Cruz v. Waterbury

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Cruz v. Waterbury

EMMANUEL CRUZ v. CITY OF WATERBURY ET AL.
(AC 47154)
Cradle, C. J., and Westbrook and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, a former Waterbury police officer who suffered a work-related
injury, appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing in part and deny-
ing in part his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant
Retirement Board of the City of Waterbury, which had denied his application
for a disability pension, and from the court’s judgment dismissing his breach
of contract claim with respect to the board and denying that claim with
respect to the defendant city. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the
court committed plain error by failing to consider and analyze an allegedly
applicable statute (§ 31-71f) regarding certain information an employer must
provide to employees, which the parties did not raise in their arguments
before the court. Held:

This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claim regarding the
trial court’s failure to consider § 31-71f, as the plaintiff failed to adequately
brief it.

The trial court did not improperly deny the plaintiff’s administrative appeal
from the board’s denial of his application for disability retirement and pen-
sion benefits, the court having properly determined that the plaintiff did
not have a ‘‘work-related disability’’ as defined under the city’s ordinances
(§§ 35.035 and 35.073), as there was substantial evidence that the city
intended to and did offer the plaintiff a qualifying job pursuant to § 35.035
that he could perform.

The board properly did not award any retroactive payments under § 35.073
of the city’s ordinances, as it determined that the plaintiff was not eligible
for disability benefits.

The plaintiff’s claim that § 35.035 of the city’s ordinances required the city
to offer him a job with a base pay rate of at least 75 percent of his total
compensation as a police officer, not his base pay rate, was unsupported
by the language of the ordinance.

The trial court properly dismissed the administrative appeal with respect
to the city, as the plaintiff provided no legal authority to support bringing
an administrative appeal against the city, which was not involved in rendering
the administrative decision.

The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
denied his breach of contract claim with respect to the city, as the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that the city violated any ordinance with respect to
disability pension benefits and, therefore, failed to establish a breach of
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Cruz v. Waterbury
the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the plaintiff’s
former union.

The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
with respect to the board, as the board was not a proper party to the claim
because it was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement.

Argued April 21—officially released September 16, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant Retirement
Board of the City of Waterbury denying the plaintiff’s
application for a disability pension and action to recover
damages for breach of contract, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Waterbury and tried to the court, Cordani, J.; judgment
denying in part and dismissing in part the administrative
appeal and denying in part and dismissing in part the
breach of contract action, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Robert C. Lubus, Jr., with whom was Donald J.
Trella, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Daniel J. Foster, corporation counsel, for the appel-
lees (defendants).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The plaintiff, Emmanuel Cruz, a
former Waterbury police officer whose employment
was terminated after he suffered a work-related injury
that rendered him unable to return to full-time police
work, brought the underlying combined administrative
appeal and breach of contract action against the defen-
dants, the city of Waterbury (city) and the Retirement
Board of the City of Waterbury (board), challenging the
denial of his application for a disability pension. The
plaintiff now appeals from the judgment of the trial
court rendered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff
claims that the trial court (1) committed plain error by
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failing to consider and analyze General Statutes § 31-
71f (a), despite the parties’ failure to raise that statute
in their arguments before the court,1 (2) improperly
denied, as to the board, and dismissed, as to the city,
count one of his complaint asserting an administrative
appeal from the board’s denial of his application for
disability retirement and pension benefits, and (3)
improperly denied, as to the city, and dismissed, as to
the board, count two of his complaint asserting a breach
of the collective bargaining agreement that governed
the terms of his employment.2 For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the court.
The record reveals the following facts, as set forth
in the administrative record and by the court in its
memorandum of decision, and procedural history. As
previously indicated, the plaintiff was a police officer
employed by the city. He injured himself on the job
when he smashed a car window with his right, dominant
arm in order to apprehend a criminal suspect. A
resulting injury to his right hand rendered him unable
to return to full-time work as a police officer, and the
chief of police terminated his employment on April 8,
1
General Statutes § 31-71f (a) provides: ‘‘Each employer shall: (1) Advise
his employees in writing, at the time of hiring, of the rate of remuneration,
hours of employment and wage payment schedules, and (2) make available
to his employees, either in writing or through a posted notice maintained
in a place accessible to his employees, any employment practices and poli-
cies or change therein with regard to wages, vacation pay, sick leave, health
and welfare benefits and comparable matters.’’
Although § 31-71f has been amended by the legislature since the events
underlying this case; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2021, No. 21-2, § 4;
those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the
interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
2
The plaintiff’s statement of the issues in his appellate brief sets forth
seven purported claims. We view several of these claims, however, as more
properly characterized as arguments in support of the plaintiff’s principal
claims as reflected and outlined in the table of contents of the plaintiff’s
brief. For ease of discussion and clarity, we have combined and restated
the plaintiff’s claims in a manner that aligns more closely with the par-
ties’ briefing.
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2019. In conjunction with the termination, the chief of
police submitted a disability pension application on
behalf of the plaintiff to the defendant board. The board
denied the application at a meeting held on March 9,
2020.
Specifically, the board determined that the plaintiff
did not qualify for a disability pension under §§ 35.035
and 35.073 of the Waterbury Code of Ordinances (ordi-
nances).3 Section 35.073 (C) (1) provides in relevant
part that a Waterbury police officer ‘‘who incurs a work-
related disability in the line of duty’’ is entitled to
receive a disability pension, and § 35.035 defines ‘‘work-
related disability’’ in relevant part as ‘‘[t]he total and
permanent inability of a participant with at least five
years of service, determined at the time that the partici-
pant ceases to be in pay status, to perform all of the
essential functions of the participant’s current job, and
the functions of any other job offered to the participant
by the city in its absolute discretion which has a base
pay rate of at least 75% of the participant’s current
job, by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment caused by or resulting from a
work-related accident, injury or illness . . . .’’ (Empha-
sis added.) The board determined that the city had a
building facility coordinator position available for the
plaintiff that he could perform and that had a base pay
rate of $56,570, which was more than 75 percent of the
base pay rate of $75,427 that the plaintiff earned in his
previous position as a police officer, and, therefore, he
did not have a ‘‘work-related disability’’ for purposes of
disability pension eligibility under § 35.035. The board
invited the plaintiff and his attorney to discuss the new
position further with the city’s assistant corporation
3
The board cited to a prior numbering scheme for the relevant ordinances,
whereas, before the trial court and this court, the parties cite to the presently
operative scheme. We, like the parties, will cite to the ordinances according
to their current numbering.
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counsel and human resources director (HR director)
after the meeting.
The plaintiff commenced the underlying trial court
action on April 8, 2020. In count one of the operative
complaint, he sought review of the board’s decision
that he did not have a ‘‘work-related disability’’ under
§ 35.035 of the ordinances that entitled him to a disabil-
ity pension. He claimed that the defendants violated
§§ 35.035 and 35.073 of the ordinances because the
building facility coordinator position was never for-
mally offered to him in writing, the terms of employment
were vague and inconsistent, and the stated base pay
rate was actually less than 75 percent of his pay as
a police officer. He also claimed that the defendants
violated § 35.073 (D), which provides that ‘‘[t]he disabil-
ity pension benefit shall be payable on the first day of
the month following the participant’s termination of
service with the city as the result of the disability,’’
because he did not receive the disability pension pay-
ments to which he was entitled following his termina-
tion of service due to his disability on April 8, 2019.
Count two of the operative complaint alleged a breach
of contract claim premised on a theory that the afore-
mentioned ordinances were incorporated into the col-
lective bargaining agreement between the city and the
Waterbury Police Union, Brass City Local, Connecticut
Alliance of City Police (union), which governed the
plaintiff’s employment as a police officer, and that the
same violations of the ordinances alleged in the admin-
istrative appeal also constituted a breach of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Both counts of the complaint
were brought against both defendants.
The trial court, Cordani, J., conducted a hearing with
respect to the count asserting an administrative appeal
and a trial de novo on the breach of contract count.
Thereafter, on November 17, 2023, the court issued a
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memorandum of decision in favor of the defendants.
The trial court made several factual findings in connec-
tion with the breach of contract count, including that
‘‘[t]he position offered to the plaintiff, and discussed at
the March 9, 2020 board meeting, was that of a building
facility coordinator for the Silas Bronson Library, which
position had a salary range of $45,000 to $65,000 and
was being offered to the plaintiff at a salary of $56,570
per year, which was 75 percent of his base rate of pay
as a police officer at $75,426.96 per year, [and] [t]he
benefits provided with the position were to follow the
benefits provided by the plaintiff’s former bargaining
unit, meaning he would receive the same benefits as
he did as a police officer’’; ‘‘[t]he plaintiff was capable
of performing the functions of a building facility coordi-
nator’’; ‘‘[t]he position as a building facility coordinator
was offered to the plaintiff and he had the ability to
take the position by accepting it’’; and ‘‘[t]he plaintiff
did not accept the position as a building facility coordi-
nator.’’ The trial court noted that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s nonac-
ceptance of the position occurred in two ways. First,
[the city’s HR director] credibly testified that the plain-
tiff affirmatively refused the job offer. Second, it is
clear that, although the plaintiff could have accepted
the position, he did not do so.’’
With respect to the administrative appeal as set forth
in count one of the complaint, the trial court held, contrary
to the plaintiff’s claims, that there was substantial evi-
dence in the record that the city had offered him the
building facility coordinator position with a base pay
rate of at least 75 percent of his base pay rate as a
police officer, which position he was capable of per-
forming, and, accordingly, he did not have a ‘‘work-
related disability’’ for purposes of qualifying for a dis-
ability pension under §§ 35.035 and 35.073 of the ordi-
nances. The trial court explained in relevant part: ‘‘The
record contains substantial evidence that the city
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Cruz v. Waterbury

offered the plaintiff such a job. First, on February 26,
2020, the board sent [the city’s] HR director a memo
inquiring whether a qualifying job existed. The HR direc-
tor signed off on the memo confirming that the job of
building facility coordinator met the pay requirement
and that the plaintiff could perform the job despite his
injury. Then, at the March 9, 2020 board meeting, the
motion approved by the board explicitly denied the
pension because the city was offering the plaintiff the
building facility coordinator job as certified by the HR
director. The board then invited the plaintiff to discuss
the job with the HR director who was at the meeting.
The transcript of the foregoing at the March 9, 2020
board meeting coupled with the memo to the HR direc-
tor is substantial evidence that the board and the city
planned to offer the plaintiff a qualifying job and did
exactly that at the meeting. There is also substantial
evidence that the plaintiff rejected the offer.’’
In accordance with well established principles gov-
erning administrative appeals brought to the Superior
Court; see, e.g., Recycling, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Energy & Environmental Protection, 179 Conn. App.
127, 139–40, 178 A.3d 1043 (2018); the trial court con-
cluded that there was substantial evidence supporting
the board’s decision and that the board’s decision was
not unlawful, in excess of the board’s authority, clearly
erroneous, or arbitrary or capricious, such that it should
be affirmed. The trial court further dismissed count one
as to the city on the ground that the city was not an
appropriate party with respect to that count because
it was not an administrative agency and had not ren-
dered the administrative decision at issue.
With respect to count two alleging breach of contract,
the court ruled in favor of the city, agreeing that the
relevant collective bargaining agreement provided for
pension and retirement benefits in accordance with the
city’s ordinances but holding that, for the same reasons
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set forth in the decision on count one of the plaintiff’s
complaint, the plaintiff was ineligible for a disability
pension under the ordinances and, therefore, under the
collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, there
was no breach of the contract by the city. The trial
court further dismissed count two as to the board on the
ground that the board was not a party to the collective
bargaining agreement at issue and, therefore, was not
a proper party to the breach of contract count. This
appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that, despite the parties hav-
ing never raised § 31-71f in their arguments before the
court, the court nevertheless committed plain error
when it failed to consider and apply § 31-71f (a) in
resolving the underlying action. As previously noted,
§ 31-71f (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each employer
shall: (1) Advise his employees in writing, at the time
of hiring, of the rate of remuneration, hours of employ-
ment and wage payments schedules . . . .’’ The plain-
tiff argues that the applicability of this statute ‘‘changes
the outcome of this case’’ because the defendants admit-
ted in their answer that the only document provided to
the plaintiff with respect to the building facility coordi-
nator position was a written job description that did
not fully satisfy the criteria set forth in § 31-71f (a) (1),
and, therefore, no job offer was made in accordance
with §§ 35.035 and 35.073 of the ordinances that would
preclude him from claiming a ‘‘work-related disability’’
for purposes of disability pension eligibility.
The defendants respond that the plaintiff’s claim is
inadequately briefed and, thus, is unreviewable. The
defendants argue that the plaintiff simply states that
plain error review is available and cites to a number of
cases in which appellate courts have undertaken plain
error review, but he fails to set forth the standards
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Cruz v. Waterbury

applicable to plain error review or to apply those stan-
dards to the facts and circumstances of the present
action. The defendants also respond, in the alternative,
that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing
to apply § 31-71f because, by its plain language, that
statute is inapplicable. In particular, the defendants
note that the statute requires an employer to ‘‘[a]dvise
his employees in writing, at the time of hiring, of the
rate of remuneration, hours of employment and wage
payment schedules’’; (emphasis added) General Stat-
utes § 31-71f (a) (1); and the plaintiff was not a newly
hired employee at any point following the 2019 termina-
tion of his employment. We conclude, for the reasons
given by the defendants, that the plaintiff has aban-
doned this claim as a result of an inadequate brief.
‘‘[The plain error] doctrine, codified at Practice Book
§ 60-5, is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate
courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although
unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that
they threaten to erode our system of justice and work
a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party.
. . . It is axiomatic that, [t]he plain error doctrine . . .
is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of revers-
ibility. . . . Put another way, plain error review is
reserved for only the most egregious errors. When an
error of such magnitude exists, it necessitates reversal.
. . . [I]t is not enough for the defendant simply to dem-
onstrate that his position is correct. Rather, the party
seeking plain error review must demonstrate that the
claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisput-
able as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of rever-
sal.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn. 437, 445, 307 A.3d 249
(2024). Our Supreme Court has ‘‘noticed plain error in
the failure of a trial court to apply a clearly relevant
statute to the case before it.’’ (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ralto Developers, Inc. v.
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Cruz v. Waterbury

Environmental Impact Commission, 220 Conn. 54, 59,
594 A.2d 981 (1991).
‘‘Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim . . .
receives only cursory attention in the brief without sub-
stantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is
deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court
to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of
error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and
fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Sicignano v. Pearce, 228
Conn. App. 664, 690–91, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024), cert.
denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025).
Here, the plaintiff’s claim consists of the statement
that ‘‘[o]ur Supreme Court routinely has held that a
court’s failure to apply an applicable statute is plain
error’’; a string cite of cases in which plain error was
found on the basis of a court’s failure to consider a
statute that was ‘‘ ‘plain[ly]’ ’’ or ‘‘ ‘clearly’ ’’ applicable;
see, e.g., Curley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 220 Conn. App.
732, 752–53 n.10, 299 A.3d 1133 (citing cases), cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 914, 303 A.3d 260 (2023); and a con-
clusory statement that § 31-71f applies in the present
case and ‘‘changes the outcome of [the] case.’’ He does
not expressly state the standard for plain error review
in his principal brief. He does not attempt to apply the
standard to the facts of the present action. Moreover,
he does not provide any real substantive discussion
regarding why § 31-71f was so clearly relevant that the
court’s failure to address it sua sponte was an error of
such ‘‘monumental proportion’’ that it threatened ‘‘to
erode our system of justice and work a serious and
manifest injustice . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Kyle A., supra, 348 Conn. 445. In short,
the plaintiff has failed to meet the minimum threshold
required for review of his plain error claim. Accordingly,
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Cruz v. Waterbury

we decline to reach the merits of the claim on the
ground that it is inadequately briefed and deemed aban-
doned.4
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
denied in part and dismissed in part count one of his
complaint asserting an administrative appeal from the
board’s denial of his application for disability retirement
and pension benefits. First, he argues that there is not
substantial evidence in the record that he was offered
a job with a qualifying salary for purposes of § 35.035
of the ordinances. Second, he argues that the court
never properly acknowledged that the defendants had
failed to pay him disability pension benefits for the
period of time between the termination of his employ-
ment and the denial of his disability pension application
and that he is entitled to such payments under the plain
language of the ordinances. Third, the plaintiff argues
that the trial court misinterpreted § 35.035 by indicating
that the city had discretion under that ordinance to
offer the plaintiff a job with a base pay rate of at least
75 percent of the base pay rate of the participant’s
current job whereas the plain language of the ordinance
refers to ‘‘base pay rate’’ only with respect to the new
job, not the current one, nor can such a construction
reasonably be inferred. Finally, the plaintiff argues that
the trial court improperly dismissed the administrative
appeal with respect to the city because the city’s actions
were so inextricably bound up with the decision of the
board that the city is a proper party to the administrative
appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reject the plain-
tiff’s claim.
4
Even if we were to overlook the inadequacy of the briefing and review
the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of the minimal briefing provided, it inevitably
would fail on its merits because, on its face, § 31-71f is not plainly or clearly
applicable to the circumstances at issue in this case, and, thus, the court’s
failure to address it sua sponte could not have constituted plain error.
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‘‘It is well established that [j]udicial review of [an
administrative agency’s] action is governed by the [Uni-
form Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes
§ 4-166 et seq.] . . . and the scope of that review is
very restricted.5 . . . Review of an appeal taken from
the order of an administrative agency . . . is limited
to determining whether the agency’s findings are sup-
ported by substantial and competent evidence and
whether the agency’s decision exceeds its statutory
authority or constitutes an abuse of discretion. . . .
[E]vidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if
it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact
in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . [T]he possibil-
ity of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s
finding from being supported by substantial evidence.
. . . Ultimately, [t]he question is not whether the
[reviewing] court would have reached the same conclu-
sion but whether the record before the [agency] sup-
ports the action taken.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Dance Right,
LLC, 230 Conn. App. 53, 72, 329 A.3d 1008 (2025).
A
We first address the plaintiff’s argument that no sub-
stantial evidence exists that he was offered a job with
a qualifying salary for purposes of § 35.035 of the ordi-
nances. He posits that the base pay rate of the building
facility coordinator position was less than 75 percent
of his pay as a police officer. According to the plaintiff,
5
‘‘This court in Greene v. Waterbury, 126 Conn. App. 746, 749, 12 A.3d
623 (2011), determined that when a retirement board was created by the
Waterbury City Code and granted such board powers and duties similar to
that of an administrative agency, this court review[s] the actions of the
board under the . . . standard[s] that [govern] review of an administrative
agency’s actions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vanghele v. Fairfield,
156 Conn. App. 714, 721, 115 A.3d 474 (2015).
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Cruz v. Waterbury

the board improperly determined his pay as a police
officer to be $75,427, whereas a pension worksheet
prepared by the city’s finance director listed his pay as
a police officer at $75,578.72. If the higher rate is uti-
lized, in order to amount to at least 75 percent of his
pay as a police officer, the base pay rate for the building
facility coordinator position needed to be at least
$56,684, rather than the $56,570 cited by the board.6
The plaintiff also asserts that he never received a formal
offer for the building facility coordinator position
because the only written documentation given to him
with respect to that position was a February 26, 2020
internal memorandum that he did not receive until after
he filed his administrative appeal.7

We agree with the defendants that the trial court prop-
erly determined that there was substantial evidence
that the city intended to and did offer the plaintiff a
qualifying job under § 35.035 of the ordinances. It is
reasonable to infer from the transcript of the March 9,
2020 board hearing in combination with the February
26, 2020 memorandum from the city’s HR director to the
board indicating the availability of the building facility
6
In his principal brief, the plaintiff states that he believes the proper basis
for the 75 percent calculation should be his total earnings as a police officer,
including overtime payments, night and weekend differentials, and bonuses,
but that he is adopting ‘‘the defendants’ preferred interpretation’’ of the
amount to demonstrate that he should still prevail on that basis.
7
The plaintiff further asserts: ‘‘In other words, the [board] received and
acted on secret information that was not part of the record and was not
provided to [him] prior to the denial of his application, thereby violating
his right to due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States constitution and article [first], § 8, of the Connecticut
constitution.’’ The plaintiff does not otherwise address a claimed due process
violation in the body of his principal brief. As we set forth in detail in part
I of this opinion, ‘‘[a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required
in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sicignano v. Pearce, supra, 228 Conn.
App. 690. Because the plaintiff does not adequately brief his alleged constitu-
tional violation, we decline to review it.
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coordinator position that the plaintiff was offered the
position and declined it.
Further, the board’s citation to $75,427 as the pay
received by the plaintiff as a police officer is supported
by the February 26, 2020 memorandum. Even if the
figure from the pension worksheet is used, we agree
with the defendants’ contention that ‘‘the difference
between [the] two possible prior base pay rates is
$151.76. Seventy-five percent of that difference is
$113.82 per year. . . . [T]his discrepancy in the record
does not render the board’s denial of the plaintiff’s
disability pension application an abuse of discretion.’’
B
We turn next to the plaintiff’s argument that the trial
court failed to acknowledge that the defendants improp-
erly had failed to pay him disability pension benefits
for the period of time between the termination of his
employment and the denial of his disability pension
application and that he was entitled to such payments
under the plain language of the ordinances. He relatedly
asserts that the board improperly declined to retroac-
tively award him such payments when it denied his
application.
We are unconvinced, on the record presented, that
the plaintiff was entitled to disability pension benefits
while his disability pension application was pending
from May, 2019, to March, 2020. Section 35.073 of the
ordinances, on which the plaintiff relies, provides for
disability pension benefits only when an applicant has
a ‘‘work-related disability,’’ which the board determined
the plaintiff did not have due to the offer of a qualifying
alternative position under § 35.035 of the ordinances.
Nothing in the ordinances provides that the plaintiff was
entitled to receive disability pension benefit payments
while his application was pending. Section 35.073 (D)
provides only that benefits become ‘‘payable’’ on the
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Cruz v. Waterbury

first day of the month following the termination of
employment. We read this provision as simply establish-
ing the start date from which benefits would accrue
upon a finding of eligibility. In other words, a more
reasonable interpretation of the ordinance would be
that the plaintiff would have been entitled to receive
benefits during the pendency of his application when
and if the board ultimately determined that he qualified
for benefits in the first place, at which point such bene-
fits would be awarded retroactively. Because the board
determined, however, that he was not eligible for bene-
fits, the board properly did not award any retroactive
payments.8
C
The plaintiff next argues that the trial court misinter-
preted § 35.035 of the ordinances when it suggested
that the city had discretion to offer the plaintiff a job
that has a base pay rate of at least 75 percent of the
base pay rate of the participant’s current job because
the plain language of the ordinance does not refer to
‘‘75 percent of the base pay rate’’ nor can such a con-
struction be inferred. The plaintiff asserts that 75 per-
cent of the participant’s current job should include all
compensation, including overtime, weekend/night dif-
ferentials, bonuses, etc. earned by the plaintiff as a
8
We note that, both in conjunction with this argument and in support of
his appeal more generally, the plaintiff takes issue with the eleven month
delay between the date of the termination of his employment and the date
the board heard and rendered a decision on his application. We agree with
the plaintiff that it is important to have timely resolutions of disability
pension applications because unwarranted delays can have significant
adverse financial impacts on individuals awaiting resolution of their applica-
tions. Although the defendants were unable to provide this court with any
compelling rationale for the lengthy delay in the present case, the plaintiff
has not directed us to any ordinance, statutory provision or other legal
authority that required the board to meet and render a decision within any
prescribed time frame, nor can we conclude, on the basis of the present
record, that the board’s delay in the present case was arbitrary, exceeded
the board’s authority or constituted an abuse of its discretion.
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police officer in the year before the injury that disabled
him from duty and that the base pay rate cited by the
city in its offer of the building facility coordinator posi-
tion was insufficient under § 35.035 as a result thereof.
This assertion, however, is unsupported by any lan-
guage in § 35.035 and also cannot be inferred when the
ordinance is read in its entirety, particularly the express
reference to the ‘‘base pay rate’’ with respect to the
alternative position.
D
Finally, the plaintiff acknowledges that the trial court
correctly concluded that the city is not an administra-
tive agency and did not issue the administrative decision
from which he brings this appeal. He nonetheless con-
tends that the city is the entity tasked with offering a
qualifying job under § 35.035 of the ordinances and that
‘‘[t]he [city’s] actions (or lack thereof) are inextricably
bound up with the decision of the [board],’’ such that
it is a proper defendant to the claim. We are not per-
suaded.
The plaintiff has provided no legal authority for bring-
ing an administrative appeal against an entity that was
not the administrative agency involved in rendering the
administrative decision at issue. Moreover, as the defen-
dants argue, even if the trial court erred in its dismissal,
any such error was harmless because the city would
have been entitled to a judgment in its favor for the
same reasons that the appeal was denied with respect
to the board. Having considered all of the plaintiff’s
arguments to the contrary, we are not persuaded that
the trial court improperly dismissed the claim against
the city.
In summary, the trial court’s conclusion that the
plaintiff was offered a position with a base pay rate
that was at least 75 percent of his base pay rate as a
police officer and that he rejected said position, such
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Cruz v. Waterbury

that he did not have a ‘‘work-related disability’’ for pur-
poses of disability pension eligibility under § 35.035 of
the ordinances, appears to be substantiated by evidence
in the record. The plaintiff’s disagreements with respect
thereto seem to result from his differing interpretations
of the relevant ordinances and the underlying facts
rather than from an identified lack of evidence or a
belief that the board acted illegally or in excess of its
authority, and he does not cite to or apply any pertinent
authority in support of his positions. Because the plain-
tiff has not established any basis for reversing the trial
court’s judgment as to his administrative appeal, we
reject this claim.
III
Finally, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
denied in part and dismissed in part his breach of con-
tract count. The plaintiff argues that all relevant terms
of the city’s ordinances are incorporated by reference
into the collective bargaining agreement, and, therefore,
the defendants’ violations of those ordinances in the
manner argued with respect to the administrative
appeal also constituted a breach of the provision of
the collective bargaining agreement that provided in
relevant part that employees of the Waterbury Police
Department are entitled to retirement benefits pursuant
to the ordinances. The plaintiff also argues that the trial
court improperly dismissed the board as a defendant
to the breach of contract count because the board was
established by the city charter with a duty to act legally
and, ‘‘[t]o the extent that an official act of the [board]
violates the . . . collective bargaining agreement, it
becomes a proper defendant in this case.’’ We disagree
with both arguments.
‘‘It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement
is a contract. . . . Like any other contract, a collective
bargaining agreement may incorporate by reference
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Cruz v. Waterbury

other documents, statutes or ordinances to be included
within the terms of its provisions. . . . [If] a contract
expressly incorporates a statutory enactment by refer-
ence, that enactment becomes part of a contract for
the indicated purposes just as though the words of
that enactment were set out in full in the contract.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Greene v. Waterbury, 126 Conn.
App. 746, 751, 12 A.3d 623 (2011). ‘‘The elements of
a breach of contract action are the formation of an
agreement, performance by one party, breach of the
agreement by the other party and damages.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lalli v. New Haven, 230
Conn. App. 863, 867 n.3, 332 A.3d 1073, cert. denied,
351 Conn. 924, 333 A.3d 796 (2025). ‘‘The determination
of whether a contract has been materially breached is
a question of fact that is subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to
support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Regional School District 8 v. M & S Paving &
Sealing, Inc., 206 Conn. App. 523, 531, 261 A.3d 153
(2021).
We first note that ‘‘[o]rdinarily a court may entertain
a suit by an individual employee to enforce the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement only if the agree-
ment so provides. . . . An employee does, however,
have standing to enforce the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement if the employee claims that the union
has breached its duty of fair representation.’’ (Citation
omitted.) Labbe v. Pension Commission, 239 Conn.
168, 182, 682 A.2d 490 (1996). Here, the complaint did
not include a count against the union for breach of the
duty of fair representation. The city nevertheless did
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Cruz v. Waterbury

not challenge the propriety of the breach of contract
count on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing
to assert it. Because the parties have not raised or
addressed any possible standing issue, and the record
consequently is inadequate to determine whether such
an issue exists, we decline to address it further.
Turning to the propriety of the court’s resolution of
the breach of contract count on its merits, all parties
largely rely on the same arguments raised with respect
to the administrative appeal. The defendants admit that
the relevant provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement provide the plaintiff with a right to retire-
ment benefits in accordance with the city’s ordinances.
Nevertheless, they argue that the board properly deter-
mined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a disability
pension pursuant to the ordinances, and, therefore, any
reliance on a violation of the ordinances as the basis
for a claim of a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement is unfounded and was properly resolved in
favor of the city. For the reasons set forth in part II of
this opinion, which we will not repeat, we agree that
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the city violated
any ordinance with respect to disability pension bene-
fits and, therefore, also failed to establish a breach of
the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the
court properly ruled in favor of the city with respect
to the breach of contract count.
We also reject the plaintiff’s argument that the trial
court improperly dismissed the breach of contract
count with respect to the board. The board, which
undisputedly is not a party to the collective bargaining
agreement between the city and the plaintiff’s union,
was not a proper party to the breach of contract count
because it is axiomatic that ‘‘[t]he obligation of con-
tracts is limited to the parties making them, and, ordi-
narily, only those who are parties to contracts are liable
for their breach. Parties to a contract cannot thereby
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Cruz v. Waterbury

impose any liability on one who, under its terms, is a
stranger to the contract, and, in any event, in order to
bind a third person contractually, an expression of
assent by such person is necessary.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) FCM Group, Inc. v. Miller, 300 Conn.
774, 797, 17 A.3d 40 (2011). Moreover, as with the court’s
dismissal of the city with respect to the administrative
appeal count, even if the trial court erred in its dismissal
of the board with respect to count two, any such error
was harmless because the board would have been enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law for the same reasons
that the court rendered judgment in favor of the city.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.