Begley v. State

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Begley v. State

TIMOTHY BEGLEY v. STATE
OF CONNECTICUT ET AL.
(AC 47188)
Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff state police trooper appealed from the trial court’s judgment
for the defendant R following the granting of R’s motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that R had transferred
the plaintiff from his job in a certain work unit in retaliation for having filed
a report three years earlier about another officer’s sexual harassment of a
female officer. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded that
no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he had established
a prima facie case of retaliation. Held:

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for R, as the plaintiff
failed to establish a factual basis connecting R to the alleged retaliatory
transfer, in that it was undisputed that R did not see the report until his
deposition in this matter, that the plaintiff had not discussed the report with
R or had any dealings at all with R, and the plaintiff’s assertion that retaliatory
animus on the part R could be inferred from an order that was given to
another police unit to stop cooperating with the plaintiff’s work unit was
merely speculative, the plaintiff having presented no evidence that it was
the defendant, rather than another supervisor, who gave the order or that
the plaintiff was the target of the alleged retaliatory animus.

Argued June 4—officially released September 2, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for alleged employment
discrimination, and for other relief, brought to the Supe-
rior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where
Stavros Mellekas was added as a defendant; thereafter,
the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial ref-
eree, granted in part the defendants’ motion for sum-
mary judgment; subsequently, the action was with-
drawn in part as against the defendant James Rovella;
judgment for the named defendant et al., from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Lewis H. Chimes, for the appellant (plaintiff).
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Begley v. State

Laura Vitale, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (defendant James Rovella).
Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The plaintiff, Timothy Begley, appeals
from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court
in favor of the defendant James Rovella1 on his claim
alleging that he was transferred in retaliation for filing
a report of another police officer’s sexual harassment
of a female officer in violation of General Statutes § 46a-
60 (b) (4).2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the
defendant because it improperly concluded that no gen-
uine issue of material fact existed as to whether he had
established a prima facie case of retaliation. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.3
The record before the trial court,4 viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party,
1
The state of Connecticut and Stavros Mellekas also are defendants in
this action but are not parties to this appeal. We therefore refer in this
opinion to Rovella as the defendant.
2
General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be a
discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . .(4) [f]or any . . .
employer . . . to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any
person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment
practice . . . has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding
under section 46a-82, 46a-83 or 46a-84 . . . .’’
3
Because we agree that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether he had established a prima facie
case of retaliation, we do not reach his additional claim that the trial court
erred in concluding that he also failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether the defendant’s proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for transferring him was pretextual.
4
At oral argument, counsel for the defendant alerted this court that several
pages of deposition transcripts that were included in the plaintiff’s appellate
brief were not presented to the trial court in opposition to summary judg-
ment. Counsel for the plaintiff thereafter sent correspondence to this court,
explaining: ‘‘On appeal, as [the plaintiff’s] counsel was setting out the facts
and arguments for the [a]ppellate [b]rief, counsel realized the error. The
[a]ppellate [b]rief was largely identical to the statement of facts in the
[o]bjection to [s]ummary [j]udgment, but the proper page references were
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Begley v. State

reveals the following facts and procedural history. The
plaintiff began his employment as a state trooper with
the Connecticut State Police in 2001. The state police
is a division of the Department of Emergency Services
and Public Protection (department). In 2013, the plain-
tiff was promoted to the position of sergeant and began
working in that capacity in the Connecticut Intelligence
Center (intelligence center) of the Counter Terrorism
Unit of the state police in 2015.5

In February, 2016, the plaintiff received a report that
Steven Citta, a detective with the Hartford Police Depart-
ment (Hartford police) who was assigned to work in
the intelligence center as a regional intelligence liaison
officer and reported directly to the plaintiff, had behaved
in a sexually inappropriate manner. At that time, the
plaintiff reported directly to Lieutenant Shawn Corey,
made in the [plaintiff’s] [b]rief, and the proper deposition pages were
attached. In the [a]ppellate [a]ppendix, both the original erroneous deposi-
tion pages cited in [the] [p]laintiff’s [o]bjection to [s]ummary [j]udgment
for those depositions, as well as the proper deposition pages cited in the
[a]ppellate [b]rief were included in the [plaintiff’s] [a]ppendix. All the evi-
dence cited by [the plaintiff] in [his] objection to summary judgment brief
accurately reflected the actual deposition testimony, despite the erroneous
page citations and attached deposition pages.’’
Our review of the record confirms that the plaintiff submitted in the
appendix of his appellate brief evidence that he did not submit to the trial
court in opposition to summary judgment. Of course, this court cannot, when
assessing the propriety of a summary judgment ruling, consider evidence
that was not before the trial court. See Solon v. Slater, 345 Conn. 794, 814
n.9, 287 A.3d 574 (2023). Because the plaintiff did not conform the materials
in his appellate appendix to the evidence submitted to the trial court, this
court was left with the task of determining which of the 575 pages of the
appellate appendix were before the trial court. Although ‘‘[i]t is not the role
of this court to scour the record in search of support for a party’s claim on
appeal’’; Weaver v. Sena, 199 Conn. App. 852, 866, 238 A.3d 103 (2020); we
nevertheless have carefully reviewed all the evidence submitted to the trial
court on summary judgment.
5
At that time, there were two other units in the Counter Terrorism Unit,
namely, the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the Critical Infrastructure Pro-
tection Unit. We refer to the units collectively as the intelligence center for
ease of reading.
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Begley v. State

who was the commanding officer of the intelligence
center. Corey reported to Major Michael Darcy, the
commander of special investigations. On March 3, 2016,
at the direction of Corey and Darcy, the plaintiff filed
a report of Citta’s conduct with the department’s Equal
Employment Opportunity Office (report).
Citta thereafter was removed from the intelligence
center and sent back to work with the Hartford police.
The plaintiff did not make the decision, or have any
input in the decision, to transfer Citta back to the Hart-
ford police. The plaintiff did not communicate with
anybody else at the Hartford police regarding the inci-
dent involving Citta. Upon Citta’s return to the Hartford
police, he was assigned to its Capitol City Crime Center
(crime center unit).6 Citta and another officer at the
crime center unit stopped sending certain information
to the intelligence center. Citta indicated to a fellow
officer that he made the decision not to share informa-
tion with the intelligence center until the plaintiff and
Corey were removed from the intelligence center, but
that was his own decision and he could not make that
decision for other officers in the crime center unit. Citta
had a discussion with Trooper Shawn Benoit regarding
‘‘what was happening with the complaint and everything
going on’’ and stated that he told Benoit that ‘‘everything
that’s being handled is being handled at the top,’’ mean-
ing ‘‘[his] supervisors and . . . [his] command staff,’’
consisting of the defendant and ‘‘the other deputy chiefs
and everybody in the place at the time.’’
At that time, the defendant was the chief of the Hart-
ford police. The report was not sent to the defendant,
and he did not see it until he was deposed in this case.
The plaintiff did not have any communications with the
6
According to the plaintiff’s second amended complaint, the crime center
unit was a ‘‘newly formed intelligence unit [that] . . . would have to work
collaboratively with . . . [the intelligence center].’’
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Begley v. State

defendant regarding the report; nor did he have any
other dealings with the defendant. The defendant
learned from the deputy chief of the Hartford police,
Brian Foley, that there was an investigation regarding
Citta’s conduct. The defendant did not speak to Citta
regarding his transfer back to the Hartford police.
In September, 2016, the investigation into the incident
involving Citta was completed, and it was determined
that the allegations in the report could not be substanti-
ated because neither of the two officers who reported
the incident to the plaintiff, nor the alleged victim, were
willing to participate in the investigation or give a state-
ment. Shortly thereafter, Darcy met with the defendant
and gave the defendant a copy of the report of the
findings of the investigation and discussed with him
the lapse of information sharing between the crime
center unit and the intelligence center. The defendant
subsequently instructed Foley that ‘‘there should be no
lapse in intelligence sharing between [the crime center
unit] and [the intelligence center].’’
The defendant left the Hartford police in February,
2018. In February 2019, the defendant was confirmed
as the commissioner of the department. On March 14,
2019, the plaintiff was transferred from the intelligence
center to Troop H in Hartford where he was assigned
to work the midnight shift.
The plaintiff initiated the present action against, inter
alia, the defendant,7 claiming that his transfer out of
7
In count one of his operative second amended complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that the state and the defendant violated § 46a-60 (b) (4) by transfer-
ring him out of the intelligence center. In count two, the plaintiff alleged
that the state, the defendant, and Colonel Stavros Mellekas of the state
police violated § 46a-60 (b) (4) by refusing to promote him to lieutenant
and imposing a two day suspension that was excessive and unsupported
by evidence and state police policies. In count three, the plaintiff alleged
that the state failed to promote him and imposed a two day suspension in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a).
All of the defendants moved for summary judgment as to all three counts
of the plaintiff’s complaint. The trial court denied summary judgment as to
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Begley v. State

the intelligence center in March, 2019, was retaliatory,
pursuant to § 46a-60 (b) (4), for his filing of the report
in 2016.
On April 17, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff
had failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation
and that, even if he had, there existed legitimate, nonre-
taliatory reasons for the plaintiff’s transfer, and the
plaintiff could not establish that the articulated reasons
were a pretext for unlawful retaliation. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any
causal connection between the plaintiff’s filing of the
report and his transfer three years later. The defendant
further argued that the plaintiff was transferred ‘‘due
to operational need as part of a reorganization.’’ Along
with his memorandum of law in support of his motion,
the defendant submitted several exhibits for the court’s
consideration.
The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, arguing that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether there was
a causal connection between his filing of the report and
his transfer. He argued that the lapse of three years
between the two events does not defeat a causal con-
nection because the defendant was not in a position to
retaliate against the plaintiff until shortly before the
plaintiff’s transfer. The plaintiff further argued that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the defendant’s claim that he was transferred for man-
power reasons stemming from reorganization was pre-
textual. Like the defendant, the plaintiff submitted sev-
eral exhibits in support of his position.8
counts two and three. The plaintiff filed a motion for permission to file
an interlocutory appeal, which the court denied. The plaintiff thereafter
withdrew the second count of his complaint as to the defendant only, thereby
disposing of all claims against the defendant, in order to proceed with this
appeal. See Practice Book §§ 61-3 and 61-4.
8
The defendant thereafter filed a reply brief. The defendant also moved
to strike several of the plaintiff’s exhibits. The trial court indicated to counsel
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Begley v. State

On November 15, 2023, following a hearing at which
the trial court heard argument from counsel,9 the court
issued a memorandum of decision granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant as to count one
alleging retaliation. The court concluded, inter alia:
‘‘There is a lack of evidence of a temporal or logical
connection between the plaintiff’s protected activity
and the adverse employment action.’’10
The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to reargue and
for reconsideration on the grounds that ‘‘[t]he court
misapplied the legal standard for providing retaliatory
motive under the Fair Employment Practices Act [Gen-
eral Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.] and state and federal
Supreme Court precedent, ignored or failed to consider
much of the plaintiff’s evidence, impermissibly invaded
the province of the jury by improperly weighing the
evidence, made credibility determinations and failed to
consider all permissive inferences in a manner favor-
able to the plaintiff in its determination that no genuine
that it would consider the defendant’s motion to strike certain of the exhibits
submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment simultaneously
with the motion for and objection to summary judgment. The court indicated
in its decision: ‘‘The [defendant] filed a motion to strike certain evidence
submitted with the plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment, on the
grounds that the items were not admissible evidence. See Docket Entry
#172. The court did not utilize these contested items in ruling on this motion;
consequently, it was not necessary to make a determination as to their
admissibility.’’ In arguing that the court ‘‘erroneously disregarded the plain-
tiff’s summary judgment exhibits that had been the subject of the defendant’s
motion to strike,’’ the plaintiff neither identifies those exhibits, why they
should not have been disregarded nor how he was harmed by the court’s
decision not to consider them.
9
Following oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff filed a supplemental response to the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on August 14, 2023, and the defendant filed a reply memoran-
dum of law on August 28, 2023.
10
The trial court also concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant’s
proffered reason for the plaintiff’s transfer was pretextual. As previously
noted, we do not reach the plaintiff’s challenge to this conclusion. See
footnote 3 of this opinion.
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issues of material fact existed [as to the plaintiff’s claim
that his transfer was retaliation by the defendant for
the plaintiff’s filing of the report].’’ Following a hearing,
the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to reargue but
denied the relief requested in his motion. This appeal
followed.
We begin by setting forth the following applicable
legal principles. ‘‘The standards governing our review
of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary
judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49]
provides that summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion
for summary judgment, the trial court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has
the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
[of] material facts which, under applicable principles
of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter
of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must
provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) DiPietro v. Farmington
Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107, 115–16, 49 A.3d 951
(2012). The standard of review of a trial court’s decision
granting a motion for summary judgment is plenary.
Id., 116.
‘‘[T]ypically [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires
a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence
outside the pleadings from which material facts alleged
in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred. . . .
Moreover, [t]o establish the existence of a material fact,
it is not enough for the party opposing summary judg-
ment merely to assert the existence of a disputed issue.
. . . Such assertions are insufficient regardless of
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Begley v. State

whether they are contained in a complaint or a brief.
. . . Further, unadmitted allegations in the pleadings
do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine
issue as to any material fact. . . . Mere statements of
legal conclusions . . . and bald assertions, without
more, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
fact capable of defeating summary judgment.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v.
Westport, 108 Conn. App. 710, 721–22, 950 A.2d 19
(2008).
‘‘[I]t [is] incumbent upon the party opposing summary
judgment to establish a factual predicate from which
it can be determined, as a matter of law, that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. . . . [M]aterial facts are
those that will make a difference in the case, and they
must be pleaded.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Martinez v. Premier Maintenance,
Inc., 185 Conn. App. 425, 455, 197 A.3d 919 (2018).
‘‘[A] party may not rely on mere speculation or conjec-
ture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a
motion for summary judgment. . . . A party opposing
a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its
adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue
of material fact together with the evidence disclosing
the existence of such an issue.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 456. ‘‘A mere assertion of fact in
the affidavit of the party opposing summary judgment
is not enough to establish the existence of a material
fact that, by itself, defeats a claim for summary judg-
ment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 451.
‘‘The standard applicable to the plaintiff’s claim of
. . . retaliation is the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine11
model of analysis. . . . Under this framework, the
11
See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56,
101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802–804, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
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Begley v. State

plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case, then
the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employ-
ment decision. . . . Once the defendant offers a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the plaintiff has
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the proffered reason is pretextual.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; footnote in original; footnote omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Lassen v. Hartford, 223 Conn.
App. 285, 290–91, 308 A.3d 564 (2024).
The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred when
it determined that no genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether he had failed to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation in that he had not presented
any evidence demonstrating a causal connection
between his filing of the report and his transfer out of
the intelligence center three years later.12 We are not
persuaded.
‘‘To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plain-
tiff must show (1) that he participated in a protected
activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected
activity; (3) an adverse employment action against him;
and (4) a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 290–91 n.5. Implicit in the
requirement that the plaintiff show a causal connection
between his participation in a protected activity and the
alleged adverse action is a showing that the defendant
knew or was otherwise aware that the plaintiff had
engaged in that protected activity. See, e.g., Forestier
v. Bridgeport, 223 Conn. App. 298, 319, 308 A.3d 102
(2024).
12
The plaintiff claims that ‘‘[t]he court did not appear to read or review [his]
exhibits’’ and ‘‘ignored much of the relevant factual detail and supporting
arguments submitted by the plaintiff.’’ Our review of the record reveals no
basis for these claims.
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Begley v. State

‘‘[P]roof of causation can be shown either: (1) indi-
rectly, by showing that the protected activity was fol-
lowed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through
other circumstantial evidence such as disparate treat-
ment of fellow employees who engaged in similar con-
duct; or (2) directly, through evidence of retaliatory
animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ayantola v. Board
of Trustees of Technical Colleges, 116 Conn. App. 531,
539, 976 A.2d 784 (2009).
‘‘Since the court, in deciding a motion for summary
judgment, is not to resolve issues of fact, its determina-
tion of whether the circumstances giv[e] rise to an infer-
ence of discrimination must be a determination of
whether the proffered admissible evidence shows cir-
cumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational
finder of fact to infer a discriminatory motive. . . . In
the absence of any affirmative evidence of a causal
connection between [the defendant’s] discriminatory
animus toward the plaintiff and the defendant’s [alleged
adverse action], no inference of the defendant’s discrim-
inatory intent can be made.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. Premier Mainte-
nance, Inc., supra, 185 Conn. App. 449–50.
The plaintiff argues that he presented direct evidence
of causation by demonstrating the defendant’s retalia-
tory animus toward the plaintiff in that ‘‘[the defendant]
directed [the crime center unit] to stop sharing evidence
with [the intelligence center] until [the plaintiff] was
transferred from [the intelligence center] or apolo-
gized.’’ The plaintiff’s argument fails for the following
reasons.
First, the plaintiff has failed to establish a factual
basis connecting the defendant to the alleged retalia-
tion. The plaintiff asserts that ‘‘[i]mmediately after Cit-
ta’s removal from [the intelligence center] . . . [the
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Begley v. State

crime center unit] . . . immediately stopped sharing
information with . . . [the intelligence center].’’ Citta
was transferred from the intelligence center on March 3,
2016. Although the defendant learned of Citta’s transfer
from Foley in March, 2016, the undisputed evidence
demonstrates that the defendant did not see the report
until he was deposed in this case.13 As noted herein, it
is undisputed that the plaintiff did not discuss the report
with the defendant or anybody else at the Hartford
police, nor did the plaintiff have any dealings at all
with the defendant. After the investigation into Citta’s
conduct was completed in September, 2016, the defen-
dant received a copy of the report of the investigation
from Darcy. Although that report listed the plaintiff as
the complainant, there is no evidentiary basis on which
a reasonable fact finder could infer that the defendant
knew before September, 2016, that the plaintiff had
filed the report. Therefore, there also is no evidentiary
basis on which one could infer that any alleged retalia-
tion that occurred immediately following Citta’s trans-
fer in March, 2016, could be attributed to the defendant.
See Mele v. Hartford, 270 Conn. 751, 778, 855 A.2d
196 (2004) (discrimination complaint dismissed where
insufficient evidence to prove that plaintiff had exer-
cised rights under Workers’ Compensation Act, General
13
In support of his argument that the defendant ‘‘had knowledge of [the
plaintiff’s] protected conduct,’’ the plaintiff cited, in his memorandum of
law in opposition to summary judgment, an excerpt of the defendant’s
deposition testimony wherein he purportedly testified that he had received
a copy of the report in March, 2016, which allegedly caused the defendant
to retaliate by directing the Hartford police to cease sharing information
with the intelligence center. The pages cited by the plaintiff, however, do
not support the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant received a copy of
the report filed by the plaintiff in March, 2016. The testimony cited by the
plaintiff refers to the report of the completed investigation of the incident
involving Citta, which was provided to the defendant by Darcy in September,
2016. The defendant submitted excerpts of the defendant’s deposition testi-
mony wherein the defendant testified that he did not see the report until
he was deposed in this case. The plaintiff has not cited to any evidence
disputing that testimony.
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14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Begley v. State

Statutes § 31-275 et seq., and that defendants knew that
she had exercised those rights and discriminated
against her based on that knowledge); Knoblaugh v.
Marshall, 64 Conn. App. 32, 38, 779 A.2d 218 (plaintiff
failed to meet burden of proving that defendant violated
General Statutes § 31-290a of Workers’ Compensation
Act where defendant was unaware of her intention to
exercise rights under that act), cert. denied, 258 Conn.
916, 782 A.2d 1243 (2001).
The plaintiff likewise has failed to demonstrate that
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
the defendant directed the crime center unit to stop
sharing information with the intelligence center. The
defendant testified that neither he nor anybody else ‘‘in
the executive team of the [Hartford police] ever [told]
Citta that . . . [the crime center unit] was not going
to cooperate with [the intelligence center] until there
were new people in command at the organization.’’ The
defendant testified that he ‘‘spoke with . . . Foley and
instructed him that there should be no lapse in intelli-
gence sharing between [the crime center unit] and [the
intelligence center].’’ The plaintiff argues that Citta
stated that the crime center unit’s refusal to share infor-
mation with the intelligence center after his removal
came from ‘‘the top,’’ and ‘‘[w]hen [Citta] referenced
‘the top’ he was referring to [the defendant].’’ In so
arguing, the plaintiff mischaracterizes the evidence in
the record. Citta testified that the decisions involving
his investigation and whether to discontinue sharing
information with the intelligence center were being han-
dled ‘‘at the top . . . it’s my supervisors and it’s my
command staff.’’ When asked whether ‘‘the top’’ was
the defendant, Citta responded, ‘‘yeah, [the defendant]
and . . . the other deputy chiefs and everybody in the
place at the time.’’14 Although Citta included the defen-
dant in his reference to ‘‘the top,’’ the plaintiff presented
14
In his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff asserts that, ‘‘on August 16,
2016, Citta explicitly also told . . . Trooper [Benoit] that he was under
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Begley v. State

no evidence that it was the defendant, versus the other
deputy chiefs or any of Citta’s other supervisors or
command staff, who directed him to stop sharing infor-
mation with the intelligence center.15 The plaintiff’s
assertion that it was the defendant who gave the order
to stop cooperating with the intelligence center is based
merely on speculation, which is insufficient to create
an issue of fact to defeat summary judgment.16
Even if the plaintiff had demonstrated that a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant
ordered the crime center unit to stop cooperating with
the intelligence center, that fact is immaterial to the
plaintiff’s burden to prove retaliatory animus by the
defendant toward the plaintiff. The plaintiff has failed
to identify any evidence that the alleged retaliatory ani-
mus that may be inferred by the lack of cooperation
with the intelligence center following Citta’s removal
was targeted at the plaintiff versus the intelligence cen-
ter. This is particularly evident in light of the undisputed
facts that the plaintiff filed the report at the direction
of Corey and Darcy and that the plaintiff had no role
in the decision to transfer Citta back to the Hartford
police.17
orders from [the defendant] not to cooperate with [the intelligence center]
until he received a written apology or command staff changed.’’ He then
cites to a memo sent to him by Benoit regarding a conversation that Benoit
had with Citta. The plaintiff’s citation to the trial court record is ‘‘Pl. Ex.
16.’’ That memo is not plaintiff’s exhibit 16. Our review of the record reveals
that that memo was not submitted to the trial court. Moreover, we have
reviewed that memo, which the plaintiff improperly included in the appendix
to his principal appellate brief, and it makes no mention of the defendant.
15
Indeed, Citta also indicated that it was his decision that he, himself,
would not share information with the intelligence center and that he could
not make that decision for his unit.
16
The plaintiff also argues that ‘‘[a] reasonable fact finder could infer
retaliatory intent from the subsequent threats and warnings that were given
to [him] not to pursue his claims and grievances.’’ The plaintiff has failed
to provide any evidence that these alleged threats and warnings came from
or were directed by the defendant.
17
The plaintiff also argues that the defendant demonstrated retaliatory
animus when he refused to replace Citta after he was transferred back to
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16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Begley v. State

Although we are mindful that questions of causal
connection and the existence of retaliatory animus are
ordinarily issues of fact best determined by the fact
finder, the plaintiff, on summary judgment, must at least
proffer some factual predicate grounded in evidence
rather than mere assertions based on speculation and
conjecture to establish the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Here, the plaintiff has failed to do so.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

the Hartford police. Again, even if this were true, it is immaterial to the
issue of whether the defendant demonstrated retaliatory animus toward
the plaintiff.