 resolution,
with the added requirement mandating the recording
of the executed encroachment agreement on the Canton
land records.
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The interim settlement agreement did not resolve
the plaintiff’s quiet title claim. On June 29, 2017, the
defendants filed an answer and special defenses, as
well as a four count counterclaim. Counts one and two
of the counterclaim sought, respectively, a declaratory
judgment and to quiet title pursuant to § 47-31.8 The
defendants requested what we construe to be identical
relief in both counts one and two, namely, declarations
that (1) ‘‘the easement has not been altered or modified
in any manner and remains in full force and effect’’; (2)
‘‘the [defendants] had the right to install, and have the
right to maintain, the utilities and driveway that they
have installed without interference from the [plain-
tiff]’’;9 and (3) ‘‘the [plaintiff] does not have a right
to compel the [defendants] to sign an encroachment
agreement that requires the modification or amendment
of the easement, the provision of insurance in perpetu-
ity, or that any such encroachment agreement be
recorded on the Canton land records10 . . . .’’11 (Foot-
note added.) The plaintiff subsequently filed an answer
8
Counts three and four of the counterclaim sounded in abuse of civil
process and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,
General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., both of which the defendants withdrew
before trial.
9
This request for relief differed slightly in counts one and two of the
counterclaim, as the requested declaration in count two omitted the phrase
‘‘without interference from the [plaintiff].’’
10
This request for relief differed slightly in counts one and two of the
counterclaim, as the requested declaration in count two read: ‘‘That the
[plaintiff] does not have a right to compel the [defendants] to sign an
encroachment agreement that requires the modification or amendment of
the terms of the easement, the provision of insurance in perpetuity, or that
any such encroachment agreement be recorded on the Canton land records
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
11
In counts one and two of the counterclaim, the defendants requested
as relief several additional declarations, which were abandoned at trial. In
a footnote in its memorandum of decision, the court, Rosen, J., stated that,
‘‘[a]t the commencement of trial, the defendants advised the court that they
were proceeding on the following prayers for relief only:’’ (1) with respect
to count one, the three declarations that we detail in the body of this opinion;
and (2) with respect to count two, the following four declarations: (1) ‘‘[t]hat
the easement has not been altered or modified in any manner and remains
in full force and effect’’; (2) that the plaintiff has no right to enter onto the
property without ‘‘reasonable advance notice and in a manner and pattern
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and special defenses12 to the counterclaim, which plead-
ing it later amended.13
On April 24, 2020, pursuant to Practice Book § 13-
19,14 the defendants filed a demand for disclosure of
commensurate with similarly situated property owners, except in the event
of an emergency’’; (3) ‘‘[t]hat the [plaintiff] does not have a right to compel
the [defendants] to sign an encroachment agreement that requires the modifi-
cation or amendment of the terms of the easement, the provision of insurance
in perpetuity, or that any such encroachment agreement be recorded on
the Canton land records’’; and (4) that the plaintiff had to negotiate with
the defendants in good faith to purchase additional property rights for just
compensation if it wanted to modify the easement. The record, however,
does not support the court’s recitation of the defendants’ requested relief
vis-à-vis count two.
During trial, the court stated that it wanted to ‘‘go through the prayers
for relief in each of [the] two counts [of the counterclaim] and confirm
which matters are still live and which matters have already been resolved.’’
With respect to count one, the court confirmed that the defendants were
requesting only the three declarations attendant to that count that we have
detailed. As to the relief requested in count two, the court asked the parties’
respective counsel whether the requested declarations ‘‘mirror[ed]’’ those
in count one; both counsel responded in the affirmative. The court then
stated: ‘‘All right. So, it’s going to be the same determination as to those
[requests for relief], as to the [requests for relief] in count one.’’ The trial
transcripts do not reflect that the defendants informed the court that, with
respect to count two, they were seeking declarations concerning the plain-
tiff’s entry onto the property with reasonable advance notice or the plaintiff’s
purchase of additional property rights; in fact, during trial, the defendants’
counsel expressly notified the court that the defendants were not pursuing
identical requested declarations in count one concerning those issues. Thus,
we construe the record to demonstrate that the defendants represented to
the court during trial that they were seeking identical relief in both counts
one and two, namely, the three declarations that we have identified.
12
The plaintiff asserted three special defenses: (1) untimeliness pursuant
to Practice Book § 17-4 and General Statutes § 52-212a; (2) governmental
immunity; and (3) unclean hands. The plaintiff withdrew the second and
third special defenses before trial, and the court later determined that the
plaintiff had abandoned its first special defense by failing to brief that
defense in its posttrial brief.
13
On April 14, 2022, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60 (a) (3), the plaintiff
filed a request for leave to file an amended answer, to which the defendants
did not file an objection within fifteen days. See Practice Book § 10-60 (a)
(3) (‘‘[i]f no party files an objection to the request [for leave] within fifteen
days from the date it is filed, the amendment shall be deemed to have been
filed by consent of the adverse party’’).
14
Practice Book § 13-19 provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any action to fore-
close or to discharge any mortgage or lien or to quiet title, or in any action
upon any written contract, in which there is an appearance by an attorney
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defense. On May 4, 2020, the plaintiff filed a disclosure
of defense, raising two defenses: (1) the defendants
acquired title to the property subject to the easement
granted in favor of the plaintiff, and (2) the express
terms of the easement restrict the defendants to con-
ducting certain activities on the surface of the easement
area and prevent them from conducting any activities
beneath the surface of the easement area, such that ‘‘the
rights of the [plaintiff] with respect to the subsurface
of the easement area are exclusive, and any attempt by
the [defendants] to conduct or cause to conduct any
activity in such subsurface is prohibited and constitutes
an encroachment under the easement.’’ That same day,
upon the recommendation of the water bureau, the
plaintiff passed a resolution rescinding its prior condi-
tional approval of the defendants’ construction project.
On September 23, 2021, the plaintiff withdrew the
verified complaint. The next day, the plaintiff filed a
motion to dismiss the counterclaim15 as moot, asserting,
inter alia, that (1) the defendants’ installation of the
driveway over and utilities within the easement area
had been completed, (2) the plaintiff had withdrawn
the verified complaint and rescinded its conditional
approval of the defendants’ encroachment on the ease-
ment, such that the attendant demand that the defen-
dants execute an encroachment agreement to be
for any defendant, the plaintiff may at any time file and serve in accordance
with Sections 10-12 through 10-17 a written demand that such attorney
present to the court, to become a part of the file in such case, a writing
signed by the attorney stating whether he or she has reason to believe and
does believe that there exists a bona fide defense to the plaintiff’s action
and whether such defense will be made, together with a general statement
of the nature or substance of such defense. . . .’’
15
The withdrawal of the verified complaint did not affect the viability of
the counterclaim. See Practice Book § 10-55 (‘‘[t]he withdrawal of an action
after a counterclaim, whether for legal or equitable relief, has been filed
therein shall not impair the right of the defendant to prosecute such counter-
claim as fully as if said action had not been withdrawn, provided that the
defendant shall, if required by the judicial authority, give bond to pay costs
as in civil actions’’).
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recorded on the Canton land records had been extin-
guished, and (3) ‘‘effecting the terms of the [interim]
settlement agreement has provided the [defendants
with] all the relief that they are seeking through the
counterclaim.’’ On October 22, 2021, the defendants
filed an objection, and on November 4, 2021, the plaintiff
filed a reply brief. On January 20, 2022, the court, Sicil-
ian, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the coun-
terclaim.
The matter was tried to the court, Rosen, J., on May
3 and December 9, 2022. The court heard testimony
from David B. Mott and two of the plaintiff’s employees,
and the court admitted several exhibits in full into the
record. The parties subsequently filed posttrial briefs.
On June 16, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision adjudicating the counterclaim.16 With regard
to the declarations that the defendants requested as
relief,17 the court first addressed the defendants’ request
for a declaration that ‘‘the easement has not been
16
Preliminarily, the court addressed an assertion raised by the plaintiff
in its posttrial brief that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain the counterclaim for lack of ripeness because (1) the relief that
the defendants sought was unrelated to the allegations in the counterclaim
and (2) the defendants failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that
they were harmed by the plaintiff’s conduct, such that their claims were
‘‘contingent on the outcome of a dispute that has not yet transpired, and
indeed may never transpire, and any injury (which is not even alleged)
would be hypothetical . . . .’’ The court rejected the plaintiff’s ripeness
claim, relying on ‘‘[t]he same analysis’’ employed by Judge Sicilian in denying
the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim. Specifically, the court
iterated Judge Sicilian’s determinations that, (1) pursuant to the interim
settlement agreement, the plaintiff expressly reserved the right to seek to
compel the defendants to execute an encroachment agreement in the future,
(2) the plaintiff’s resolutions established that it continued to maintain that the
defendants had encroached on the easement and were required to execute
an encroachment agreement, which was to be recorded on the Canton land
records, and (3) nothing precluded the plaintiff from again raising in court
the positions reflected in its resolutions. Neither party has briefed the issue
of ripeness on appeal, and we discern no need to address it further.
17
The court cited the declarations requested as relief in count one of
the counterclaim; however, as we have determined, the defendants sought
identical declarations as relief in count two. See footnote 11 of this opinion.
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altered or modified in any manner and remains in full
force and effect . . . .’’ The court determined that
‘‘[t]here was no evidence adduced at trial that the ease-
ment was altered or modified in any respect since it
was recorded on the Canton land records in 1939, and
the plaintiff agrees ‘that the [easement] . . . has not
been altered or modified and remains in full force and
effect.’ ’’ Accordingly, the court declared ‘‘that the ease-
ment has not been altered or modified in any manner
and remains in full force and effect.’’
Next, the court considered the defendants’ request
for a declaration that ‘‘the [defendants] had the right
to install, and have the right to maintain, the utilities and
driveway that they have installed without interference
from the [plaintiff] . . . .’’ After citing language in the
easement providing, inter alia, that the plaintiff had the
right to install and to maintain one or more pipelines
within the easement area, as well as the right to enter
the easement area to inspect, to operate, and to repair
any such pipelines, the court declared ‘‘that under the
easement, the defendants had the right to install a drive-
way and underground utilities in the easement area
on [the] property pursuant to a conditional approval
granted by the plaintiff. The court expressly decline[d]
to grant the defendants’ request that the court declare
‘[t]hat the [defendants] had the right to install, and have
the right to maintain, the utilities and driveway that
they have installed without interference from [the plain-
tiff].’ . . . The defendants must, of course, comply
fully with their obligations under the easement and at
law.’’ (Citation omitted.)
Thereafter, the court turned to the defendants’
request for a declaration that ‘‘the [plaintiff] does not
have a right to compel the [defendants] to sign an
encroachment agreement that requires the modification
or amendment of the easement, the provision of insur-
ance in perpetuity, or that any such encroachment
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agreement be recorded on the Canton land records
. . . .’’ After summarizing the plaintiff’s authority as a
political subdivision of the state,18 the court determined
that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff does not allege or argue that it has
the power to compel the defendants to sign the
encroachment agreement, only that it believes that it
is appropriate for the defendants to do so.’’ Accordingly,
the court declared ‘‘that the plaintiff does not have a
right to compel the defendants to sign an encroachment
agreement that requires the modification or amendment
of the easement, the provision of insurance in perpetu-
ity, or the recording of any such encroachment agree-
ment on the Canton land records. As the plaintiff aptly
note[d] [in its posttrial brief], ‘[n]ow that the [defen-
dants] have installed their improvements and built their
home on the property, the parties must work to accom-
modate each other [going forward].’ . . . If they do
not, each party may seek appropriate remedies under
the easement and at law as and when circumstances
in the future may require.’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes
omitted.)
Next, the court briefly addressed, and rejected, argu-
ments by the defendants that the plaintiff was barred
from contesting their requests for declaratory relief (1)
pursuant to the unclean hands doctrine and (2) because
the plaintiff waived such right by withdrawing the veri-
fied complaint. With respect to the unclean hands doc-
trine, the court determined that (1) the basis of the
defendants’ invocation of the doctrine was the plaintiff’s
alleged (a) passage of ‘‘ ‘illegal’ ’’ resolutions and (b)
breach of the interim settlement agreement, and (2) the
doctrine was inapplicable because the plaintiff was not
18
The plaintiff ‘‘is a political subdivision of the state, specially chartered
by the Connecticut General Assembly for the purpose of water supply, waste
management and regional planning. See 20 Spec. Acts 1204, No. 511 (1929);
see also Rocky Hill Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan District,
160 Conn. 446, 450–51, 280 A.2d 344 (1971).’’ (Footnote omitted.) Martel v.
Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38, 41, 881 A.2d 194 (2005).
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seeking any relief following the withdrawal of the veri-
fied complaint. As for the waiver issue, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiff’s withdrawal of the verified
complaint did not constitute a waiver of its right to
contest the allegations in the counterclaim, the material
allegations of which the plaintiff had denied.
The court proceeded to adjudicate count two of the
counterclaim seeking to quiet title. The court deter-
mined that ‘‘there is no dispute over title to the property.
The parties agree that the defendants hold record title
to the property, subject to the plaintiff’s easement.
Accordingly, judgment shall enter in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendants on count two of the
counterclaim.’’
Finally, the court addressed requests by the defen-
dants to award them attorney’s fees and costs pursuant
to several statutes, as well as Practice Book § 1-25. The
court determined that the defendants were not entitled
to attorney’s fees and costs under any of the claimed
provisions. This appeal followed. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
Preliminarily, we note that resolving some of the
defendants’ claims requires us to interpret the court’s
decision and/or the counterclaim. ‘‘[T]he construction
of a judgment is a question of law for the court. . . .
As a general rule, judgments are to be construed in the
same fashion as other written instruments. . . . The
determinative factor is the intention of the court as
gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The judg-
ment should admit of a consistent construction as a
whole. . . . To determine the meaning of a judgment,
we must ascertain the intent of the court from the
language used and, if necessary, the surrounding cir-
cumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Char-
tier v. Valliere, 234 Conn. App. 1, 11, A.3d
(2025). ‘‘It is well established that the interpretation of
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pleadings is always a question of law for the court
. . . . Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of
the pleadings therefore is plenary. . . . Furthermore,
we long have eschewed the notion that pleadings should
be read in a hypertechnical manner. Rather, [t]he mod-
ern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to con-
strue pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than
narrowly and technically. . . . [T]he complaint [or
counterclaim] must be read in its entirety in such a way
as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the
general theory [on] which it proceeded, and do substan-
tial justice between the parties. . . . Our reading of
pleadings in a manner that advances substantial justice
means that a pleading must be construed reasonably,
to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with it
the related proposition that it must not be contorted
in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational
comprehension.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hepburn v. Brill, 348 Conn. 827, 848,
312 A.3d 1 (2024).
I
We first consider the defendants’ claim that the decla-
rations issued by the trial court in adjudicating the
counterclaim were improper. We conclude that (1) we
lack subject matter jurisdiction to review portions of
the defendants’ claim for lack of aggrievement and (2)
the remaining portion of the defendants’ claim fails on
the merits.
A
The defendants contend that the court committed
error in declaring that (1) ‘‘the easement has not been
altered or modified in any manner and remains in full
force and effect’’ and (2) ‘‘the plaintiff does not have a
right to compel the defendants to sign an encroachment
agreement that requires the modification or amendment
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of the easement, the provision of insurance in perpetu-
ity, or the recording of any such encroachment agree-
ment on the Canton land records.’’ With respect to the
former declaration, the defendants maintain that the
court, inter alia, ‘‘never discussed the language of the
easement or any other evidence or circumstance it may
have relied upon to support its conclusion that the
easement had not been altered or modified.’’ (Footnote
omitted.) As to the latter declaration, the defendants
posit that the court predicated the declaration solely
on the plaintiff’s withdrawal of the verified complaint,
which was not a sufficient ground supporting the decla-
ration. The plaintiff argues, inter alia, that the defen-
dants expressly requested that the court issue these
two declarations, which we construe to be a claim that
the defendants were not aggrieved by them. We con-
clude that the defendants cannot demonstrate that they
were aggrieved by these two declarations, such that we
lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the defen-
dants’ contentions.

‘‘[P]roof of aggrievement is . . . an essential prereq-
uisite to the court’s jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the appeal. . . . Ordinarily, a party that prevails in
the trial court is not aggrieved. . . . Moreover, [a] party
cannot be aggrieved by a decision that grants the very
relief sought. . . . Such a party cannot establish that
a specific personal and legal interest has been specially
and injuriously affected by the decision.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Seymour v.
Seymour, 262 Conn. 107, 110–11, 809 A.2d 1114 (2002).
Moreover, ‘‘a litigant has no right to appeal a judgment
in his or her favor merely for the purpose of having the
judgment based on a different legal ground than that
relied upon by the trial court, or to settle an abstract
question of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Jones v. Redding, 296 Conn. 352, 366, 995 A.2d 51 (2010).
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In the counterclaim, the defendants expressly requested
as relief that the court issue declarations that (1) ‘‘the
easement has not been altered or modified in any man-
ner and remains in full force and effect’’ and (2) ‘‘the
[plaintiff] does not have a right to compel the [defen-
dants] to sign an encroachment agreement that requires
the modification or amendment of the easement, the
provision of insurance in perpetuity, or that any such
encroachment agreement be recorded on the Canton
land records . . . .’’ The two declarations in question
that the court issued either mirrored or substantively
tracked the language of the defendants’ requested decla-
rations. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no basis
for the defendants to claim that they were aggrieved
by the two declarations in question, such that we lack
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the defendants’
assertions challenging them. See, e.g., Scalora v. Sca-
lora, 189 Conn. App. 703, 712–13 n.5, 209 A.3d 1 (2019)
(concluding that this court could not review portion of
defendant’s claim when trial court resolved matter in
defendant’s favor, such that defendant could not claim
aggrievement and lacked standing in relation to that
portion of claim); State v. Sanders, 86 Conn. App. 757,
764, 862 A.2d 857 (2005) (concluding that this court
could not review, for lack of aggrievement, defendant’s
claim when trial court resolved matter in defendant’s
favor).

B

The defendants also assert that the court improperly
declared that, ‘‘under the easement, the defendants had
the right to install a driveway and underground utilities
in the easement area on their property pursuant to
a conditional approval granted by the plaintiff.’’ The
defendants contend that the plaintiff had no ‘‘approval
authority’’ cabining their right to install a driveway and
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utilities in the easement area.19 In short, the defendants
misconstrue the court’s decision in this regard. The
court determined that (1) the plaintiff enjoyed certain
benefits pursuant to the easement, including the right
to enter the easement area to inspect, to operate, and to
repair the pipeline, (2) the plaintiff utilized a ‘‘voluntary
encroachment process’’ to assess whether proposed
construction within the easement area posed a threat
to the pipeline, and (3) pursuant to this process, the
plaintiff conditionally approved the defendants’ con-
struction project within the easement area. We do not
interpret the court’s decision to reflect a determination
that the plaintiff was imbued with binding, enforceable
‘‘approval authority’’ regulating the defendants’ activity
within the easement area; rather, we construe the deci-
sion as determining that the plaintiff, after following
its ‘‘voluntary encroachment process,’’ had acquiesced
to the defendants’ encroachment20 in the easement area
19
Relying on the principle that ‘‘a declaratory judgment action must rest
on some cause of action that would be cognizable in a nondeclaratory suit’’;
Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 116, 617 A.2d 433 (1992); the defendants
further contend that all of the court’s declarations ‘‘lacked an essential
nexus to a viable claim or cause of action’’ because the plaintiff withdrew the
verified complaint and the court ‘‘dismissed’’ count two of the counterclaim
seeking to quiet title. This contention is unpersuasive. The court did not
dismiss count two; rather, it rendered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on
that count. As we explain in part III of this opinion, insofar as the court
granted the defendants the relief that they requested vis-à-vis count two,
the court should have rendered judgment in the defendants’ favor thereon.
20
The defendants take issue with a statement in the court’s decision
that they ‘‘had encroached on the easement’’ by engaging in construction
activities within the easement area prior to the filing of the present action.
The defendants maintain that the court misapplied the term ‘‘encroached’’
because ‘‘a claim that the defendants ‘encroached’ is inconsistent with the
defendants’ fee title to the property.’’ Our case law belies this position. See,
e.g., Lyme Land Conservation Trust, Inc. v. Platner, 325 Conn. 737, 743,
159 A.3d 666 (2017) (setting forth finding that property owner’s relocation of
driveway ‘‘encroached’’ on conservation easement encumbering property);
Kelly v. Ivler, 187 Conn. 31, 34–35, 48, 450 A.2d 817 (1982) (setting forth
finding that property owners’ fence ‘‘slight[ly] encroach[ed]’’ on easement
located along boundary of property); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v.
Holson Co., 185 Conn. 436, 437–38, 440 A.2d 935 (1981) (noting that action
involved request for injunctive relief to require property owner to remove
portion of building ‘‘encroach[ing]’’ on easement encumbering property).
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by their installation of the driveway and the utilities,
provided certain conditions were satisfied. Thus, the
defendants’ claim is unavailing.
II
The defendants next claim that the trial court improp-
erly failed to address three issues in adjudicating the
counterclaim. The defendants maintain that the court
did not determine whether (1) the relief requested by
the plaintiff in the withdrawn verified complaint, seek-
ing orders that the defendants execute the encroach-
ment agreement and that the executed encroachment
agreement be recorded on the Canton land records,
was improper as a matter of law, (2) the plaintiff
‘‘ ‘own[ed]’ ’’ or had ‘‘ ‘exclusive use and possession of
the subsurface’ ’’ of the easement, and (3) the resolu-
tions adopted by the plaintiff concerning the easement
were illegal. For the reasons that follow, this claim is
untenable.
With respect to the first issue—whether the plaintiff
improperly requested as relief in the withdrawn verified
complaint orders that the defendants execute the
encroachment agreement and that the executed
encroachment agreement be recorded on the Canton
land records—the court issued a declaration that the
plaintiff had no right to compel the defendants to sign
the encroachment agreement or to demand the
recording of any such agreement on the land records.
See part I A of this opinion. In light of this declaration,
and assuming that this issue was properly before the
court notwithstanding the plaintiff’s withdrawal of the
verified complaint, we conclude that there was no rea-
son for the court to address the propriety of the plain-
tiff’s requested relief.
Moreover, the court expressly found that the defendants held record title
to the property, such that we do not construe the court’s use of the term
‘‘encroached’’ to be inconsistent with its finding that the defendants owned
the property.
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As to the second issue—whether the plaintiff
‘‘ ‘own[ed]’ ’’ or had ‘‘ ‘exclusive use and possession of
the subsurface’ ’’ of the easement area—the court
expressly found that the defendants held record title
to the property, subject to the easement. ‘‘It is well
settled that [a]n easement . . . obligates the possessor
not to interfere with the rules authorized by the ease-
ment. . . . [T]he benefit of an easement . . . is con-
sidered a nonpossessory interest in land because it gen-
erally authorizes limited uses of the burdened property
for a particular purpose. . . . [E]asements are not
ownership interests but rather privileges to use [the]
land of another in [a] certain manner for [a] certain
purpose . . . . The use of an easement must be reason-
able and as little burdensome to the servient estate as
the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit.
. . . [T]he owner of an easement has all rights incident
or necessary to its proper enjoyment, [although] noth-
ing more.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Hamer v. Byrne, 231 Conn. App. 53, 68, 333
A.3d 158, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 930, 334 A.3d 482
(2025), and cert. denied, 351 Conn. 930, 334 A.3d 483
(2025). In short, we interpret the court’s decision to
reflect a determination that the plaintiff (1) neither
owned nor had exclusive use and possession of the
easement area, including the subsurface of the ease-
ment area, but (2) had rights pursuant to the easement,
such as access to the easement area, including the sub-
surface thereof, with which rights the defendants were
prohibited from interfering. Thus, we conclude that,
contrary to the defendants’ position, the court resolved
the second issue.

Turning to the third issue—whether the resolutions
adopted by the plaintiff were illegal—the court men-
tioned this issue in two different sections of its decision.
First, the court acknowledged that the defendants
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raised this issue as part of their unclean hands argu-
ment; however, the court did not address the issue
further on the basis of its conclusion that the doctrine
was inapplicable because the plaintiff was not seeking
any relief following the withdrawal of the verified com-
plaint. The defendants do not address on appeal the
court’s resolution of their unclean hands argument,
beyond making an isolated assertion in their principal
appellate brief that the court improperly ‘‘overruled the
equitable defenses of unclean hands and waiver . . . .’’
Thus, we conclude that the defendants have abandoned
any claim challenging this aspect of the court’s decision
by failing to brief it adequately. See Robb v. Connecticut
Board of Veterinary Medicine, 204 Conn. App. 595, 611,
254 A.3d 915 (‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are
not required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief.
. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judi-
ciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised
on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set
forth their arguments in their briefs. . . . The parties
may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing
the relationship between the facts of the case and the
law cited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
denied, 338 Conn. 911, 259 A.3d 654 (2021).
Second, the court observed that the defendants were
seeking attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to General
Statutes § 48-17b in part because the plaintiff had
‘‘adopted ‘invalid and improper’ resolutions’’; however,
the court did not discuss the issue further because
it determined that § 48-17b was inapplicable. As we
conclude in part V B of this opinion, the court correctly
determined that § 48-17b was inapplicable, and, there-
fore, the defendants were not entitled to attorney’s fees
and costs pursuant to that statute. Thus, there was no
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reason for the court to address whether the plaintiff’s
resolutions were illegal in the context of the defendants’
§ 48-17b claim.21
In sum, we reject the defendants’ claim that the court
improperly failed to address the three issues in ques-
tion.
III
The defendants next claim that the trial court improp-
erly rendered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on count
two of the counterclaim seeking to quiet title pursuant
to § 47-31. The defendants assert that the court improp-
erly (1) determined that § 47-31 was not applicable to
disputes concerning easements and (2) disposed of
count two solely on the basis of its determination that
the parties did not dispute that the defendants owned
the property, subject to the easement. The plaintiff
argues that the court properly resolved count two in
its favor on the basis of its determination that there
was no dispute as to title. For the reasons that follow,
we conclude that the judgment rendered in favor of the
plaintiff on count two must be reversed in part.
Insofar as resolving the defendants’ claim requires
us to interpret § 47-31, we exercise plenary review. See
Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford, 229 Conn. App. 615, 637,
328 A.3d 225 (2024) (questions of statutory interpreta-
tion are subject to plenary review), cert. denied, 351
Conn. 919, 333 A.3d 103 (2025). ‘‘When construing a
statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . .
21
Insofar as the defendants contend on appeal that they raised an issue
regarding the legality of the plaintiff’s resolutions outside of the context of
their unclean hands argument and § 48-17b claim, we note that they did not
request as relief in the counterclaim a declaration invalidating any resolution
issued by the plaintiff. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Bristol Heights Associ-
ates, LLC, 142 Conn. App. 390, 418, 70 A.3d 74 (defendant’s right to recovery
was limited by allegations in counterclaim), cert. denied, 309 Conn. 909, 68
A.3d 662 (2013).
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In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes
§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute
itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship,
the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratex-
tual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered. . . . It is a basic tenet of statutory con-
struction that [w]e construe a statute as a whole and
read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a
reasonable overall interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 637–38.
Section 47-31 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) An action
may be brought by any person claiming title to, or any
interest in, real or personal property, or both, against
any person who may claim to own the property, or any
part of it, or to have any estate in it, either in fee, for
years, for life or in reversion or remainder, or to have
any interest in the property, or any lien or encumbrance
on it, adverse to the plaintiff, or against any person in
whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim
or title conflicting with the plaintiff’s claim, title or
interest, for the purpose of determining such adverse
estate, interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts
and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the
property. . . .
‘‘(f) The court shall hear the several claims and deter-
mine the rights of the parties, whether derived from
deeds, wills or other instruments or sources of title,
and may determine the construction of the same, and
render judgment determining the questions and dis-
putes and quieting and settling the title to the property.’’
In rendering judgment for the plaintiff on count two
of the counterclaim, the court deemed the lack of a
dispute between the parties regarding ownership of the
property, subject to the easement, to be dispositive.
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Our case law demonstrates, however, that disputes aris-
ing as to an express easement when title to the encum-
bered property is not in question—as is the case here—
may be resolved pursuant to § 47-31. See, e.g., Fitch v.
Forsthoefel, 194 Conn. App. 230, 233, 239, 220 A.3d 876
(2019) (affirming judgment for plaintiff, inter alia, on
quiet title count seeking determination of rights of par-
ties under express easement). This conclusion is sup-
ported further by the language of § 47-31, providing in
relevant part that an action may be brought ‘‘for the
purpose of determining [an] adverse estate, interest or
claim [to that of the plaintiff], and to clear up all doubts
and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the
property’’; (emphasis added) General Statutes § 47-31
(a); and that ‘‘[t]he court shall hear the several claims
and determine the rights of the parties . . . and render
judgment determining the questions and disputes and
quieting and settling the title to the property.’’ (Empha-
sis added.) General Statutes § 47-31 (f). In our view,
resolving disputes surrounding an express easement
that encumbers a property, the ownership of which is
not in dispute, functions to quiet and to settle title to
the property as contemplated by § 47-31.

In disposing of the defendants’ quiet title claim, the
trial court cited to Simonds v. Shaw, 44 Conn. App.
683, 691 A.2d 1102 (1997). In Simonds, the trial court
concluded that the plaintiffs enjoyed an easement by
prescription for a right-of-way over a portion of the
defendants’ property and issued injunctive relief prohib-
iting the defendants from obstructing the right-of-way.
Id., 684–86. On appeal, the defendants asserted, inter
alia, that the trial court improperly awarded the plain-
tiffs injunctive relief because the plaintiffs had an ade-
quate remedy at law available by way of § 47-31. Id.,
686. This court rejected that claim, determining that (1)
the plaintiffs had pursued a prescriptive easement claim
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pursuant to General Statutes § 47-3722 and (2) ‘‘§ 47-31
creates an action to quiet title that is not relevant to a
claim of an easement because actual ownership of the
property is not at issue.’’ Id., 686–87. In the years follow-
ing Simonds, our courts have addressed easement dis-
putes raised in the context of quiet title claims pursued
under § 47-31. See, e.g., Walters v. Servidio, 227 Conn.
App. 1, 7, 9, 320 A.3d 1008 (2024) (plaintiff sought to
quiet title as to alleged express and implied easements);
Fitch v. Forsthoefel, supra, 194 Conn. App. 233, 239
(plaintiff sought to quiet title as to scope of express
easement); First Union National Bank v. Eppoliti
Realty Co., 99 Conn. App. 603, 604, 610, 915 A.2d 338
(2007) (plaintiff sought to quiet title by claiming ease-
ment of necessity). Moreover, our research has revealed
no case that has cited Simonds for the proposition
that § 47-31 is inapplicable to resolve claims regarding
easements. See, e.g., Travelers Property & Casualty
Co. v. Christie, 99 Conn. App. 747, 765 n.13, 916 A.2d
114 (2007) (concluding that reasoning of early twentieth
century appellate case regarding prejudgment interest
had not been adopted in subsequent cases when,
although never overruled, appellate case had never
been cited for that reasoning); Burke v. Avitabile, 32
Conn. App. 765, 772 n.9, 630 A.2d 624 (deeming prior
appellate case ‘‘anomalous’’ insofar as appellate case
ostensibly indicated that motion for summary judgment
could be used to test legal sufficiency of complaint
prior to judgment when appellate case was published
more than twenty years earlier and had never been
cited for that proposition), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 908,
634 A.2d 297 (1993), and cert. denied, 228 Conn. 908,
634 A.2d 297 (1993). Accordingly, we conclude that
Simonds’ isolated statement regarding § 47-31, which
22
General Statutes § 47-37 provides: ‘‘No person may acquire a right-of-
way or any other easement from, in, upon or over the land of another, by
the adverse use or enjoyment thereof, unless the use has been continued
uninterrupted for fifteen years.’’
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was not supported by any analysis or citation to legal
authority; see Simonds v. Shaw, supra, 686–87; cannot
be relied on to limit the scope of quiet title claims
brought pursuant to § 47-31.
Having concluded that the court committed error in
adjudicating count two of the counterclaim, we now
turn to the appropriate remedy. As we have explained,
the defendants sought identical relief in counts one and
two, namely, that (1) ‘‘the easement has not been altered
or modified in any manner and remains in full force
and effect’’; (2) ‘‘the [defendants] had the right to install,
and have the right to maintain, the utilities and driveway
that they have installed without interference from the
[plaintiff]’’; and (3) ‘‘the [plaintiff] does not have a right
to compel the [defendants] to sign an encroachment
agreement that requires the modification or amendment
of the easement, the provision of insurance in perpetu-
ity, or that any such encroachment agreement be
recorded on the Canton land records . . . .’’ The court
afforded the defendants the relief that they sought in
part, issuing declarations mirroring or substantively
tracking the first and third requested declarations but
declining to issue the second requested declaration,
such that, in essence, the court partially quieted title
in the defendants’ favor. Therefore, we conclude that
the court should have rendered judgment in the defen-
dants’ favor on count two insofar as the court granted
the defendants’ requested relief. See, e.g., Freidheim
v. McLaughlin, 217 Conn. App. 767, 776–77, 803, 290
A.3d 801 (2023) (concluding that trial court improperly
rendered summary judgment in defendants’ favor on
portion of count of plaintiff’s complaint seeking to quiet
title as to view easement and remanding case with direc-
tion to render summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor as
to that portion of quiet title count). Insofar as the court
did not afford the defendants the relief that they
requested vis-à-vis count two, we further conclude that
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the court properly rendered judgment in the plaintiff’s
favor on that count.
IV
We next turn to the defendants’ claim that the trial
court improperly admitted irrelevant evidence during
trial. For the following reasons, this claim either (1) is
unreviewable or (2) fails on the merits.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our consideration of this claim. In a pretrial
brief that they filed, the defendants argued that ‘‘[a]ll
of [their] claims for relief are legal questions and there
are no facts or arguments the [plaintiff] can interpose
to defeat the requested relief.’’ Additionally, prior to
trial, the defendants filed three motions in limine seek-
ing to preclude the plaintiff from introducing ‘‘extrinsic
evidence’’ at trial.23 On the first day of trial, prior to the
start of evidence, the defendants’ counsel alerted the
court to the pending motions in limine. The court
responded: ‘‘Yeah, the court is not going to be ruling
on any motions in limine. If there are objections that
come up during the trial, I’ll take them on the fly.’’24
Thereafter, the defendants’ counsel requested an
opportunity to present an opening statement to explain
to the court ‘‘that there is no fact issue to be decided
by the court, other than the possibility of sanctions,
because the remaining questions that [the defendants
have] identified are all legal questions . . . .’’ The court
23
The defendants filed a fourth motion in limine vis-à-vis an expert witness
retained by the plaintiff. During trial, without expressly adjudicating this
motion in limine, the court precluded the expert witness’ testimony.
24
The defendants contend on appeal that the court ‘‘never ruled on,’’
‘‘refused to consider,’’ or ‘‘ignored’’ their motions in limine. The record
reflects that the court decided to address the defendants’ evidentiary objec-
tions during trial in lieu of adjudicating their motions in limine, which belies
the defendants’ characterization of the court’s handling of the motions.
Moreover, the defendants do not identify any evidentiary objections that
they raised, and that the court overruled, during the evidentiary portion of
the trial.
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denied that request and proceeded to review with the
parties’ counsel their agreement as to the admission of
certain exhibits. Afterward, the court asked the defen-
dants’ counsel to present the defendants’ first witness,
whereupon the defendants’ counsel iterated ‘‘that this
is a legal issue. There is no fact issue. . . . [I]f [the
court] disagree[s] with that analysis, [the defendants]
can [introduce] the witness . . . on the one issue that
would matter. . . . I maintain . . . the entire case at
this point [consists of] legal issues. There are no fact
issues.’’ The court responded: ‘‘All right. Well, I’m not
going to tell you how to try your case, so you can decide
what you want to put before the court . . . .’’25 The
court then rejected another request by the defendants’
counsel to provide additional argument, noting that the
defendants had filed a pretrial brief and the court was
‘‘familiar with the argument.’’ The defendants’ counsel
proceeded with the defendants’ case-in-chief. In their
posttrial brief, the defendants maintained that the
issues posed by the counterclaim comprised ‘‘only legal
questions without any disputed facts for the court to
resolve . . . .’’
The defendants assert on appeal that, during trial,
the court admitted irrelevant evidence because ‘‘[t]here
were no fact issues to be decided in the case; there
were only legal questions for the . . . court to rule
upon. . . . There were no factual disputes the . . .
court was called upon to decide.’’ The defendants fur-
ther contend that ‘‘[f]act evidence would only have been
relevant and admissible for unreasonable or material
interference with easement rights or a scope of ease-
ment rights claim,’’ but no such claims were at issue
before the court. Insofar as the defendants’ claim per-
tains only to certain evidence, our review of such a
25
The court also inquired as to whether a motion for summary judgment
had been filed, and the defendants’ counsel confirmed that the defendants
had filed a motion for summary judgment, which had been denied by the
court, Sheridan, J., in 2019.
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claim is frustrated by the defendants’ failure to identify,
with any specificity, the evidence that the court purport-
edly erred in admitting. Without this requisite informa-
tion, we cannot afford the defendants review of their
evidentiary claim. See Aspiazu v. Orgera, 205 Conn.
623, 636–37 n.5, 535 A.2d 338 (1987) (‘‘[w]hen raising
evidentiary issues on appeal, all briefs should identify
clearly what evidence was excluded or admitted, where
the trial counsel objected and preserved his rights and
why there was error’’); see also Weaver v. Sena, 199
Conn. App. 852, 866, 238 A.3d 103 (2020) (‘‘[i]t is not
the role of this court to scour the record in search of
support for a party’s claim on appeal’’); State v. Tocco,
120 Conn. App. 768, 786–87, 993 A.2d 989 (‘‘this court
is not an advocate for any party; it would be beyond
the proper role of this court in resolving the issues
raised on appeal to sift through the voluminous record
before us and speculate as to the specific evidence at
issue in the present claim’’), cert. denied, 297 Conn.
917, 996 A.2d 279 (2010).

Alternatively, insofar as the defendants maintain that
the court should not have received any evidence at
trial, that contention is untenable. The court was
charged with adjudicating counts one and two of the
counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment and to
quiet title. The defendants have failed to establish that
the court committed error in hearing evidence in order
to resolve the counterclaim.26
26
Moreover, assuming that the defendants had demonstrated that the
court abused its discretion in admitting evidence; see Martin v. Olson, 226
Conn. App. 392, 405, 318 A.3d 1067 (abuse of discretion standard of review
applies to evidentiary rulings), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 902, 322 A.3d 1059
(2024); their principal appellate brief is bereft of any substantive legal analy-
sis explaining how they were harmed by such error. See id. (‘‘[B]efore a
party is entitled to a new trial because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling,
he or she has the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . . .
The harmless error standard in a civil case is whether the improper ruling
would likely affect the result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
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V
The defendants’ last claim is that the trial court
improperly declined to award them attorney’s fees and
costs pursuant to (1) Practice Book § 1-25 and (2) § 48-
17b.27 We address each subclaim in turn.
‘‘Ordinarily, we review the trial court’s decision to
award attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. . . . This
standard applies to the amount of fees awarded . . .
and also to the trial court’s determination of the factual
predicate justifying the award. . . . When, however, a
damages award is challenged on the basis of a question
of law, our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Indoor Billboard Northwest, Inc. v. M2 Sys-
tems Corp., 202 Conn. App. 139, 197, 245 A.3d 426
(2021).
A
The defendants contend that the court improperly
declined to award them attorney’s fees and costs pursu-
ant to Practice Book § 1-25. For the reasons that follow,
we decline to review this claim.
Practice Book § 1-25 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
No party or attorney shall bring or defend an action,
or assert or oppose a claim or contention, unless there
is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivo-
lous. . . .
‘‘(b) Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the
judicial authority, solely on its own motion and after a
hearing, may impose sanctions for actions that include,
but are not limited to, the following:
27
In their posttrial brief, the defendants further argued that they were
entitled to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to (1) General Statutes § 52-
240 and (2) General Statutes § 52-245. The court also declined to award
attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants pursuant to these statutes. The
defendants do not challenge the court’s decision in that regard.
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‘‘(1) Filing of pleadings, motions, objections, requests
or other documents that violate subsection (a) above
. . . .
‘‘(c) The judicial authority may impose sanctions
including, but not limited to, fines pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-84; orders requiring the offending party
to pay costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees;
and orders restricting the filing of papers with the court.
‘‘(d) Offenders subject to such sanctions may include
counsel, self-represented parties, and parties repre-
sented by counsel.’’
In rejecting the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees
and costs pursuant to Practice Book § 1-25, the court
construed the defendants’ request to be predicated
solely on the ground that the plaintiff’s disclosure of
defense was frivolous. The court interpreted the plain-
tiff’s disclosure of defense to raise two defenses: ‘‘(1)
the defendants were on notice at the time of [their]
purchase [of the property] as to the terms [of] the ease-
ment; and (2) the express terms of the easement con-
trolled the rights and obligations of the parties within
the easement.’’ The court then determined that the
plaintiff’s disclosure of defense was not frivolous
because (1) the defendants were aware of the easement
before they purchased the property and (2) the ease-
ment’s express terms controlled the parties’ rights and
obligations.
The defendants contend on appeal that they were
entitled to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Practice
Book § 1-25, propounding various reasons to support
their argument that the plaintiff engaged in conduct that
was frivolous and lacked good faith. The defendants,
however, do not discuss the court’s reasoning in
rejecting their claim under § 1-25, that is, that the plain-
tiff’s disclosure of defense was not frivolous. Under
these circumstances, where the defendants have not
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addressed the dispositive basis for the court’s rejection
of their § 1-25 claim, we decline to review the defen-
dants’ claim as inadequately briefed. See Sicignano v.
Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 692, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024)
(declining to review plaintiff’s claim as inadequately
briefed when plaintiff failed to address dispositive bases
of court’s decision), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330
A.3d 881 (2025).
B
The defendants also assert that the court improperly
determined that they were not entitled to attorney’s
fees and costs pursuant to § 48-17b. We disagree.
Section 48-17b provides in relevant part: ‘‘The state
court rendering a judgment for the plaintiff in an inverse
condemnation proceeding brought against the state by
the owner of real property . . . shall determine and
award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judg-
ment . . . such sum as will in the opinion of the court
. . . reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs,
disbursements and expenses, including reasonable
attorney, appraisal and engineering fees, actually
incurred because of such proceeding.’’
In their posttrial brief, the defendants argued that,
pursuant to § 48-17b, they were entitled to attorney’s
fees and costs because the plaintiff had engaged in
‘‘actions [that] constitute[d] an attempted and deliber-
ate act of inverse condemnation though admittedly not
a sufficient deprivation of the [defendants’] property
interests to permit [an inverse condemnation] claim.’’
In its posttrial brief, the plaintiff argued that § 48-17b
was inapplicable because the defendants had neither
pleaded nor proven an inverse condemnation claim.
In rejecting the defendants’ claim for attorney’s fees
pursuant to § 48-17b, the court concluded that the stat-
ute was inapplicable because the defendants (1) con-
ceded in their posttrial brief that they did not assert
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an inverse condemnation claim, (2) did not receive a
judgment in an inverse condemnation proceeding in
their favor, and (3) did not provide any evidence demon-
strating that the use of their property had been
restricted in any manner, ‘‘let alone that the plaintiff’s
actions somehow ‘[had] so financially burdened the
[defendants] as to constitute a practical confiscation.’
AEL Realty Holdings, Inc. v. Board of Representatives,
82 Conn. App. 613, 621, 847 A.2d 998 (2004).’’
The defendants maintain on appeal that the plaintiff
engaged in conduct that constituted an improper regula-
tory taking under the color of law, thereby entitling
them to attorney’s fees and costs under § 48-17b.28 As
the court correctly determined, however, the defen-
dants neither alleged an inverse condemnation claim
in the counterclaim nor successfully prosecuted such
a claim. Accordingly, the court properly concluded that
§ 48-17b was inapplicable to this case.29 See Cumber-
land Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 81 n.35, 808
A.2d 1107 (2002) (‘‘under . . . § 48-17b, a property
28
The defendants do not refer expressly to § 48-17b in their appellate
briefs; however, on the basis of their discussion of regulatory takings, we
construe this subclaim to be challenging the court’s rejection of their request
for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 48-17b.
29
In light of our conclusion that § 48-17b is inapplicable because the
defendants failed to plead an inverse condemnation claim and did not suc-
cessfully prosecute such a claim, we need not address the court’s third
reason for rejecting the defendants’ § 48-17b claim, namely, that the defen-
dants failed to demonstrate that the use of their property had been restricted
in any manner. See AEL Realty Holdings, Inc. v. Board of Representatives,
supra, 82 Conn. App. 621 (‘‘For inverse condemnation to occur, property
does not have to be appropriated by governmental action to the extent that
no value remains. It is sufficient if use of property is severely restricted and
its profitability greatly reduced as a result of the action of the government.
. . . The relevant inquiry here is whether the governmental regulation of
the property has so financially burdened the landowner as to constitute a
practical confiscation. The financial burden imposed on a landowner by a
regulation is measured by the extent to which the regulation interferes with
the property owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations of use of
the property. . . . A regulation does not constitute a compensable taking
if it does not infringe on such reasonable investment-backed expectations.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).
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owner who successfully prosecutes an inverse condem-
nation claim may receive, in addition to compensation
for the taking, reimbursement for certain costs and
expenses’’ (emphasis added)).
The judgment is reversed in part with respect to count
two of the defendants’ counterclaim only and the case
is remanded with direction to render judgment on that
count consistent with this opinion; the judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.