Curto v. Hartmann

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Curto v. Hartmann

ANGELO CURTO v. ROBERT D.
HARTMANN, SR., ET AL.
(AC 47129)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The defendants appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff on
his claims of fraud and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) in connection with a loan agreement
between the parties. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court erred
in finding that the three year statutes of limitations governing the plaintiff’s
claims had been tolled by their fraudulent concealment pursuant to statute
(§ 52-595). Held:
The trial court correctly determined that § 52-595 tolled the statutes of
limitations governing the plaintiff’s fraud and CUTPA claims, as sufficient
evidence supported the court’s finding that the defendants intentionally
concealed from the plaintiff the facts necessary to establish his claims and,
due to the defendants’ conduct in repeatedly and falsely representing to the
plaintiff that he would be repaid, the plaintiff did not become aware of his
causes of action until almost two years after the defendant H had knowingly
misappropriated the loaned funds.
The trial court’s punitive damages award pursuant to statute (§ 42-110g (a))
on the CUTPA claim did not constitute an abuse of its discretion, as the
court reasonably could have concluded that the defendants’ conduct in
knowingly misappropriating the loaned funds and repeatedly engaging in
deceptive acts to conceal the fraud and delay the plaintiff from pursing legal
action warranted the amount of the award.
Argued May 19—officially released September 9, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and transferred
to the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the
case was tried to the court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge
trial referee; judgment in part for the plaintiff, from
which the defendants appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Trent A. LaLima, with whom, on the brief, was Vir-
ginia M. Gillette, for the appellants (defendants).
Juda J. Epstein, for the appellee (plaintiff).
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Curto v. Hartmann

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The defendants, Robert D. Hartmann,
Sr. (Hartmann), and HSGCHG Investments, LLC (HSGCHG),1
appeal, following a trial to the court, from the judgment
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Angelo Curto, on his
claims of fraud and violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-
110a et seq.2 On appeal, the defendants claim that the
trial court (1) erred in tolling the statutes of limitations
governing the plaintiff’s claims and (2) abused its discre-
tion in awarding excessive punitive damages to the plain-
tiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On August
25, 2016, the defendants signed a ‘‘funding agreement’’
(loan agreement) with the plaintiff, pursuant to which
the plaintiff loaned the defendants $100,000 to fund a
concert scheduled for October 8, 2016. The loaned funds
were to be spent in accordance with a proposed budget
that was attached to the loan agreement. In return, the
defendants agreed to repay the plaintiff the principal
sum of $100,000 plus one third of the net proceeds from
ticket sales for the concert.3 Hartmann executed the
loan agreement on behalf of HSGCHG and in his individ-
ual capacity, and the funds were deposited into Hart-
mann’s account on September 1, 2016.
The defendants, however, ended up canceling the
scheduled concert.4 Consequently, the plaintiff con-
tacted the defendants and requested repayment of the
1
Hartmann is the principal of HSGCHG, which conducts business in Con-
necticut by and through Hartmann.
2
Pursuant to CUTPA, ‘‘[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce.’’ General Statutes § 42-110b (a).
3
In addition, ‘‘pursuant to the terms of the loan [agreement], Hartmann
personally guaranteed [the plaintiff] repayment of all sums due and owing
thereunder.’’
4
It is undisputed in the record that the defendants canceled the concert
due to inclement weather.
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Curto v. Hartmann

principal sum. In response, Hartmann told the plaintiff
that the money had been spent on advertising and to
pay performers and staff for the canceled concert. Hart-
mann further represented to the plaintiff that the defen-
dants would file a claim against the insurance policy
they had purchased for the concert, which they would
then use to reimburse the plaintiff. In addition, Hart-
mann subsequently represented to the plaintiff that the
concert would be rescheduled for the summer of 2017
and that the plaintiff would be reimbursed from the
proceeds of that concert. The concert, however, was
never rescheduled, and despite Hartmann’s subsequent
repeated representations to the plaintiff that he was
pursuing legal action against the defendants’ insurance
carrier to collect on the insurance policy so that they
could repay the plaintiff, no such insurance policy was
ever procured or produced by the defendants.
On March 14, 2018, the plaintiff ‘‘made written
demand upon the defendants for repayment of all sums
due [to him]’’ under the loan agreement, but the defen-
dants ‘‘failed and/or refused to comply.’’5 Thereafter,
on April 27, 2018, the plaintiff obtained a bank statement
detailing the transactions on the account into which
Hartmann had deposited the loaned funds (bank state-
ment). Upon review of the bank statement, the plaintiff
discovered that Hartmann had spent ‘‘only a minimal
amount’’ of the funds in accordance with the loan agree-
ment and proposed budget and, instead, had used most
of the funds to pay ‘‘for his personal expenses.’’ Specifi-
cally, on September 2, 2016, the day after the funds had
been deposited, Hartmann made a payment of $38,908.25
toward his personal mortgage and a payment of $12,000
to a construction company for ‘‘something unrelated to
In addition to not receiving repayment of the principal sum of the amount
5

loaned, the plaintiff had not received ‘‘any portion of the preconcert ticket
sales . . . [or] the advance ticket sales’’ from the canceled concert, as
required pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement.
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Curto v. Hartmann

the [concert].’’ Later that month, on September 28, 2016,
Hartmann made a second payment of $38,908.25 toward
his personal mortgage.

Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced the present action
against the defendants by way of an eight count com-
plaint in February, 2020.6 On May 20, 2022, the defen-
dants filed an answer and, on June 17, 2022, filed several
special defenses related to the plaintiff’s ability to
recover damages under the loan agreement.7 The case
was tried to the court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge
trial referee, on September 19 and 29, 2022. Following
the conclusion of evidence on the first day of trial, the
court asked the plaintiff whether he wished to amend
his complaint, to which plaintiff’s counsel stated that
he was withdrawing five of the eight counts against the
defendants and proceeding only on count one, alleging
breach of contract, count four, alleging fraud against
Hartmann,8 and count five, alleging CUTPA violations
against both defendants.9 In response, the defendants,
6
The plaintiff alleged breach of contract (count one), breach of common-
law duty of good faith and fair dealing (count two), breach of statutory duty
of good faith and fair dealing (count three), fraud (count four), violation of
CUTPA (count five), unjust enrichment (count six), and civil theft (count
seven). In count eight, the plaintiff ‘‘demand[ed] an accounting of how all
sums borrowed . . . were used . . . by the defendants.’’
7
Specifically, the defendants asserted as special defenses: (1) lack of
mutual assent; (2) ambiguity; (3) lack of consideration; (4) statute of frauds;
(5) illegal contract; and (6) frustration of purpose.
8
The plaintiff alleged in count four: ‘‘Hartmann made false statements to
induce the plaintiff to enter into the [loan] agreement . . . and to delay
[the plaintiff from] enforcing his rights . . . thereunder. . . . [Hartmann]
made false statements regarding his intention to repay [the plaintiff] and
the need to pursue a claim against the defendants’ insurance policy in order
to repay [the plaintiff]. . . . The false representations of . . . Hartmann
constituted a pattern and a continuing course of fraudulent conduct that
continued up until at least March, 2018.’’
9
The plaintiff alleged in count five: ‘‘The acts and conduct of the defen-
dants as alleged hereinabove are unfair, unethical, immoral, oppressive and
violative of public policy, all in violation of [CUTPA]. . . . The defendants
are liable for punitive damages . . . pursuant to [CUTPA].’’
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through counsel, orally requested to amend their plead-
ings to add as a special defense that the plaintiff’s fraud
and CUTPA claims were barred by the respective stat-
utes of limitations. The court instructed the defendants
to file amended pleadings reflecting their new special
defense of statutes of limitations and further stated that
it would permit the parties to file supplemental briefs
on that issue.
On that same date, the defendants filed an amended
special defense and accompanying memorandum of
law, in which they asserted that the plaintiff’s fraud
claim was barred by the three year statute of limitations
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-577,10 and the plain-
tiff’s CUTPA claim was barred by the three year statute
of limitations pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110g
(f).11 On September 22, 2022, the plaintiff filed a reply
to the defendants’ amended special defense, along with
a supporting memorandum of law, in which he asserted:
‘‘Though the defendants are correct that the statute of
limitations is three years for both fraud and CUTPA,
[his] complaint affirmatively alleges, and evidence has
been produced to show . . . conduct [by the defen-
dants] . . . which constitutes fraudulent concealment
[of those causes of actions]. . . . The plaintiff could
not have known until he received [the bank] statement
on April 27, 2018, that the [loaned funds] were [misap-
propriated] and/or stolen in derogation of the [loan]
agreement.’’ The plaintiff, therefore, contended that the
defendants’ fraudulent concealment had tolled the stat-
utes of limitations for his fraud and CUTPA claims until
April 27, 2018, ‘‘which . . . was the last in a series of
10
General Statutes § 52-577 provides: ‘‘No action founded upon a tort shall
be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission
complained of.’’
11
General Statutes § 42-110g (f) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An action under
[CUTPA] may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence
of a [CUTPA] violation . . . .’’
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acts intended to obfuscate fraudulent conduct,’’ and,
accordingly, those claims had been timely brought.
On November 3, 2022, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision finding in favor of the defendants on
the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim,12 and in favor
of the plaintiff on his fraud and CUTPA claims. As to the
plaintiff’s fraud claim, the court found that Hartmann
‘‘committed fraud in the inducement’’ in that he know-
ingly ‘‘made false representations as statements of fact
regarding how the defendants were to spend the [loaned
funds] . . . in order to induce the plaintiff to provide
the . . . loan.’’ Specifically, the court found that Hart-
mann ‘‘used the solicitation budget [attached to the loan
agreement] to induce the plaintiff to lend the defendants
$100,000’’ to fund a concert in accordance with that
budget, ‘‘knowing that [this representation was] untrue,’’
and subsequently ‘‘spent the majority of the [loaned
funds] on matters not [contemplated by] the budget
[or] associated with the [concert] at all.’’ As to the
plaintiff’s CUTPA claim, the court found that Hartmann,
after fraudulently inducing the plaintiff into loaning the
funds, misappropriated those funds ‘‘on expenses
wholly unrelated to the [concert],’’ and that his subse-
quent misrepresentations to the plaintiff regarding an
insurance policy and the rescheduling of the concert
‘‘were intended to, and did, obfuscate and delay the
plaintiff from commencing legal action.’’ The court found
that these ‘‘deceptive acts’’ constituted fraud and were
‘‘immoral, unethical, and unfair, and, therefore, sup-
port[ed] a finding of CUTPA [violations].’’
The court further found in favor of the plaintiff on the
defendants’ special defense of statutes of limitations.
Although the court noted that the plaintiff had filed the
present action outside of the three year statutes of
12
The plaintiff does not challenge the judgment with respect to the breach
of contract claim.
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limitations for his fraud and CUTPA claims,13 the court
found that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff has established by clear, pre-
cise, and unequivocal evidence that the defendants
fraudulently concealed [from him the existence of such]
cause[s] of action.’’ The court, therefore, concluded that
the statutes of limitations governing those counts had
been tolled pursuant to General Statutes § 52-595, which
provides that, ‘‘[i]f any person, liable to an action by
another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence
of the cause of such action, such cause of action shall
be deemed to accrue against such person so liable there-
for at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon
first discovers its existence.’’ The court noted that ‘‘[t]he
analysis of how the defendants’ conduct amounted to
fraudulent concealment and tolled the statute of limita-
tions is identical’’ with respect to both counts. Specifi-
cally, the court found that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff repeatedly
reached out to the defendants regarding the status of
his repayment’’ and that ‘‘[t]he defendants intentionally
concealed [Hartmann’s misappropriation of the funds]
from the plaintiff’’ by making repeated misrepresenta-
tions regarding how the money had been spent, the
purported insurance policy, and the rescheduling of the
concert. The court found that these misrepresentations,
as well as the defendants’ ‘‘two year delay in providing’’
the plaintiff with the bank statement which revealed
Hartmann’s misappropriation of the funds, ‘‘[were]
intended to, and did, obfuscate and delay the plaintiff
from discovering [the] fraud and CUTPA violations and
commencing legal action.’’
With respect to the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim specifi-
cally, the court acknowledged that in Fichera v. Mine
13
The court found that the date of occurrence of the acts or omissions
complained of in both counts four and five; see footnotes 8 and 9 of this
opinion; was ‘‘either the date the defendants signed the loan agreement,
August 25, 2016, or the date the [concert] was supposed to take place,
October 8, 2016.’’
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Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 213–17, 541 A.2d 472 (1988),
our Supreme Court, faced with a similar issue, rejected
the plaintiffs’ claim that fraudulent concealment could
be used to toll the statute of limitations for their CUTPA
claim.14 The trial court in the present case, however,
emphasized that our Supreme Court in Fichera v. Mine
Hill Corp., supra, 216, expressly left open the question
of whether fraudulent concealment could toll the stat-
ute of limitations for a CUTPA claim ‘‘in factual settings
different from [that] case.’’15 Because the trial court
found the facts of this case to be distinguishable from
14
In Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 206, the plaintiffs had
seen an advertisement for a residential subdivision being developed by the
defendants. When the plaintiffs visited the property, the defendants’ sales
agents represented that the development would include, among other fea-
tures, a community recreation center. Id. When the plaintiffs subsequently
purchased four lots in the subdivision in May, 1979, the defendants’ attorney
represented at the closing of title that the recreation center would be com-
pleted by May, 1980. Id. On June 16, 1981, however, the plaintiffs learned,
from a letter written by the defendants’ attorneys to the planning commis-
sion, that the defendants did not intend to construct the recreation center.
Id., 207. In January, 1984, the plaintiffs commenced the underlying action
against the defendants, alleging, inter alia, violation of CUTPA. Id., 208.
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that the three year statute of limitations
for their CUTPA claim had been tolled by the defendants’ alleged fraudulent
concealment, our Supreme Court reasoned that ‘‘the only evidence of any
affirmative conduct of the defendants’’ constituting a misrepresentation had
occurred at the closing of title in 1979. Id., 214. Accordingly, although the
plaintiffs did not discover that misrepresentation until June 16, 1981, the
court held that their CUTPA claim was barred by the statute of limitations
because the only deceptive acts by the defendants that could have formed
the basis of that claim had occurred more than three years prior to the
commencement of the action, and the plaintiffs had not presented any
evidence of any other conduct of the defendants after the misrepresentation
that had transpired in 1979 that would support a finding of fraudulent
concealment. Id.
15
The court noted that ‘‘[s]everal Superior Court cases interpret Fichera
[v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 204] as holding that fraudulent conceal-
ment cannot be applied to CUTPA claims’’ but concluded that ‘‘those cases
do not adequately address Fichera’s unique fact pattern,’’ which involved
the defendants committing ‘‘an initial deceptive act, which occurred outside
of the statute of limitations [for CUTPA],’’ but ‘‘committing no further act
to conceal their [initial] wrongdoing.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.)
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Curto v. Hartmann

those in Fichera, it concluded that Fichera did not
16

bar the application of § 52-595 to the plaintiff’s CUTPA
claim in the present case.
Accordingly, the court found that, pursuant to § 52-
595, the defendants’ fraudulent concealment had tolled
the statutes of limitations for the plaintiff’s fraud and
CUTPA claims until April 27, 2018, the date that the
plaintiff discovered the existence of such causes of
action. Relying on the fact that the plaintiff commenced
the present action within three years of that date, the
court held that his fraud and CUTPA claims were not
barred by the statutes of limitations. The defendants
subsequently filed a motion for reargument and recon-
sideration, which the court denied. Thereafter, the
court, following a hearing in damages, awarded the
plaintiff $509,303 in damages, interest, attorney’s fees,
and costs, which included $100,000 in compensatory
damages and $240,894 in punitive damages under CUTPA.
This appeal followed.
I
The defendants first claim that the court erred in
finding that § 52-595 had tolled the statutes of limita-
tions governing the plaintiff’s fraud and CUTPA17 claims
16
The court reasoned that, ‘‘[u]nlike in Fichera [v. Mine Hill Corp., supra,
207 Conn. 214], the defendants in the present case have performed more
deceptive acts other than the initial deceitful act. Specifically . . . the defen-
dants [in the present case] made numerous false representations about
repaying the plaintiff from proceeds of a second [concert] and/or insurance
lawsuit, and those misrepresentations were intended to and did obfuscate
and delay the plaintiff from discovering a cause of action [pursuant to
CUTPA] and commencing legal action.’’
17
The defendants argue that the court erred as a matter of law in applying
§ 52-595 to the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim because ‘‘the rationale of Fichera
[v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 215–17] . . . indicate[s] [that] such
tolling is not available for CUTPA claims.’’ The defendants, however, concede
in their principal appellate brief that ‘‘[our Supreme Court in] Fichera stated
it was applying this rationale to [the] specific facts [of the present case]
. . . .’’ In addition, during oral argument before this court, counsel for the
defendants expressly conceded that Fichera did not hold, as a matter of
law, that fraudulent concealment cannot toll the statute of limitations for
CUTPA claims.
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because, they argue, the plaintiff failed to present suffi-
cient evidence of fraudulent concealment. We disagree.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review and
the legal principles relevant to the defendants’ claim.
‘‘Whether a particular action is barred by the statute of
limitations is a question of law to which we apply a
plenary standard of review. . . . The factual findings
that underpin that question of law, however, will not
be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Prime Bank v. Vitano, Inc., 198 Conn. App. 136, 141,
232 A.3d 1265 (2020). ‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that [t]he trial
court’s [factual] findings are binding [on] this court
unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence
and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A
On appeal, the defendants do not meaningfully challenge the court’s find-
ing that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Fichera.
Rather, in arguing that the court improperly applied § 52-595 to the plaintiffs’
CUTPA claim in derogation of Fichera, the defendants rely on several Supe-
rior Court decisions ‘‘that have interpreted Fichera [as holding] that fraudu-
lent concealment does not apply to CUTPA claims.’’ First, we emphasize
that this court is not bound by decisions of the Superior Court. See, e.g.,
Freidheim v. McLaughlin, 217 Conn. App. 767, 799, 290 A.3d 801 (2023).
Second, the trial court acknowledged several of the Superior Court decisions
cited by the defendants on appeal but correctly concluded that those deci-
sions had misinterpreted Fichera. See footnote 15 of this opinion. This court
and our Supreme Court repeatedly have held that Fichera, contrary to the
defendants’ claim on appeal and the Superior Court decisions on which
they rely, does not stand for the premise that the statute of limitations for
CUTPA claims cannot be tolled by fraudulent concealment as a matter of
law. See, e.g., Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT
Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 46, 717 A.2d 77 (1998) (Fichera ’’does not
stand for the proposition that independent fraudulent or deceptive acts
taking place within [the] three year period [prior to the filing of CUTPA
action] that have been undertaken for the purpose of concealing actionable
conduct occurring prior to the three year period cannot independently form
the basis of a CUTPA violation’’); Randolph v. Mambrino, 216 Conn. App.
126, 142 n.10, 284 A.3d 645 (2022) (‘‘Fichera did not hold that § 52-595 is
inapplicable for purposes of CUTPA, only that that tolling provision did not
apply under the specific facts of that case’’); see also Normandy v. American
Medical Systems, Inc., 340 Conn. 93, 112 n.18, 262 A.3d 698 (2021) (expressly
reserving question of whether statute of limitations for CUTPA claims may
be equitably tolled). Accordingly, the defendants’ argument is without merit.
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Curto v. Hartmann

finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) K. S. v. R. S., 350
Conn. 692, 750, 326 A.3d 187 (2024).
‘‘The question before us is whether the [plaintiff] [has]
adduced any credible evidence that . . . the defen-
dants fraudulently concealed the existence of the [plain-
tiff’s] cause[s] of action. To meet this burden, it was
not sufficient for the [plaintiff] to prove merely that
it was more likely than not that the defendants had
concealed the cause[s] of action. Instead, the [plaintiff]
had to prove fraudulent concealment by the more exact-
ing standard of clear, precise, and unequivocal evi-
dence. . . . Under our case law, to prove fraudulent
concealment, the [plaintiff] [was] required to show: (1)
[the defendants’] actual awareness, rather than imputed
knowledge, of the facts necessary to establish the
[plaintiff’s] cause[s] of action; (2) [the defendants’]
intentional concealment of these facts from the [plain-
tiff]; and (3) [the defendants’] concealment of the facts
for the purpose of obtaining delay on the [plaintiff’s]
part in filing a complaint on [his] cause[s] of action.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medical Device
Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 207 Conn. App. 707, 745–46,
264 A.3d 130, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911, 264 A.3d 94
(2021). ‘‘Generally, fraudulent concealment requires a
showing of affirmative acts of concealment.’’ Id., 749.
On appeal, the defendants challenge the court’s find-
ing of fraudulent concealment only with respect to the
second element.18 Specifically, they argue that the plain-
tiff established the facts necessary for his fraud and
18
The defendants argue that the court erred in applying § 52-595 to the
plaintiff’s claims because he failed to ‘‘ ‘affirmatively plead [fraudulent con-
cealment]’ ’’ in his reply to the defendants’ special defense of statute of
limitations. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In its memorandum of deci-
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CUTPA claims on the date of the canceled concert, and,
therefore, the court erred in finding that the defendants
had intentionally concealed such facts on the basis of
their subsequent misrepresentations to the plaintiff. In
support of their claim, the defendants rely on the plain-
tiff’s testimony at trial that, pursuant to his understand-
ing of the loan agreement, he would receive proceeds
from ticket presales prior to the October 8, 2016 con-
cert. On the basis of that testimony, the defendants
contend that the fact that the plaintiff had not received
any such proceeds by the date of the scheduled concert
should have put him on notice that the defendants ‘‘never
intended to meet [their] repayment obligations.’’19
Accordingly, the defendants contend that the plaintiff
‘‘had sufficient [facts] to make a [fraud and CUTPA]
claim from the moment the concert date passed in Octo-
ber, 2016,’’ and, therefore, the ‘‘[l]ater obfuscations [by
the defendants] described by the trial court’’ are insuffi-
cient to support the court’s finding that the defendants
had intentionally concealed from the plaintiff the facts
sion, the court noted that, ‘‘[a]lthough the plaintiff did not specifically cite
§ 52-595 in [his] reply, the plaintiff did discuss fraudulent concealment and
cited . . . case law discussing § 52-595.’’ Accordingly, the court interpreted
the plaintiff’s reply as ‘‘making the argument that the statute of limitations is
tolled because of fraudulent concealment pursuant to . . . § 52-595 . . . .’’
On appeal, the defendants argue that the court erred in ‘‘interpret[ing]
[the plaintiff’s reply] as sufficiently pleading fraudulent concealment’’
because the plaintiff, in his reply and supporting memorandum of law, ‘‘did
not analyze [the] facts [of the case] under the three prong test for fraudulent
concealment.’’ The defendants, however, fail to cite any supporting authority
for their claim or advance a substantive legal or factual argument in support
of their contention that such an analysis is necessary to sufficiently plead
fraudulent concealment. ‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court
through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract asser-
tion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buhl, 321
Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016). Accordingly, because the defendants’
argument that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment
is inadequately briefed, we decline to review it.
19
See footnote 5 of this opinion.
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Curto v. Hartmann

necessary to establish his fraud and CUTPA causes of
action. We are not persuaded.
The court, in addressing the second element, found
that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff repeatedly reached out to the defen-
dants regarding the status of his repayment,’’ and ‘‘[t]he
defendants knew . . . that Hartmann [had] spent the
[funds] on matters unrelated to the [concert],’’ but the
defendants ‘‘intentionally concealed this fact from the
plaintiff by making false representations that Hartmann
[had] spent the money [on expenses] for the [canceled]
concert’’ and that ‘‘the defendants would reimburse the
plaintiff from an insurance policy payout . . . [or] pro-
ceeds from a subsequent [concert].’’ On the basis of
those findings, the court concluded that ‘‘the plaintiff
did not become aware of his cause[s] of action for fraud
[and CUTPA violations] until . . . April 27, 2018,’’
when he obtained the bank statement revealing Hart-
mann’s misappropriation of the funds and, thus, learned
that the foregoing representations by Hartmann had
been false.20 We agree with the trial court’s conclusion
that, contrary to the defendants’ claim on appeal, the
fact that the plaintiff had not received any presale ticket
20
As we stated previously, the court additionally found that the defendants’
‘‘two year delay’’ in providing the bank statement to the plaintiff ‘‘was
intended to, and did, obfuscate and delay the plaintiff from discovering [the]
fraud and CUTPA violations . . . .’’ On appeal, the defendants argue that,
because they owed no fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, the court ‘‘improperly
used [that] delay . . . as a basis for fraudulent concealment’’ because ‘‘[t]his
places a duty to disclose on the [defendants] that is barred by [our] case
law.’’ See, e.g., Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, supra, 207 Conn.
App. 751 (declining to hold that ‘‘violation of a contractual duty to disclose
in the absence of a fiduciary duty is sufficient to constitute fraudulent
concealment’’). The defendants’ argument, however, is misplaced because
it mischaracterizes the court’s memorandum of decision. The court’s finding
of fraudulent concealment in this case did not rely on the defendants’ mere
failure to notify the plaintiff of Hartmann’s fraud but, rather, the ‘‘affirmative
steps’’ taken by the defendants afterwards ‘‘to conceal that [fraud], as evi-
denced by [the defendants’ repeated misrepresentations to the plaintiff].’’
See Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, supra, 752 (in absence of
fiduciary duty, evidence of ‘‘additional fraudulent behavior’’ beyond mere
nondisclosure can toll statute of limitations pursuant to § 52-595).
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proceeds by the date of the scheduled concert, in and
of itself, was insufficient to demonstrate that the plain-
tiff was aware of actionable fraud and CUTPA claims
against the defendants. Although this may have pro-
vided the plaintiff with the facts necessary to establish
a cause of action for breach of contract, we cannot
conclude that it would have provided the plaintiff with
the facts necessary to establish his fraud and CUTPA
claims, which were predicated on Hartmann’s misap-
propriation of the loaned funds and his subsequent mis-
representations to the plaintiff. We further conclude,
on the basis of our thorough review of the record, that
the trial court’s findings were supported by sufficient
evidence. The court heard ample witness testimony
describing Hartmann’s repeated misrepresentations in
response to the plaintiff’s requests for repayment fol-
lowing the cancelation of the concert.21 Furthermore,
the plaintiff explicitly testified that he did not discover
21
Specifically, the plaintiff testified that he ‘‘requested [his] money back’’
shortly after the concert was canceled and told Hartmann that they could just
‘‘void the loan’’ if the defendants refunded the principal sum, but Hartmann
represented that he was unable to do so because he already had spent the
funds on expenses related to the canceled concert. The court also heard
testimony from Brian Mahoney, who, acting as the plaintiff’s agent, drafted
the loan agreement and served as a broker between the parties. Mahoney
testified that he also asked Hartmann about the status of the money owed
to the plaintiff, and Hartmann represented that ‘‘he spent all the [loaned
funds] on the [canceled concert],’’ that the defendants had ‘‘some kind of
insurance, which . . . should . . . [cover] the cost of the [canceled con-
cert],’’ and that the defendants ‘‘[were] going to reschedule the [concert].’’
Mahoney further testified that, when he followed up with Hartmann ‘‘months
. . . after’’ the cancelation of the concert, Hartmann again represented that
he ‘‘[does not] have the cash [to repay the plaintiff] right now but [the
defendants were] suing [their insurance carrier] and were going to get the
new [concert] scheduled as soon as [they could].’’
Finally, the court was presented with copies of emails between Mahoney
and Hartmann, which included a March 7, 2018 email in which Hartmann
himself stated that he had told the plaintiff that the ‘‘[loaned] funds [had
been] spent on advertising, staff, and entertainment’’ for the canceled concert
and that ‘‘[the defendants] have filled [out a claim] with [their] insurance
carrier’’ in order to get the proceeds to repay the plaintiff. As stated herein,
the court found, and the evidence supports, that neither representation
Hartmann admitted to making was truthful.
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that Hartmann’s numerous representations following
the cancelation of the concert were false, and that Hart-
mann in fact had misappropriated the loaned funds to
pay for his personal expenses, until he obtained the
bank statement in April, 2018.22
Accordingly, on the basis of our examination of the
trial court’s findings and the evidentiary record in sup-
port thereof, we conclude that the trial court correctly
found that the defendants intentionally concealed from
the plaintiff the facts necessary to establish his fraud
and CUTPA claims and that the court properly deter-
mined that the statutes of limitations were tolled by
the defendants’ fraudulent concealment.
II
Next, the defendants claim that the court abused its
discretion in awarding the plaintiff an excessive amount
of punitive damages under CUTPA. We disagree.
Pursuant to CUTPA, ‘‘[t]he court may, in its discre-
tion, award punitive damages and may provide such
equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper.’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 42-110g (a). ‘‘Awarding punitive damages
. . . under CUTPA is discretionary . . . and the exer-
cise of such discretion will not ordinarily be interfered
with on appeal unless the abuse is manifest or injustice
appears to have been done. . . . In order to award
punitive . . . damages, evidence must reveal a reck-
less indifference to the rights of others or an intentional
22
In addition, the court reasonably could have inferred from the emails
between Hartmann and Mahoney, and the plaintiff’s March 14, 2018 letter
of demand to the defendants, that, in March, 2018, sixteen months after the
concert had been canceled, the plaintiff still was unaware that Hartmann
had used the loaned funds on expenses unrelated to the concert and that
his representations regarding how the funds had been spent and a purported
insurance policy were not truthful. See, e.g., Falls Church Group, Ltd. v.
Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, 281 Conn. 84, 110, 912 A.2d 1019 (2007)
(in proving fraudulent concealment, ‘‘[p]roof by circumstantial evidence is
sufficient where rational minds could reasonably and logically draw the
necessary inferences’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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and wanton violation of those rights. . . . Awarding
punitive damages based on a multiple of a plaintiff’s
actual damages is a recognized method for determining
punitive damages under CUTPA. . . .
‘‘In determining whether a punitive damages award
pursuant to § 42-110g (a) is so excessive as to constitute
an abuse of discretion, we look to the factors that the
United States Supreme Court discussed in Exxon Ship-
ping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 503, 128 S. Ct. 2605,
171 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2008).’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Pointe Residential Builders
BH, LLC v. TMP Construction Group, LLC, 213 Conn.
App. 445, 461–62, 278 A.3d 505 (2022). Those factors
include, among others, ‘‘the degrees of relative blame-
worthiness, i.e., whether the defendant’s conduct was
reckless, intentional or malicious . . . whether the
wrongdoing was hard to detect . . . [and] whether the
. . . compensatory damages were small, providing a
low incentive to bring the action . . . .’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ulbrich v.
Groth, 310 Conn. 375, 454, 78 A.3d 76 (2013).
At the hearing in damages, the plaintiff’s counsel
requested that the court award $300,000 in punitive
damages under CUTPA, an amount equal to three times
the compensatory damages. In response, counsel for
the defendants argued that the defendants’ conduct did
not warrant an award of punitive damages. Specifically,
the defendants’ counsel noted that the bank statement
reveals that the defendants had made several payments,
totaling $19,701.72, on expenses related to ‘‘an actual
concert,’’23 which, according to counsel, demonstrated
23
As we stated previously in this opinion, the court found that Hartmann,
after receiving the plaintiff’s loaned funds in September, 2016, had used
$89,816.50 of the plaintiff’s $100,000 loan to make three payments, two to
his mortgage company and one to a construction company, for ‘‘expenses
wholly unrelated to the [concert].’’ We note for clarification that, on the
basis of our thorough review of the record, we do not interpret the argument
of the defendant’s counsel at the hearing in damages as claiming that the
defendants spent $19,701.72 of the plaintiff’s $100,000 loan on expenses
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Curto v. Hartmann

‘‘that [the defendants had] some intention to actually
[put on a concert and] pay back the plaintiff . . . even
if they [were not] honest about where the money would
go.’’ The court disagreed that punitive damages were
not warranted, emphasizing that ‘‘there was evidence
[that Hartmann] used [some of the loaned funds] for
his own [benefit] along the way, including paying his
mortgage off . . . and [then] lie[d] about insurance for
the [concert].’’ In other words, Hartmann had ‘‘cheated
[the plaintiff] out of that money and used it where it [was
not] supposed to be used . . . .’’ The court, however,
concluded that the proper base for its calculation of
punitive damages was $80,298.28, which was equal to
the plaintiff’s compensatory damages of $100,000 minus
the $19,701.72 that the defendants had put toward an
actual concert. The court then multiplied that base fig-
ure by three, resulting in approximately $240,894 in
punitive damages under CUTPA.
On appeal, the defendants argue that the amount of
the court’s punitive damages award was excessive, and
therefore an abuse of its discretion, because the factors
discussed previously in this section ‘‘favor a smaller
award in this case.’’ The defendants advance several
arguments in support of their claim, none of which we
find persuasive.
First, the defendants argue that ‘‘some of the [loaned]
funds went to legitimate concert expenses, showing a
true intent to arrange the concert,’’ thereby ‘‘mov[ing]
[the defendants’] conduct, and failure to repay [the
plaintiff], from malicious to reckless.’’ We do not agree
related to the concert. The record indicates that the total projected budget
of the concert was $300,000, and, thus, the plaintiff’s $100,000 loan only
partially funded the concert, with the remaining $200,000 to be funded by
the defendants themselves and/or by third parties other than the plaintiff.
Accordingly, on our review of the record, we interpret counsel’s accounting
of the defendants’ expenditures, which the plaintiff did not challenge, as
claiming that, out of the entire $300,000 budget for the concert, a total of
$19,701.72 had gone toward expenses related to an actual concert.
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with the defendants’ interpretation of the evidence,24
and, even if we had, it would provide no basis to con-
clude that the court’s award of punitive damages was
excessive. We reiterate that the specific conduct that
the court found to have violated CUTPA, and, therefore,
the factual predicate for its award of punitive damages,
was Hartmann’s misappropriation of the funds, cou-
pled with his subsequent misrepresentations to the
plaintiff to conceal that fraud. Thus, the court’s award of
punitive damages was not predicated on the defendants’
intent, or lack thereof, in entering the loan agreement,
but, rather, the fact that Hartmann, irrespective of his
initial intent, subsequently used a significant portion of
the loaned funds for his personal expenses in deroga-
tion of the loan agreement.25

Next, the defendants argue that ‘‘[their] wrongdoing
was not hard to detect’’ because the plaintiff had loaned
the funds pursuant to a written agreement, and, there-
fore, ‘‘the funds were not taken surreptitiously’’ and
‘‘[t]he [plaintiff] was always going to become aware
[that] his funds were taken and not returned.’’ This
argument merits little discussion. As stated herein, the
violation of CUTPA, and, thus, the court’s award of
punitive damages, was predicated on Hartmann’s sur-
reptitious misappropriation of the loaned funds for his
own benefit and his subsequent ‘‘deceptive acts’’ which
were intended to, and did, prevent the plaintiff from
24
We are not convinced that a few concert related transactions totaling
$19,701.72, which amounts to a mere 7 percent of the $300,000 total budget
for the scheduled concert, evinces the defendants’ genuine intent to put on
an actual concert. Moreover, the defendants fail to meaningfully explain
how Hartmann’s knowing misappropriation of 80 percent of the plaintiff’s
loaned funds for his own benefit was reckless, rather than malicious, merely
because he had not misappropriated all of the funds allocated for the concert.
25
Indeed, the basis of the court’s award of punitive damages—Hartmann’s
misappropriation of the funds—is plainly evident from the fact that the
court expressly excluded from its calculation the amount of money that the
defendants had spent on expenses related to an actual concert.
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Curto v. Hartmann

becoming aware that his money had been taken and
would not be returned.

Finally, the defendants, without citation to any sup-
porting authority, argue that the amount of the court’s
punitive damages award was excessive because the
compensatory damages award was ‘‘already a signifi-
cant amount . . . .’’ As we stated previously, ‘‘[a]ward-
ing punitive damages based on a multiple of a plaintiff’s
actual damages is a recognized method for determining
punitive damages under CUTPA’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) Pointe Residential Builders BH, LLC
v. TMP Construction Group, LLC, supra, 213 Conn.
App. 461; and our Supreme Court has upheld punitive
damage awards that were calculated in a manner consis-
tent with the method used by the court in the present
case. See, e.g., Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 310 Conn. 456
(court did not abuse its discretion in awarding punitive
damages under CUTPA equal to three times compensa-
tory damages); Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273
Conn. 478, 486, 871 A.3d 981 (2005) (same).

Under the circumstances of the present case, we can-
not conclude that the court’s award of punitive damages
constituted an abuse of its discretion. Rather, we con-
clude that the trial court reasonably could have con-
cluded that the defendants’ conduct, which included
Hartmann’s knowing misappropriation of the loaned
funds for his own benefit almost immediately after they
were deposited into his account, together with the fact
that Hartmann, for a period of almost two years there-
after, repeatedly engaged in ‘‘deceptive acts’’ intended
to conceal his fraud and delay the plaintiff from pursu-
ing legal action, warranted the amount of the award.
See Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 310 Conn. 456. Accordingly,
we conclude that the amount of the trial court’s punitive
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damages award did not constitute an abuse of its discre-
tion.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.